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John Cochrane on Free Markets & Economic Growth and the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level – EP214

Professor John Cochrane of the Hoover Institution discusses the importance of free markets for economic growth and highlights stagnating growth as the biggest economic issue of our time. John talks about what may be his next book, “Free to Grow,” which aims to update Milton and Rose Friedman’s “Free to Choose” for today’s world. After John speaks, show host Gene Tunny interviews him about his views on growth and his controversial Fiscal Theory of the Price Level. This is a recording of a live event at the Centre for Independent Studies in Sydney on 26 September 2023. 

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About Professor John Cochrane

John H. Cochrane is the Rose-Marie and Jack Anderson Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution. He is also a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research and an adjunct scholar of the CATO Institute. 

Before joining Hoover, Cochrane was a Professor of Finance at the University of Chicago’s Booth School of Business, and earlier at its Economics Department. Cochrane earned a bachelor’s degree in physics at MIT and his PhD in economics at the University of California at Berkeley. He was a junior staff economist on the Council of Economic Advisers (1982–83).

For more on John, check out his bio here:

https://www.hoover.org/profiles/john-h-cochrane

What’s covered in EP214

  • 00:03:36 Importance of economic growth.
  • 00:16:06 Incentives drive productivity and growth.
  • 00:17:12 Regulation hinders economic growth.
  • 00:22:59 Fixing problems requires better solutions.
  • 00:28:53 Fixing social programs by embracing free markets.
  • 00:39:28 Regulatory state causing innovation slowdown.
  • 00:46:24 Free market healthcare benefits the poor in John’s view.
  • 00:48:47 Fiscal Theory of the Price Level: Inflation caused by government debt.
  • 00:53:56 Avoid old left-right division.
  • 01:05:21 Government debt may lead to a sovereign debt crisis.

Links relevant to the conversation

Video of the Free to Grow event on YouTube:

CIS web post about the Free to Grow event:

https://www.cis.org.au/event/free-to-grow-unlocking-economic-prosperity/

Transcript: John Cochrane on Free Markets & Economic Growth and the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level – EP214

N.B. This is a lightly edited version of a transcript originally created using the AI application otter.ai. It was then looked at by a human, Tim Hughes from Adept Economics, who did his best to decipher some tricky dialogue that otters understandably missed. It may not be 100 percent accurate, but should be pretty close. If you’d like to quote from it, please check the quoted segment in the recording.

Gene Tunny  00:03

Yeah, John has written this immense book. It’s fascinating. I’ve picked it up but then I discovered I had to buy three more books to be able to, to interpret it. But it’s it is it’s, it’s terrific.

John Cochrane  00:17

Get past, past, just ignore the chapters to the equations and get to the fun stuff…

Gene Tunny  00:26

I’m getting through it!

Welcome to the Economics Explored podcast, a frank and fearless exploration of important economic issues. I’m your host Gene Tunny. I’m a professional economist and former Australian Treasury official. The aim of this show is to help you better understand the big economic issues affecting all our lives. We do this by considering the theory, evidence and by hearing a wide range of views. I’m delighted that you can join me for this episode, please check out the show notes for relevant information. Now on to the show.

Hello, thanks for tuning in to the show. In late September, renowned US economist Professor John Cochrane spoke at the Centre for Independent Studies in Sydney. I’m an adjunct Fellow at CIS and I was lucky enough to interview John after his talk, and I also moderated the Q&A session. John is usually based at the Hoover Institution at Stanford, but he was visiting Australia and New Zealand to attend conferences held by the central banks of both countries. The theme of the event that CIS held was “Free to Grow”. John emphasised the importance of free markets for economic growth, and how stagnating growth is the big issue of our time in his view. After his talk, which I’m replaying entirely because it’s so good, I asked John about his views on economic growth and about his controversial fiscal theory of the price level. So stay listening to hear what he says about that. If you’d like to watch the video version of the CIS event, it’s available on YouTube. And I’ll put a link to it in the show notes. I’ve edited the audio so it’s a bit shorter. But if you’d like to hear the whole thing, including a great introduction of John by the CEO of CIS Tom Switzer, then check out the video, I’d be interested in what you think about what either John or I have to say in this episode. So please get in touch. Contact details are in the show notes. Okay, let’s get into the episode. I hope you enjoy it.

John Cochrane  02:24

Thank you. Thanks, it truly is a pleasure to be here. You may ask why, why do I visit central banks rather than just coming to talk to you? The answer is because central banks pay business class, you know, you know who pay, who prints the money. So I want to tell you a little bit about a project that I’m on. I call it Free To Grow. I hope it’s the next book, you’ll notice the allusion to Free To Choose. But Free to Choose was nearly 50 years ago. And it’s time to update it for today’s world and today’s problems. And it really amounts to I’ve been blogging and writing op eds, and so forth for about 15 years now. It’s time to put all that together in one place, which I discovered is not as simple as copy paste. Because you copy paste and you get immense amounts, it means copy, paste and boil down. And that’s much much harder than I thought. So part of that process is to come to talk to people like you where I have to boil it down, because after half an hour, you’re gonna fall asleep. And we can’t go on and on too far. So thank you for coming. What is the most important economic issue of, you know, facing us or the globe or anyone else? Is it climate change, inequality, unemployment, recession? The answer is none of the above, long term growth, the one that nobody talks about now, to get you to think about growth, why it’s a problem and why we need to do something about it. Let me ask you another quiz question. When was the best economy ever? Now a lot of my left wing friends, they’ll point ah the 1950s were just wonderful because, you know, the economy was growing and middle class jobs and so forth. 1950 the average American income was $15,000 in real terms, today it is $60,000. 15 versus 60. Which do you want? It’s not even close. The absolute best economy ever, in all of human history is right now. by a long shot, unless you want 15 versus 60. Now gee, this is GDP per capita and it evokes yawns, but I want to get you excited about it. GDP per capita is not just about more stuff. It’s about first of all better stuff. That household in the 1950 at a tiny house badly insulated, terrible cars that rusted immediately. One maybe black and white TV, health care. You know, they they all smoke. But you know most things you know if you got cancer in 1950 well, they you know, it’s cheap and then they’ll send in the priest. GDP per capita is health, environment, education, culture, defence, social programmes or any hope of repaying government debt, GDP per capita, that people look down on it, but it correlates with everything else. I’m trying to appeal to the progressives in the audience, which might be a few, but we nonetheless, we have to listen. You want to eliminate extreme, you know, extreme poverty, health, child mortality, clean water, all of those things are just collapsing the number of people who live in extreme poverty around the globe is is fallen dramatically. Child mortality what our ancestors even 100 150 years ago, many of their children died. And as a father and grandfather, I cannot imagine that heartbreak that’s just practically unknown, that comes from GDP that comes from economic growth that comes from it’s all part of it. Even you know, things like parks and a clean environment that that all cool, you have to be able to avoid that stuff. One of the things I find most shocking is the new degrowth movement. A lot of the climate movement will admit that it’s really not about the climate, it’s about an excuse to stop growth, and go back to some idea of the farm. These people have never been on an actual farm, say in India, and had to go get the water by hand first thing every morning. It’s just and it’s also annoys me because how much how much does the world economy have to grow before everyone can enjoy the standard of living of say, a social justice activist who likes to fly private jets to Davos we got along great growth before that, for that can happen. GDP is actually a vast undercount. People say, Oh, it doesn’t include, you know, parks and so forth. But it’s a vast undercount of how much better off we are now than than in the past. Among other things, it’s you know, it’s at market prices, it doesn’t count willingness to pay. If you remember, your your economics, the willingness to pay is always much greater than the market price, we get Google Maps for free, that’s worth a lot GDP counts it as nothing, and no medicines, medicines may be expensive. But if you’re about to die, you’d be willing to pay a whole lot more than that $10,000 it costs. A lot of our progressive friends worry about, oh, you know, we’ll run we can’t keep growing forever. That’s wrong. GDP is not just more stuff. First of all, we keep forecasting the end of resources, and it keeps not happening. But where we’re going GDP is the value of things, it’s producing valuable things for your fellow citizens. You know, it’s it’s funny, they say, oh, it’s immoral to go make a profit, you should go do social justice, the most moral thing you can do is to get up in the morning work hard for your fellow citizens. And and and they pay you for it, which shows you how valuable it is to them. But what we are doing, you know, where we’re going is the services economy, the economy of the future, the GDP of the future, will be for example, health, it will be the ability to to live longer and to conquer diseases and to live happier that that doesn’t take a lot of materials. Now I emphasised across time 15,000 in … from like 1,000 in the 1800s 15,0oo in the 1950s, 60,000 today, this is just an enormous increase in prosperity. Let’s look across countries. What’s the economic problem for India? Should they worry about recession? Should they worry about inequality? Well, their income is 2000. Our income is 60,000. The number one question for India is how to be more like us. That’s just orders of magnitude more important. Even China’s only only 20,000. This swamps these kinds of numbers 15 to 60, 2,000 to 60,000, that swamps every other economic issue. A recession is maybe a fall of 2 to 5%. We’re talking orders of magnitude. Climate is as you know, in the news, let’s just take the IPCC reports that say this will cost us 5% of GDP in 100 years, 5% of GDP versus, you know, doubling tripling, quadrupling, the process of growth. India $2,000 plus or minus 5%, or $2,000 to $60,000. And this is just the swamps, that that kind of issue. Now the question is, will this continue? As long as we’re thinking climate change and the economy of 100 years from now, instead of 5%? better off, will growth continue at say 2% a year? Well, then it’s 200% better in 100 years or three times better than today? If it was 4%, we would be five times better than today. That’s Those are big numbers two times better than today four times better than today or just like today that the the end of growth. So the question I see for Western society is will that continue? And the danger is the creeping stagnation, but it may not continue. The US from 1950 to 2000 grew per capita three and a half percent a year. Since 2000. It’s been 2%. We’re cutting the growth rate nearly in half. And the US as much as I will bemoan it is doing better than everywhere else, except maybe Australia, you guys are catching up. But Italy, my favourite country to go visit stopped growing in in 20, in 2010, just a disaster, Europe, Europe is falling behind, the UK, mother country to us both the UK is half as well off as the US in GDP per capita. And it’s just it’s stagnating and going nowhere, you know, half again, I’m going to I’m going to pick on climate, not because climate isn’t important, but just to get a sense of proportionality of what’s important relative to other things, the crisis of climate change 5% of GDP in 100 years, relative to doubling the UK GDP per capita, if they could just be like the US, you know, so climate change is, you know, that UK versus us is 10 times worse than the damage of climate change, we should be paying attention to long term growth and that and that convergence. So for us, the issue is is stagnating growth, and if it keeps going whether our children and grandchildren will experience what we did relative to our grandparents, of course, for for India, for China, for Africa, the ability to live lives like we do in 100 years, rather than be stuck in grinding poverty forever. That is the most important issue. So where does growth come from? Productivity. In the end, it’s all about what can each person produce per hour. It’s about supply. It’s about efficiency. It’s not about stimulus demand, central banks sending money out. It’s not about it’s not about unions. So why are why are we all wealthy? Because our grant, say your grandfather likely worked in a mine. And it’s 1890 and kaboom with a pick? Did Did we get richer because unions made the profits of the mine go to the worker, and now he gets, you know, 50 cents an hour rather than 25 cents an hour at the pick? No, it’s because now the mine is run with some enormous machine. And everybody else moved to the city and got nice jobs like we have. It’s about productivity. In turn, it’s actually, something is really stuck in our in our policy discussion. It’s always 1933. It’s jobs. It’s stimulus. No, Keynes is dead. We’re stuck with the long run. And the long run is about growth and supply. Where does productivity come from? In the end ideas, ideas, not just products and inventions, the you know, the iPhone, we all we all understand that’s an idea. But the little ideas of how to run businesses better. My my favourites is I spent a lot of time Southwest Airlines if you ever travel in the US, they figured out how to board an aeroplane in 10 minutes, United still takes us 30 minutes because we’re all going there fighting for the overhead bins then you swim upstream to check your bags. That is productivity growth. 10 minutes to board a plane versus 30 minutes to board a plane. Every little thing, you know old fashioned businesses like steel, steel I just found out in the US is is cut by at least in half how many man hours it takes to make us a tonne of steel, the yields on boring things like wheat, are just boom, boom, boom up every year. That’s the slow improvements in how do we do things. So it’s ideas. And ideas are very tricky, economically the crucial event and I’m gonna say something that you probably won’t like. The crucial thing about an idea is that it’s what we call non rival, its intellectual property. iPhone property, real property if you use, take my iPhone, I can’t use it anymore. If you take my wonderful recipe for spaghetti alla Puttanesca I can still use it. It doesn’t hurt me at all for you as you use it. Now, why are we all upset about intellectual property? Intellectual property, Once created, should be used by everybody immediately and then we’re all more productively. Why are we so upset about intellectual property? Well, you do need the incentive to create it. But you only need the incentive to create it. It’s it’s tricky that way. Universities you know, my business is creating intellectual property and giving it away for free. That is the good thing. Now that leads you to say, well, we should subsidise research. We should subsidise new ideas. No, no, no, don’t jump to that fact many of my growth theory economist jumped to you know, subsidised research. That’s the answer to producing new ideas. The problem is and let me tell you for sure because I work in a university. It is very easy to subsidise terrible ideas. You know in In the past, there used to be theology departments, whatever, I don’t know what you think religiously, but that doesn’t improve productivity. Now, it’s called departments of intersectional studies, which is the same thing. But it does not lead to productivity gains is what what matters with us whether you want, it is easy to fill academic journals with BS. So we need ideas. And for us, we need new ideas and better ideas. It’s much easier for China, India and Africa, because the ideas are there, they just need to copy. The only reason, the only reason India is not as productive as the US is they don’t do things the way the US does. Their technology, their productivity is not as high, which is a whole bunch of things, education, legal system, management, all the rest of it, but they don’t have to invent anything new. They just have to copy ideas, and it’s not going to hurt us, for them them to copy them. Ideas need to be embodied. So ideas, not just ideas, lots of inventions that are that they need to be embodied, usually a new products, new businesses, new ways of doing things. So they need incentives. And that is, I don’t really call it free market economy, economics, I call it incentive economics. That is the one thing we have to offer. Nobody else pays attention to incentives. Our job is to pay you need the incentives to take those ideas and implement them in new products, new businesses, and every step is hard. We think of growth as 2%. For years just gonna happen. No, every one of those 2% is is is is hard work to do things a little better, and to upset the established order. The problem is, every step is disruptive. So think about Uber and taxis. Easy example, Uber comes in, obviously better, right? We get cheaper rides, cars get used, people get employment opportunities, part time work, and who hates it? The taxi companies. Now I don’t know what happened here. But what happened in the US is just an unholy mess. The taxi companies had been protected forever. They, they they don’t like it. Nobody, don’t count on businesses to be for free markets, businesses hate free markets. Businesses want protection from competition and an easy life. And that’s the problem. This process of productivity enhancement has to be embodied in new businesses that disrupt the existing order. So all of regulation is designed to stop growth. Think of economic regulation, what does economic regulation do? By and large, it says I protect you from competition from him in order to keep the existing way of things going. A lot of it is about transfers, I’m going to take money from you and give to him but we’re going to do it very inefficiently by making you charge by forcing you to charge a higher prices. This regulation is designed to stop growth, not to get it going to preserve jobs, businesses always of doing things. Why? Because we live in democracies. Democracies are responsive to the needs of their citizens. And when the citizens come come screaming to stop competition and preserve my way of life. Democracies give them what they want good and hard as HL Mencken used to say, My ancestor I have an ancestor who came from Germany to the US and he came to the US. They hated Germans at the time, he went to New York, didn’t speak English. He wrote back come to America, the streets are paved with gold. Why? They were in a business they they made furniture and they wanted to move into pianos. But the guilds in Germany didn’t like this. There’s no damn guilds here stopping us from doing what we want to do. That’s what it needs. So why how do we how do we get around that? Well, we have property rights. We have rule of law, the institutions that protect our ability to innovate and and to and to cause problems for the existing people. So why are we stagnating? In my view, the answer is simple. We got people we got ideas, we’ve got entrepreneurial spirit, we have abundant investment capital, we just can’t get the permits. Now my notes say US regulatory nightmare insert horror stories. And you can we have all heard horror stories of regulation gumming up the works of doing things. Good ideas include public institutions. Now I’m I’m a good libertarian with lots of adjectives in front and one is a rule of law in libertarian. Property lights a rule of law and efficient legal system, that the the prep protections against depredation against the ability of your neighbours to go and demand competition that’s really important. And we see that good institutions are one of the most important things to get into growth, that’s why. So how can we get going growth again? Well, let’s we gotta fix the all the sand in the gears that’s getting in the wing. Can this help? There is a strain of thought and economics that says we have just run out of ideas. That’s the end of that, you know, growth is bound to end. I don’t think that’s true. But let’s let’s fix what we can, we can look and see lots of sand in the gears and we can certainly improve the level and, and I think we can do an enormous amount. When you look across countries, the GDP per capita from the Central African Republic, which is about 200, to India, 2000, China, about 20,000. UK about 40,000 US 60,000. There’s a very strong correlation between our incomes and ease of doing business index rule of law index, those kinds of institutional indices, so we know what’s good. What’s amazing is is how big the effect is, from 200 to 60,000, is really just institutions that my favourite is the my colleague, Chad Jones has a textbook on growth theory. And the cover is is a picture of Korea from a satellite, North Korea dark South Korea light. Now, now the good Lord has given us a controlled experiment, I’m sorry for the people of North Korea, but you want same background, same culture, same language, same everything. In fact, North Korea was the wealthier part in before the for the war, you want a controlled experiment on what government can do, it’s just amazing that it can do so much damage. But But there it is, for you, well, continue that regression line, the ease of doing business index puts the US at 82, 100 is possible. 100 just means the best observable everywhere, as I run that regression line out that puts the US 400% higher than it is today. Well, that seems possible that that is I think, a struggle. So how do we do? Erm fixed regulation sounds, you know, like pie in the sky. And the bulk of what I have to offer is, you know, concrete ideas of how we do it. The problem is, here’s there’s a political problem, stimulus is so attractive, stimulus is, ah, I the great politician will give you money and this will float all around, say yay give me, write me a check. Fixing things is a reform effort. And every market is screwed up in its own way with a bunch of vested interests, I call it what we need is the Marie Kondo approach to our public life. You can’t just stimulus, you can’t just go down and buy a lot of containers. You got to fix the sock drawer, and then the underwear drawer and my god the garage is waiting for us the tax code?.Well, that’s the way it is, you know, you have to know where you’re going and and, and start that reform effort. So I want to give you some examples. You’re not going to get in the next 10 minutes programme for everything, but it is the Marie Kondo approach. How can we get out though of the debate, you can see there’s sort of stuck. And I, what I’ve been thinking about mostly is I don’t want to call it out of the box, because that’s so trite, but a way beyond sort of the standard left right dilemma. And I think that’s right, I think there is an answer to air, to most of our problems, that is not just one or the other side more of this. What do you have to do first? Many regulations actually have some reason to them. So understand why, but then do a better job of what they’re doing. One important exercise is what’s the question? As you look at policies, most are answers in search of a question. My favourite being like tax the rich, it’s always tax the rich, but why keeps changing over the time? Well, let’s get the question. And then we can find a better answer. Regulation, regulation is not more versus less. Regulation is better, worse versus worse, well crafted versus not well crafted, full of unintended consequences and bad incentives or not. The the game is to fix, not just more or less, that’s harder. Another important principle, think of the overall incentives, the overall system, not just parts in isolation. And above all, think about the incentives. No one else is thinking about the incentives. It’s politics is just about taking from you giving to him. Nobody’s thinking about the incentives. If you think about the incentives, you’re away from the political wrangling about about who gets what. So for example, let’s think about let me start with an easy one, taxes. What should we do about taxes? Well, what’s the question? If the question is raise revenue for the government with minimal damage to the economy? I said the question once you say the question, the answer is very simple. That the answer to that question is eliminate income taxes, corporate taxes, state taxes, taxes on rates of return, basically just a flat sales tax on absolutely everything. That raises the most revenue for the government with with least cost and and now the objection what’s what’s wrong with that? First objection is, wait a minute, that’s gonna be like a 50% tax rate. Yeah. If GDP if if The government spending 50% of GDP, the tax rate average tax rate is going to be 50%. And if you don’t like that, you need to spend less. The it’s the same tax rate now it’s just raised in a different way. What we do now is we, we put it in lots of different places, so people don’t know. But the idea is simple. What about inequality? Well, number one, get the rich at the Porsche dealer. If you have a flat sales tax, you’re gonna get them you’re just gonna get them at the Porsche dealer, not when when they make the money, and it’s vastly simple. But what about inequality? Oh, you mean that wasn’t the question? The problem with our tax code is it’s trying to do and this is the US, by the way, I should say, I don’t know anything about Australia, and I hate Americans who wander around the world telling other people what they should do. So but I’m gonna seem parochial as a result, because all my stories about America, we’re trying to do 15 things. We’re trying to raise revenue, we’re trying to transfer income, we’re trying to subsidise all sorts of stuff, like my neighbour in Palo Alto lives in a $5 million house got 7500 bucks from the government for his new Tesla. That’s nice. We’re trying to and we’re trying to subsidise all sorts of things off budget without actually, you know, we’re taxing and spending without taxing spending? Well, you’re trying to do too many things. No wonder you get a mess. Let’s separate these. So the way I’d like to do it is let’s put all of that stuff on budget as expenditures. The flat taxes said, Oh, it’s not progressive. But what is the taxes don’t matter. What matters is the whole system. If we raise money efficiently with a flat tax, and then spend checks to whoever you want to spend, the whole system can be as progressive as you want. And as progressive as the voters will like, or as less progressive as you want. But it doesn’t matter. There’s this focus on each one individually, no, look at the whole system. And that can be as progressive as you want. And that you know, but if you put it on budget, then it’s up to the voters. I’m gonna follow principle, I got nothing to say about transfers, all I got to say about is incentives. And I want the lowest possible marginal rates, with the highest possible revenue for the government, that fixes the incentives, how high those rates are? up to you how much you want to spend, how much gets transferred up to the voters? how much they’re happy to do. Let me talk about social programmes. We are in the US at least, we’re running 5 to 7% of GDP structural deficits. And here come the retirement of the baby boomers. That’s our that’s our debt problem. Well, here’s a classic of left versus right. Right, oh, we gotta cut social programmes, we’re gonna go bankrupt. Left, you heartless whatever, you’re gonna throw grandma from the back of the train, how can you do that? How can we break out of this one? Let’s look at incentives. What’s the real problem with American social programmes. The real problem is not how much money we spend. The real problem is the disastrous incentives and it’s incentives that the programmes all put together. You take the average American between zero and $60,000. They if they earn an extra dollar in legal income, they lose $1 of benefits. And that’s on average, there’s many cliffs where you earn $1 And you lose all your health insurance. Make sure not to earn that extra dollar. If you have, if you have affordable housing with an income limit, earn an extra dollar, you lose your house, people are very smart, they respond to incentives. The other problem we have is that low income Americans basically don’t work. The labour force participation is just catastrophically low. Well, duh, why don’t they work? Because if they earn extra, do you want to cheer after me? If you earn an extra dollar, you lose $1 of benefits. So why don’t we work on fixing the disincentives of social programmes? What will happen then, what will happen is more people work, so they won’t need so much social programmes just save money, you’ll help people who actually need help much more effectively. And you reduce the cycle of poverty and dysfunction in a lot of our neighbourhoods. How can we do that? Well, one of the most important ways is that the problem comes from all programmes together. It’s the the food stamps you it’s only like a 50% implicit tax rate. But if you add the food stamps, the Social Security, the low the earned income tax credit, the the low income bus pass, that actually exists, I mean, all the things that are income limited, you put those together, so why don’t we put those all together instead of having 15, 150 actually different different programmes, remove the cliffs. One of the most crazy things in the US if you get another dollar of income, we lower your benefits. If you go get out and get another programme that gives you another dollar of transfers. We don’t lower your benefits. Well we can fix these things. Control the disincentives. Banking, oh boy. banking regulations. This is a classic one of disincentives. And there’s we have we’re in we’ve just done this again. We’re in this cycle of, the crisis comes, bail everybody out, promised to fix it. It doesn’t work. Great. Run comes again, bail everybody out. Again, this is a ne.., this is an important one because there’s remember the little old lady who swallowed the fly, just swallowed the spider to catch the fly and so on and so forth. This is when you think about how things got bad is not just dumb people. It’s smart people patching up a dumb system. And that’s what happened a run happens. What do you do? You got to bail out the creditors to stop the runs. Now you have moral hazard. A bailout deposit insurance is like giving your uncle Luigi your credit card on his way to Las Vegas. That’s what we economists call moral hazard. So we write rules, okay, no double down on 16. No spinning double black or whatever. Luigi figures out, I have an Italian family so I get to use this. Luigi figures out and goes to the craps table and next thing you know you got another crisis. We have the answer. It’s it’s a sensible thing. But now it’s it’s it’s falling apart we have the answer, which is was put in place 1992 but it requires tearing the whole system down and starting from scratch. And that’s the hard part, the answer, by the way is banks should get their money by issuing stock. And then deposits should just flow into flow into trade. It’s called narrow banking. It’s been around since the 1930s. There’s a lot of money people making money in the current system. Housing, you have a housing problem, we have a housing problem, let them build. And I’m only beginning, health, oh boy, healthcare. This one always causes me problems. But I got to tell you so healthcare in the US is one of the most dysfunctional things around. It’s actually possibly worse than socialised health care. Fully private health care can work. Now here and in 30 seconds, I’m not gonna give you the programme. But health is a complex personal service. It’s like lawyering, accounting, architecture, construction, aeroplane pilots, car repair. It’s a complex personal service, all of those we leave to the free market, there is no reason that healthcare can’t be left to the free market as well. And then a brutally competitive market can give us better service and lower prices. Oh my goodness, I haven’t even gotten to horrible publication, public education, labour laws, occupational licencing laws, immigration restrictions, regulatory barriers, lawsuits, prevailing wage, domestic content rolls, the sand in the productivity gears. What are we gonna do? Well, that’s it, those are all out there. But you can see the general principle can, can be used to fix all those if we want to, you know, free, free markets is still a vital way to fix today’s problems. And that’s just today’s economy. Well, you know, new ideas are also the the sand in the gears is there too. You know, there’s a possibility of factory built mini nuclear power plants. Why don’t we have those in the US? Because the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has not licenced a single new plant since 1975. AI, we live in a moment of a spectacular technological advance. It’s like Gutenberg. It’s potentially like like Gutenberg’s movable press. And immediately what do people want to do? Run to Washington to regulate it. And where’s this, it’s not just coming from fear the robots will take over. There’s a strong demand to regulate it because this is information. We are we’re living at the outbreak of the technical censor the censorship state, and boy, oh boy who has control over ChatGPT3, has control over politics, especially biology I see great advances in biology, better health, longevity, that what we’re learning about about the fundamentals of life is fantastic. But good luck getting FDA approval, or increasingly politicised research funding. So let me summarise here we can’t just bemoan, there’s a tendency among us free marketers to have a beer and just say, Oh, how dumb Why are their zoning zoning laws are so dumb, they’re stopping that. But if you understand where they came from, and what the disincentives are, I think you have a better chance of fixing you have to understand where they came from. That patchwork the old lady and the fly, how to how to ask the right questions, to get the answer. You have to examine the whole system, you have to examine the incentives. And you have to make your opponents state the question. And then often there’s a very simple answer. And then they go duh, that wasn’t the question I asked. It’s okay, now we’ll have a better conversation. There’s a way to do this. Economists are quite a bit at fault, my fellow economists. What you’re taught in economics school, is how to look at every problem, diagnose some failure of the hypothetical totally free market, and then advocate new rules that the benevolent omniscient planner will do to fix the problem. But we don’t live in a free market. When you see a problem. Look first, not at a hypothetical failure of some free market look for the regulation that caused the problem, as you can see with zoning and housing, it’s not a failure of the market, it’s regulatory. Now I have to close on a optimistic note. You know, people often tell me, Oh, if only we could get leaders who will listen, They all believe in democracy. How does this happen? Things things will get better when the average person understands how it works and votes for sensible policy. I know a lot of politicians, they, by and large, understand perfectly well how things work. And they understand they won’t get voted in office for it. So when the average person sees, you know, when the average person sees too high house prices, and says, Well, why don’t we let people build more houses, you’ll get politicians who understand that. So really, the way things work is there’s leaders, there’s the chattering classes around them, and there’s the vast amount of sensible voters around that. If you operate in the world of ideas, then the politics will follow. And that’s why institutions like this one exist, we exist to help the ideas that then will make their way into policy. The idea that you can just whisper into the into the great emperors ear, that’s not how a democracy works. And thank goodness, that’s the way our society works. Okay, thank you.

Gene Tunny  36:19

Okay, we’ll take a short break here for a word from our sponsor.

Female speaker  36:24

If you need to crunch the numbers, then get in touch with Adept Economics. We offer you frank and fearless economic analysis and advice. We can help you with funding submissions, cost benefit analysis studies and economic modelling of all sorts. Our head office is in Brisbane, Australia, but we work all over the world. You can get in touch via our website, http://www.adepteconomics.com.au. We’d love to hear from you.

Gene Tunny  36:54

Now back to the show.

36:59

John, thank you. And now it’s time for our Q&A session with our friend and colleague leading proceedings, Gene Tunny is director of Adept Economics in Brisbane. And he’s the author of a recent CIS publication that I’d encourage you to read, Debunking Degrowth. Gene Tunny, over to you Gene.

Gene Tunny  37:17

Thanks, Tom. And thank you, John, for that excellent lecture. That was terrific. John, I’d like to start with this idea of the age of stagnation or the risk of stagnation. And it seems like you’re attributing that to government, I’d like to understand what evidence there is behind that. So we’ve, if you believe the people on the left, we’ve had an age of neoliberalism, we had the reforms of Thatcher and Reagan and in this country, we had Hawke and Keating and then Howard. And there’s an argument that we’ve deregulated too much. But you would push back on that, could you tell us a bit more about why you’re so confident, it’s it’s government regulation that is driving that slowdown?

John Cochrane  37:55

You got an alternative for me? I mean, just look out the window, and you know, try to run a business and and see how hard it is to get anything done. So Reagan and Thatcher were great, but they just scratched the surface. They sort of talked about deregulation, but you know, how many federal agencies did Reagan actually get rid of? You know? So there was a little bit of a pause. But the regulatory state just kept adding more and more. And I see it’s a larger issue, not just of the size of regulation, but the nature of it, our public institutions in the US are fraying. I actually am a free marketer, I look back with nostalgia at the era of regulation. And by which I mean, when our regulatory agencies had rules and cost benefit analysis and public comment and proper procedures. Now, it’s just an executive order and a Dear Colleague letter, you know, and so that that’s in many ways worse as an example. Also, it’s getting more and more politicised. I was shocked. So you may or may not know what’s going on. There was a case, Missouri v Biden that revealed what was happening the censorship of the internet during the COVID era, and went unremarked. The Biden administration was simply threatening businesses like Twitter, we’ll close you down. We’ll send the EEOC, the NLRB, the EPA, you know, this alphabet soup of agents, we’ll send them after you. But by saying that, you know, you see right there, it’s taken for granted. This isn’t rules. This isn’t law. This is just we arbitrary power to close things down. So I see the regulatory state getting bigger, the the legal system in the US, you know, you can’t get anything built because you’re gonna get years of environmental suits. And it’s part of sort of the scorched earth politics. That may not be the answer to the question you wanted, but that’s what I see.

Gene Tunny  39:45

No that’s okay, I just wanted to ask because the the alternative view is that there has been that slowdown in the rate of innovation that you mentioned the the Robert Gordon thesis of the rise and fall of American growth. I think it’s, yeah to me, it seems like a difficult thing to be able to prove one way or another,

John Cochrane  40:02

It is no, what you’re asking me is not just my view but what I think of those views. Yeah. So these views, we got to take this seriously. Gordon basically said, our growth was an SJ thing, it was a one time thing, we learned to use fossil fuels. And that’s over, just, you know, that the possibilities are over. And there is evidence, you know, it’s taking more and more in resource, find an invention. But in part, that’s always been the case. So there’s a great study of the steam engine, steam engines invented, it wasn’t, you know, 18, if you’ve been to the museum’s, it wasn’t like the final steam engines 100 years of making it better and better, and it gets harder and harder to harder to make it better. And we’re kind of running out of ways to make steam engines better. And then someone invents the diesel engine, and then someone invents the aeroplane. So I think we’ve been in a period of sort of, there was a new invention, we kind of work and all that, and you’re waiting for the next new thing to come, which I think is potentially biology or AI. So just wait. But who knows, you know that that’s a possibility. We but we also know, the regulatory state is causing tremendous problems. So you know, maybe we can only raise GDP by a factor of four, before we run in, run out of ideas, factor four will be pretty good. And to let India and Africa have our way, know how to do things the way that will be pretty good, too. And if 200 years from now, that’s where we plateau. Okay, we’re done.

Gene Tunny  41:20

What do you think the risks are with? With AI? I mean, there’s a lot of potential there with biotech is that is the risk that we’re going to be too timid, that we’re going to over regulate, because of the precautionary principle, for example, how do you see that? And what alternative would you offer? What, would you have a principle that you could apply for there?

John Cochrane  41:38

The last big thing on the internet was was, you know, social media sorts of things and Google, and then they’ve been kind of looking for what, I live in Silicon Valley, they’ve been looking for what to do for 10 years. And I talked, everybody wanted crypto for a while that was kind of going nowhere. Not that kind of hard. But the old tech companies have turned into regulatory regulated utilities with remarkable speed. And I worry that this, this is really a demand for the new stuff to do that I don’t, the idea of the robots will take over. They’ve been worrying about that since 1850. I think just technically, that’s silly is just complete sentences, it completes your sentences. Don’t worry about that taking over. I think the demand for regulation is the demand to control the flow of information that we get, and we’re worried about tech is there’s no monopoly that doesn’t get enforced by the government that lasts very long. People say tech’s a monopoly? Oh, yeah, Netscape, AOL, Yahoo, they got that one wrapped up, don’t they? And the same thing is happening to the big tech tech companies now. So the demand I think, really is the danger is the danger of the surveillance state. And, and so, you know, there’s you can see the political demand for regulation, and people like to keep their profits up. So that’s the demand for regulation. Not that the robots are gonna come get us.

Gene Tunny  42:57

Okay. I’d like to ask, again about, well about government. And you mentioned the, the Marie Kondo approach to fixing government and if I remember Marie Kondo correctly, it’s you pick up an item and if it doesn’t bring you joy, you toss it out. Are there parts of the government that don’t bring you joy, that you would toss out?

John Cochrane  43:16

I think the converse of that question is going to be harder or easier to answer. Yes. What what do I like about the government? I think the US is vastly underfunded the legal system, that it takes years to get to get something through the courts is just a shame. That’s part of public infrastructure. You know, where roads, bridges and efficient courts. So that’s why as much as I hate lawyers, and environmental suits and all the rest of it, nonetheless, that’s, you know, that’s a part of the work that we can have some public infrastructure there. Is there anything else that we actually like? What do we like in the government?

Gene Tunny  43:54

That’s okay.

John Cochrane  43:56

Sorry? Yeah, National Defence. That’s a big inefficiency that we put up with. Thank you. It is remarkable. I’m a good libertarian and free marketer, that the military is so efficient at what it does. I mean, it’s a big inefficient waste, but that it actually wins wars is pretty amazing. You know, given given the structure that they’re really amazing people.

Gene Tunny  44:17

Okay. John I’d like to ask about health care, for example, and you’re a proponent of free market, in health care. A lot of the other advanced economies or most of them would have large public health care systems. And the concern is that if you have the free market in health care, there’d be some people that would miss out, they’d be left behind, there’d be people who couldn’t afford it, people who wouldn’t be insured. How do you deal with that objection given, if you look at the US system, US life expectancy is significantly lower than other advanced economies. How would you cope with that objection? How do you, I know it’s difficult to unscramble from where we are and you do have regulation intervention already, but how would you deal with that, that objection?

John Cochrane  45:01

Yeah the US already has a public health system that’s just a remarkably inefficient one. So most of the population is on some sort of government thing, whether it’s Obamacare or federal employees, and the US, you know, in other countries they say, You’re we’re paying taxes, you’re gonna pay some taxes to pay for his health care. In the US, the government says, well, we don’t want to tax and spend instead you business are going to provide her health care, and is that any different than taxing and spending? But then we have this horrible system of cross subsidies, which is what kills the competition? You know what, so government doesn’t want to pay that much. So we say, well, you hospital, you have to provide free health care, and the hospital says fine where are we making up the difference? Well, we’ll let you overcharge everybody else. Okay, but now you can’t have any competition. That’s where the whole homeless comes from. Now, now the left behind issue. So US life expectancy is lower. That’s because we shoot each other. And we and we do a lot of bad drugs. But US life expectancy, if you have cancer, it’s a whole lot better than anywhere else in the world. So it’s horrendously expensive, but but not that bad. You know, the poor people have cars and houses and lots of things, they don’t get great health care, by the way, anywhere in the world. Everywhere in the world, rich people have ways of getting really good quality health care, and we sort of have a fig leaf that that everybody else is, is getting great stuff. So I don’t see that free market health care, because it’s going to be so much more competitive, so much more cost effective. I think it’s gonna serve poor people, poor people, you know, have money just like anybody else. They’ll they’ll buy health insurance and it’ll be cost effective. And, and I don’t mind subsidising it. So you want a subsidy, so we can have transfers, I said, do you know all the transfers you want? I just I’m gonna give you a voucher, you can have a voucher for 5000 bucks, 10,000 bucks here, I don’t care what it is. Go buy your health care on a brutally competitive insurance and healthcare market. You’re going to come great because you got a $10,000 voucher.

Gene Tunny  47:00

Okay, okay. Might be good to ask, go to the audience soon. ButI’ve got one more question…

John Cochrane  47:04

I’ll try to shorten up my answers. Stop asking such good questions.

Gene Tunny  47:08

No, I’ve got one more question about your fiscal theory the price level, which is, yeah John’s written this immense book. It’s fascinating. I’ve picked it up. But then I discovered I had to buy three more books to be able to, to interpret it. But it’s it is it’s, it’s it’s terrific…

John Cochrane  47:27

Get past the, past, just ignore the chapters of the equations and get to the fun stuff…

Gene Tunny  47:31

I’m getting through it. But John, how do you distinguish this from, say, the Milton Friedman view that inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon, you’ve got a fiscal theory of the price level. We look at what happened during the pandemic, when we had this massive monetary expansion in the Western world and in Australia and the United States, UK. And then we see the inflation following that. And we think, Well, this is what Milton Friedman was telling us. But you’ve got a theory of inflation that is different. You’re saying it’s to do with fiscal policy with government debt? What do you say about Friedman’s theory and how is yours different how does yours add to it or reject Friedman?

John Cochrane  48:08

That’s not a question that’s gonna get you a short answer. 600 page book in 30 seconds, here we come! The fiscal theory of the price level says that where does inflation come from fundamentally? It comes from more government debt than people think can be repaid by future taxes. Government debts and assets just like stocks and bonds. If you think the stock doesn’t have is not doesn’t have any dividends coming, what do you do you try to sell the stock the price goes down. If you hold government debt, and you think, you know, these guys are never gonna pay this off. What do you do? You try to get rid of the government debt? How do you do that? You try to buy stuff to try to sell the government debt, but we can’t all sell it. The only the you know, what is if we try to sell the government debt, we buy stuff, prices go up. That’s where inflation comes from. Now, what about Milton Friedman? I love Milton Friedman. Milton Friedman was 99% right. Wrong about one little thing. So Friedman, he said money causes inflation, not total government debt. Now, how do we agree and disagree? Suppose you take $5 trillion of money and hand it out from helicopters, as Milton said, that’s gonna cause inflation. I agree, because money is one form of government debt. And when you drop money from helicopters, you’re telling people here’s debt, we have no intention of paying this off with future taxes. So we agree that is, it’s an expansion of government debt is money that finances a deficit. But suppose the government drops $5 trillion of money from helicopters. And simultaneously the government burglars come and take $5 trillion of treasury bills out of your safe, you have no more wealth, you have lots more money, but we took away your treasury bills. Now monetarism would say that causes exactly the same inflation as just giving you the debt. And I say ah ah ah, what counts is overall amount of government liabilities and as proof, yes, in the pandemic, the government did drop a lot of money and debt on everyone and got inflation. It was financing huge deficits. That was a fiscal expansion. The government also did $5 trillion of giving you money and taking back debt. That was called quantitative easing. And what did that do? Nothing. So 5 trillion in quantitative easing designed to increase inflation, absolutely no effect whatsoever. 5 trillion of deficits, which could have been money could have been debt, 5 trillion deficits, we got inflation. That’s actually Episode One for the fiscal theory.

Gene Tunny  50:27

Okay. Thanks, John. That explains it better to me for sure.

John Cochrane  50:31

And Milton was great. Now many not that many episodes of money causing inflation, and they were almost all governments printing money to, to cover deficits. So we agree on all those episodes.

Gene Tunny  50:43

Very good. Okay, Tom, should we open up to the floor for questions? And question I’m going to enforce the questions must be questions rule. Gigi Foster?

John Cochrane  50:54

I welcome speeches. Short speeches.

Gigi Foster  50:56

I’m Gigi Foster. I’m a professor of economics at UNSW, one of our local universities. And thank you so much for your lovely talk, which I will be trying to get somehow for my students, hopefully CIS will make that possible. So I really agree with you know, 99%, of what you said. But towards the end, I thought maybe your optimism about being able to fix this through democratic processes may be a little bit overstated. And my worry is that what we have now is this sclerotic mess in not just in government, but in organisations as well, including universities. And it is sustained by poor incentives on the part of the people in the state and the bureaucracies that are not accountable, and the politicians themselves who are career incentives. And what we face is a situation similar to what Kafka saw, similar to what we had in the USSR before it fell. And we know that how those bureaucracies end is they they either have wars that defeat them, or they come crashing down under the weight of their own inefficiency. And right now, our democratic mechanisms are not very strong. A few elections, sometimes, to me, it’s just not a strong enough force. So I’ve been advocating for a lot of direct democratic revival in the resistance and restoration movement here in Australia. And I wanted to know what you thought about the need for that. And if we don’t think it’s necessary, how is this going to come to pass?

John Cochrane  52:08

In the past, democracies, especially actually, small countries, who seem better able to do it than the US are capable of reform. Even the US we’ve had a social security reform, we had a tax reform there, you know, historically, we’ve been able to fix things. I worry as you do, that the institutions are fraying that we are we are in the US having, the government is so powerful, that it’s worth scorched earth tactics, to destroy the institutions to grab power for the next round, because then you get control of the Justice Department, the surveillance state, the taxes and all the rest of it. There is a limited government allows you to lose elections and go lick your wounds and try again. So and I, I’ll be a little political here. I think our big, one of our biggest challenges is we face a political religious movement on the far progressive left, that is understood the march through the institutions. It’s a small fraction of popular opinion, but they know they grabbed the educational institutions, they grabbed the bureaucracies they grabbed the philanthropies, they have the universities, they have the institutions of civil society in their grasp. And they are profoundly undemocratic. They they are, they call themselves save our democracy, but they are Maoist in their in their policies and that and with the fraying of institutions, and the rise of a technical surveillance state, that, you know, that is a genuine threat to democracy and growth. So I was trying to close optimistically, I’m making your point. I am, you know, very worried about that, and our freedom to have events like this.

Gene Tunny  53:47

Righto, Peter Tulip, at the back and then over here… Thank you, Chief Economist at CIS, yes.

Peter Tulip  53:54

Thank you. I’d like to ask about you’re talking about avoiding the left right division, that a lot of the regulations you want to get rid of have a strong constituency within the economics profession. But that’s not true of all of them. There are some views and in particular, free trade, or housing policy, you mentioned where left wing economists, like Jason Furman or Paul Krugman, have almost exactly the same agenda, as you do. But the general public is on a different planet. And part of that is that the public just doesn’t trust market forces. I was wondering if you have views, how do we prosecute those other issues where economists across the spectrum agree, and we’re against the general public?

John Cochrane  54:43

Boy, that’s a hard one, by the way, Econ profession is in many cases very interested also. You know, how do you get consult like health economists, you know, they live to consult for the for the big health either, they’re not gonna say free market. They live to provide advice and benevolent dictators, they tend to be pro regulation as well. How do we get, boy, basic education on basic things that support the institute? I get to think about that one and come back after another question, but because those are fairly straightforward, and of course, the far left doesn’t believe in the far right doesn’t either. You know, Trump has 25% tariffs on everybody. In fact, I was so disappointed in California. There’s a there’s now a yimby movement where progressive lefties they’re saying, You know what, I get it. The only way to bring down housing prices is let people build housing and market rate housing, not just government subsidised housing. And instantly the Republican Party said, no, no, no, no, we must have zoning control and local local. Don’t Don’t count on the right to be free market either.

Gene Tunny  55:56

Over here, and then we’ll go over here. Yes, if you could just…

Michael Potter 55:59

Yes, Michael Potter. So I just wanted to ask about you mentioned I think a when you were talking about health care that the US system is actually worse than a socialised system was just wondering if you could expand or develop on that idea. Why is the system which is sort of partly free market and partly regulated or socialised, why is that actually worse than a fully socialised system?

John Cochrane  56:23

Well in part I was making a joke. But you know, what, there’s a couple of original sins in US healthcare, and one of them is this idea that we’re going to do, we’re not going to tax and spend, we’re going to do it by forced cross subsidies. Because if you tax and spend, you can still have a competitive system. When you do it by forced cross subsidies, you you have to stop competition, and then just the price just explodes. So, you know, we have better health care than most places, but we pay we have twice as good health care at five times the price. And actually, you know, there is this issue, what do you do about poor people? And I said, vouchers is one way to do it another way is, let’s just, if you want it, you know, deal with the homeless people shouldn’t die in the gutter, why don’t we pass some taxes and give them whatever health care you think is a compassionate society deserves the least fortunate. And then the rest of us can be left to the mercies of the free market. And one of the crazy things is that my health care insurance has to be so screwed up, just because to provide health care to the bottom 5% of the homeless person in the gutter, that’s silly. You know, we, we need, you know, I can still go to a private hotel. And we don’t, you know, we don’t we don’t try to socialise that in order to solve the homeless problem. So there is, you know, I assume a government provided system all one in is pretty horrendously inefficient. But a system a crony capitalist system can be as efficient as a, as a well run, government provided system. And I’ll say it I would be for taxing and spending, you know, one way to, you know, tax and provide a a community hospital for the poor, and then we get the free market.

Gene Tunny  58:07

Okay, with some questions over here. And then we’ll go to you, we’ll go to this gentleman. Thank you. Thank you. Thanks.

David Tregenza 58:14

Hello, my name is David Tregenza. I was just wondering, when you talked about development economics. I’ve read arguments from maybe more progressive that the reason America has such all those ideas booming is from their large spend on military, which then leaks to entrepreneurs. And that’s where computers, internet, rockets, satellites, and all that come from? What do you say to that?

John Cochrane  58:38

Well like, China seems pretty good at taking our military ideas and implementing them. You know, those ideas are available for anyone. Now, to what extent was, you know, to what extent the idea is that the most efficient way to produce new ideas, you know, Apollo programme was 1% of GDP, we got Tang and Teflon, you know, maybe we could have gotten that cheaper from from other ways. So some of the basic ideas did come from the military. But the hard work is not the basic idea. The hard work is the implementing it and starting the new company, you know, famously, Xerox, created the mouse and didn’t know what to do with it. Steve Jobs saw the mouse and boom, that, you know, he knew what to do with it. So I’m not sure that we have a dearth of basic ideas. We have as the dearth of is the ability to take new ideas and implement them in new companies, which then challenge the profits and ways of doing things of the old companies.

Gene Tunny  59:36

Nicholas Moore is it? Has the microphone.

Nicholas Moore 59:37

Thanks, thanks for the presentation. It’s been terrific. I’m, of course a subscriber to to, as you say, 99% of these views, using a natural experiment US versus the UK I think is a good test. But I always used to get confused when I looked at France and the UK because the French obviously wouldn’t embrace the sort of ideas we’re talking about, whereas the UK, typically would have, and again, looking at the US, you know, the contrast between California who arguably embrace all the wrong ideas. And when we talk about AI, you know, Where’s that coming from? So, so there does, you know, the natural experiments throw up a bit of challenge don’t they in terms of where GDP per capita ends up where ideas come from?

John Cochrane  1:00:23

I don’t know are France, France and the UK that different in terms of overall level of so…

Nicholas Moore 1:00:28

That’s a point so their GDP is per capita is the same, one’s more open and one’s more closed

John Cochrane 1:00:33

France spends 55% of GDP the UK spends 50% of GDP on on government stuff. There’s sort of this de industrialised, the UK is a financial centre and then tourist de industrialised wasteland, France has a certain efficient technocracy. So they they may be socialist, but they kind of they send people to the Ecole Polytechnique, and then they build nuclear power plants and we don’t kind of let you I don’t know what it’s like in the US. There’s kind of anything we want to build in the US there’s just this chaos of regulatory nightmare. And, you know, can you get stuff built in the in the UK the way it can, you know, you get the technocrats in France to build something they build something you know, they can build a high speed train, the US can’t build a high speed train. SNC, I don’t know if I told this story SNCF bailed out of the contract to build the California High Speed Trains. They said you guys are crazy. Not even socialist France works like this. I don’t see a great. I wish the UK had taken Brexit and become Singapore on Thames. But they don’t seem heading that direction.

Gene Tunny  1:01:44

Very good. Michael Brennan is it Michael?

Michael Brennan 1:01:46

Thanks yeah, Michael Brennan, used to be the chair of the Productivity Commission in Australia up until a couple of weeks ago, I wanted to ask about the economics profession, and where you see the role that it has played. I mean, I hate to indulge in nostalgia, but it does feel as though in your country and ours the economics profession had and played a much stronger role in the economic policy debate but had a much stronger feel for markets, institutions, the broad sweep. We feel it feels to me as though a lot of economists have gone down different rabbit holes, either very abstract, or ultra empirical, but involved in very narrow questions rather than the sorts of big questions that that you’re posing and answering.

John Cochrane  1:02:31

You know, to the extent that economists want to waste their time on technical stuff, they’re not harming anybody. So enjoy it. The economics profession has actually always been quite left wing and statist and, and serve and view their job as sort of advancing progressive goals. The American Economic Association was was founded that way, there’s kind of a, you’re thinking Milton Friedman, University of Chicago, but that was a very small number of people for a very short window of time. And now mostly, they’re in their advancing progressive agendas. You know, you can’t even you can’t publish a paper that says raising raising minimum wages, lowers employment anymore, so it’s kind of going a way of the other sciences as well. So we’re really the danger I see is that it is becoming part of the ideology production machine for the progressive narrative, and becoming less open to critical empirical work that challenges that that narrative, and you know, well, when you work for the government’s guess what you tend to say that the government’s good things?

Gene Tunny  1:03:36

Okay. There’s one question over here.

David Murray 1:03:39

Yeah. David Murray. How do you help people understand these concepts of corporate social responsibility and social licence?

John Cochrane  1:03:47

Do I want them to understand those concepts? With Friedman, your job is to to make profits for your shareholders. Unfortunately, right now, the way you make profits for your shareholders is to keep the regulator’s out of your hair. And the way you do that is to echo whatever political blather is in the regulator’s minds these days. So never count on big businesses to challenge the regulatory state or argue for free markets. They’re in business to get good regulatory treatment, and maybe you can protect us from your markets, and that means they go along with whatever nonsense is coming out of Washington.

Gene Tunny  1:04:21

Okay John, I might ask one more question. I’ve had a gentleman on my podcast who produces these things called Goldbacks. So there, there are a lot of people maybe, still, maybe, I don’t know, it’s under 10% of the population. But there are a significant number of people who are worried about the future of the US and the future of the global economy. And, you know, worry about fiat money. Is fiat money a problem? Do we need to go back to something like a gold standard or goldback currency? What’s your view on that before we wrap up?

John Cochrane  1:04:51

Fiat money is now a share in federal government. It is not, fiat money means money that’s backed by nothing but our money is backed our money is backed by the willingness of our government to raise taxes to soak up the money if necessary, I’m giving you fiscal theory the price level. So it’s a great system, so long as our governments maintain the fiscal space to always back their money with taxpayer, that’s a good system, so long as governments are fiscally solvent, I think the danger of the of the current, not fiat money, so the current system of money backed by the present value of fiscal surpluses is that it might not be backed anymore. And that therefore I do see a possibility of a of a sovereign, a grand sovereign debt crisis. When do you get a crisis? Nobody ever sees a crisis coming, right? Because if you knew the crisis was going to happen tomorrow, then it would have already happened today, you’d run and get your money out. What is the one cl.., and crises always happen when there’s money that can’t be paid back, shady accounting and nobody doubts that this is good stuff yet. Have I just described government debt? So I think, you know, in the next crisis, there is a possibility that our, we reveal our governments to have debts that they have no way of repaying and you could have a global inflation a default on you know, Italy, in some of the EU states, basically, a run on sovereign debt is possible. I don’t, we’re not there yet. But that’s kind of where the end of Western civilization goes. And then you got a problem because our monetary system is all built on the idea that government debt is sacrosanct. Now really any idea of history and you think government debt is the safest assets since the since the Henry the Henry the Third, I think defaulted on the Petruzzi government debt has been the riskiest asset around. And so we live in this kind of golden age. So to your question. I think if that happens, not, I mean, we’re in smoking financial ruins, but you might want some monetary system that doesn’t depend on the value of the government. And, you know, we all have our free market fantasies about that’s the one one place I’ve kind of stuck with the government we have a decent system of short term government debt is long, you know, it works okay. In free market fantasyland. And, you know, after we’ve had our third drink, we should talk about private monetary systems for the moment I kind of put it in, you know, airline pilots. Yeah, pilot licences should be privatised. Okay. Maybe that’s not the first thing we want to do. It’s kind of thing you talk about at the third rank of the Cato. So the same thing? Now gold is not the answer. So a gold standard is a government promise to deliver gold. So you haven’t gotten rid of the government. And a gold standard is a fiscal commitment. No government’s ever had enough gold to back their currency. So what is the gold standard, a gold standard, the government says I promised all these notes. One for one with gold, I know that the gold so what keeps that afloat? What keeps that afloat is the Government’s commitment, that if you start coming to ask for gold, I will raise taxes, and I or enough to get or borrow the gold to give you it’s a commitment to running the fiscal theory the price level. And it’s a bad one because the relative price of gold and other stuff fluctuates, it just would not work in a modern economy, because we don’t use gold coins. So So gold isn’t the answer. And gold doesn’t obviate the problem of if the government’s are bankrupt, they’re not going to be able to give you a gold standard. Is there something in the Bitcoin space that could maybe do it? We need to Yeah, I believe money has to be backed. So you need to find a security that’s backed by real assets that has a steady real value that there’s a lot of it, and that in and that people could use, we could devise such a system but you know, why don’t we just have our governments not default and have to build this from the smoking ruins anyway.

Gene Tunny  1:08:46

Very good Professor John Cochrane. Terrific, thank you. John’s gonna move a vote of thanks. Very good.

Righto, thanks for listening to this episode of Economics Explored. If you have any questions, comments or suggestions, please get in touch. I’d love to hear from you. You can send me an email via contact@economicsexplored.com Or a voicemail via SpeakPipe. You can find the link in the show notes. If you’ve enjoyed the show, I’d be grateful if you could tell anyone you think would be interested about it. Word of mouth is one of the main ways that people learn about the show. Finally, if your podcasting outlets you then please write a review and leave a rating. Thanks for listening. I hope you can join me again next week.

56:06

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Credits

Thanks to Obsidian Productions for mixing the episode and to the show’s sponsor, Gene’s consultancy business www.adepteconomics.com.au. Full transcripts are available a few days after the episode is first published at www.economicsexplored.com. Economics Explored is available via Apple PodcastsGoogle Podcast, and other podcasting platforms.

Categories
Podcast episode

Structural budget deficits – EP164

he governments of many countries have structural budget deficits, so even as their economies recover from the COVID-recession they are still running deficits. In many countries, the fundamental structure of the budget is bad. There is too much spending relative to revenue, even in normal or good times, not just in recession. In this episode we explore how economists can calculate structural budget balances. We look specifically at what the Australian Treasury does, given that a new Australian Budget came out last week.

Please get in touch with any questions, comments and suggestions by emailing us at contact@economicsexplored.com or sending a voice message via https://www.speakpipe.com/economicsexplored

You can listen to the episode via the embedded player below or via podcasting apps including Google PodcastsApple PodcastsSpotify, and Stitcher.

Links relevant to the conversation

Australian structural budget balance indicators available here:

https://budget.gov.au/2022-23-october/content/bp1/download/bp1_bs-3.pdf

Australian Treasury methodology for estimating structural budget balances:

https://treasury.gov.au/publication/economic-roundup-issue-3-2010/economic-roundup-issue-3-2010/estimating-the-structural-budget-balance-of-the-australian-government

IMF Fiscal Monitor which contains cyclically-adjusted budget balances (Tables A3 and A4):

https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/FM

Media coverage of Australian budget:

https://www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/politics/jim-chalmers-takes-forensic-approach-to-tax-concessions/news-story/25c4e1be826abb87f27c918532a69614

https://www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/bill-shorten-admits-push-to-curb-ndis-cost-growth/news-story/8a15cb3daabd55961e35df957f206bcf

IFS analysis of UK mini budget:

https://ifs.org.uk/articles/mini-budget-response

Transcript: Structural budget deficits – EP164

N.B. This is a lightly edited version of a transcript originally created using the AI application otter.ai. It may not be 100 percent accurate, but should be pretty close. If you’d like to quote from it, please check the quoted segment in the recording.

Gene Tunny  00:00

Coming up on Economics Explored. 

So I think this is a really neat methodology that the treasurer is trying to break down the different influences on the budget to see what’s really going on. And what it reveals is that there’s this structural problem with the budget. 

Welcome to the Economics Explored podcast, a frank and fearless exploration of important economic issues. I’m your host Gene Tunny broadcasting from Brisbane, Australia. This is episode 164 on structural budget balances, government budgets around the world was smashed by COVID-19. With countries recording huge deficits and big increases in debt. The governments of many countries have structural budget deficits. So even as their economies recover, they are still running deficits. In many countries, the fundamental structure of the budget is bad. There is too much spending relative to revenue, even in normal times, not just in recession. For example, the IMF estimates the United States will have a structural or cyclically adjusted government budget deficit of five to 7% of GDP over 2023 to 2027. In this episode, we explore how economists can calculate structural budget balances, we consider the different components of budgets, the structural, cyclical and temporary. We look specifically at what the Australian Treasury does, given that a new Australian budget came out last week. Joining me for the conversation is my Adept Economics colleague, Arturo Espinoza. Please check out the show notes relevant links and clarifications and for details where he can get in touch with any questions or comments. I’d love to hear from you. Righto, now for my conversation with Arturo on structural budget balances, thanks for my audio engineer Josh Crotts assistance in producing this episode. I hope you enjoy it. Arturo, good to be with you again.

Arturo Espinoza Bocangel  01:49

Hi Gene. My pleasure to be here.

Gene Tunny  01:51

Excellent. Arturo, so I thought today we could have a good chat about this concept of a structural budget balance. So we had our federal budget, the Australian government budget was released last week. So for 2023, the financial year. And this was because we have a new government. So there was an election in May. And there was a change of government, we now have a Labour government. So a more left wing government than the previous government, which was the Liberal National Government, the coalition government, and in Australia, a Liberal government is actually a conservative government. It’s all very confusing. Right, so we had a change of government and there was some improvement in the current year budget balance because of higher commodity prices, which flow through to, to earnings to and to tax revenue, that the federal government pulls in, particularly from the big mining companies. So there was an improvement in that underlying what they call the underlying cash balance. But this federal government is still running quite significant deficits. So it’s still running a deficit of some $37 billion, this financial year, the previous government did its budget back in May, I think they were projecting that up around must have been nearly 80 billion, I can’t remember exactly. But it was an improvement on that. But it’s still one and a half percent of GDP at $37 billion. And then over what they call the forward estimates, which is out to 25-26. We’ve still got deficits in the range of 40 to $50 billion, approximately, and, you know, up to 2% of GDP is in 24-25. So we’ve still got significant deficits. And the problem that we’re seeing in Australia, and this is similar to in other countries, too, is that governments are just spending much more than they’re bringing in in revenue. I mean, I guess that’s what a deficit is, right? I mean, that’s, but but there’s a problem that, that because of politics, because no one wants to pay taxes, politicians don’t want to put up taxes, and they want to deliver the goodies, they want to fund a high level of services for the population, and that helps them get elected. And so we’ve got this, this problem, this imbalance between what they’re spending and what they’re bringing in in taxes. And this is where I think this structural budget balance concept is of great use. And I just want to talk about that. So does that make sense Arturo, what we’re going to cover today?

Arturo Espinoza Bocangel  04:45

Yeah, that makes sense. It also is a very interesting topic related to government debts and this structural budget.

Gene Tunny  04:58

Yeah, yeah. So It’s always a concept that’s fascinated me. So I used to work in the Treasury in the budget policy area. And when I was there, we didn’t produce this structural budget balance estimate, and there was a big debate about whether Australia should have one and whether it’s feasible to develop one because as we’ll discover, you have to make all sorts of assumptions to generate it. It’s it, there’s a there’s a bit of, you know, there’s there, there’s a bit of number crunching that goes into it. And you have to make all sorts of assumptions regarding, well, what’s the normal state of affairs, because one way of thinking about this structural budget balance is that it’s what the budget would be if you took away the cyclical or cyclical factors. So if you if you’re able to abstract or control for the business cycle, so whether the economy is booming, or whether it’s slumping, then it gives you the budget balance that you would get in that situation, because one of the problems with the standard budget balance as a, as a measure of how the gut of the government is performing in a fiscal sense is that it is what economists call endogenous, it’s determined, partly, it’s determined or largely as determined by the state of the economy is determined within the system, it’s endogenous. It’s not something that the government can, can totally set, exogenously or it doesn’t have full control over it. Because your level of taxes depend on the state of the economy and commodity prices in Australia, if the iron ore prices is really high, or the coal price is high, then BHP, Rio Tinto, et cetera, the big mining companies, they’re only more profits and the federal government, it gets a share that it gets about 30% of their profits. So yeah, that can have a, you know, that can mean billions of dollars to the budget bottom line. And so that’s why we see the budget balance, it’s, it moves with the economic cycle, and so your government could be running a deficit. But that could be understandable, given the state of the economy. And so the underlying budget is okay, the structural part of the budget is okay, that’s not the case with Australia, but I’m just using that as an illustration. So it may be useful. Well, I think it is very useful to adjust for those cyclical factors. And that’s what the Australian Treasury has done in what I think is one of the most useful charts in the budget, which is in their statement on the fiscal outlook chart 320, the structural budget balance. And that really tells a story, it tells a story about how within the federal budget, because of this, this gap between what the government is spending money on and what we’re paying in taxes. So if government spending is at a level of around 26% of GDP. And revenue is under 24% of GDP. Or maybe it’s 25. And 23. It’s sort of that sort of order of magnitude, or it’s those are approximate figures, I’ll put the right figures in the show notes, we’ve got this gap. And this is a permanent gap. It’s a structural gap. And this is what this chart shows of two percentage points of, or 2% of GDP. And this is baked into the budget. And this is what this structural budget balance chart shows. So what they’ve, what they’ve done is the they’ve worked out that structural factors, leading to a deficit of about 2% of GDP, cyclical factors, so the state of the economy, the state of commodity prices, the fact that the iron ore price is super high, the fact that the economy has been booming. What that’s doing is pushing up, or that’s improving the budget balance by looks like 1.8 or 1.9%. If you look at the chart, and what that is telling me and what that is, this is for the current financial year 22-23. What it’s telling me is that, well, if we didn’t have that, that structural problem in the budget where we’re just spending more than we’re, we’re bringing in, and that’s the case and that would be the case in a normal year, in an average year. If we just control the economic cycle. If we didn’t have that structural problem. And if we looked at what the strength of the economy is commodity prices, and the government should be running a budget surplus of nearly 2% of GDP, and in actual fact, it’s running a budget, a budget deficit of what is it, one and a half percent of GDP. So there’s this big, there’s this big gap, which, in a way, represents the additional demand that the government is generating in the economy that isn’t warranted, given the economic circumstances. So the government budget is highly stimulatory to the economy and that is arguably a problem for Well, I think it is a problem, it’s contributing to the inflationary situation that we have in the Australian economy at the moment. And likewise, governments around the world that are running large budget deficits, such as the US government, such as the UK Government are contributing to the inflationary situations in in those countries, because if you looked at what the budget should be, given the state of the economy, it should be in a lot better state than than it is now than then those budgets are now and that’s what this cyclically adjusted budget balance or structural budget balances is approximating. Okay, one of the other fascinating things in that chart, I should note, the Treasurer is prepared on the structural budget balance for Australia, is that in 22-23, there’s still a sizable impact over 1% of GDP coming from temporary fiscal measures. So these are things that are related to COVID 19, to the pandemic response. So even though, I mean, look, I know that COVID COVID is still around, and apparently we’ve got another wave coming. I mean, the worst part of the pandemic is over, but still there is a, we do have these temporary fiscal measures occurring. And so what that means is, yeah, so that’s, that’s something that’s contributing to the, the deficit here in Australia. So what that chart is telling us is that, look, the structural budget, the structural problem in the budget is around two percentage points, or 2% of GDP. The cyclical, the benefit to the budget from the improvement in the economic cycle and higher commodity prices is, is just under 2% of GDP. So what that would suggest is that, that would mean we’d have a budget deficit of just a fraction of GDP, like maybe point one or point 2% of GDP. But then we’ve got these. Actually, it might be point three or point four, I’ll have to check the numbers that don’t put the exact numbers in the charts. I’m just trying to eyeball and I’m not wearing my glasses. But then we’ve got this temporary fiscal measures, which is, which is worsening the budget by over 1% of GDP. And how these all sort of add up is that we end up with a budget deficit in 22-23. Of what was it, one and a half percent. So I think this is a really neat methodology that the treasurer is trying to break down the different influences on the budget to see what’s really going on. And what it reveals is that there’s this structural problem with the budget. And, you know, this is something that all treasuries and finance ministers should do, in my opinion. There are some IMF estimates for other countries we’ll talk about later, the Australian Treasury seems to be doing a really good job at its estimates, and it’s discovered this structural problem, this big hole in the budget. Okay, so does that all make sense Arturo?

Arturo Espinoza Bocangel  14:01

Yeah, that makes sense. That was very clear. This is incredible how Australia is spending around this, because you, you mentioned around two or 3% is spending more than what they receive in terms of revenue. But let’s explore what are the main components of that structure, structural deficit?

Gene Tunny  14:33

Yes, well, a big component, or one of the major contributors to it in recent years, has been the National Disability Insurance Scheme. So it’s this expansion of the welfare state. Now I’m not making any judgement about whether that’s a good idea or not, because it’s very popular, and it’s well intentioned and there are clearly a lot of people out there in need. One of the challenges with it, though, is that it is growing at a very high rate. So it’s not the total structural deficit, because it’s at the moment, I think it’s around $30 billion. So it’s not just the NDIS. It’s other things. And then we have, we’ve had various tax cuts in the past, there’s a stage three tax cut that’s programmed in. So there’s going to be a tax cut in 2024-25, which aims to get rid of one of the tax brackets and to flatten the progressivity of the tax system. And that’s going to cost the budget revenue. So it’s a combination of spending new spending programmes and spending programmes that are costing more money than were expected. Also, we’ve got rising interest, a rising interest bill at the moment because of higher interest rates. And then people on the left of politics would argue, Well, look, the the problem is, we’re just not raising enough in taxation, if you’re going to spend this and that, look, that’s one legitimate perspective. If the government is going to spend this much on a permanent basis, if we are committed to an NDIS, National Disability Insurance Scheme, then we will have to have higher taxes to make the budget sustainable in the long term. I mean, personally, I’d prefer that we’d have lower taxes, we would, we would, we would get spending under control. But look, if we can’t get spending under control, then we may have to, we may have to put up with that. So because ultimately, we do need a sustainable budget, we’ve got to keep that debt to GDP ratio under control. At the moment, the projections are that for Australia, it’s not looking catastrophic yet, luckily, I mean, it’s on the current budget projections, it’s going to get up to around 48% of GDP. So it’s going to plateau around that, by the What is it 2030 to 2033. There’s another chart where they’re projecting that in how that’s going to perform. So this is the debt to GDP, which is one of the critical ratios that commentators, economists, ratings agencies, like S&P and Fitch and Moody’s, what they look at. And I mean, Australia’s lucky we started off with so what we started off with no debt to begin with, in 2008, we had, we had negative net debt, and we only had $50 billion of bonds on issue. So we’re in a good position to start with, so we’re at, we’re only gonna get up to about 50% of GDP at the moment compared with you look at the states, which is the US it’s over. We had a look the other day, didn’t we? I mean, it’s up 120 to 130% of GDP or something. Yeah. Okay. It’s very high if you look at projections for actual data and projections for the US. So we’re, we’re nowhere near that what’s happening is that the outlook is worsening. So if you look at that Treasury chart and the budget, compared with where we were back in May, or back in April, when the government released its last budget, that’s right before the election, and then the Treasury put out the pre election, fiscal, economic and fiscal outlook, the instead of the gross debt to GDP ratio, peaking around 24-25 and then falling as the economy grows, and the debt doesn’t, doesn’t grow as fast, which was what they were previously forecasting back in April. And they had the gross debt to GDP ratio going to 40%. Instead, it’s going to continue to grow over this decade, and then start to flatten out around 2032 to 33 at around 48%. And I mean, who knows that could get worse. I mean, this out. So much depends on what happens with interest rates and a big part of this change, why things are worse now than they were back in April is one, it’s because this NDIS is growing, the cost of that is growing faster than expected. And also because of the higher interest burden. I think that’s really shocked people and this is something I’ve been calling out for a while I’ve been identifying for a while that this as interest rates rise, that’s going to have a big impact on the budget, because we’ve got so much debt already not as much as other countries but still more than we’ve had in the past. So well in the last few decades, okay, so does that answer your question Arturo? You’re asking about where’s it come from? And yeah, where’s that structural deficit come from? And look, it’s a, it’s a variety of things. It’s just our willingness to bear the taxes. It’s either you can either look at it as our unwillingness to pay the taxes that we need to to fund the level of services. That’s one perspective. That’s the perspective of people like The Australia Institute, they would argue that all these things we’re spending money on. So from a left wing perspective, I’m not making any judgments at the moment about, I mean, I’ve got my own personal judgement, but I’ll just present both sides of the story, they would argue we’re not, we’re not raising revenue. And then the people on the other side, they would like the IPA or whoever the right, they would argue, well, we’re actually spending too much relative to what we’re paying in taxes, the level of taxation is fine or should be cut even further, let’s cut expenditure. And the government itself is very conscious it, it doesn’t want to raise taxes, right, because raising taxes is politically unpopular. No one wants to buy any more tax. So it looks like the government itself recognises that it will have to cut spending. I mean, maybe it’ll try and tweaks and tax policy settings or, or cuts in tax concessions. Jim Chalmers, the Treasurer here who he’s talking about taking a forensic approach to tax concessions. There was a story in the Australian today, so it looks like they’re gonna have a look at some of those tax concessions, so who knows they could look at tax concessions for superannuation, and they could look at our concessional taxation of capital gains, things like that. So we’ll have to wait and see what happens there. But look in the IRS is the one that they really need to look at because it’s just growing at a very high rate. So let me try to illustrate that with some figures. So last week’s federal budget so I’m quoting from a report in the Australian day today revealed the NDIS which will cost the federal and state governments $35.5 billion this financial year is on track to hit 52 billion by 2025 26, dwarfing the costs of both Medicare and aged care. So long term Treasury forecasts suggests the federal government’s contribution to the scheme will grow by almost 14% a year for the next decade, with total scheme costs approaching 100 billion by 2030 to 33. It became operational in 2013. It currently has 555,000 participants. Its annual financial sustainability reports suggest numbers will reach almost 860,000 by 2030. More young people with diagnoses of autism and psychosocial disorders are entering the scheme. Almost a third of current participants have an autism diagnosis. And four and 10 are age 14 and under. So this is an illustration of one of the challenges of public services. I think because there is a lot of need out there are a lot of people who are doing it tough or there’s a lot of need in the community. And as soon as the government gets involved, there are a lot of pressures on the government to expand the level of service to increase the level of service. This is a great challenge for the government. I remember when I was in workplace health and safety here in Queensland, it’s nearly 20 years ago now. I remember the policy discussions around the need to look after people who are catastrophically injured. This NDIS has come out of a need to at least look after people who fell through the cracks of the previous system. What happened years ago was if you were catastrophically injured say you had a diving accident. And it was recreational diving. You weren’t covered by any insurance. Okay, there’s, it’s it wasn’t a motor vehicle accident. It wasn’t a workplace accident. And there would be very high costs of care if you were made quadriplegic, for example, but there’s no insurance to cover you. And so there was this concern that there are these people who are missing out. And so there’s clearly some sort of there was a need definitely to do something to help those people out. And this whole NDIS from what I can tell grew out of that conversation that was occurring around the early 2000s because I remember being part of the conversation at the Queensland Government level and some of the policy development there and then it came out of this 2008, the 2020 summit that Kevin Rudd organised his ideas fest that they had in the talk fest that they had at Parliament House and, and they invited 1000 of the best and brightest from around Australia. And this was one of the ideas that was advanced at the summit. And, this was one of the ones that progressed and then the Gilad government introduced that I think in 2013. And look, it’s a really valid thing. There is certainly cases, people that needed assistance. The problem is where do you draw the line, and this is a problem that governments often have. And here, the line has become, the circle has expanded even more. And I mean, people or families with autism, and with developmental delay, certainly need assistance. And I’m on the board of a non-for-profit that advocates for families where a child has a developmental delay, so I fully understand the concerns. And the need. The issue is that there’s a big cost to the budget from having this expansive definition. And the government is currently I mean, we’ll have to wait and see what it what it does about it all. Okay, we’ll take a short break here for a word from our sponsor.

Female speaker  26:23

If you need to crunch the numbers, then get in touch with Adept Economics. We offer you Frank and fearless economic analysis and advice. We can help you with funding submissions, cost benefit analysis studies, and economic modelling of all sorts. Our head office is in Brisbane, Australia, but we work all over the world, you can get in touch via our website, http://www.adepteconomics.com.au. We’d love to hear from you.

Gene Tunny  26:52

Now back to the show. So any questions or any thoughts on that Arturo?

Arturo Espinoza Bocangel  27:01

No, at the moment..

Gene Tunny  27:02

Good. So yeah, that’s essentially where we’ve got this structural budget balance problem coming from Australia. And I thought it might be good just to go over quickly, what the different sources or the different ways that they adjust for the state of the economy. And what it comes down to is coming up with estimates of how the economy would have performed, what it would do in the absence of a business cycle. So you have to work out what a trend level of GDP is. So the if you think about macro economics, one way of thinking about how the economy evolves over time is a cycle and trend. There’s the economy. Over time, we know that the economy expands. So the economy today is much larger than it was 10 years ago, it’s much larger than it was 20 years ago, 30 years ago. So over time it grows, there’s trend growth, it’s on an upward trajectory. But it will cycle around that trend. So you can have periods where you’re well above that trend when the economy’s booming. And then you can have periods when you’re, you’re well below you’re in a recession, for example. And so what these structural budget balance estimates, what they do, is they will they based on an estimate of what that trend level of GDP would be. And so what they will do, what the Treasury will do, if they will look at, well, what’s the underlying population growing at? What’s productivity, on average growing at? And are there any trends in labour force participation that we need to take into account? And this is this supply side model, underpinning these trend GDP estimates? So these are what you would expect in the absence of a business cycle. And so that’s one of the core parts of it, they’re trying to control the business cycle. And then they also have to control commodity prices. So they’ll look at well, how much higher than we normally are commodity prices, the iron ore price or coal price, how much higher are they than we normally expect them to be? And let’s discount that, let’s, let’s, let’s assume that they’re not so high. And so the Treasury will have these parameters. They’ll have these sensitivities of different types of these revenue, items of income tax and company income tax, two different commodity prices they’ll have, and they’ll have an estimate of how sensitive the unemployment benefits that are paid are to the state of the economy to where GDP is relative to its trend. And I think that’s the one item that the Treasury adjusts. So it tweaks it adjust revenue on the revenue side and adjusts income tax and company tax. And I think capital gains tax, if I remember correctly on the expenditure side, it just adjusts unemployment benefits. We know that unemployment benefit payments are going to be higher if the economy’s in recession, lower if it’s, if it’s booming. And so there’s an adjustment that’s made there. And there’s a whole bunch of assumptions that go into these estimates. Does that all make sense Arturo?

Arturo Espinoza Bocangel  30:39

Yes, it’s all clear.

Gene Tunny  30:42

Okay, so what I’ll do is I’ll put a link in the show notes to a paper estimating the structural budget balance of the Australian government that was by three of my old colleagues. So Tony McDonald, Yong Hong Yan, who I don’t know, Blake Ford and David Stephan, I worked with Tony, Blake and David. So all good people. So that’s a great paper. I’ll link to that in the show notes. And I’ve noticed that the IMF also produces some estimates of these structural budget balances, although they call them, they use the other, the other name for them cyclically adjusted balance, and you can find these at the back of what’s called the IMF fiscal monitor. And I’m looking at the one from October 2022. So check that out. There’s a whole range of interesting estimates there. So if for example, you look at table A3 for advanced economies, general governments cyclically adjusted balance 2013, to 27. So it’s got historical data, it’s got forecasts in it. For Australia, they’ve got their own estimates of what the structural budget deficit is, they’ve got estimates that go from around, or three and a half percent in 2022. So that’s a calendar year 3.1%, deficit and 2324 to 2.6%. And it gets down to about .7%, deficit in 2027. So not as bad as the Australian Treasury’s estimates, which are, which have the structural deficit maintaining around 2%. There are reasons why the IMF figures are different from the Australian Government’s because the IMF, the IMF doesn’t take into account as many factors. It’s on a calendar year basis, the Treasury and I think in one of its papers, it goes through why it’s estimates are different from say, the IMF or the OECD, I think for Australia, the Treasury are probably doing a better job at it just because the IMF and and the other agency, international agencies, they have to do it for all the countries and they’re not experts in any particular country. I think the Australian Treasury’s estimates are probably better for getting a sense of the structural problem in the budget, the Treasury has got access to, to much better info, much better data on Australia, then the IMF, it’s got much better insights, I should say, into what’s going on. And its model for the structural budget balance for Australia is much more precise. It goes into more detail than the IMF. So all I’m saying is I think the, I think the Australian Treasury numbers are better than what the IMF is, is estimating there. And I tend to agree that there is that structural budget balance of, of 2% of GDP, which is a challenge for this current government, and will probably be a challenge for future governments. And it’s going to require either large cuts in spending. So getting the NDIS under control, which is going to be hugely unpopular, because it’s a very popular programme and well intentioned. And I know people are benefiting from it. And you know, it’s, it’s, it’s giving people a sense of dignity and improving people’s quality of life. So look, who knows, I mean, this government, because it’s a government from the sort of left wing I mean, it’s not as left wing as some other governments you’d see around the world. It’s not left if you think about what left, left wing governments are in South America, for example. But it’s not. It’s going to find it difficult because it is more left wing than right wing. So the Liberal National Government is going to find it difficult to cut something like NDIS or cut welfare benefits, and hence maybe it does have to look at some tax measures. Maybe it does have to cut it tax concessions heavily. Maybe it does have to adjust that stage three tax cut that’s programmed in, maybe not give us much of much, maybe not have such a big tax cut. We’ll have to wait and see. Okay. Anything else Arturo, that we should cover before we wrap up?

Arturo Espinoza Bocangel  35:21

Yes, I think I wanted to highlight that it should be a good discussion was a good topic to see which of those programmes social programmes are working? Good in terms of indicators. So in terms of the results on population, you’re in to see if there is any problem there. But because we know that not all the things are all the social programmes are working well. Perhaps that will be a good topic to discuss, to discuss in other episodes.

Gene Tunny  36:04

Yeah, look, I think you’re right there. And what this is highlighting I think, Arturo is yes, the need to, to really delve into whether these programmes are working or not, because we’ve got these programmes that are well intentioned, that governments they hope to do some good to achieve outcomes, but how do we know that they are actually achieving outcomes? Are they doing it in the most cost effective way? And that’s why something like this evaluate a general concept could be so valuable. This is an idea that the first person I remember proposing it was Nicolas Gruen. And so Nick’s been on the show before, well known Australian economist, CEO of lateral economics, I do some work with Nick from time to time. And, you know, he’s been involved in public policy for decades, he was involved with the button car plan back in the 80s. He was involved with your work for the treasurer in the 90s, very lateral thinker, and he came up with this idea of the evaluator general, which would have a, it would have a brief of going across the Australian Government and figuring out which programmes work, which don’t, are there other ways we do things, other innovative ways we can do things to, to solve problems. And it looks like this government is going to go ahead with some sort of evaluator general. So Jim Chalmers has pledged to put in place an effective and rigorous evaluator general and new offers based within treasury and flagged by Labour before the 2019 election, which could work with other departments to access to assess the effectiveness of government programmes. Okay, great stuff. So this is in an article by Joe Kelly in the Australian, I’ll put a link in the show notes that I was quoting from there. I think one of the issues Nick has with that proposal, though, is that it’s located within the Treasury, I think he would prefer that it has its own life, it’s outside of the Treasury. It’s a statutory authority, it has some degree of independence granted by the parliament. So yeah, I don’t think Nick’s actually I can’t speak for him. I should have him on the show to talk about that. But I’m guessing he’s probably thinks that that’s not exactly what we need. But look, I should let him. Let him speak about that in the future. So that’s the evaluator general. So I think that’s the sort of thing you’re driving at is it Arturo? That we, because we need to evaluate these programmes. The evaluator General’s one way of doing that. Exactly. So one thing I thought I should cover before we wrap up, is just what happened with the UK earlier. When was it last month? Or remember, they had their mini budget, maybe it was in September now? They had the mini budget, Liz Truss the new PM, no longer PM, shortest reigning PM in British history. And the chancellor Kwasi kwarteng, I think it was, and they released that mini budget with a big tax cut, and the markets just absolutely went nuts. The pound crashed. We had yields on UK bonds spike, because everyone there and this is the recognition that there was a structural problem already with the UK budget, the UK couldn’t afford to have a tax cut, who was going to spend, go on spending what it was spending, and it’s just quite extraordinary the way that the Institute of Fiscal Studies describe that and I’ll put a link to this in the show notes, I think it’s a great note and some really good take on it. The way they describe that mini budget, which has been reversed because the current, there’s a recognition that it was unsustainable, so we’ve got a new PM now and a new chancellor, and they’re, and they’re, they’ve reversed that. I think Liz truss, had even reversed it. And she had sacked her Chancellor, but okay, so it’s gone. But for a short time it was in place and the markets absolutely freaked out. And yeah, this is the IFS take, which I think is great, which was made at the time the chancellor announced the biggest package of tax cuts in 50 years without even a semblance of an effort to make the public finance numbers add up. That is just brutal. Goes to show just how important it is to actually care about this stuff. And I mean, I’ve been saying this for years, I used to work in the Treasury in the budget area, and I know how important it is to get this stuff right and not to go and do silly things. And so I understand where IFS is coming from and understand why the markets really just hated that mini budget. And there’s a great, there’s a great chart and that IFS analysis, which showed that if you look at what was happening to the, to the national debt or the the UK public debt, if you compare that mini budget, what would have happened with the mini budget was what was expected before so instead of the debt as a percent of national income, staying in the range from 80 to 85%, of GDP going down gradually, over the next five years, from around 85 to 80. Instead, it was going to end up going from a bit under 85% to nearly 95%. So it’s just a really bad policy. So understandably, that mini budget was absolutely. Yeah, I mean, the markets just reacted very badly and essentially brought down the Prime Minister and the Chancellor, just because, yeah, it was just very irresponsible fiscal policy. And that’s what we’ve always got to guard against now. We’re not there yet in Australia because we started off in such a good position, debt to GDP is still relatively low compared with other countries. We’ve got a bit of room, still we’ve got time, we’ve got time to turn it around. But we’ve got to start doing something because we just can’t be in a situation where we keep accumulating debt. And we know, we know there’ll be another crisis of some kind, there’ll be a downturn, hopefully, we don’t have another pandemic, but there’s going to be another crisis, there’ll be a period when we end up adding lots of debt in a short period of time or a few years. And that will mean a higher interest burden, these projections of our debt to GDP, starting to flatten out around 2032 to 33 at 48% of GDP. Okay, that could give us some comfort, but we just don’t know what’s coming down the track. My worry is that interest rates could go higher. There could be another downturn or a crisis and then we add more debt on and then that gross debt to GDP, instead of flattening out it goes on an upward trajectory. That’s a risk I worry about and why it’s so important to get the budget under control. Okay. Final thoughts, Arturo?

Arturo Espinoza Bocangel  43:39

No, thank you for all your explanation Gene.

Gene Tunny  43:43

Very good. Well, it’s been great chatting with you, Arturo. And I’ll look forward to chatting again. And if you’re listening in the audience, if you want to look at any of these, these articles I’ve mentioned, I’ll put links in the show notes. Please get in touch with any questions or comments. Let me know whether you agree or disagree. Let me know if they’re things you want to know more about, and I’ll do my best to cover them in a future episode. So thanks for listening. And Arturo, thanks for joining me.

Arturo Espinoza Bocangel  44:14

Thank you for having me, Gene. Bye.

Gene Tunny  44:17

Okay, that’s the end of this episode of Economics Explored. I hope you enjoyed it. If so, please tell your family and friends and leave a comment or give us a rating on your podcast app. If you have any comments, questions, suggestions, you can feel free to send them to contact@economicsexplored.com And we’ll aim to address them in a future episode. Thanks for listening. Until next week, goodbye

Thanks to Josh Crotts for mixing the episode and to the show’s sponsor, Gene’s consultancy business www.adepteconomics.com.au

Please consider signing up to receive our email updates and to access our e-book Top Ten Insights from Economics at www.economicsexplored.com. Also, please get in touch with any questions, comments and suggestions by emailing us at contact@economicsexplored.com or sending a voice message via https://www.speakpipe.com/economicsexplored. Economics Explored is available via Apple PodcastsGoogle Podcast, and other podcasting platforms.

Categories
Podcast episode

Slouching Towards Utopia w/ Brad DeLong – EP163

Slouching Towards Utopia is the new book from Brad DeLong, Professor of Economics at University of California, Berkeley. Professor DeLong joins show host Gene Tunny to discuss the long twentieth century from 1870 to 2010. The conversation considers the three factors which came together to massively raise living standards post-1870, and how nonetheless we’ve struggled to achieve the Utopia that once appeared possible. The “neoliberal turn” beginning in the 1970s and 1980s is considered, and DeLong explains why he writes that “Hayek and his followers were not only Dr. Jekyll–side geniuses but also Mr. Hyde–side idiots.”

You can buy Slouching Towards Utopia via this link and help support the show:

https://amzn.to/3TK4evm

Please get in touch with any questions, comments and suggestions by emailing us at contact@economicsexplored.com or sending a voice message via https://www.speakpipe.com/economicsexplored

Highlights

  • The big story after 1870: technological progress becomes rapid, the technological competence of the human race globally doubles every generation. [6:50]
  • The importance of industrial research labs in the big story since 1870 [16:35]
  • The role of the modern corporation [18:23]
  • Globalization in the late nineteenth century and pre WWI [23:25]
  • How bad governance can make a country very poor very quickly [29:09]
  • The neoliberal turn [35:56]
  • Prof. DeLong thinks the big lesson of history is that trying to maintain social and economic systems past their sell-by date doesn’t work [58:28]

You can listen to the episode via the embedded player below or via podcasting apps including Google PodcastsApple PodcastsSpotify, and Stitcher.

About this episode’s guest: Brad DeLong

Brad DeLong is a professor of economics at U.C. Berkeley, a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research, a weblogger at the Washington Center for Equitable Growth, and a fellow of the Institute for New Economic Thinking. He received his B.A. and Ph.D. from Harvard University in 1982 and 1987. He joined UC Berkeley as an associate professor in 1993 and became a full professor in 1997.

Professor DeLong also served in the U.S. government as Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Economic Policy from 1993 to 1995. He worked on the Clinton Administration’s 1993 budget, on the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, on the North American Free Trade Agreement, on macroeconomic policy, and on the unsuccessful health care reform effort.

Before joining the Treasury Department, Professor DeLong was Danziger Associate Professor in the Department of Economics at Harvard University. He has also been a John M. Olin Fellow at the National Bureau of Economic Research, an Assistant Professor of Economics at Boston University, and a Lecturer in the Department of Economics at M.I.T.

Links relevant to the conversation

Brad DeLong’s substack:

https://braddelong.substack.com/

DeLong on Hobsbawm’s short 20th century (1914 to 1989) compared with his long 20th century:

https://www.bradford-delong.com/2016/12/the-short-vs-the-long-twentieth-century.html

Re. Yegor Gaidar’s analysis of the collapse of the Soviet Union:

https://sites.dartmouth.edu/asamwick/2007/06/08/the-soviet-collapse-grain-and-oil/

Lant Pritchett’s book Let Their People Come: Breaking the Gridlock on Global Labor Mobility:

https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/9781933286105-Pritchett-let-their-people-come.pdf

Transcript: Slouching Towards Utopia w/ Brad DeLong – EP163

N.B. This is a lightly edited version of a transcript originally created using the AI application otter.ai. It may not be 100 percent accurate, but should be pretty close. If you’d like to quote from it, please check the quoted segment in the recording.

Gene Tunny  00:00

Coming up on Economics Explored.

Brad DeLong  00:02

2008 you seemed to see the engine of technological progress itself drop into a lower gear slow down by half or more. Starting in 2012-2013, we see the rise of anti democratic movements all over the world.

Gene Tunny  00:23

Welcome to the Economics Explored podcast, a frank and fearless exploration of important economic issues. I’m your host Gene Tunny. I’m a professional economist based in Brisbane, Australia, and I’m a former Australian Treasury official. This is Episode 163, on Slouching Towards Utopia, the new book from the renowned US economist, Brad DeLong. He joins me this episode. Brad DeLong, is professor of economics at the University of California Berkeley. From 1993 to 95. He was deputy assistant secretary of the US Treasury for economic policy, and slashing towards utopia. Professor DeLonge explores why, despite the incredible increase in our productivity since 1870, we have failed to achieve a utopia. DeLong argues that what he calls the long 20th century began in 1870 mended by 2010, after which a productivity slowdown and stagnant wages have contributed to political discontent around the world. Please check out the show notes, relevant links and details of how you can get in touch with any comments or suggestions. I’d love to hear from you. If you’d like to buy Professor Long’s book, very grateful if you could do so via the Amazon page link in the show notes. By doing so you’ll help support the show. Right oh, now it’s my conversation with Professor Brad DeLong on Slouching Towards Utopia. Thanks to Nicholas Gruen for connecting us and to my audio engineer Josh Crotts for his assistance in producing this episode. I hope you enjoy it. Professor Brad DeLong thanks for appearing on the programme.

Brad DeLong  02:02

It’s wonderful for me to be here. Right. Might help me sell some books. Excellent. Something I’m very, very interested in right now.

Gene Tunny  02:09

Excellent. Yes, yes. I hope to help you do that. And hopefully if people in the audience if they enjoy the conversation, and I’m sure they will, I’ll put a link in the show notes for sure for to your book. So I’ve been I’ve been reading your book and enjoying it.

Brad DeLong  02:20

Thank you very much. 

Gene Tunny  02:23

Yes, I’m the Kindle. Nicholas Gruen put me on to it. So Nick’s a big fan, too.

Brad DeLong  02:33

Yes. Yeah. So I’m very grateful to him for spreading the word.

Gene Tunny  02:37

Yes, yes. And it’s Slouching Towards Utopia in economic history of the 20th century. Brad, I’d like to kick off by asking, What motivated you to write the book? And what message are you trying to convey with the title, please?

Brad DeLong  02:53

Well, I suppose I started. I guess it really was reading Eric Hobsbawm’s, Age of Extremes, you know, back in 1994. And thinking that the story he was telling wasn’t the big story, that what he was telling was only a relatively small part of the big story. And that someone should write a book that told the other big story of history after 1870. And so I grossed about that for a couple of years. And in 1998, I thought, since no one else was writing it, maybe I should write the big story. And so I wrote a chapter to kind of put a stake in the ground and started showing it around, but you didn’t do anything else. And then maybe a decade, a decade and a half later, an editor from basic Tim Sullivan came around and said, You know, someone should write this, that someone should be you, you’re clearly not, why don’t we put you under contract. So I can call you once a year and yell at you about where the manuscript is. Um, and, you know, he did that. And to get into that once a year, that was a call and so forth. And then eventually, I just kind of buckled down and wrote the thing. Then, after writing the first draft, I had to take the chainsaw to it, because it was twice as big as the book that was published. And then after that, we had to polish it, and was out there in the world, you know, spiffy and polished and shrunken down considerably from the project I originally attempted. But it’s out there in the world. And I’m, I actually like it a lot, which I didn’t expect to at this point. At this point. I expected to be sick of it and thinking there was a lot wrong with it, then I find but I’m not thinking that way.

Gene Tunny  04:45

Okay. Yes. Well, that’s good. I mean, I think it’s, I think it’s terrific. And, I mean, it’s still a big book, it’s still 600 pages or so. So it’s still very, very meaty. I was impressed by all of the examples. In history, I didn’t know things that I found fascinating. So thank you. Yes. One thing I didn’t appreciate until I read your book. And maybe I’ve just missed this in other places, but the role of the Saudis in ending the Soviet Union, I didn’t appreciate how much when they increased oil output in the 80s. I think that’s the story, isn’t it? That meant the Russians or the Soviets weren’t earning as much income from their own production and that effect. Yeah. Yeah. I thought that was.

Brad DeLong  05:32

This was this was what the late Yegor Gaidar always insisted on, you know, that as long as the Soviet Union could trade oil for grain, the fact that the system was so sclerotic, they were unable to figure out a way to grow more grain at all was, you know, a problem, but not a crisis. But then the price of oil falls by two thirds and 1986, you know, as the Saudis react to with current, what’s currently going on in the Iran, Iraq War, and other things, and all of a sudden, the Soviet Union has to start borrowing if it wants to import its grain, and it starts borrowing from banks. And then the banks begin to say no. And then it goes and starts borrowing, starts asking for loan guarantees from Western governments. And then the demands come for well, we’ll guarantee these loans, but we want you to kind of be cooperative and open with respect to politics and democracy and things. And then the whole system simply collapses. It’s really quite an interesting story. Yegor Gaidar, Gaidar has a short speech he gave, I think, at the American Enterprise Institute called something like grain and oil. It’s very much worth reading,

Gene Tunny  06:50

RIght. Okay. Well, that’s good. I’ll see if I can track it down and put a link in the show notes. I mean, that’s one of many examples of, of good stories in the book, I look, I’d like to go back to what you mentioned about Eric Hobsbawm, who’s a Marxist historian, if I remember correctly, and you’re saying that you think he got the he missed the big story of what happened after 1870? Could you please explain what was he saying? And how is what you’re saying? What what do you think the big story is, please,

Brad DeLong  07:19

Eric’s big story is that you know once upon a time, there was Vladimir Lenin, there was the Bolshevik Revolution. And it created world communism, which was the world’s only hope for utopia. And in the end, world communism was betrayed by exterior enemies outside it, and by interior enemies inside of it, and it expired. But before it expired, I managed to defeat the worst tyranny in human history, the Nazis, because without the Soviet Union, the Nazis would probably still be ruling Europe. And when it expired, that brought the end of human hopes for a really good society. And, you know, from my perspective, this is a story. It’s kind of the story of the Soviet Union as tragic hero betrayed internally and externally is, you know, it’s a story that is, in some ways, simply total bonkers. Unless you’re a strong believer in world communism, as it was formed in the middle of the 20th century, you know, and Eric was right, Eric was, you know, a young Jewish teenager in Berlin in the early 1930s. You’re watching The Nazis marched past calling for the immediate death of himself and all of his family in a time when everyone else was pussyfooting with the Nazis. And you know, only the Soviet Union and the Soviet Communist Party, Soviet led German Communist Party was willing to say, these are horrible people, we need to fight them. And so he made that political commitment as a teenager and you know, was never really able to outgrow it. I’m told that even at the end of his life, if you got a couple of drinks into him, you could get him to say that, you know, Stalin had been too harshly judged by history. And a very smart guy, you know, very learned historian, desperately trying to get it right. Yeah. And the fact that someone like me thinks he could still get it so wrong is very much a cautionary tale about how I should not be proud. And be aware that other people are likely to judge me in the future the way I judge Eric.

Gene Tunny  09:30

Right. And so what do you think is the big story after 1870? So you’ve got to, you’ve got a more optimistic view of history, obviously.

Brad DeLong  09:39

Yeah. Yeah. Well, maybe that 1870 really is the hinge of history. Right. But, you know, before 1870, your technological progress is slow. And you know about infant mortality is extremely high. You’re going to see half your babies die before you’re five. And do something like 1/3 of women are going to wind up without surviving sons, should they be lucky enough to reach 50? themselves? And do you know when the pre 1870 high patriarchy world you reach 50 without a surviving son, you have no social power whatsoever, you know, you have absolutely no account, you have no one to advocate for you. And so before 1870, pretty much whenever there was an improvement in human technology, the response was, oh, great, now I can try to have more kids and raise the chances I’ll have surviving sons above two thirds. And so you’ll from minus 6000, BC, on up to 1870. There is a lot of improvement in technology. Yes, and the upper class lives better, yes. But for most people, you know, you simply have 100, and you simply have a farm size only 102 50th as large potentially at 1870, as your ancestors had back in minus 6000. And you know, you’re still living at something like $3 a day, you’re spending 60% of your income on just getting your 2000 calories plus essential nutrients. And there are a lot of days when you can’t think about much other than you’re very hungry. And that’s the state of the world before 1870. And that means that unless you’re in an extremely lucky place, or like Australia, or an extremely lucky class, that life is going to be kind of brutal, short, and without very many options, which means that in most times in most places, governance is going to be how does an elite figure out how to grab enough for itself and maintain its rule over society. And after 1870, everything changes, technological progress becomes rapid. The technological competence of the human race globally doubles every generation, you quickly get a world in which people are kind of rich enough that infant mortality falls substantially. And with that falling infant mortality, and with the erosion of patriarchy, all of a sudden, you don’t have to concentrate a lot of effort on having children, to be confident that if you reach the age of 50, you’ll still be able to run your own life. And so you’ll we get the demographic transition, now headed toward a stable world population of 9 billion. So for the first time after 1870, technology wins the race with human fertility. And we begin to look forward to a time when humanity will be able to bake a sufficiently large economic pie so that everyone can have enough. And you know, people back in 1870, and before, you know, they thought most of the problems of society came because incomes were low, and technology was underdeveloped. And you had this elite running a kind of domination and exploitation game on everyone. And once you can bake a sufficiently large economic pie for everyone to have enough, those things should fall away. And the problems of properly slicing and tasting the economic pie, right? Have equitably distributing it and then utilising it so that people can feel safe and secure and live lives in which they’re healthy and happy. Yep, those should be relatively straightforward to solve. And so we today at least we today in the rich countries should be living in a utopia, which we are manifestly not. And so the story of history after 1870 is how we’re well on the way to solving the problem of baking a sufficiently large economic pie. While the problems of slicing and tasting of distributing and utilising it continues to flummoxed us.

Gene Tunny  13:57

So with 1870, that’s several decades after what is traditionally thought of as the start of the Industrial Revolution, is it and in there are a few things that come together. Around that time, would you be able to explain that please?

Brad DeLong  14:13

Well, I’d say that the industrial revolution itself, you know, that steam power and metallurgy and early engineering, you know, they were really really weren’t quite enough that they get the average rate at which technology improves along the world up to about half a percent per year. And of that maybe, maybe a third comes from the fact that you’re concentrating on that you can cut that you’re suddenly concentrating all the manufacturing of the world in the districts, most of them in England where manufacturing is most efficient. And you know, 1/3 of it comes from the underlying engine of science and discovery and engineering. And 1/3 of it comes because we were lucky enough that the last round of glaciers, that they scraped all the rock off of the coal around a huge chunk of Northwest Europe, which left you with a lot of coal at sea level that you could just pick up off the ground and ship it out. But come 1870 you’ve concentrated all the manufacturing and you know, you’re pretty much mining out the really easy coal and you have to go deeper, which is more expensive. But the possibility was that, you know, the industrial revolution would be not completely but largely over, except that in 1870, we got the development of the industrial research labs to rationalise and routinized the discovery and development of new technologies. And then the modern corporation, the modern corporate form to rationalise scrutinise, the development and deployment of technologies plus full globalisation, which provides us enormous incentives to deploy and diffuse technologies. And so all of a sudden, instead of half a percent per year, you had a 2% per year rate of global technological change. And while it was possible for human humanity to be fertile enough to kind of offset the half a percent per year technology growth before 1870 with greater fertility and a population explosion, after 1870, even the population explosion could not keep us poor. Yeah. And then we go through the demographic transition and the population explosion reaches its end.

Gene Tunny  16:35

Yeah. So this is the industrial research lab. So you’re talking about Thomas Edison in Menlo Park. 

Brad DeLong  16:41

Yeah, Menlo Park and others. You know, I like Nikola Tesla. Because, you know, Nikola Tesla was, I suppose today, we’d call him neurologically divergent. He’s definitely not neurotypical. Which means that unless you can slot him in exactly the right place, you know, where he has lots of people surrounding him who will tolerate him being in A-hole, and pickup which of the crazy ideas he has that might actually be useful unless you have George Westinghouse to build an industrial research lab, to surround him with and then the Westinghouse corporation to deploy his technologies. While Edison is General Electric, and others are frantically trying to keep up because, you know, Tesla knew how to make electrons get up and dance in the way that nobody else did. Without that Nikola Tesla would have been no use to humanity at all, as it was he personally pushed the entire electrical sector forward in time by a decade. And that’s a wonderful set of things. That’s a wonderful set of meta inventions. You know, that turns the process of technological development from being a difficult one in which you have an idea, but then you need to be a human resource department and a executive, a marketer and impresario, an advertiser you know, a well as an engineer, in order to get anything done to one in which engineers can engineer and find people who are good at the other things, to kind of surround them and do all the things you need to do to actually deploy a technology and make it useful. And that really only falls into place around 1870.

Gene Tunny  18:23

Right, okay, yep. And what about this modern corporation or the modern corporate form? So corporations have existed in some form since well, the first few centuries? I mean, the East India Company, the Dutch East Indies Indies Company, yes, yeah.

Brad DeLong  18:40

No, no, but still, they were relatively, they were relatively small things and they were tight have very special the fact that anyone could kind of organise a form in which us have a special royal charter as well. And the idea that anyone could set up a framework which would be a a large, internal, centrally planned division of labour, which could expand and copy itself, but also which had all of these interfaces with the market economy so that it was focused on producing the things that people wanted or at least that people with money wanted. This is something that allows once you have a good idea, and once you’ve built it in one factory, you know, it’s then very natural for the corporation to say, Okay, let’s build it over in the next town. And let’s expand the factory, let’s licence it, let’s move it to another country. You know, all of that only happens to all of what you know, management. The Business School professor Herbert Simon used to call these red islands of central planning, you know, in mesh to connected with the green lines of market exchange. Those are very characteristic of the modern economy. And we really need to have those islands in there and working very well, you know, in order to be even nearly as productive as we are.

Gene Tunny  20:09

Right, and what would be the exemplars of that modern corporate form Brad, are you thinking of General Electric or DuPont of those sort of companies

Brad DeLong  20:18

In the early days, in the early days, it was things like the great farm machinery producers. Were I think the first because, you know, once you figure out how to make a Reaper or a harvester, or later on a combine, you know, demand for it is absolutely huge. And so you don’t want to have one small workshop, you know, one small workshop in some small town in Illinois or something, you know, making a Reaper when the Reaper can be put into use from the Murray Darling River Valley all the way to Argentina and up there. Yeah. Later on, it was Ford Motor Company and General Motors that were the classics. And now of course, I think it is, you know, Apple Computer, which is simultaneously the most to market economy and capitalist driven thing in the world, but also the orchestrator of this enormously complicated, and centrally planned division of labour all over the world with all of its suppliers, in which a relatively small number of people in Cupertino, California, can conduct an economic division of labour, that dwarfs that of the centrally planned Soviet Union at its most prosperous, in terms of how much money and resources are moved around in a way in which in response to commands and to requests issued by Cupertino, to produce the more than a billion iPhones that currently populate the world.

Gene Tunny  22:01

Yeah, yeah, absolutely. It’s extraordinary for sure.

Brad DeLong  22:04

And, you know, we haven’t even gotten into its role as the pusher forward of electronics technology of modern semiconductor, whereby your Apple Computer pays the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation $30 billion each year, which it then turns around and uses to invest in pushing semiconductor technology forward to make circuits smaller and chips faster and bigger, which it then sells to Apple, which then puts into iPhones so it can earn the $30 billion it needs for the next round.

Gene Tunny  22:40

Yeah, yeah, for sure. And I mean, Apple is still innovating even though Steve Jobs is no longer around.

Brad DeLong  22:47

Jobs is gone. Yeah, yes.

Gene Tunny  22:51

Okay, we’ll take a short break here for a word from our sponsor.

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Gene Tunny  23:25

Now back to the show. Can I ask you about full globalisation? You talk about that? And then you talk about what happened later in the 90s with what you call re globalisation, I think and then there’s hyperglobalisation. What I think what your book reminded me of was just those the large flows of people, and also capital that occurred in the late 19th century and before World War One, and that’s something I think Polanyi wrote about, could you talk about that please Brad?

Brad DeLong  23:54

Oh, well, one thing is to say that, that kind of from 1870 to 1914, 50 million people leave Europe and also 50 million people leave Asia. The people who leave Europe by and large go to you know, Argentina, Chile, southern Brazil, United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand. They go there they bring European biotechnology crops and animals and so forth. In Australia, they find at least before the great drought of the 1890s that there is not a better place for European sheep than Australia. And so Australia before the drought of the 1890s becomes the place with by far the highest standard of living in the world. As you know the equivalent of the equivalent of OPEC instead of oil. It’s sheep. And instead of shipping petroleum and container ships, they ship out wool in steam powered ocean going ships and they produce the you know an amazingly rich and prosperous middle class civilization of its day, something that I don’t see know very much about. Except for the things I see are the backgrounds I see on Mrs. Fisher’s murder Mr. Rene Fisher’s Murder Mystery Show, which my wife says the clothes the clothes at does extremely well. And then Australia with its large middle class, you’ll powers the demand for Australian factories and Australia industrialising and becomes and remains an extremely rich and prosperous country. Brazil might have seen the been on the same trajectory. You know, Australia has land that’s wonderful for sheep. You know, Brazil in the second half of the 19th century was the best place for rubber. It was the place rubber came from. And so you know, you have the rubber tappers of Brazil making a good living, you have the growth of the Brazilian economy, you have the construction that European singers like Enrico Caruso or Jenny Lind, when they went on world tours, they would go up to Amazon to Manassas and performing them in Manassas Opera House and things worked very, very well, except that the British arrived and they grabbed some rubber plants from Brazil and they carried them back to Kew Gardens. And then the Belgians got a hold of them and they took them down to the Congo and then King Leopold began cutting off the hands of people who didn’t bring in enough rubber from the villages. And in Malaysia, the British Empire brought down workers from China combined it who were desperate to get out of China, given how small farm sizes were and how poor China was, combined it with British capital, and this Brazilian biotechnologies, so that Malaysia, Malaysia, the Malay Peninsula becomes the world’s biggest rubber producing centre in the world by 1914. And the enormous crash, and the enormous crash of the Brazilian rubber industry as well, because the rubber plant had left all its pests and parasites behind in Brazil. And so it grew like a weed on the Malay Peninsula. And, you know, the Chinese plantation workers brought down from the Pearl River Delta, were extremely happy that the British could pay them a quarter of what the Brazilian rubber tappers were used to getting. And they would still say we’re much better off than they would be back in China. That is, and this transfer of all kinds of tropical goods and plants around the world, right that Yemen finds itself suddenly faced with enormous competition from coffee grown in Indonesia, and in kind of Costa Rica as well. Which means that if you were in the tropics between 1870 and indeed, up until 1950, you’d find that whatever you export, its price was dropping like a stone because there was all of this extra competition from all of these extra sites for production opened up by this Asian migration. Well, the rich first world countries did quite well and did quite well in large part because immigrants from India and China were by and large kept out of Australia and the United States. And so wage levels in Australia and Australia and the United States stayed very high. And they got the middle classes in the middle class demand needed to provide the demand so that they could industrialise you know, while Brazil or Malaysia or Congo really didn’t have a chance to industrialise because, you know, no middle class large enough to buy the manufactured goods and no ability to export given how cheap and how good at manufacturing Britain was back then and how eager Britain was to export. 

Gene Tunny  29:09

The story we tell ourselves is that it’s, it’s all about it was all about good governance as well. I mean, in good institutions.

Brad DeLong  29:17

Yeah, no bad governance can make something very country very poor very quickly. That and indeed, Arthur W. Economist, Arthur Lewis, you know, all those used to say, look, Australia and New Zealand are not just cousins of Canada and the United States, but also of Argentina and Chile, and in some ways South Africa. And, indeed, come 1914, Buenos Aires looks a lot like Melbourne. But then governance falls apart in the 1920s and 1930s. And even more so after World War Two. And now, you know, no one thinks of Argentina as being a country that is kind of on the same level of development of the Earth, Australia or Canada, because it simply is not. And yet, it certainly has the land, it certainly had the resources that had the education in 1914 it had the technology base, but bad governance can do terrible things. You know, you see this most with respect to communist, right that when the Iron Curtain failed in 1990, we could actually look, and we could see that those countries that had been ruled by the Communists were only 1/5, as rich as the countries immediately outside, immediately across the border. And you know, where that border was, was principally determined by where the Red Army had managed to march in 1945. Yeah, what’s the difference between Czechoslovakia and Austria? Yeah, yeah. Or Yugoslavia and Italy?

Gene Tunny  30:59

Yeah, very good point. I’d like to ask now about the what you call the is it the long 20th century? You talk about this period from 1870 to 2010? And is that the period where we were Slouching Towards Utopia?

Brad DeLong  31:15

Yeah, where every generation, we were doubling humanity’s technological competence. And it was really clear that we were solving the problem of baking a sufficiently large economic pie. And we were trying to figure out how to slice and tastes how to distribute and utilise it. And that was kind of flummoxed more sometimes than others. And people were trying various things. Some of them reasonable, and some of them absolutely horrible and genocidally destructive. Yeah, yeah. I’d say that’s what gives 1870 to 2010 its unit, you know, that we’re solving the what people thought was the big problem, but not at all solving what people thought were, but people back before 1870 had thought would be smaller problems.

Gene Tunny  32:03

Okay, and so 2010, that’s in the aftermath of the financial crisis. So that’s a pivotal event, in your view.

Brad DeLong  32:13

Except it’s not really a pivotal event, okay. It’s more like a pivotal 20 years. Maybe it starts on September 11 2001, when all of a sudden, a willingness to kill people because they worship God differently that we thought was over in 1648, at the end of the 30 Years War in Central Europe, after which people said, let’s not do that, again. We’re back. Maybe it continues in 2003, you know, when the United States stops acting like a relatively cooperative leader of the world, and instead says, We’re another great power, and we’re going to act like great powers do, maybe it’s 2007, when it becomes very clear that in the attack that an ideological attachment to the view that I’m rich, because the market has rewarded me, therefore the market must be a good thing. Had that that idea had hobbled the regulation of finance, and then come 2010 It’s clear, that same idea keeps people from responding to the Great Recession, by saying we need to get back to full employment rapidly instead, all over the globe, people are saying, well, you know, the market is a good thing. And the market has been doing this for a reason. And so you know, we shouldn’t artificially we shouldn’t artificially stimulate the economy. 2008, seemed to see the engine of technological progress itself to drop into a lower gear slow down by half or more. Starting in 2012-2013, we see the rise of anti democratic movements all over the world from you know, Modi’s version of national Hinduism to Viktor Orban and many, many others. And last, I’d say, come 2022, we have the return of major power war. Right, the idea that big wars rather than wars that are kind of a civil war component are a way to solve things. You know, even though if I wanted to convince the Ukrainians that they weren’t a separate nation, but only a Russian ethnicity, you know, I would send the Bolshoi Ballet and I would send orchestras to play the works of Tchaikovsky and I would send poets to read the poems of Pushkin in the general streets of Ukraine. I would not say send killer robots flying overboard to drop overhead to drop bombs and kill but you know the return of a major power war. Add to that global warming is now We’ll go not a distant threat. But lots of people were underwater in Pakistan early this summer and lots of people saying, Why is the Yangtze River five metres below where it’s supposed to be? It’s now a thing. And a thing for the three and a half billion people of Asia who live in the great river valleys and the monsoons and some with the coming of global warming. We have a different and more complicated and I don’t think we yet understand what the post 2010 story is. But it isn’t the technological progress is pulling ahead extraordinarily rapidly making us potentially all prosperous, and we only need to figure out how to distribute and utilise our wealth. Instead, the world faces other and probably bigger problems, and certainly more of them. So that’s why I bring it to an end in 2010.

Gene Tunny  35:56

Okay, okay. I’d like to ask you about what you call the I think it’s the neoliberal turn in your book. So you talk about how we changed or the philosophy the I don’t know, the dominant philosophy and government and politics change from social this, we’re talking about advanced economies change from social democratic, or whatever you want to call it to, starting in the 70s, and 80s, with Thatcher and Reagan. And we also had a variant of it here in Australia. You call it this neoliberal turn and would you be able to be good if you could explain what you mean by that? And also, I’d like to ask you about your this is great, one of my favourite quotes in your book, you wrote that Hyack. So Frederick Hayek, the Austrian economist Hayek, and his followers were not only Dr. Jekyll, side geniuses, but also Mr. Hyde side idiots, I love that. So if you could explain what you’re driving out there, please, that’d be great.

Brad DeLong  36:56

1945 to 1975 or so are absolutely wonderful years. peace, prosperity, the most rapid growth, at least in the Global North that has ever been seen before. Middle class society, everything seems to be going right. But come and after 1975, you know, there’s inflation, which leads to the general consensus that there’s something wrong with social democracy, that it’s handing out too many tickets to things more tickets to things than the economy and society can produce. And when you hand out more tickets, and there are seats, the result is going to be the tickets get the value that is also going to be inflation. And so social democracy needs to get a grip, and become, you know, more responsible and less willing to simply hand out tickets to anyone who asks, add to that the idea that it’s greatly over bureaucratized that the government is doing too much, and there are too many forms to fill out. Add to that, the idea that too many people have taken advantage of the social democratic system, you know, to grab benefits to which there were not in title. I remember in the late 1970s, as a young teenager, there were people who would come around with maps of where the people in Australia drawing unemployment benefits were. And the claim was that they were on the beaches. Yeah, you know, that you get unemployment benefit. And you say, Okay, I won’t look for another job for two months, I’ll go to the beach for two months, and then I’ll look for a job. That all kinds of things in which too many people were saying too many union members and welfare recipients were getting away with too much and not working hard enough. Yeah, that benefits for the slackers were too great than the taxes on the actual productive members of society were too high. And that the tax system was greatly discouraging investment. And thus, economic growth. And thus, the inflation and the slowdown of economic growth that we saw in the late 1970s. Were a result of the fact that social democracy had tapped out and it needed very much to be a rethink. And the rethink takes the form of Thatcher in the United Kingdom and Reagan in the United States. You know, the idea that taxes need to be lower, that the job creators need to be properly incentivized that, you know, the non rich need to be a little bit poor, so they’re a little bit hungrier and work harder. That sources of rent seeking, you know, people who have claims to income but who are not productive, need to have those claims erased , especially if they’re welfare recipients on the one hand, who haven’t been able to maintain a stable family, or if they happen to have lucked into a particular union that manages to have its kind of hands around the throat of some important part of the distribution system. You know, Ronald Reagan’s saying, I’m going to destroy the, Jimmy Carter in fact, Jimmy Carter was, in fact, launched the Airline deregulation effort in the 1970s. One big purpose of which was to make the lives of airline pilots a little less cushy. And Ronald Reagan followed that up by breaking the strike of the air traffic controllers. It was Jimmy Carter, who by deregulating trucking in the United States, you know, applied the same medicine to the then powerful teamsters union, saying, once deregulated trucking, you’re going to be exposed to all kinds of rail and non union competition as well, you know, in your ability to extract an extremely cushy life go. And the ability of the collected organised crime gangs of the United States to draw on the teamsters pension fund is going to be sufficiently reduced. So you have this great wheel around 1980. So much so that in 1994, Bill, Bill Clinton, who really is a Social Democrat at heart, wants to win another term, he feels he has to go out there and say that the era of big government is over. That just as Dwight Eisenhower, a very conservative person could only govern in the 1950s. By saying the New Deal, social democracy is a good thing, but I’m going to be a much better manager. Because I can say no to interest groups that are demanding too much while the Democrats are relying on those interest groups to turn out the vote. So you should elect me to be the president to run the new deal rather than let a Democrat. Yeah, so Bill Clinton was having to say that I’m going to be because I understand how valuable government can be, I’m actually the one who will do the best job of cutting it. So it’s so to do the most good. And that kind of lasted that kind of era in which neoliberal, this neoliberal view, that the market should be doing more, and the government should be doing less? You know, it really lasted up until the great recession since then, since then, we’ve had a time of confusion.

Gene Tunny  42:28

Yeah, yeah. Yeah, for sure. I’m just interested. I’m interested in your thoughts on the that neoliberal term? Because I mean, you’re someone you’ve got, you know, people who are very prominent in our time, and you worked with Larry Summers you’ve written and you’ve done research with, with Larry Summers, who was US Treasury secretary. I mean, how do you feel about all because Would you say there was some benefits to it? Because, I mean, Airline Deregulation, and I mean, that was good for consumers. How do you think about it now?

Brad DeLong  42:58

As they say, you know, in some ways Friedrich von Hayek really was Dr. Jekyll. Yeah, in that if you have a, you know, if you have a command and control system, you know, there’s somebody at the top, who’s issuing orders and everyone else is kind of not really using their mind that they’re kind of robots doing what the person at the top orders. And, you know, if you’ve ever worked in any large organisation, you know that the person at the top has very little idea of what’s actually going on down at the bottom. And will often be issuing commands about what you should do next that are best nonsensical, and that are worst highly destructive. You try to have a committee solve that problem of central command by establishing it by writing a rulebook. And then you have a bureaucracy because God knows the rulebook only covers about a third of the cases, it’s simply not possible for any small group to think about. But um, assign people private property and let them trade and exchange in a market. And all of a sudden, the people who are actually on the ground in the situation, you’ll have the ability to do things because the property is theirs. And also, as long as market prices are in accord with social values, they have a very strong personal incentive to do the right thing. Or at least the thing that makes money and then there’s the well, but our market price is in accord with social values problem, but if you can solve that problem, then a properly tuned market economy with private property is the best possible anti bureaucratic, you know, anti authoritarian crowdsourcing mechanism for helping people to organise themselves in order to do what is needed for the common good. Did you know much better to impose a carbon tax and say, you know, gas filling up your car was going to be expensive. Then too, as Jimmy Carter said to say, if your licence plate ends in an even digit, you can only fill your car with gas on even days and with an odd digit, you can only fill your gas on odd days. Friedrich von Hayek was a Dr. Jekyll positive genius and seeing this and seeing this very clearly. But as I say, he also was on Mr. Hyde style idiot. Because you’ll Hayek, having grasped on to this value of the market, he couldn’t think of anything else. And so he reached his position, which is the market economy will take modern science and technology and make us all prosperous, full stop, we need to be happy with that. We should not ask for anything else, we should not ask for an equitable income distribution or any form of social justice. Because if we do, we’ll find ourselves monkeying with the system. And when we monkey with the system, we will destroy the ability of the market to actually be productive and to make us rich. And ultimately, we’ll wind up on the road to serfdom. We won’t get social justice, and we will be at our we will make ourselves poor. And so the one thing we definitely need to do is whenever anyone starts talking about social justice, or income distribution or their rights to something that isn’t, that aren’t property rights, we need to tell them to shut up, you know that the only rights that matter are property rights, and that’s how it should be, you know, and yes, this is not social justice. You know, the market gives most things, not the people who deserved them, but instead of the people who are lucky enough to own the valuable pieces of property. But if you can’t accept that you don’t have any business doing politics or speaking in the public square. Yeah. And, you know, that’s profoundly unhealthy. That’s profoundly unhealthy in actually figuring out how we should utilise and distribute our wealth, but you know, Hayek stuck to that to the end. So much so that he was an enthusiastic supporter of Augusto Pinochet. Believing at some level that you know, Pinochet would reform Chile. And then once Marxism and Social Democracy had been stamped out, then you know, he could retire and the Chilean people could be allowed to go back to electing their governors again. But in the meantime, you definitely need it. You know, he called it the Lycurgan moment. And the myth of the semi mythical dictator, yeah, even though not a king of Sparta had established what people said was the Spartan system of government and war back in the Classical Age.

Gene Tunny  48:03

Yeah, I was shocked by that. Brad, when I read that in your book, I’ll have to go back and look at where Hayet wrote that because I mean, it’s quite shocking to think that someone who is a champion of liberty, and I mean, he’s inspired there’s a think tank in Australia, the Centre for Independent Studies, which I have a bit to do with which is inspired by Hyack. And so I mean, I’ve read Road to Serfdom, but I don’t remember anything like that, but I’ll definitely go back and look.

Brad DeLong  48:31

He gets cranky, he gets cranky or as he gets older. That, you know, in 1944, when writing the Road to Serfdom, he’s chiefly interested in trying to persuade a future British Labour Party government not to be really stupid with respect to nationalising everything in sight. But you know, he ages and as my father says when you get older, you discover that you are more like yourself and it’s not necessarily a good person. That back when you were younger and had to pretend not to be yourself and weren’t quite as much as yourself, maybe we’re better off right, Yeah. Yeah. There is a letter from Maggie Thatcher back to Hayet saying thanking him for one of his and indeed saying but you are recommending the use some Chilean and methods and do those are unacceptable given our constitutional traditions, and I haven’t been able to find out what this is in response to.

Gene Tunny  49:29

Right, okay

Brad DeLong  49:32

In the context of a world that is drifting towards Central planning and very heavy bureaucracy, it’s more understandable than as account. You know, Hayet’s, crankier parts are more understandable and useful as a counterweight than they are as you know, an accelerator, an accelerant for a kind of neoliberal era.

Gene Tunny  49:56

Yeah, I think you definitely make some I mean, a lot of what you’ve you’ve written I think is great. And I mean, I’ve been thinking about this myself, I think we’ve I feel it in Australia, we’ve probably managed things better than in the States. I mean, there’s definitely. And then the way I’ve thought about it is that some of the neoliberal policies we’ve enacted, I think, have been good for consumers, we cut tariffs, I mean, we used to have this very high tariff wall. So I think it was as late as 1988, or 89, we had a 57% tariff on motor vehicles. And so cars were, in real terms, much more expensive. So they benefited a lot. But there has been dislocation, but we seem to have manage that, because we’ve had a Social Security system and a public health care system. And I look at the states. And I mean, I mean, I think Americans, I think the US is a great country. But the lack of a public health care system, and the lack of a social security system, I think, is making things very difficult. And that’s meaning the politics becomes very, I mean, it’s just, it looks awful at the moment from over here. So yeah, that’s just a comment. But if you have any reflections, that’d be great.

Brad DeLong  51:09

Things are never as awful as they look on YouTube. Still, it’s still strong and rich, and you know the sense of a very, very strong sense of one nation, and we should all be pulling for each other. Which you won’t see if you go on YouTube or Twitter where it is indeed, the politics of you know, Ezra Klein says you get clicks only if you make enemies. And that’s really not how most people normally live their lives. But yeah, there’s a great book that’s getting some considerable play now by Elizabeth Berman called Thinking Like an Economist, you know, how efficiency replaced equality in the US public policy, which I think definitely could use a dose of the good Dr. Jekyll Hyatt, right. That says that demanding equality, demanding one size fits all rather than letting people crowdsource solutions on an individual level, is something that we should value greatly. And yet Elizabeth Popp Berman doesn’t value it at all.

Gene Tunny  52:21

Right. Okay. Okay. I’ll have to check that out. I might have to wrap up soon. But the final final question i’ve good is just referencing one of your quotes in your book where you talk about the power of some individuals, and you talk about the power of Keynes and FDR? Yeah. How do you think they would want to know it’s almost an impossible question, but how would they be diagnosing where we are today? And what needs to be done? Do you have any thoughts on that?

Brad DeLong  52:53

With respect to the Great Recession, Keynes would certainly say, I told you so. And with glory in it, because he was at some level of British upper class twit of the early 20th century. With respect to the rest, he would say that, by and large on my number with the predictions he made in a 1930 speech, he gave on economic possibilities for our grandchildren to have indeed come true. And that at least the global north is approaching the stage in which we do indeed have enough. And then our problems are that we’re kind of hag written by ideas and ideologies that were useful and essential in past poor age, you know, avarice, usery, and precaution. And that we’re also facing the prominent problem of the human race, which is how to take your wealth and resources and live life wisely and well. And he would say that he had hoped that we would have made more progress on learning how to live life wisely, and well than we have, and would have hoped that we were less hag written by you know, avarice, usury and precaution. By kind of not realising how wealthy we are. And you know, how broad open our possibilities should be, but being instead do to mean and ungenerous to ourselves and to others.

Gene Tunny  54:17

Yes, yeah. Okay. And what do you think? I mean, what would you have any thoughts on? I mean, what’s, what’s to be done, particularly in the US or in other? What other advanced economies? I mean, I mean, one of the challenges we’ve got here in Australia is how we pay for this National Disability Insurance Scheme. So we’ve got this permanent structural deficit in our budget now of about 2% of GDP. And the current government when it was in opposition committed to these what we call over here, these stage three tax cuts that are kicking in in a few years, where there’s, they’re more geared well, because the wealthier pay more tax just because of the way the system is set up. And the way these tax cuts work is that the bulk of the benefits go to the upper end. And there’s a big debate about whether it’s appropriate or not to have those tax cuts at the moment in Australia, but what are the levers? Is that you see, is it around? Is it taxation? Is that one of the levers for redistribution? Or is it regulation? What what do you see as the levers?

Brad DeLong  55:22

Well, you know, I think, I think the biggest and the best lever and in fact, the one in which the United States and Australia have historically been most successful, you know, is immigration, right. That over time, we have been very, very good at taking in people from elsewhere whose parents were not Americans, Australians, and making them into, you know, Americans and Australians. Like, I remember Maine Senator George Mitchell, you know, the guy who negotiated the Good Friday Accords in Ireland. And, you know, he looks like one of my great uncle’s, someone all of whose ancestors had been in Maine since 1750. And, you know, talked with an extremely strong accent, you know, um, and so actually, he’s simply a second generation immigrant, he’s half Irish, half Lebanese. He just looks and sounds exactly like my great uncles with their eight generations of, you know, hardscrabble time in the soil. But, um, we have enormously powerful and strong cultures, ideologies, and forms of Nash forms of national unity, that are actually not based on us all really being the descendants of our founders, and both countries willingness to take in large numbers of people from elsewhere. You know, Australia, taking in an enormous number of refugees after World War Two have been huge sources of national strength. And we are still largely empty countries, and you can move someone from Mexico to the United States, you know, from Malaysia to Australia. And you know, you are going to triple their productivity just by doing that alone. And that will generate a huge amount of potential wealth from a well we grow by immigration. Otherwise, the problem is that, you know, we had a steam power economy in 1870. And, you know, an electricity and diesel and chemical economy in 1900, and a mass production economy in 1940, and you know, a global value chain economy in 1990. And now we’re headed for info biotech economy and whatever worked in the sense of, you know, politics, economics and sociology, 30 years ago, back when the technological foundations of the economy are different, it’s probably not going to work well now. So anyone who says we need to go back to X is probably going to wind up unhappy. And so we should try to move forward into the future rather than trying to pick up models from the past. Although what those forward and the future models are, you know, that’s beyond me.

Gene Tunny  58:19

Okay. Okay. You’re telling the economic history story, the policy and then that’s, that’s for someone else.

Brad DeLong  58:28

But the big lesson of history is that trying to maintain social and economic systems past their sell by date as the technology changes underneath it just doesn’t work.

Gene Tunny  58:39

Right. Yeah. Yeah. Interesting point about immigration. We one of the one of the challenges in Australia we have is that, I mean, everyone wants to live in one of the big the three major capital cities. I mean, I’m in one of them, I’m in Brisbane, and Nick’s down in Melbourne, then Sydney is the, you know, the biggest, but the concern is that everyone wants to live in those cities. And there’s just not enough housing. I mean, we’ve got, I mean, I guess, it’s around. It’s in other advanced economies, too. But there’s a housing crisis and property prices have surged, although they are falling out, because the of the dynamics of the lending and what’s happened with the monetary policy, but they’re still very high rents are going up. So we’ve got concerns about housing availability. And in the short term, I think, if we’re bringing immigration back, I think that’s going to cause a lot of pressure. So we’ve got to manage that better and harder. No, there’s the environmental issues about allowing development. So I think, yeah, I agree with you about immigration providing benefits. So just see that in the short term. There are a lot of these absorption issues that we have to deal with.

Brad DeLong  59:48

A lot of people who think they have rights that things need to stay as they are. Yes, yes. And do you know to this, there’s a great Italian novel called I think Lampedusa, no written by Lampedusa, called Gattopardo, called The Leopard about Sicily in the 1860s, in which at one point, the young guy yells at his uncle, the count of Selena, you don’t understand in order for everything to stay the same. Everything has to change. Yeah, yeah. As the young guy goes off to join Garibaldi in the Italian revolution. And so I do think we need to look much more at the things that need to change. He says, sitting in a house built in 1897, we think, at a time, but it was surrounded by pear orchards. And now when it is half a mile or two thirds of a mile south of the university campus and two thirds of a mile north of the subway line. And so is a, that something so close to so many extremely desirable places, should house only three people right now. Rather than have been turned into a 10 storey apartment building is in some sense, an offence against land planning.

Gene Tunny  1:01:08

Yeah, well, I think we’ve got to find a better balance. I mean, who knows. That’s, that’s an issue for another episode, I think.

Brad DeLong  1:01:17

It is, you know, and we did actually build a cottage on our lot as soon as we were allowed to do so. But still. Yeah, so we did add to Berkeley’s housing stock. Yep. Still, you know,, the San Francisco Bay Area has seven and a half million people and looking back at the past 450 years of history, it’s easy to say how if we’d had a 1800s view toward development, we now have 20 million people, you know, we the size of Los Angeles in population. And it would probably be a better world I must say, because those other 12 and a half million people who aren’t here are in other places that are kind of less great to live in, and where they are likely to be less productive than they would be if they were here.

Gene Tunny  1:02:14

And just just finally, probably, you know, you’ve I don’t want to take too much of your time. But have one more question is, in your view, what are the most what’s the most important factor there is the governance, it always the agglomeration effects when they move countries because I know that Lant Pritchards crunched the numbers on this, and there’s this huge gain from moving people around the world. What’s the benefit? Where does it come from? Do you have thoughts on that?

Brad DeLong  1:02:38

A lot of it is agglomeration, thick market agglomeration effects that we don’t really understand that appear to be extremely large. And, but that also can very quickly turn into pollution and crowding effects if the local government is not competent at handling the process.

Gene Tunny  1:02:59

Yeah, I think that’s right. I think that makes sense.

Brad DeLong  1:03:03

And a lot more is that, you know, it is, throughout history, it’s always proven much, much easier to move people that where institutions are good, and where they can be productive than to somehow move institutions to where the people are, that attempts to build prosperity or build democracy in places where it does not seem to be strongly established, that those rarely go very well. And I would say, I do not really understand why that is the case. And I used to have a guru, a classmate of mine, who I went to about that, Alberto Alesina, to teach me. But alas, he dropped dead of a heart attack a few years. And I haven’t found another guru who I trust.

Gene Tunny  1:03:48

Okay, I might try and cover that in a future podcast episode. It’s a fascinating question. It just occurred to me then.

Brad DeLong  1:03:57

I love what Lant has to say about his numbers actually why his numbers are what they are.

Gene Tunny  1:04:05

Yes, yes. Yeah. I’ll put a link in the show notes to some of that work. Okay. Very good. Okay.

Gene Tunny  1:04:11

Well, I’m Professor Brad DeLong. It’s been a real pleasure. I’ve really enjoyed talking with you very much about your book and I’ll put a link in the show notes. And so if you’re listening in the audience, and please, I’d suggest getting a copy. Yeah. I’ve got it on Kindle. But I mean, it’ll be in bookstores and major bookstores in Australia I’m very sure. And yeah, Professor DeLong. Any final thoughts before we wrap up?

Brad DeLong  1:04:38

Just thank you very much. And I think be hopeful right that even though individually, each of us is just a jumped up East African plains ape who often forgets where he left his keys yesterday. Together, there are 8 billion of us and if we talk to each other together, we can be a very smart anthologie intelligence.

Gene Tunny  1:05:02

Absolutely. I think that’s a great note to end on. Professor Brad DeLong thanks so much. Okay, that’s the end of this episode of Economics Explored. I hope you enjoyed it. If so, please tell your family and friends and leave a comment or give us a rating on your podcast app. If you have any comments, questions, suggestions, you can feel free to send them to contact@economicsexplored.com And we’ll aim to address them in a future episode. Thanks for listening. Until next week, goodbye

Thanks to Josh Crotts for mixing the episode and to the show’s sponsor, Gene’s consultancy business www.adepteconomics.com.au

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