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Podcast episode

Australia’s Lost Policy Exceptionalism w/ Nicholas Gruen – EP248

Gene Tunny welcomes Dr Nicholas Gruen from Lateral Economics to explore the decline of Australia’s policy exceptionalism. They delve into the era of microeconomic reforms, the role of neoliberalism, and the challenges current policymakers face. Nicholas provides a historical perspective and discusses potential ways forward. He shares insights from his time advising the Hawke and Keating governments, discussing the successes and failures of Australia’s economic reforms from the 1980s and 1990s.

If you have any questions, comments, or suggestions, please email us at contact@economicsexplored.com  or send a voice message via https://www.speakpipe.com/economicsexplored

You can listen to the episode via the embedded player below or via podcasting apps including Apple Podcast and Spotify.

What’s covered in EP248

  • Introduction to Australia’s loss of policy exceptionalism. (0:00)
  • Regulation, economics, and politics in Australia in the 1960s and 1970s. (4:59)
  • Early Australian economic reform and its challenges. (10:45)
  • Australian economic reform under Hawke and Keating governments. (16:20)
  • Car industry policy. (21:36)
  • Free education vs HECS – why was HECS a good reform? (32:06)
  • Airline deregulation. (36:48)
  • Privatisation of public assets and its consequences. (42:55)
  • Economics of toll roads (48:18)

Takeaways

  1. Since the early 2000s, Australia seems to have lost the problem-solving spirit and policy exceptionalism of the 1980s and 1990s, struggling in various policy areas like energy.
  2. Impact of Neoliberalism: Neoliberal reforms, initially embraced by the left, significantly improved Australia’s economic landscape but also led to unintended consequences.
  3. Key reforms included cutting tariffs, higher education policy changes, airline deregulation, and other competition policy reforms, but some privatised infrastructure assets have not been appropriately regulated post-privatisation. 
  4. Challenges in Current Policy: Australia faces challenges in various policy areas, including energy and housing, indicating a need for renewed reform efforts.
  5. Moving forward will require reinvigorating honest, evidence-based policy conversations focusing on problem-solving rather than fixed ideological positions.

Links relevant to the conversation

Nicholas’s YouTube channel where Uncomfortable Collisions with Reality episode will be published:

https://www.youtube.com/@NicholasGruen

Nicholas’s Club Troppo post on economic reform featuring Colin Clark quote:

https://clubtroppo.com.au/2008/03/01/compare-and-contrast/

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Transcript: Australia’s Lost Policy Exceptionalism w/ Nicholas Gruen – EP248

N.B. This is a lightly edited version of a transcript originally created using the AI application otter.ai. It may not be 100 percent accurate, but should be pretty close. If you’d like to quote from it, please check the quoted segment in the recording.

Gene Tunny  00:00

Welcome to the economics explored podcast, a frank and fearless exploration of important economic issues. I’m your host, Gene Tunny. I’m a professional economist and former Australian Treasury official. The aim of this show is to help you better understand the big economic issues affecting all our lives. We do this by considering the theory evidence and by hearing a wide range of views. I’m delighted that you can join me for this episode. Please check out the show notes for relevant information. Now on to the show. Hello and welcome to the show. This episode features a conversation I had with Nicholas Gruen about the loss of Australia’s previous reputation for exceptionalism in public policy. This conversation will also be published on YouTube as the latest installment of Nicholas’s uncomfortable collisions with reality podcast. So check that out if you’d like to watch the video recording in our conversation, Nicholas shares some great insights from his experience as an advisor in the hawk and Keating governments of the 1980s and 1990s he’s well positioned to tell us about what went right during our so called microeconomic reform era. He’s also well placed to provide some great insights into why we’re messing things up so badly right now. I’ll be interested in your reactions to this conversation, so please let me know. You can email me via contact@economicsexplored.com Before we get into it, please be aware I’m taking a four week break after this episode, but the show will return in August. Also, thanks to Lumo coffee for sponsoring this episode. This grade one organic specialty coffee from the highlands of Peru is jam packed full of healthy antioxidants. There’s a 10% discount for economics explored listeners. Details are in the show notes. Okay, without further ado, let’s dive into the episode. I hope you enjoy it.

Nicholas Gruen  01:51

Welcome everyone to another edition of uncomfortable collisions with reality. And my guest not looking uncomfortable is Gene Tunny, my colleague, Gene Tunny and this podcast, this discussion came out of an email that gene sent me as he was reflecting on some of the work we were doing. We’ve been doing over the over the last six months. Gene please explain what the story is,

Gene Tunny  02:21

yeah. So thanks, Nicholas, good to be with you again. What I was reflecting on was that it seems that in a number of policy areas now, we seem to be struggling as a nation. Whereas I remember when I was in Treasury, we told ourselves a story about how we were exceptional in policy, there was this view that of Australian policy exceptionalism, and that was behind our recovery in terms of GDP per capita relative to our OECD peers. We had a productivity surge in the late 90s, and that allowed us to catch up with, you know, other OECD economies. And so we essentially moved from the bottom third of the OECD, the 24 countries, as it then was, to the top third, so the top eight. And there was a feeling that in large part, this was due to the the era of micro economic reform of which you were, you were part of. And, I mean, I’d like to explore that with you. And somehow we just seem to have lost that policy exceptionalism. I mean, I look at various different areas of policy, energy policies, one, for example, where we just we’re really not performing as we once did. I mean, that we things seem to be in a real bit of a mess. So I thought it would be good to discuss that. And I mean, what’s the way forward that we might see if there is a way forward? Yeah,

Nicholas Gruen  04:00

yeah. Well, it’s a subject that I’ve thought about a lot, and I can’t, I can’t sort of give you any easy answers. I can certainly give you plenty of thoughts. And I think, I guess this sort of happens a lot, when new movements turn up, and the movement we’re talking about, whether we use it as a swear word or as a word of allegiance, is neoliberalism and around the world actually certainly true of the United States, and it’s absolutely true of Australia. Australia is an exemplar here, the Neo early neoliberalism was a left of center project. It was taken most seriously by the left. And by the left, I mean the center left, and I mean people like Jimmy Carter, who had the audacity to spark pretty dramatic Airline Deregulation. They had a. Entirely regulated, ridiculously regulated civil aviation sector, in which delta airways, if they existed, would apply to the government to say, we want to go on a new route. And then there’d be lots of discussion about whether they’d be allowed to, and that that even got to them clearing menus of the food that would be would be served on these routes. And it’s pretty obvious that that regulation, if it ever had any, if there was ever any sense to it, was clearly wildly over regulated and stupidly over regulated, and we had that sort of thing as well. And in fact, my father had been part of a kind of a movement in which, I mean, he was an economist, and this was a time of triumph for economists. But I the way I saw it when I was young is that he was university educated, and he was, he was his role in society was to at least make the case as to how we could run this system better, and he was an agricultural economist. And one of the things that I remember. I think I now remember this in retrospect. I mean, I think I heard him talking about it, but I know something of the policy background, which is that in Australia in the 1960s it was illegal to put yellow dye in margarine and Gene you. I don’t know whether you know that, but you can probably extemporize now until and say why that rule existed. Why do you think it existed?

Gene Tunny  06:49

Would it be unfair competition with butter? Yes,

Nicholas Gruen  06:52

exactly, terrible. It’d be terrible for farmers. It’d be terrible. You know, it was against the human rights and farmers, and you can see you can make it’s easy to make this stuff up. We don’t want to mislead people. You know, you can smuggle in these holier than thou excuses for what you’re doing and what you’re doing is what we see every day, which is we see lawyers do it and surgeons do it, and we’re not doing much about that today, just as we weren’t doing anything about this kind of nonsense from farmers and from wharfies on the on the labor side of things back then. And so neoliberalism, in my experience, is a is a revolt against businesses politics as usual. And you’ll find some marvelous descriptions of politics as usual in Adam Smith from 200 years previously, which is business men. They were men in his day. They’re still mostly men today. Re of seldom meet even for merriment, but even for merriment, but that the conversation turns to some conspiracy against the public, yeah,

Gene Tunny  08:07

to fix prices, or something like that. It was it That’s right?

Nicholas Gruen  08:10

Or contrivance to fix prices. Or, yeah.

Gene Tunny  08:13

Can I ask about your father? For those who don’t know, I mean, Fred Gruen. He was an advisor to Prime Minister Whitlam, wasn’t he?

Nicholas Gruen  08:22

Yes, and he was a bit unusual in that regard. But he was a professor of Agricultural Economics who, in 1970 at the end of 1972 picked up Trevor Swan’s chair. He was a Trevor swan was a great Nobel Prize quality economist that Australia produced. But all his Nobel Prize quality work was wasn’t even published. It circulated around Canberra, but something known as this he growth theory. He was an innovator in growth theory. And there is you may. There’s the solo Swan model of growth. I think it’s called or it’s a solo Swan model, or maybe it’s the solo Swan model of internal and external balance.

Gene Tunny  09:11

There’s a swan Salter model, which is internal and external balance. And then there’s the solo Swan growth model, which is the neoclassical growth model. So we had two innovations, yeah,

Nicholas Gruen  09:22

that’s right. And he so he was that kind of, he was that good. And I don’t know, I don’t think either of those were published. Certainly the solos, the certainly the internal and external balance stuff wasn’t, which was basically a diagram wasn’t, wasn’t published. It circulated around Canberra. So dad got that that dad got that gig at the end of 1972 and the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet were looking around for an external advisor, a consultant, if you like. And it was. Wasn’t the prime minister. And my I think my father was quite proud of the fact that he was a consultant to the Prime Minister’s department, not a political mate of the Prime Minister, although he would have voted for that Prime Minister, Gough Whitlam. And so he then had a problem, because he just accepted this job. This is also, I think this is also a nice thing to talk about, because it talks about a world that’s more or less gone, and that is that he just accepted the chair in this position at ANU, and along came this job that he was would have loved to do, and he basically said, Well, I won’t do it if the university doesn’t want me to do it, because I’ve agreed to do this other job. I don’t think that sort of happens very much these days. And so that was worked out. And he was a part time consultant to the Prime Minister’s department, and he had been an advocate for economic reform, for freer trade, which was, which was really almost every Australian agricultural economist was a an advocate for freer trade and but, but all kinds of things at the same time, his great friend Alan Lloyd was a great campaigner for a thing called the little Desert. So he was an early environmentalist. He was saying, Look, this We’re now developing this land, which is the Ord River in WA was another famous example where it was economists who said, this recipe for development is a scam. It won’t work. We’re not getting the right advice. And it’s it’s a it’s being driven by private interests. And the little desert, a minister in the Victorian Government had a holiday home or something and wanted a road built to the little desert. Now, there may be more to it than that, but this little desert needed to be a national park. And Alan Lloyd, an economist, helped, helped galvanize. He was one of the early campaigners for this. Now, my father wasn’t nearly as strong an environmentalist. He wasn’t an environmental campaigner, but it was the same kind of mentality, which is, we want a civilized life here. Economists are there to help us be rational in pursuing a civilized and rewarding life, not just to optimize GDP. Optimizing GDP is a great thing to do other things being equal, other things are never equal, and therefore we try to make the appropriate compromises in our ignorance as we go.

Gene Tunny  12:48

Yes, okay, and so, yep. So is that a good place to start with, the reform era, if you’d call it that in Australia. Yeah.

Nicholas Gruen  12:55

So that was kind of what I was getting at. So it’s, it’s kind of London to a brick at that stage, for any I don’t know whether that’s an English saying, I suppose it must be an English saying, not an Australian saying. I’m thinking of our international listeners, but it’s kind of obvious that at that early stage there is lots of low hanging fruit. There’s lots of worthwhile things to do, a lot of completely crazy and and and borderline corrupt things going on. And by corrupt here, I don’t mean that any that money is necessarily changing hands. I mean in the sense that Adam Smith meant it, that government decisions are being influenced by private to advantage private people and to advantage private interests. And so this was the early part of economic reform. Gough Whitlam himself was, if you kind of look through the chaos, was this was an important part of Gough whitlam’s political rhetoric, which is that the super phosphate bounty should be justified on economic grounds, and we’re going to take it off the farmers because we’re doing a bunch of other more sensible things. And of course, that turned into a big political bun fight. And likewise, we’re going to take the opportunity in 1973 we had this situation. Remember, we didn’t have floating exchange rates, and we had a lot of pressure on the current there was a lot of pressure to revalue the currency, and we did that as I recall, but we also took the opportunity to cut tariffs because the economy was booming. We didn’t have enough labor. Inflation was taking off, so this was a great opportunity to achieve longer term goals in a way that was very consistent with short term imperatives. So that was early. Uh, that was early neoliberalism, and it was a success. Then along comes a massive recession, and then, and this is somewhat unfair to Malcolm Fraser’s government, but not terribly unfair. Malcolm Fraser wins government, promising jobs, not dogma. Malcolm Fraser is part of a an operation which blames tariff which blames unemployment on tariff cuts. It wasn’t tariff cut. Very little of it was tariff cuts. Most of it is macroeconomic. Most of it’s the state of the economy, which is a different thing, and Whitlam can take some uh, reverse credit for that. Whitlam management the economy was far from exemplary management of the macro economy. And the other main thing that was leading to large scale layoffs in Australia was equal pay for women, particularly in textiles, clothing and footwear. Well, no government so Malcolm Fraser wasn’t going to come out and say it was equal wages for women. That is, that did it. So this thing suffers from politics. I’m not, again, I don’t want to be overly critical of Malcolm Fraser. It’s a bit like being critical of lions for eating meat. That’s kind of what or or business people for making profits. That’s kind of what they have to do to stay in business. And, and, but then, after with this sort of promising towards the end of his reign, towards the end of Malcolm Fraser’s reign, he became famous for giving speeches overseas talking about how great free trade was, and arguing for countries to embrace free trade, and coming back to Australia and not doing a damn thing about how very high protection levels and that that sort of set the scene for the Hawke government and the glory Days, which lasted until arguably the first third of the Howard government, from the whole of the Hawke Keating government, and then in economic terms until 2001

Gene Tunny  17:10

Yeah, okay. And I mean, Fraser government famously sat on the was it the Campbell inquiry report into the financial system, there were, yeah,

Nicholas Gruen  17:22

I think that’s right. It was a record, yeah, that’s right. And then it was the Martin inquiry that the Hawke government had, yeah, when it got in. Yeah, that’s correct.

Gene Tunny  17:30

So I think there’s a general recognition among conservatives in Australia that the Fraser years were a wasted opportunity to reform the economy, to to make it more

Nicholas Gruen  17:46

and and I recall, I think it was the 20, I think this was 19. I mean 2003 I think it was, yeah, it would have been during, yeah, it was 2003 rather an interesting time, because I went to a dinner that was put out, put on by people associated with the think tank. You’re associated with the CI, the Center for Independent Studies, right of a right leaning Think Tank. Now it wasn’t, it wasn’t an official function. Was a whole bunch of people, people like Andrew Norton and a bunch of other people. It was a dinner. It was just a dinner in Melbourne. It was a dinner to celebrate the election of the Hawke key, of the Hawke Labor government in 1983 because that was seen as the beginning of Australia getting serious about economic reform, becoming better than pretty much anyone else in the world, and I think held in 2003 people were already starting to be anxious that the Howard Government, really, having done its having kind of had a near death experience with the GST, just sort of improvised away. We know that when it got control of the Senate, then we need to another reform paroxysm which killed it off. At least. That’s the that’s the folklore, but it but, but by but Howard. I think of Howard as a very momentum free politician. He was a good politician in a number of respects, and I use that term as in terms of virtuosity rather than virtue. He was good at what he did, and he had a certain idea about what he wanted. And I don’t fully I’m not very sympathetic with that, but I have some sympathy for it now in the age of wokedom, of talking about things like practical reconciliation rather than symbolic stuff. But then anyway, that’s another that’s another topic, but Howard lost momentum almost immediately on. Gaining office, the business community was very upset about it. I was working for the Business Council at the time, and it was an attempt at a reasonable interpretation, is that it was an attempt to to respond to that listlessness that Howard said we’re going to have tax reform. And that turned into another major reform episode in Australia, and that was kind of the last one. Yeah,

Gene Tunny  20:32

yeah. So be good to talk about Hawke and Keating, I mean, very consequential government that essentially brought about the end of what Paul Kelly called the Australian settlement. This is something I talked about with my friend Darren Nelson on a recent episode of my podcast economics explored, you know, the conciliation arbitration, the the, you know, the very rigid IR regulation, the tariff wall, White Australia Policy, although that ended under Whitlam, I suppose. But that that had ended before, it had sort of ended before you, I think. And then there are a couple of other elements of the I might have been Imperial preference that had already gone. And there was another. There was one more element, maybe state paternalism, I think it was the his five elements of the Australian settlement. And, you know, that is that really, you know, shook things up. It got rid of the tariff wall. And as I’m sure, we’ll, we’ll talk about, and, you know, various other policy innovations. Can I ask? How did you get involved in it to begin with, you’re, you’re an advisor to John Button. Were you the industry? I

Nicholas Gruen  21:41

asked as an advisor to John Button. I was my first job out of it. Was my first job out of uni, and I got the job. I think, yeah, I think this is how I got the job. I was a volunteer in Gough whitlam’s office in 1977 when he was in opposition. I was at uni, and I used to go in and do a couple of hours filing for his secretary, Roz Byrne, and I’d just go in and do her filing. And occasionally this enormous red faced man would walk in, walk past, say, slaves coffee, and then walk, then walk into his office. And anyway, I met him once or twice, and John Button used to board in ROS burns house in Canberra. And I don’t know whether I don’t know what happened, but I may have said to ROS I was looking for a job or something. Anyway, I started working for John Button when he was Shadow Minister for Communications in 1981 then I went back to uni in 1982 and finished a law degree. And then in 1983 Hawke got in. And so I started working for John Button, and he put and and the government had got in with a classic opposition’s promise, which is General Motors. Holden had sacked 14,000 workers. Ford was sacking people, and the labor policy was that this was a disgrace. Was all the government’s fault, and that what we and we would review it and fix it up so no one had any idea what to do. And I was given this job, and it was completely fascinating, and it sort of extend, you know, I kind of, I’d never studied economics, but I realized, I realized, in retrospect, that I understood a lot about economics because I’d been talking to my dad about it at the dinner table. And one of the strange things that happened was that I didn’t really I ended up making common cause, not with the economists in the what was then called the industry’s Assistance Commission is now called the Productivity Commission and the Treasury, because they were in ways that I can explain extremists of a certain kind. And I I basically made common cause. And then there was John Button’s department, the Department of Industry and Commerce. It took me, I don’t know, six or nine months. John Button said to me, what do they want? And I said, I don’t know. And, and it took me, I don’t know, nine months to work out that they were following Jerry Seinfeld’s principles of life, which is, we’re not thinking anything. We’re just walking around, looking around, and, and they were sort of, they had this immensely complicated system of local content plans and and limits here, and special rules there, and they were just sort of having meetings with all the stakeholders and trying to keep them as happy as they could. I. Yeah. So anyway, I ended up making common cause with people in people like Ed vis board in the department and John spaziovich in the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet. And these people were all economically trained, but they weren’t economic zealots. They knew that local content plans made no damn sense. They were broadly free trading, but they didn’t get themselves as tied up in the culture war of in the culture war of of neoliberalism, of of economic reform and so on.

Gene Tunny  25:39

So what was the Could you explain the local content plan this? This was highly interventionist industry policy. Was it for the car? Well,

Nicholas Gruen  25:47

I’ll start with a few, a few riddles, if you like, a few questions. Which is, what government body made an independent recommendation to have a local content plan for Australia in the car industry, answer the tariff board, which was the forerunner of the industry’s Assistance Commission that was in 1957 year. I was born then in 1965 al frantic, and was the chairman of the Productivity Commission of the in of the tariff board. And he’s a kind of Saint among us, among us early neoliberals. And he recommended a and he signed off on a report that recommended a local content plan as well. So he was figuring stuff out himself. Now the local what the local content plan said was that in return for the for access to duty free components, so there’s a tariff of 35% on components. You can have free components if your local content is over 95% now this was always a moving feast. And the big thing that came along was not really that. That killed the industry all on its own. We had the oil shock and a swing towards smaller cars that Australia was bad at making. And then everybody looked all the policy makers looked at Japanese cars coming in and said, Well, can we make those here? Which was a terrible idea. And so then what happened was that we watered down the local content plan for them, to get them to assemble here. They started making cars at about 60% local content. 60% local content is basically zero. What we would, what a non economist would think of a zero local content. There’s virtually no pieces. You pick up some tyres and some windscreen wipers and some spark plugs. But basically, this is a fully imported car, imported in pieces and stuck together in Australia. And then it and then, and then they fiddled. And then so there was a 65% local so then we wanted to get their content up from 60% to 65% and then so there was a 65% plan and a 95% plan. And of course, lots of fights between different factions of the industry. They’re saying, Well, you’ve so Holden and Ford would just say, well, thanks a lot. When we’re making serious cars here and we are now discriminated against, these people have got access to these people have got access to 35% of their content, duty free. So then the Department of of do Industry and Commerce would say, well, we’ll put quotas on these so you can only make 30,000 of each of these things. And it just went on. It just went on and on. I mean, let me tell you one other thing, which was a thing called the non reversion rule. And that was that if you had, if you had started buying breaks in Australia, and then your break supplier was a lousy break supplier, or for some other reason you wanted to change, you weren’t allowed to, and you have to get permission from the non reversion from the reversion Committee, which was a body that sat in the Department of Industry and Commerce. And I will say one further thing, which is that in 1974 under the Whitlam government, that rule had been torn up as part of tariff cuts and things like that, and there was a caucus revolt. And guess who, and guess who moved the motion to retain the to retain the non reversion rule, one, one Junior, the. Old, soon to be Junior minister, then back bencher, member for Blaxland. Need I say more? Paul Keating anyway, like Ratigan, Paul Keating changed his tune on a lot of those things.

Gene Tunny  30:15

Yeah, it’s fascinating just how differently we did things back then. I mean, the past is a foreign country, as they say, Isn’t it just extraordinary? Yeah, yeah. And what do you see as the highlights of that reform era of Hawk and Keating? What do you see as the real great achievement? Well,

Nicholas Gruen  30:35

obviously, cutting tariffs, getting rid of tariffs, is a major highlight. I’ll tell you something that I think of we should put further up there. I know well, Bruce Chapman will thank me for this, but it’s not really, it’s not that it was a great intellectual piece of genius, and this is the higher education charge hex. Now that was something that Milton Friedman had suggested, and it’s just bleedingly obvious. And the reason I and so, what it is, is that the government sits there and says, Well, we administer the tax system that makes a great piece of infrastructure, which we can build finance around, and we can say to people, we’ll help you. We’ll fund your education, and you will and then we’ll once your income achieves a certain amount, we will chart, we’ll tax you more, and we will tax some of that money back. So I think of that as the sort of neoliberalism I would have liked to see far more of we also did it for we also did it for child support. So typically ex husbands, but doesn’t have to be it can be ex wives who have left a left some partnership, instead of the ram shackle system that is run by the courts. Once you have a court order, we then run all that through the tax system, and it works like a charm. Yeah.

Gene Tunny  32:07

Can I ask about, oh, sorry, I was just gonna ask about, Heck, yeah, because that was very controversial at the time. I mean, I was in, I was probably in high school at the time, and I remember, like, you’d see all the news footage of the protests at university, and people were saying, Oh, this is the end of free education, and we’re going to be a backward nation. There’s a lot of controversy. What, what do you see as the benefits? I mean, did it allow an expansion of higher education? Well,

Nicholas Gruen  32:34

well, that was the argument. And I think the answer is yes, but I do. I mean, I think that the thing about the thing about hex, was that the argument for Hex, and again, it was a left leaning neoliberal argument, and the argument picked up by the right and the argument for people paying for their own tuition is that, guess who gets their own tuition? People who are predominantly wealthy, relatively speaking, so it’s it’s so it’s very hard to get around the the fact that free education produces a subsidy from the least well off to the comfortably well off and the comfortably well educated. Now, in fact, that gives me an opportunity to kind of complicate my story, because I’m not sure. Well, firstly, I didn’t really agree with the way hex was introduced. We were told fairly arbitrarily when the when the was the RAND Neville ran, was on the committee, and Bruce Chapman is the person who’s the economist, who’s associated with this. The RAND committee, as I recall, recommended that hex recover 20% of cost. Now, my in my way of thinking, if you’ve if you become a lawyer and you’ve become extremely successful, I don’t see any problem with asking you for 100% of those costs back. In fact, I don’t see any problem with asking for 150% of those costs back. And that takes you back to the idea that which, again, neoliberal, neoliberalism is expunged largely which is progressive marginal tax rates. Australia has cut its top marginal tax rate, like almost every other western country, but still has one of the highest, which I think we can be proudest of, not now, that’s we can argue about when it should cut in. But this was one of the, this was one of the what Martin, whether I can call it the jewels in the crown, it was, it was a piece of common sense among economists of my father’s generation that as you get more money, money becomes less important to you. And therefore, if you can take more. Money off wealthy people without messing up their investment decisions too much, either with their human capital or their physical capital, go for it. That’s a good thing to do. So so it’s so in a way, hex is a nice segue, because it shows you that these arguments that the neoliberals put were right and powerful, but they weren’t complete that they weren’t so it’s absolutely true that free education with an ex with the same existing tax system is is, is a certainly in the short term, a transfer of wealth, transfer income, to the well off and moderately well off from the poor, or not the poor, but the working poor. And so that should have been factored in, it wasn’t factored in. So one of the things neoliberalism did is that it bit like modern university education. It kind of compartmentalized things, and it said university fees, we’re going to talk about that as its own system. And there’s some sense to do that, but it’s all in a larger system, and we’ve got to try and do both things,

Gene Tunny  36:23

some other successes of what they call neoliberalism. Now I’m, I’m a bit reluctant to use the term, because it seems to be always used pejoratively. Yeah, and oh, you’re this neoliberal economist as a way of dismissing what economists say. So I’m always

Nicholas Gruen  36:40

where. That’s what always happens with such words, yes,

Gene Tunny  36:45

yes, anyway, but I was just thinking of other successes. There’s the the airline. Was it deregulation? Did

Nicholas Gruen  36:51

we have a two airline policy here? Yeah, two airline policy was crazy, but, but again, let’s have a look at two airline policy. So what we did was we, we had a kind of nutty system, and it was a kind of, it was a compromise that Menzies made. Because I think what happened was that Chifley was sort of halfway through nationalizing airlines at the time, and so Menzies created this cozy little duopoly. And there were nice cartoons of a twin bodied plane flying from from Melbourne to Sydney, with one one of the fuselages had an set written on it, and the other one had TAA, as it was called, trans Australian airlines, which has subsequently became quant well, was subsequently bought by Qantas. So, so that was a kind of complete mess, and it was like the local content plan. However, airlines are naturally very oligopolistic, and so that was an opportunity not, not, not to just think, Well, I think deregulating the airline was with a system was better than what we had. I think that’s quite clear, but it sort of jumped out of the out of, well, sort of, let’s say it jumped out of the out of the fire and into the frying pan. In other words, it is a bit better, but I think we could have done quite a lot better. And let me give you an example of what I mean, quite a because it’s this is hard. It’s hard to interact oligopolies are hard to interact with. Policy finds it hard to interact with oligopolies. Helpfully, it’s one of the problems we have with supermarkets and things. But this is one of the things we could have done at the same time as deregulating the airlines, or a little bit later, actually, we implemented national competition policy. And national competition policy gave us the tools to say to Qantas, oh, by the way, your your terminal facilities, or some chunk of the terminal facilities that we require you to negotiate with us are, I think, the term and the relevant act is, infrastructure of national significance, and any newcomer. Remember, compass was an old newcomer, and a recent one is bonds or airlines. I think it was called, any newcomer has a right to pay you a commercial price to access those resources. We didn’t do that. And in fact, we did something quite different, which is we essentially allowed, and we would have, I’m pretty sure we would have been doing this while it was publicly owned, or majority publicly owned. We allowed Qantas to do what oligopolists do, which is to have price wars, targeted price. Wars against any new entrant, and that’s the exact opposite of the sort of behavior that we want. And so here’s two policy levers that we had, and we sort of behaved as if, we sort of behaved as if those policy levers didn’t exist. They barely were discussed in the in at the time, and one way of thinking about our failures in reform is to say that we went through a very comprehensive process of policy reform, and we had a quite a powerful philosophy of private enterprise, and really no philosophy of public enterprise, of the role of the public sector in in being a good host for the most competitive possible private sector we could have,

Gene Tunny  40:47

right? And so is this why I think I’ve heard you say this before, or you’ve written it that the micro economic reform era, it contained the seeds of its own demise, or, etc, yeah, yeah. Well,

Nicholas Gruen  41:01

yeah. I mean, what I would say is that it, it, it collapsed into a kind of reductive formula. And the reductive formula was that being market oriented was somehow better than not the and so something like re fashioning the CES the Commonwealth employment services as job active and as a network of private competitors. I’m not actually, I’m not saying that’s a terrible thing to do. I’m saying that, if you do it, pay attention to the problems that the public sector, that the public system has tried to deal with, and be confident that you’re doing a reasonable job on them. And if you can do that, then you might some of this might work. But we didn’t really do that. We just we’re in there, and VT, particularly in Victoria, we just said, Oh, this looks pretty you know, this is kind of competitive. It’s, this is sort of like supermarkets or something, and it’s not these different sectors operate differently. And if you were going to play your role as a custodian of the public interest. You have to think about these things in a critical way, not in a formulaic way. So that’s what I that’s the way in which this, these ideas that, and I’m kind of romanticizing it a bit. I think, as a young person, did his what he saw people older than him do, but it as I saw it when it was being built. This was an engine of human liberation in the spirit of the Scottish Enlightenment and Adam Smith. And it was a problem solving. It was a problem solving mindset, and it became an ideology. It became a formula, and we just went from one difficult area of policy after another saying, Well, how hard can it be? We’ll privatize electricity or as much of it as we can. And then, oops, we got the regulation of rates of return wrong on transmission. Well, how much harm can that do? Well, $100 billion of too much investment, that’s how much harm that’s, that’s, that’s not bad, that’s not bad. Just a little, just a little glitch.

Gene Tunny  43:37

Yeah, yeah, there’s, yeah, there’s certainly been problems. And yep, if you’re going to privatize monopolies or natural monopolies, and you need to have effective regulation and, and, well,

Nicholas Gruen  43:48

yeah, and we don’t know a lot about what we’re not, you know, the state of economic knowledge is not so great. We can, we can help prevent things being a complete disaster. But the state of economics is not so great that we can be that helpful in producing a great result from a from a sector like that. But one thing, I mean, another thing that economic reform did, really, I makes me quite angry, actually, is that there were things that were being done, that were obviously wrong economically, and which were not corrupt in the sense of money changing hands, although that might have happened, but corrupt in a policy sense that we would we were the governments were getting away with mortgaging the public interest. And I The example I give. I remember Chris Richardson telling me this at a conference. Now at No actually, he’s not at Access Economics. I don’t think a Deloitte Access Economics. I think he’s playing his own trade. But I remember Chris Richardson telling me that the Commonwealth Government was selling off its offices. Office, and it was selling off its offices so that it could sell them to a property in trust and rent them back. And the rent would be substantially more than the interest that they were paying. The rent would be about a real return of 7% and they were and they the interest they were paying was a real return of 5% just a plan to miserize the public sector and and it’s just just working out on a spreadsheet. And we’ve done this with every tonight, I’m driving out to the airport. If I go on the road that is the most direct route to the airport in Melbourne, I will pay $20 $20 in fees for 15 minutes, either way, on a on a tollway. And that is much more than what I would be paying or the state would be paying if the government had built that and we replicated that, Sydney did this, and Melbourne did this, and it’s being done much less now, for various reasons, partly because these things have fallen over, because the price the private sector got better at doing them, and then ended up having to sharpen its pencil too much. And there were various bankruptcies. Queensland made these mistakes much less than the southern states. As I recall, you’ve got if you’ve had a few of them, but you’ve done rather well because you had a privately built train line to the airport, and that went broke. But I think the state did rather well out of that. Anyway,

Gene Tunny  46:41

costiness, it’s controversial now, because, because of that deal, it’s a 30 year deal and extend it, you know, and certainly the state government got some money out of it, some reasonable money out of it, but, yeah, because it overlaps with the Olympics, like the deal lasts longer than the Olympics. Yeah, we Brisbane City Council can’t run busses to Brisbane Airport, and that’s going to affect our ability to get people to the games,

Nicholas Gruen  47:07

exactly. And so it’s financially very generally speaking, I don’t know about the Brisbane train line, but generally speaking, the this form of funding, because it uses private funding, not government borrowing. It’s about 40% more expensive, but that’s before you count these things where you have to sign away your ability to improvise using the infrastructure you have, which has happened in Melbourne. So we’ve widened the Tollway to Tullamarine airport. And of course, how do we do that? Well, the the owner says, Oh, well, we don’t really want to do that unless you extend our monopoly for another decade or two or three. So you’re basically caught up in this evergreen monopoly, and you’ve signed away your ability to use infrastructure the way you need to use it. It’s really terrible.

Gene Tunny  47:58

Yeah. And so, I mean, look, I mean, I’m, I like the idea of, you know, trying to use the private sector as much as possible, but I do recognize that in many cases, governments in the past have made decisions based on what they saw as a favorable short term budget treatment like the wholesale and leaseback. Yeah, yeah.

Nicholas Gruen  48:19

Well, let me make a rhetorical point, but it’s a pretty important one. We call these mechanisms for these free these mechanisms for funding freeways, public private partnerships. In England, they call the private finance initiative. Now I think it’s really important, a really nice way to crystallize This is to say that with roads, are always public private partnerships. It’s just that they were good private public partnerships when governments designed, funded and then outsourced the building of them. That’s a good that’s an excellent interface between the public and the private sector. The public does its role, which is to stay in control of planning a city, and it’s a cheaper source of funds. So if you keep that reasonably efficient, that’s going to work for you. And then you’ve got the private sector grinding the gravel and and running the steamrollers up and down and laying the concrete. That’s exactly how you know these weren’t these weren’t these, these, these. None of these roads are built by governments. They’re they’re funded by governments. They’re planned by governments. And you really should have a good reason, and so saying you’ve got private funding when this is a thing that Tony Harris, the former auditor general of New South Wales, says, you know, this stuff, we can’t afford to build it. What absolute nonsense. We can’t that’s simply not true. So sort of a throwaway line, and then you end up building something that’s 40% too expensive and. It ties you up in knots for decades.

Gene Tunny  50:03

The other point, I think, is interesting, is one John Quiggin makes. He gave, he gave a really good talk to Economic Society of Australia, Queensland branch a few years ago. And his point is that, I mean, the issue with toll roads is that you’re not thinking as the road network, as a whole network, as a whole system, and you can end up it can be inefficient in an economic sense, yeah, yeah. Just basically,

Nicholas Gruen  50:27

I mean, that is what a transport economist will learn at university and and our trends and the transport economics that our system implemented, didn’t know any transport, didn’t know any of that stuff. That just sort of said, Oh, well, you know, market, you know, we’re going to stick a toll road here. I mean, all of these toll roads. You know that if you ask the question, why a toll road there? Well, that’s just because a particular politician had a particular thing that they wanted to do at a particular time. There’s, there’s no logic to any of that.

Gene Tunny  51:02

Yeah, yeah. And so we’ve got arterial roads clogged, but yet we’ve got toll roads which, which could take some of that traffic, but because there’s a toll on it, people are hopping on it. And in

Nicholas Gruen  51:15

fact, you know, as you would know, Gene hope I’m not being presumptuous. I think you would agree with this. The standard economic textbook answer is, if you want to put tolls on roads, put them on the old clogged ones, not on the new not on the new ones that are not congested. That’s where the opportunity costs are.

Gene Tunny  51:34

Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. So you should be charging a court. You know, the congestion charging that economists talk about, absolutely. Yeah. I’m just thinking we’ll probably have to start wrapping up soon. But I want to ask you before we go, yeah, about this great quote from Colin Clark in an article you wrote, you put it in your compare and contrast article about in the early days of the Rudd Government in 2008 Yeah? And, I mean, Colin Clark, at the time was, he was working here in Brisbane, I think in Queensland, is economic advice.

Nicholas Gruen  52:07

No, no, no, he wasn’t. No. He was working for Keynes in England, and he went back to Queensland. But that’s where the quote, that’s the, oh, actually, it says, I want to stay in Australia. So it must have what must have happened is Colin Clark, a great Australian economic historian and economist who was instrumental in building national accounting. Was, I guess he must have been at Cambridge, possibly was at lac, but he was a big contributor to the econocracy, the iconocrates in such as they were in the United Kingdom. I think this is so. This is in the 30s, and Keynes says to him, I think Keynes had the same sort of attitude to Australia as Churchill did, which is us into the world, basically. What the hell would you want to go there? So do you want to read it? I can read it

Gene Tunny  53:03

well. If you you’ll read it with more passion, I think, than I will. So please go ahead. Yeah. So

Nicholas Gruen  53:12

he’s so John. John Maynard Keynes is saying, Look, come to England. You know, we’ll get the band back together. This is really important work to be done here. And he says, I’m reaching the conclusion I want to stay in Australia. People have minds which are not closed to new truths, as the minds of so many Englishmen are. Of course, Keynes would have agreed with him about that, and with all the mistakes Australia has made in the past, I still think she may show the world in economics. And I think of that as a sort of we did show the world. We showed the world with Australian exceptionalism, until around about 2001 and then the politics as usual caught up with us.

Gene Tunny  53:58

We might have to come back and talk about, you know, how we might reinvigorate that exceptionalism. Yeah,

54:06

that’d be good.

Gene Tunny  54:07

I think it’s having honest conversations and and not believe in your own you know. I mean, we have, we seem to have too many fixed positions on some of these issues, and ideology plays a role. But I think to resolve some of these, we really have to be much more open, yeah, and just have those conversations. But yeah,

Nicholas Gruen  54:27

I agree with that. And I also think that there are a lot of people it’s easy to pose as an expert about these things, and the experts actually, there’s a marvelous quote from and I’m he was the editor of The Sydney Morning Herald, and he resigned on a matter of principle about Vietnam. And his name was Tom Fitzgerald, and he gave the Boyer lectures. You can’t get them on the net, which infuriates me. And he said that Paul Samuelson, the great post war. Economist talked about my down under heroes, and what he was talking about was the way in which the economists of the Brigden committee in the 1930s anticipated his ideas about factor proportions driving trade. And Tom Fitzgerald said that economists that good economic policy relies on talented amateurs to it relies on a kind of, you know, people like Henry George, a 19th century economist who came up with a very simple and incredibly important idea and was rather and other more learned economists were rude about him, basically. But I’ll try and find that quote, but, but my point is that, I mean, I, I, well, here’s, I hope this doesn’t offend anyone, but I worked for two ministers, and one of them had an economics degree, John Dawkins and the and then I saw Paul Keating in action. I’m not a huge fan of Paul Keating, but Paul Keating had a terrific intuition about what economics was about. He was the only one who could on the Sunday interview program, explain not that he used these terms. He could explain the principle of comparative advantage. He could explain why it wasn’t in Australia’s interest to have trade barriers, even if other countries had trade barriers. And so in that sense, I mean, that’s what we we need. But what I’m getting at is that everyone and their dog and all the journalists class, they pose as economic experts, and almost an awful lot of these people are kind of surfing. They’re kind of sound. They’re going with the vibe, but they’re not that. They don’t, they don’t. They don’t have a real regard for the simplicity, and was an odd word to use, but the beauty of some of the basic ideas and economics, and that means they just end up confused and following the latest, following the latest, the latest trend, the latest fact. Yeah, yeah, economics is about problem solving, and there’s this whole discipline. It helps a little bit, but mostly about problem solving on the merits.

Gene Tunny  57:33

Yeah, exactly. And I think, yeah. I think you’ve, you’ve given some good examples of how there was that problem solving approach in the 80s. I mean, you talked about hex and, I mean, you know, the various other innovations. I mean, it certainly was an incredible reform period. And, yeah,

Nicholas Gruen  57:51

I mean, another problem we had was the trade deficit. It wasn’t entirely clear whether we should regard it as a problem that was a controversy in itself, but what we did was we adopted a very principled approach, which, I mean, it was haggled through politics, but that was the superannuation system. Now, again, I’m quite critical of certain aspects of the superannuation system, but I think I participated as an amateur in this debate that people rather like, which is, why did New Zealand do so much worse than Australia and we were both economic reformers, and I don’t think anyone really knows, but I think one of the reasons is that we gave ourselves access to a big pot of savings, and we lowered the cost of investing, of investment in Australia, and the New Zealanders did the opposite. They didn’t. They’re, I think the only developed world country that doesn’t have a capital gains tax certainly doesn’t have an effective one. And I think those things, those things might matter, but, but that was an example of a bit like the tariff cut an example of a series of themes being run together and turning into a policy solution to a range of problems. Of course, as is almost inevitable with a system like as big as that, especially set up by politicians, advised by economists. We didn’t get much of a look into certain aspects of it. It also created some new problems, but there you are. Life goes on, and we try and solve those as well.

Gene Tunny  59:33

Yeah, yeah. I’ll have to have a closer look at New Zealand. I mean, the big thing I think about is, I mean, we’re lucky. We’ve got iron ore and coal, and New Zealand’s got sheep. So, I mean, it’s, you know, we’ve, we’ve been very fortunate in some of our the minerals that we have and that we can export, although there’s an argument over whether we’ve properly, whether we’re properly taxing the the economic rents that earned off those resources. Yeah,

Nicholas Gruen  1:00:00

that that might be right. But then again, there’s the we’ve got a, we have a I think right now we’re in the grip of a mild form of the resource curse. And you know, the wealthiest, the countries that have done well in the last 3540 years have been resource poor countries. New Zealand has some fantastic assets in in tourism, in dairy, you know, could have tried to set itself up as an offshore bank. We’re not in offshore banking. Now, that wouldn’t do the world any favors, but it might have done New Zealand some favors the way the Irish managed to get some favors done for it. So but, but anyway, they weren’t really thinking. They weren’t thinking like that. And, but, but, look, I don’t know. And I think it’s the other possibility with New Zealand is that its distance from major markets started to matter more than than than it mattered in the 1970s but it’s quite remarkable that New Zealand and Australia have exactly the same standard of living until 1970 and then they just diverge, and now they’re about 20 25% less well off. One other thought is that there are two countries in the in the developed world, two English speaking countries, that effectively have an elective dictatorship, and they’re the English speaking countries that have done worst, the UK and New Zealand. They have a single house. They have no federal infrastructure. So the game is, you head for the center, you persuade the center to do what you want, and then it does what it wants. And it turns out that that you know that that might not be such a distributing power and having more deals and and more log rolling, more deals done to in the way that we do in the Senate. Of course, it’s, it’s like, like Bismarck said, It’s like making sausages. It’s better if you don’t see them being made, but the result turns out, turns out to be better.

Gene Tunny  1:02:07

Yeah, very good. Okay, Nicholas grew and that was, that was good. I learned a lot about your experience in that in the reform era, and some some highlights from it, and just thinking about how we might do better in the future.

Nicholas Gruen  1:02:23

So Well, there we are. We’ve got a teaser for the next for the next episode.

Gene Tunny  1:02:27

I think so. I think so. So you’re happy to wrap up here. Yeah, that sounds good. That’s okay. Very good. Okay. And thanks everyone for for watching and listening. Really appreciate it. And Nicholas, I’ll catch up with you sometime soon for another uncomfortable collision with reality.

Nicholas Gruen  1:02:46

Thank you.

Credits

Thanks to the show’s sponsor, Gene’s consultancy business, www.adepteconomics.com.au. Full transcripts are available a few days after the episode is first published at www.economicsexplored.com. Economics Explored is available via Apple Podcasts and other podcasting platforms.

Categories
Podcast episode

Government vs. Private Sector: Who Generates Wealth? – EP247

In this episode, Gene Tunny explores the relationship between government spending and wealth creation. He talks about President Obama’s memorable expression, “You didn’t build that”, and how economists think about the role of government and wealth creation. Gene discusses the roles of both the government and private sector in generating wealth and their impact on productivity, GDP and living standards. 

If you have any questions, comments, or suggestions, please email us at contact@economicsexplored.com  or send a voice message via https://www.speakpipe.com/economicsexplored

You can listen to the episode via the embedded player below or via podcasting apps including Apple Podcast and Spotify.

What’s covered in EP247

  • Government role in the economy – private sector vs public sector. (0:00)
  • Government spending and its impact on the economy. (5:52)
  • Keynesian economics and the role of aggregate demand in determining GDP. (11:51)
  • Government spending and its impact on productivity. (18:13)
  • Government intervention in the economy, with a focus on public goods and cost-benefit analysis. (25:11)
  • Government’s role in the economy, potential for crowding out the private sector. (31:32)
  • Government impact on the economy and living standards. (38:20)

Takeaways

  1. Government Spending and GDP: Government expenditures can contribute to GDP, but their efficiency and the type of spending critically determine their economic impact.
  2. Private Sector’s Role: The private sector is essential in wealth creation due to its efficiency incentives, but it also depends on government-provided infrastructure and services.
  3. Crowding-out Effect: Excessive government spending can crowd out private investment, potentially reducing overall economic efficiency and growth.
  4. Cost-Benefit Analysis: It is vital to conduct thorough cost-benefit analyses for government projects to ensure that public funds are used effectively and do not become a drain on the economy.

Links relevant to the conversation

Dan Mitchell’s article on the impact of government spending on economic growth:

https://www.heritage.org/budget-and-spending/report/the-impact-government-spending-economic-growth

Dan’s article “OECD Economic Research Finds that Government Spending Harms Growth”

https://danieljmitchell.wordpress.com/2016/11/28/oecd-economic-research-finds-that-government-spending-harms-growth/

Episode on Alvin Hansen and Evsey Domar:

https://economicsexplored.com/2024/06/19/popularizing-keynes-how-alvin-hansen-and-evsey-domar-shaped-post-war-macroeconomics-ep245/

Episode on Thatcher:

https://economicsexplored.com/2020/12/06/ep64-adam-smith-margaret-thatcher-with-dr-eamonn-butler/

Bacon and Eltis’s 1978 book “Britain’s Economic Problem: Too Few Producers”:https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-1-349-15863-8

Lumo Coffee promotion

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Promo code: 10EXPLORED 

Transcript: Government vs. Private Sector: Who Generates Wealth? – EP247

N.B. This is a lightly edited version of a transcript originally created using the AI application otter.ai. It may not be 100 percent accurate, but should be pretty close. If you’d like to quote from it, please check the quoted segment in the recording.

Gene Tunny  00:00

Jeanne, welcome to the economics explored podcast, a frank and fearless exploration of important economic issues. I’m your host, Gene Tunny. I’m a professional economist and former Australian Treasury official. The aim of this show is to help you better understand the big economic issues affecting all our lives. We do this by considering the theory evidence and by hearing a wide range of views. I’m delighted that you can join me for this episode. Please check out the show notes for relevant information. Now on to the show. Hello. Thanks for tuning in to the show. Today, I want to cover an economic issue, and it’s also somewhat a philosophical issue that came up in a recent conversation that I had with Darren Brady Nelson on competition policy. To what extent is the government paid for by the activities of the private sector? To what extent is it a drain on the wealth of the community, is it only the private sector that generates wealth. You may remember that in the 2012 election campaign in the United States, President Barack Obama, in a speech in Roanoke, Virginia, famously said that somebody helped to create this unbelievable American system that we have that allowed you to thrive, somebody invested in roads and bridges. If you’ve got a business, you didn’t build that very, very controversial statement, very I mean, just goes to show what an effective speaker Obama was, that that phrase really captured a lot of people’s attention, and there’s an important economic issue there that I think it’s worth having an Episode on. So yes, I thought this would be a great topic to talk about relevant theory and evidence before we get into it. This episode is brought to you by Lumo coffee. So seriously healthy organic coffee with triple the antioxidants of regular coffee, there’s a 10% discount available for economics explored listeners if you use the promo code 10 explored. So that’s all in caps. You can check out the show notes for further details. Now, I should let you know I’m going to take a break soon from the show. I’ll see if I can get one more episode out before I go on the break. So I’ll probably have about four weeks off and then come back in August. I need to spend some time finalising the book I’m working on, and I need to spend a bit of time on that, but I will be excited to get back on to the podcast, and yeah, looking forward to trying to get more great guests and more great topics. I’ll be interested in your ideas on future topics or guests, or how I can improve the show. Let me know if you have any ideas. You can email me at contact, at economics explored.com, right? Oh, we’d better get into it. One reason I thought that this would be a good topic for the show is after this issue came up in the conversation I had with Darren, I found a passage on this issue in Hanson and Perloff book, state and local finance and the national economy, their 1944 book that I did an episode on a few weeks ago. That was the episode on Alvin Hansen and FC Domar. Now this is a very Keynesian book, and Keynesian economics has become controversial. And if you’re a regular listener to this show, you will know that we’ve talked about the debates about activist fiscal policy, having said that there is, there are some important lessons from Keynes that have been very influential in macroeconomics. So I think while Keynes is controversial, he is an important figure in the history of economic thought, and he has influenced the development of economics, and there are still Keynesian concepts that are very influential and widely agreed upon, even if all of the whole. The Keynesian doctrine and the the primitive Keynesian NISM that we saw in the immediate post war period, even if we now reject that, or most, or I’d say mainstream economists, would would reject that. So with that caveat in mind, we might, we might get into it, because I think what Hansen and Perloff wrote in this book, there is a lot of truth to it. Their discussion of this issue is very illuminating, and hence I think it’s worth us just going through it, and then I will provide some further thoughts and talk about views of other economists and what the evidence is telling us on this very important question. Now I’m going to read from Chapter Nine of the Hansen and Perloff book, public expenditures, income creation and costs. And I’m going to I’m going to start on page 184 and they write that the popular view is that government expenditures and activities are entirely sustained and supported out of income derived from private business. This is quite wrong, as a little economic analysis will reveal the public expenditures made in operating a public school are no less income creating and productive than a private business, say, a cosmetics factory. Indeed, the public school is productive, not only in the sense that it supplies a once satisfying service, as does also the cosmetics factory, but also in the respect that it increases the efficiency and productivity of the future labour force of the nation. Okay, so that very you know, that’s a very good point, and you know, that’s where you know that’s consistent with what Obama was saying, in a way. I mean, Obama’s making the point that public services are helping the operations of the business. Now, of course, you do have to think about the efficiency of those public services or public goods that are provided, which we’ll talk about later. But I think what Hansen and Perloff write, what they’ve written there, is, is sound okay. Let’s go on economic activities, whether governmental or private, involve two operations with respect to their income, with sorry, with respect to their impact in the flow of income, which must be entered on opposite sides of the ledger. And quite erroneous conclusions follow by looking at one side and closing one’s eyes to the other side, with respect to the cosmetics factory, the erroneous argument might be advanced that it is a burden on the community, since the sale of its products drain off a part of the money income flow from the community, that the cosmetics factory is dependent upon all other businesses, since they are the ones that create the income stream and purchasing power enabling the factory owner to find a market for his product. This analysis would, however, be quite unfair to the factory owner, since, in fact, at the same time that he taps a stream of purchasing power and selling his product, on the other side, he turns an equivalent amount of purchasing power right back into the income stream through the expenditures involved in operating the factory, he therefore sustains other businesses just as much as they sustain him. Okay? So, yep, fairly important point there, and that goes to show the the interdependence of all of the the businesses in an economy. So businesses, households and also government, as we’ll talk about, they are all connected. They interact. There’s flows of money, flows of goods and services between them. So very, very important point there we shall proceed. Precisely the same is true of government expenditures and activities. The government, in operating the school, taps a part of the income stream in the form of taxes, but it throws this right back into the income stream through the expenditures made in operating the school. It is not true that government is sustained and supported out of private business any more than the prior than that private business is supported and sustained out of government expenditures and activities in. Okay, so what I would say regarding that paragraph is, look, that’s all fair enough. If we think about it from a normative perspective, though, if we think about it from in terms like more philosophically and make value judgments, where I think some people start to wonder about how we measure economic activity. We’ll get onto this soon, and the value of economic activity. You you might think, well, if we’re talking about goods and services sold in the market, and we work out their value, there’s the presumption that, well, because people paid for those goods and services with their money, with their own money, they at least valued the good and service as much as the price of that good and service, whereas, with government, if the government provides goods and services to the public and it’s funding them from taxation, and we don’t really have a say, I mean, maybe at the ballot box we can have some influence on it, but we we basically have to pay the government. We have to pay our taxes. We don’t really have a lot of say in it individually. Then they provide us goods and services, and when we add them up and put them into GDP, they go in at the cost of delivering those services. But who’s to say they’re really of that value, and we might talk about that a bit later too. So that’s the that’s one commentary I’d make on on what Hansen and Perloff are saying so far. I mean from a factual point of view, from the point of view of impacts on GDP, then they are absolutely correct from the point of view of what this means normatively, or what it means philosophically, I suppose, then, well, you could argue that that may be the case in terms of impacts on GDP, but it may be that the government, what the government spending money on, isn’t sensible. It’s not a good use of our tax dollars. And the point I’ll make even further later is that to the extent that government isn’t spending on sensible things, to the extent that it’s not doing the job it’s supposed to, in terms of supporting the generation of or supporting the productive capabilities the economy, or it’s not providing essential goods and services to the people, then it may well be wealth destroying. We may well have, we may well be able to achieve a higher GDP per capita if we, if we cut some of those inefficient government activities, if we if we cut taxes, if we move towards greater provision of the market sector, that’s a that’s a possibility that I wouldn’t want to rule out. So that’s my one commentary on what’s been written so far. I mean generally, factually, in terms of what it all means for GDP, it’s sound that we should also be thinking about whether we could be doing things differently, whether what government is funding is giving us the best value for money. Okay, we will go on. No private business can sustain its sales volume unless the outlays of other businesses and the government continued to feed the income stream. Nor is private business as a whole self sustaining. It was not self sustaining when the national income fell from 80 billion to 40 billion in the early 30s. So that was the Great Depression. Obviously, that was me saying that not Hansen and Perloff, nor indeed in any other period of depression, the sales receipts of private business, no less than the tax receipts of government, depend upon the maintenance of a high national income, and the outlays of government can and do contribute to a sustained national income no less than the outlays of private business. Indeed, when private business outlays decline, the government alone is in a position to go forward and sustain the income through increased expenditures. Okay, so that’s that’s a very Keynesian one. Point there that in the short run, the level of output, the level of activity, the GDP, is determined by aggregate demand, so the sum of what all of the different sectors are wanting to purchase, in terms of goods and services, and in our national income accounts, GDP, that is equal to aggregate demand, which is equal to the sum of the expenditures by the major sectors. So we’re talking about consumption expenditure, Big C, plus investment expenditure by business, big i, plus government expenditures on goods and services, including infrastructure. This does not include transfer payments, so we talk about them a little bit later. Plus exports minus imports. That’s the net exports component. So we typically see aggregate demand written as C plus I plus G plus x minus m equals y, which is income or GDP, because GDP is defined and is constrained in the short term by the level of aggregate demand, because if people don’t want to purchase the goods and services, then they won’t get produced, and income and employment will fall. So output gets constrained by aggregate demand. That’s one of the core messages in Keynesian economics. And I mean this is, this is something that is widely accepted by economists, that the role of aggregate demand in determining short run, GDP, what happens to the economy in, you know, over in the you know, currently, what, what’s, what’s actually driving economic circumstances? It’s, it’s influenced by the level of spending. That’s, that’s something that’s widely agreed, how, what, what ends up being controversial, as we’ve talked about in in other episodes, is to what extent governments should actively intervene to try to get GDP closer to some desirable level. So Should they actively intervene if GDP, they think GDP is too low for in a depression, should they try and stimulate the economy, or should they try and take some of the heat out of the economy by running a budget surplus so that that there’s more of a debate about, well, there’s a big debate about to what extent governments should be pursuing activist policies, beyond what are called the automatic stabilisers, where the budget naturally reacts to the business cycle, where if the economy slumps, you have less tax revenue, more unemployment benefits. So there’s this automatic stability built in, in a way, and I’ve talked about that in other episodes. So we may not, we may not cover it. I won’t cover it in too much detail. Now, the other thing I should talk about here is this point about taxes and transfers. I said that the government expenditure item in the national accounts doesn’t include taxes and transfers, because where that gets picked up, picked up that will get picked up in the in the consumption spending item so any so what will happen is that if governments, to the extent that governments are taxing and then transfer that money to households, those households spend that money on consumption goods and services, And that gets picked up, picked up in the C item that the transfer spending itself doesn’t add to GDP, it’s just redistributing the taxes and transfers are redistributing incomes from some households to others and helping those other households consume goods and services. Okay, so there’s just one more paragraph from Hansen and perlifer I’d like to read before we I had more of my own commentary the view that public investment is unproductive while private investment is productive, will not withstand careful analysis public investment, just as with private investment, may be merely utility creating, or it may be also or it may also be efficiency creating, the development of a public. Park, swimming pool, playground or concert hall, makes possible a flow of real income, no less than the creation of a radio factory. Public invest, investment in the National Forest, by preventing soil erosion and floods or the construction of school buildings, may contribute to raising the efficiency of labour, no less than private investment in improved machinery. Public investment, like private investment, if wisely made, will be utility creating, or both utility and efficiency created. So yes, the that final, that clause there that that final part of the sentence, where they go, if wisely made, will be utility created, or both utility created and efficiency created. So there, Hansen and Perloff do acknowledge the point that, okay, all of this assumes that what the government’s spending money on is sensible. It may add to GDP in a statistical sense, and it may well employ people, but in terms of whether it actually creates what we might call utility, or whether it improves efficiency, that’s that’s another question that depends on the quality of the spending. I mean, sadly, governments can waste, can waste a lot of money. We can have programmes that that are essentially, you know, not contributing a lot to the community, and end up being brought to a bit. Darren and I, when we chatted, we talked about the National Disability Insurance Scheme here in Australia. So a very noble scheme. And perhaps, I mean, it is doing a lot of good. I suppose there are a lot of people who are benefiting of it, from it, but it is very expensive, and there are, there is a lot of Rorty. Now, all of this is to say that we should be thinking about what the expendit, what’s what’s happening, if what government is doing, whether the dollars that we’re taking that might otherwise be employed in the private sector, whether they’re most productively employed in private or public sector, what’s best for productivity? And that brings me to a famous quote from Paul Krugman. I think it was in his book peddling prosperity. But I could be wrong about that. I’ll have to check that where Paul Krugman wrote that productivity isn’t everything, but in the long run, it is almost everything. So while I I think Hansen and burloff, their analysis of what government spending means in an economic sense is is correct, I’m not, and I think they do recognise the qualifications that I’m about to make. Maybe they have a different judgement as to how, as to how big of a an issue. This is the than I do. But it can be the case that if government’s not spending money wisely, then that’s not going to be good for your long run. Living standards, more spending and transfers, they mean higher taxes, particularly on employees and businesses. And that’s going to impact efficiency. It’s going to impact economic efficiency. Taxes create what’s known as a dead weight loss, an excess burden. They can discourage productive activities. They can discourage people from working or opening businesses. They can discourage people from consuming certain goods and services that that would make them better off. So I think the question we have to ask is, what’s the most productive use for our resources, where we’re thinking about what’s going to deliver the best bang for buck, what’s going to give the best ROI, and we think we should think broadly about what that ROI is. It’s not just going to be, it’s not necessarily going to be what it’s not neces it’s not necessarily, it doesn’t necessarily have to mean that it. It generates an ROI in for the business community, it could be an ROI in terms of providing services, goods and services, education or health, government services that are valued by the community, if a government can do an activity more productively than the private sector. Yeah, or do an activity that the people demand, but which gov but which the market will fail to provide, then that’s fine. I mean, government should be doing that. And so we have various public goods, such as national defence. The traditional example is a lighthouse. You often hear that given as an example, but there’s a wide range of public goods out there. There. There would be a free rider problem if we were relying on the private sector to provide them. So there’s there’s scope for government intervention. But generally speaking, and this is the point I will often make when I’m thinking about, well, when I’m talking about these issues, the incentives for efficiency are better in the private sector, and I think there’s a lot of evidence for that that came out of when governments were reforming public enterprises in the 80s and 90s, we learned about significant efficiency gains that can come from that when governments outsource more of activity, outsourced more activities from the public sector. Clearly, there are failures. I’m not going to deny there have been challenges. There I mean, there have been those botched privatisations in the UK, for example, particularly in rail and it looks like water. So I’m not going to be too I’m not going to be unrealistic or just assume, Oh yes, the market is always going to do things better. But I think generally, the evidence is that the private sector is going to be more well, it’s got greater incentives for efficiency, because if you’re not efficient, you go out of business, whereas governments could, you know, governments keep going, and we tend to see that. Well, I mean public sector unions, for example, or construction unions, which where they have a lot of members working on government projects, they can be very, very influential and affect the efficiency, affect the costs and the efficiency of government programmes and spending. I think that is something that is worth thinking about. Here. I should make the standard point that economists always make that it’s important to crunch the numbers. So we always should be doing cost benefit analysis of programmes and projects. In some cases, we want to do a comprehensive cost benefit analysis. In other cases, it’s, maybe it’s a much smaller amount of money, and it’s more of a it’s not the full blown let’s, let’s do a comprehensive economic study where we’re trying to estimate all of the relevant costs and benefits. It might be more of a desktop exercise, a simpler type of analysis, but we should be thinking, whenever we’re spending money on on government goods as government purchases of goods and services, we should be thinking about the costs and benefits, the pros and cons, and to the extent that we’re not getting that those net benefits, to the extent that we’re not getting a benefit to cost ratio above one, a return on investment, we’re effectively burning money, and the government is then detracting from the wealth of the community, in my view, because that money would pro it would have been better if that activity was not done, if it was, if it if some other activity occurred, possibly in the private sector. And I mean, the last governments have funded many poor projects. They continue to do so, whether because of politics or they, they think that there’s some social benefit that mean, or equity benefit that means that the project should go ahead. One, one example that comes to mind, there’s a new Weir on the Fitzroy River in central Queensland. I actually visited it. I visited it just before it opened. I got a tour of the construction site. Thanks to Sun water, the project proponent. It’s the Queensland Government’s irrigation water business. I mean, it’s a very impressive Weir, and it’s certainly going to deliver some benefits to the community, in terms of, well, there’s, you know, it improves the reliability of water supply. There are some local farmers, they’ve built, uh, they’ve constructed pipes that hook them up to the the weir, and they’re going to be getting water from that. And I think they’re planning things like macadamias and and. Other crops that you need to that you need to water. So there will be some, I mean, you need to irrigate, rather than just rely on the the water from the from the sky, for relying on rainfall. So this is certainly going to expand agriculture, irrigated agricultural production. The problem was, it’s a very high cost dam. It was already going to cost 200 or 50 million, I think it was, and it ended up blowing out its costs. And it’s costing 450 to 500 or something like that. So it was a big cost blowout. And the economics of the dam are pretty of the we are a fairly questionable. There was a business case prepared for it that showed that it had a benefit cost ratio. I think it was under point five. It was, it was rather embarrassing, but the government went ahead and built it anyway, I think because there was such political pressure to build it, and you could argue, well, let’s help it sustain those regional communities. So maybe there’s an equity element to it, but yeah, unfortunately, even where governments do cost benefit analyses, even sometimes they ignore them. So having said about having just talked about the importance of cost benefit analysis, I just note that it’s, it’s not always the cure, and often governments go ahead and, do you know, spend money unwisely anyway. But that, of course, is not going to stop me from arguing always in favour of crunching the numbers right. I might, might go on to a few other things I’d like to talk about before we wrap up. I talked earlier about the the issue, the problems you have when you do have a larger government sector, and you can crowd out the private sector, and you can end up in a situation where, by I mean, that can, that’s going, that’ll affect your living standards. Because even though the government may be boosting, you know, it may be adding to GDP, the C plus I plus G plus x minus m, it could be the case that if those resources were better deployed, then GDP were would be higher and and also, in an international comparison, your GDP per capita would be higher through Well, you know better, better use of resources in your economy. Your economy is more productive, and also because the economy is producing more things that you can sell overseas, that people overseas might want to buy, and therefore that helps improve your exchange rate. You’re not sucking resources out of out of the private sector. So this crowding out, I mean crowding out so well, well known phenomenon in economics. But there was a famous book in the late 60s or early 70s, actually might have been 70s, the bacon eltus thesis, 1976 it was, which was a really interesting diagnosis of the economic problems that Britain faced in the 70s. And this is essentially what led to Thatcher taking over? I did a podcast episode on Thatcher a few years ago. I mean, Thatcher is a, I mean, she’s a very controversial figure. And they’ll, I mean, a lot of people really hate Thatcher. And I mean, certainly she, you know, she was, yeah, she’s, she was a very controversial figure. But the what, if you look at where Britain was economically in the 70s, then really Thatcher taking over and, you know, having to, you know, really shake up the economy. That was inevitable, given that the state the economy was in, the stagflation, the excessive industrial action garbage piling up in Leicester Square in London because there was a strike of the the garbos. It’s, it was really awful time. And this book, this was written by Robert bacon and Walter eltus. So eltus was chief economic advisor to Michael Heseltine, or Heseltine in the Department of Trade and Industry from 1992 until 1995 and he also edited Oxford economic papers. So he was an economist, and he ended up going on to be an advisor to a minister in the major government made John Major followed Thatcher in the he was a Conservative Prime Minister after Thatcher. So their book Britain’s economic problem too few producers that argued that it was the rapid expansion of the public sector that was contributing to Britain’s economic difficult. Is during that period because it was taking resources. It was taking labour and capital out of more productive uses of the private sector and into the public sector. And yeah, so that was a rather influential book at the time, and I’ll put a link in the show notes it. It goes to show that. And I think this is a this is a qualification that I think Hansen and Perloff themselves would have accepted, that, you know, while the government can contribute to the wealth of the community, while the government can help the private sector be more productive. And while the government can provide goods and services and it can invest, it can it can provide capital goods. It can produce public capital, public assets that are of great value, unfortunately, it can also produce things services that aren’t, that are inferior, that are that aren’t as good as what could be provided in the private sector, and in those cases, that it’s subtracting from the the wealth of the community, or we could be richer if we had a shift from government to the private sector. So look, it’s a difficult one, because I do recognise that I get a lot of benefit myself out of public services. In particular, what I the one I think about all the time is the Roma street Parklands in Brisbane, which were built by the state government. Here, there’s an amazing park with a beautiful spectacle garden. And there’s a a great walk that I go on every morning. I go up to, up to the parklands, and I walk through the parklands, and there’s a there’s a rain forest, part of it, there’s a bridge, the Fern Gully bridge, I think it’s called that. I that I go on. It’s been, it’s closed for maintenance at the moment, but it’s just amazing. And that’s that’s a public asset, and my life is is better because the government built that, that public asset and and they maintain it. So I’m not going to say, look, government’s terrible. Let’s get rid of government some government services are are valuable. There are at the same time, you’ve got to recognise that there are cases where public provision of services is is subpar and it’s not. Maybe we could be better off if we have a shift to the private sector. And I mean, maybe this isn’t the best example, but we know that there are a lot of failing government school funded schools out there. We have a real problem in Australia with the lowest performing schools. I think they’re letting down the people in those in the areas where they they’re serviced by these subpar schools. And we should be thinking about whether there’s whether there’s an alternative, whether we can rely on greater school choice, charter schools, etc. That is a big issue, and one I should come back to in a future, a future episode. One person who has a really good take on this issue that we’re talking about today is Dan Mitchell, who is a is a guest. He’s been a former guest on this show. Dan’s been on, oh gee, a handful of times at least, we had a conversation recently about US debt. Dan wrote a really good piece on relevant to this question of how government impacts the economy, how it impacts wealth, the impact of government spending on economic growth. This was for the Heritage Foundation. This is, this is about 20 years old. This piece, I’ll put a link in the show notes, it’s very good. Dan writes that economic theory does not automatically generate strong conclusions about the impact of government outlays on economic performance. Indeed, almost every economist would agree that there are circumstances in which lower levels of government spending would enhance economic growth, and other circumstances in which higher levels of government spending would be desirable. If government spending is zero, presumably there will be very little economic growth, because enforcing contracts, protecting property and developing an infrastructure would be very difficult if there were no government at all. In other words, some government spending is necessary for the successful operation of the rule of law. And then he goes on to say that, that said, well, in his view, most government spending has a negative impact. And. And there’s overwhelming evidence that government spending is too high and that America’s economy could grow much faster if the burden of government was reduced. Okay, so that those point, those final points, are probably going to be more controversial. But the I think what the passage I read out before from Dan, I think that’s, I think that’s very non controversial. You know, he’s saying it’s all about getting the right mix, the right balance. And then you can have an argument over whether, you know, we’ve got too much or too little at the moment. I mean, I probably share Dan’s presumption that we’ve got too much government. But then there are others. I mean, folks at The Australia Institute here in in Australia, and they’re arguing, oh, we should actually have more tax, we should have more government spending, and we’ll be better off. Okay, that’s, uh, that’s an interesting perspective. It’s not one I share. But, I mean, they’re entitled to it. Perhaps I’ll, uh, I’ll have, I’ll have Richard Dennis, or one of his colleagues on the show one day to talk through that. Okay, so that was, that was a broad discussion about the theoretical and philosophical issues associated with government involving in the economy, and to what extent it affects, like, how does it affect living standards? How does it affect the wealth of the community? I mean, clearly we just can’t say something like, government doesn’t create wealth, it just subtracts through wealth. That’s not true, but we should be thinking critically about the how our resources are used in the economy. To what extent are they used by government versus the private sector, and whether we can have a better mix, whether we could be have a higher GDP per capita, whether our living standards could be higher if we move resources out of government back to the private sector. I think that’s a that’s a legitimate question, even if the sort of the simplistic point, or the simplistic argument that the government is just dependent on the private sector and it’s it doesn’t create any wealth itself, even if we reject that, we still recognise that government can be too large. And in the view of economists such as Dan Mitchell and myself, I must say, I think it is too large. I think we would be better off with a smaller government. Okay, one point that you know, I’m going to talk a bit about empirical evidence now before we wrap up, because I think it’s important to always look at the data. What does the data tell us? And Dan, Dan always saw talks about these OECD studies, so he always criticises the OECD you says, Oh, well, you know, you’ve got all of these bureaucrats over in Paris and highly paid and but they’re they’re always saying, Oh yeah, let’s just raise taxes on everyone and spend more money. However, he does note that their research departments, the research part of the OECD and also the IMF, often produces research which contradicts the policy views that are being advocated by these international bodies. And Dan wrote a post, OECD Economic Research finds that government spending harms growth. I will link to it in the show notes. This was back in 2016 very good post. And Dan wrote that a new working paper by two economists at the OECD contain some remarkable findings about the negative impact of government spending on economic performance. And what it found is that, yeah, there certainly is an impact that when they did the cross country data analysis, they did some econometrics, if I remember correctly, they found that larger governments are associated with lower long term growth, and larger governments also slow down the catch up to the productivity frontier. Okay, so the larger the government sector, that’s going to constrain the productivity of your economy. It’s going to adversely affect it, which is in line with what I was saying before. Okay, so there’s some good evidence there. I’m going to link to that in the show notes. That’s, that’s worth that’s worth checking out. Okay, so I hope you found that episode informative. I think it’s an important question, and it it is worth us thinking carefully and critically about how government does impact the economy and our living standards. I’ve given an introduction to this topic and have provided some of my own views. Now, of course, they’re my views, and your views may differ. You may have. Different experiences. I mean, you will have different experiences from me. You may be aware of of different evidence that’s out there. So I yeah, I’d really love to hear from you if you have any thoughts on what I’ve said this episode. If you think there’s there’s evidence, or there are points that I should be considering, then please get in touch. Let me know what you think. You can email me at contact@economicsexplored.com I’d love to hear from you, and I hope that you tune into a future episode. So I’ll be taking a break soon, but should be back strongly in August 2024 I may have one more episode before then I’ll see how I go. But thanks for joining me. I think this is these are important issues to talk about, and I really hope you got something out of it. Thank you. Bye.

Credits

Thanks to the show’s sponsor, Gene’s consultancy business, www.adepteconomics.com.au. Full transcripts are available a few days after the episode is first published at www.economicsexplored.com. Economics Explored is available via Apple Podcasts and other podcasting platforms.

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Podcast episode

Dollar Dominance: Can the US Keep Its Edge? w/ Stephen Kirchner – EP246

This episode features a conversation between Gene Tunny and Stephen Kirchner about the dominance of the US dollar in global finance. They examine the reasons behind the dollar’s strong position, the effects of US fiscal policy and public debt, and the debate over the future role of the US dollar. Kirchner provides insights into how the US’s status as a net oil exporter influences currency dynamics and global trade.

If you have any questions, comments, or suggestions, please email us at contact@economicsexplored.com  or send a voice message via https://www.speakpipe.com/economicsexplored

You can listen to the episode via the embedded player below or via podcasting apps including Apple Podcast and Spotify.

About Stephen Kirchner

Stephen Kirchner is the Senior Economist at the Business Council of Australia, the former Program Director for Trade and Investment at the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney, and a Senior Fellow of the Fraser Institute. An expert in monetary and fiscal policy, financial markets, and trade economics, Mr. Kirchner was formerly a research fellow at Australia’s Centre for Independent Studies, an economist with Action Economics, LLC and a former director of economic research with Standard & Poor’s Institutional Market Services, based in Sydney and Singapore. He has also worked as an advisor to members of the Australian House of Representatives and Senate.

Mr. Kirchner holds a BA (Hons) from the Australian National University, a Master of Economics (Hons) from Macquarie University, and a PhD in Economics from the University of New South Wales. He blogs at http://www.institutional-economics.com and is active on Twitter (@insteconomics).

What’s covered in EP246

  • US dollar’s global role as reserve currency, benefits, and potential challenges. (0:00)
  • US fiscal policy and its impact on the US dollar’s global role. (8:40)
  • Monetary vs fiscal policy dominance in determining interest rates and exchange rates. (14:39)
  • US dollar’s role in global finance and its potential replacement by other currencies. (20:39)
  • China’s economy, currency, and trade agreements. (29:59)

Takeaways

  1. The US dollar’s dominant role in global finance is largely due to the unparalleled size, depth, and liquidity of US capital markets.
  2. Despite concerns about the US fiscal position, the demand for US assets remains strong, which supports the dollar’s value.
  3. Other economies, like the Eurozone and China, face challenges in rivaling the US dollar due to less developed capital markets.
  4. The US becoming a net oil exporter has altered the traditional relationship between the US dollar and commodity prices.
  5. Fiscal policy in the US, while concerning, does not currently pose an immediate threat to the dollar’s global dominance due to strong international demand for US assets.

Links relevant to the conversation

Stephen’s post on dollar dominance:

https://stephenkirchner.substack.com/p/dollar-dominance-if-you-can-keep

Stephen’s US Studies Centre article “The ‘reserve currency’ myth: The US dollar’s current and future role in the world economy”:

https://www.ussc.edu.au/the-reserve-currency-myth-the-us-dollars-current-and-future-role-in-the-world-economy

Stephen’s post on how the US dollar is now a commodity currency

https://stephenkirchner.substack.com/p/why-is-the-australian-dollar-so-weak

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Transcript: Dollar Dominance: Can the US Keep Its Edge? w/ Stephen Kirchner – EP246

N.B. This is a lightly edited version of a transcript originally created using the AI application otter.ai. It may not be 100 percent accurate, but should be pretty close. If you’d like to quote from it, please check the quoted segment in the recording.

Gene Tunny  00:00

Gene, welcome to the economics explored podcast, a frank and fearless exploration of important economic issues. I’m your host. Gene Tunny, I’m a professional economist and former Australian Treasury official. The aim of this show is to help you better understand the big economic issues affecting all our lives. We do this by considering the theory evidence and by hearing a wide range of views. I’m delighted that you can join me for this episode. Please check out the show notes for relevant information. Now on to the show. Stephen Kirschner, welcome to the programme.

Stephen Kirchner  00:36

Thanks for having me back. Gene,

Gene Tunny  00:38

oh, good to have you on, Stephen, you’re doing really interesting things in your newsletter. It’s, well, it’s a sub stack, the institutional economics sub stack. And I wanted to chat with you about some of the things I’ve been reading in your sub stack recently, and also some of these, you know, big international macro economic issues to start with. Might ask you about this recent post. You had dollar dominance. If you can keep it, could we start off? Could you explain what’s what do people mean by this concept of dollar dominance, please.

Stephen Kirchner  01:23

Mostly it’s referring to the fact that the US dollar plays an overwhelming role in as the currency of denomination for international finance. So it makes up the vast majority of global ethics turnover. It’s the currency of denomination for most of the world’s debt issuance and a lot of international lending as well. It’s about 60% of global FX reserves, and it’s the predominant currency of denomination for most of the global trade in goods and services. And so the US dollar plays this very prominent role, which I think is ultimately attributable to the fact that the US has capital markets that are really unrivalled in terms of their size, their depth and liquidity. And so that puts the US in a very good position to be a provider of financial services to the rest of the world. And I think that, more than anything else, is what underpins the role of the US dollar, where I think there’s been a lot of interest over many years, is how much longer this role can continue, and there’s constant speculation about the future role of the US dollar. And this speculation goes back a long way. So in my paper for the US study centre a few years ago on the reserve currency myth, I went back and pointed to lots of embarrassing quotes from the Economist magazine and various other sources predicting the dollar’s demise. All those predictions have proven to be incorrect, but it’s remarkable that half a week goes by, I would say, without an op ed in the FT speculating about the US dollar’s future, which I think about Oasis, sort of getting the cart before the horse. I think before you speculate about the US Dollars global role, you kind of need to think about what would actually change in terms of underlying fundamentals to really shift that position.

Gene Tunny  03:39

Got You Can I ask about that the role as the global reserve currency? Economists such as Joseph Stiglitz have argued that this, this gives the US an un an unfair advantage or an exorbitant privilege. Is that right? Is that? Is that a concern is, does it? Does it actually get is it? How, to what extent does it benefit from being that global reserve currency?

Stephen Kirchner  04:06

Yeah, I have a lot of problem with the idea or the term reserve currency, because I think it’s a little bit confusing. And if you look around trying to find definitions of what it means to be a reserve currency, most of them are somewhat tautological. And so when you invoke the term reserves, people will automatically think of central bank holdings, the foreign exchange reserves. And all central banks hold foreign exchange reserves. On average, about 60% of those reserves are denominated in US dollars, but I don’t think that’s what gives the US a dominant role in the US dollar, a dominant role in international finance. And in fact, if, if foreign central banks held no US dollars, I think that would actually have a fairly marginal impact on both the US dollar exchange rate and. And interest rates similar, because the turnover in foreign exchange markets on a daily basis is in the order of trillions of dollars. It’s probably eight or $9 trillion on a daily basis, and central bank holdings the US dollars in the billions. And so the effect that those reserves might have, and changes in reserve balances, I think you’re going to be very marginal. So the way I think, prefer to think about it is that the US provides a very deep set of capital markets which can accommodate the world’s saving and there is a demand for US dollar assets, and so that’s what I think of, in terms of the US dollar having a dominant role, or a reserve currency role, but it’s really a case of us being a supplier of safe assets to the rest of the world, and this is what’s responsible for the US Dollars roles. I think central bank reserves in this context are fairly marginal.

Gene Tunny  06:10

Yeah. Okay, so the couple of things to explore there in terms of, well, safe assets to the rest of the world. Are you talking about US Treasury bonds?

Stephen Kirchner  06:21

Principally, yes. So the US provides not only what is effectively a risk free benchmark asset for the rest of the world in the form of US Treasuries and treasury bills, but even in terms of a medium of exchange, about 40% of the US banknotes in circulation actually circulate outside the United States, so there’s a demand to hold the US Dollar as a medium of exchange as well.

Gene Tunny  06:53

Yeah. So does this all mean that that the US dollar its value in its exchange rate, so it’s more favourable than it otherwise would be. And so that means that Americans can get, you know, they can buy stuff from the rest of the world a lot cheaper than otherwise. Is that? Is that reasonable to say

Stephen Kirchner  07:17

that’s part of it? I mean, there are people like Michael Pettis, for example, who argue that the US dollar suffers from a structural overvaluation problem that’s because of its dominant role, as you say, would tend to contribute to a higher exchange rate than otherwise. But the way I think about it is in terms of the equilibrium US dollar exchange rate. You would want that exchange rate to reflect all underlying fundamentals, and this is just a one of the fundamentals that feeds into the US Dollars valuation. So I don’t see that as being a problem per se, and it’s certainly not a problem with the United States that there’s very strong demand to invest in the US, whether it’s in the form of debt securities, equity securities, or foreign direct investment. We had this debate in Australia for many years about whether the current account deficit was a problem or not, and I think most of those arguments carry over to the US setting, where it’s certainly not a problem that in the US there’s very strong investment demand, not all of that demand could be met through domestic saving, and it’s actually a vote of confidence on the part of foreign investors that they want to invest in your economy. Yeah,

Gene Tunny  08:39

it’s remarkable. Stephen, you just reminded me, if you go back to say, the mid to late 80s and then the early 90s, there was such an obsession with the balance of payments and the current account deficit. So, I mean, Australia’s now got a current account surplus, haven’t we, thanks to mining, which is a, yeah, very, very positive thing, but yeah, we were, we were obsessed about it, and there was a big debate about whether that made sense or not, or whether this was just a reflection of the great investment opportunities in Australia. So it was good to to remind me of that debate. Can I ask about the safe assets? So you’re talking about us, treasury bonds. And I’ve had guests on this show. I’ve had Romina from, I think she was a Cato. And I’ve had Dan Mitchell from, he’s, he’s got his own Centre for freedom and prosperity. He’s ex Cato, ex heritage. And Dan’s a prominent commentator. And I mean, they’re very worried about US fiscal policy as I am. I mean, it looks like they’re on a very, you know, very bad, well, you know, unsustainable trajectory. They’re gonna have to correct it in some way. But from what you’re saying, I mean, there’s still this healthy demand for US government bonds, isn’t there? So is how. Do. How do you actually reconcile these, these two facts?

Stephen Kirchner  10:04

Well, in fact, a lot of the commentary around the future of the US dollar over the decades has really turned on this question of is the US on an UNSUSTAINABLE fiscal trajectory, to the extent that this might actually compromise the US Dollars global role, and is certainly the case that the US, in terms of the debt held by the by the public, has reached levels that are just a little bit below the levels we saw at the end of World War Two, and the US government was obviously very heavily borrowing. The difference being, of course, that we’ve got this level of debt in the absence of wartime conditions, and with the US economy is still pretty much fully employed. So the question would be, what would happen in the event of an adverse macroeconomic shock when you’ve got such a bad starting point. So I mean on the one hand, the US debt position, the public sector debt position, is one which actually is useful from the point of view of providing a supply of risk free assets to the rest of the world. So there’s no shortage of demand to invest in US Treasury securities. And if there was going to be an issue around the sustainability of the US fiscal position, you’d kind of expect it to show up in the exchange rate and interest rates at some point. But if you if you’re not seeing that in the price, then I think there are fewer concerns about the sustainability of the US deposition. So one way of thinking about this is us, dollar exchange rate actually serves to sort of price this demand to hold us assets. I’d say there’s an excess demand globally to hold us dollar assets, and the US dollar exchange rate reflects that.

Gene Tunny  12:15

So is the market just thinking that, Oh, well, all of these fiscal problems, there still a fair way down the road, and it’s not going to affect our demand for five year or 10 year treasuries. Or are they thinking, Oh, well, the Americans that they’ll eventually sort it out in in Congress, I mean, that they’ll recognise the that they need corrective actions as they have. You know, the Americans managed to do that in the 90s with under Clinton and Gingrich. So is that what they’re thinking? I think

Stephen Kirchner  12:48

from the point of view of the exchange rate, you have to remember that the exchange rate is a relative price, and so it’s the relative price of US, output and assets compared to the rest of the world. And if you look at fiscal policy trajectories in other economies, they don’t look too great either. So Japan, Japan will be an obvious example of an economy which has an even worse net and gross debt position than the US. Fiscal policy settings in places like Italy, which is the world’s third largest market for sovereign debt, don’t look too flashy, either. So with exchange rates, you always have to ask yourself, how does a country look on a relative basis? And so I think the US still looks good in those terms. Yeah, of course, in an absolute sense, you know, I’d certainly agree that the fiscal position in the United States is of a concern. At some stage they’re going to have to address it. But they’re hardly alone in that regard. So thinking about the US Dollars role internationally, I don’t see the US fiscal position, per se as being a problem, okay, but ultimately, I think the issue for the US is that there’s a rising interest Bill associated with its public sector Debt. Just recently, that bill has eclipsed the US defence budget in terms of absolute science, right? And this in itself, is a constraint on US fiscal policy, because that rising interest bill ultimately constrains what the US government can do. Yeah,

Gene Tunny  14:39

yeah, that’s extraordinary. I’ll have to check that out. I mean, to think, I mean, given how large the US military machine is that, how large the Pentagon is, to think that that’s incredible, right? Why I asked that before Stephen was because you’ve got this fascinating chart from macro bond in. Your newsletter on dollar dominance. If you can keep it, I’ll add a link in the show notes that essentially shows practically no correlation between general government gross debt to GDP percentage and the 10 year government bond yield. And I mean, we all know that there’s challenges with doing cross country correlations. But what do you you know and inferring things from from cross country data? But what do you read into that, that that chart? What do you read into those, those data points?

Stephen Kirchner  15:34

Yeah, like the point I was making with that chart, and this probably applies more so to developed markets than emerging economies, but still holds broadly, I would say, is that the fiscal position of an economy is actually not a very good predictor of its borrowing rates, its government borrowing rates. I mean, most obvious example that would be in Japan, which probably has the worst fiscal position on a gross and net basis of any of the advanced economies, and yet has the lowest in interest rates. So I think what that’s telling you is that interest rates are ultimately determined by other things. So underlying productivity growth and monetary policy, and monetary policy, I think, is a much more powerful predictor of cross country variation in interest rates. So if you’re looking to try and predict movements in interest rates between economy and stuff looking at changing fiscal positions, I don’t think you’re going to get very far. And that then flows through to exchange rates, because, yeah, if it’s if it’s the case that interest rates are actually not that sensitive to fiscal policy, then it’s going to imply that exchange rates are probably, by extension, not going to be that sensitive either. So this comes back to the issue of monetary versus fiscal dominance, and that monetary policy ultimately is far more important in terms of determining interest rates than fiscal policy.

Gene Tunny  17:21

Yeah, I think that’s, I think that’s right, certainly in the I mean, I mean you, I can ask you this. I mean, you can, you may have answered this, but I mean, I can understand that in the short term, like I think about how market economists forecast the value of the Australian dollar, and they’ll look at the differential between you know, bond yields or or, you know, they’ll have different maturities, like they might be looking at, I don’t know whether it’s three three month bills or six months or a year, but they, I know they’ll have an interest rate differential or spread, and then they’ll have the terms of trade, for example, in there, but yep, they’re not going to have something like the, you know, what’s happening with the the debt or the budget, I suppose. Or maybe I’m wrong about that, but I take your point. I think it’s a it’s a good one. What does it mean for say, John Cochran theory of the fiscal fiscal theory the price level. I spoke with John Cochran at Centre for independent studies. There was an event we had last, last September in Sydney, and I asked him about the fiscal theory of the price level. What do you think this means for that theory? Have you looked at that at all? Stephen,

Stephen Kirchner  18:41

yeah. I mean this, I’ve addressed that in a number of posts on the newsletter, and I think this goes to your question about the long run. And the long run situation is a little bit different in that it’s possible to imagine fiscal policy and public sector debt getting to a point where it is so unsustainable that you enter a regime of fiscal dominance. In other words, fiscal policy ends up determining the price level, and that is certainly a possibility. So in that situation, the central bank is forced to effectively accommodate expansion fiscal policy. So it’s certainly the case that fiscal policy can play that role. But the way Australia, the United States and other advanced economies have set up their sort of macro policy frameworks is one in which, for the short term, at least monetary policy is dominant. So whatever the fiscal authority is doing with fiscal policy tends to get discounted by monetary policy actions. So as long as you have an independent inflation targeting central bank. Think, then I think you’re in a regime of monetary dominance, but it’s certainly possible that those institutional arrangements might fall apart in the context of a fiscal position that’s unsustainable in the long run, and then you are in that sort of fiscal theory of the price level type world,

Gene Tunny  20:21

yeah, yeah, for sure. Okay, yeah, I think that’s a good point. So if you’ve got an independent central bank, and it’s, it’s not just, you know, it’s, it’s setting monetary policy to target inflation, and it’s, you know, monetary policy doesn’t end up being determined by the government. I mean, if the gov, because you get into that problem in, say, some Latin American countries historically, or Weimar Republic, where the government just prints money to pay its bills, to cover its deficits, rather than borrowing from the bond market. And yeah, that’s where you end up in all sorts of strife, potentially even hyperinflation. So, yeah, I think that’s a fair point. Yeah. Just thought I’d ask you about that, because I think, yeah, John’s, he’s got a really fascinating theory there, and he’s a very, very compelling presenter, and a, you know, really top economist, obviously. So that that’s really good, one of

Stephen Kirchner  21:18

the Argentina, Argentina, good example of the sort of situation you’re referring to. So they’ve had a number of experiments with managed exchange rate regimes that have blown up, and the reason for the blow up in each case was basically that fiscal policy was incompatible with that regime, and it was fiscal policy the one out in the end. So the issue around Argentina, addressing both its inflation problem and the issues around its exchange rate ultimately depend upon it putting in place institutions that will constrain fiscal policy. Yeah,

Gene Tunny  21:58

one of the other posts that I’ll put a link to in the show notes, Stephen, I think it was a post of yours where you’re talking about how the US dollar, how it’s been or the exchange rate, how that’s been affected by the fact that the US has become such a Strong producer of was it shale oil and shale gas? I mean, it’s become a has it become a net energy exporter? Or have I got that wrong? Or how do you

Stephen Kirchner  22:29

Yeah, the United States is now a net oil exporter. Has been since about 2018, 2019, yep. And in fact, produces more oil than Saudi Arabia, which I think is a a fact that would surprise most people. Yeah, so. So the significance of this is that US dollar now trades, you know, as a positive correlation with its terms of trade. It’s it’s trading in much the same way as we’re familiar with here, where the Australian dollar has a very close relationship with our terms of trade. And so the US dollar is trading like a commodity currency. This has big implications for the Australian dollar exchange rate, because what it means is the US dollar is now positively correlated with commodity prices, and in terms of the Australian dollar, traditionally, the Australian dollar has exchange rate has been correlated with commodity prices, but we typically quote The Australian dollar in terms of the US dollar, if its correlation with commodity prices is increasing, then our exchange rates correlation with those prices is going to weaken. And you can see that in the data that the relationship between Australian dollar and commodity prices is essentially broken down since 2018 2019 coinciding with the US becoming a net oil exporter? Yeah,

Gene Tunny  24:06

yeah. But do we do? Is there still a correlation with trade weighted index? Do you know? I mean, I can check that myself, but just wondering, because I think that’s what, where you’re going at there. I mean, because we, we tend to, yeah, quoted in terms of US dollars, but there’s this broader exchange rate concept that you could use instead,

Stephen Kirchner  24:27

no, it affects the Australian dollar trade weighted index as well. So that was actually the charts that I used in that post were the Australian dollar twy. And the reason is, US dollar still has a big weight in the tui China has a big weight as well. But of course, China is running a managed exchange rate regime, largely targeting the exchange rate with the US dollar. Yeah, so China’s weight effectively becomes a US dollar weight in that measure. Gotcha. Yeah. Yeah. So this has huge implications for us, because it means that the with these australian dollar being less sensitive to commodity prices, we’re going to lose some of the shock absorbing role of the Australian dollar. The Australian dollar is not going to moderate those fluctuations now in terms of trade and quality of prices as it has historically. And I think one implication of this is that the reserve bank is going to have to become more activist in its conduct of monetary policy, because it won’t be able to rely on the exchange rate to do a lot of the heavy lifting in terms of setting monetary conditions. So if the exchange rate is not adjusting as aggressively as it has historically, then I think by implication, the cash rate is going to have to do more of the work. I

Gene Tunny  25:50

think that’s a really excellent point, because I remember when I was in Treasury, yeah, we always used to talk about that shock absorbing role of the Australian dollar. And there was a view that that’s why Australia got through the Asian financial crisis so well. So I think that’s a really excellent point. Just trying to remember where I was, where, what I was going to ask about the Yeah, so we’ve got the point about the the twy. I’ll the trade weighted index. I’ll link to that article. Is it China? Is that the in terms of who, which country could replace, the which currency could replace, the US dollar? Is it the the Chinese currency, or is it the euro? What are what are people speculating on? I

Stephen Kirchner  26:40

think the problem that people have there have trouble wrapping their head around is the idea that the US dollar and its role is somewhat disconnected from the relative size of the US economy and its importance in global trade. So the Chinese and the eurozone economies rival the US in terms of size, and they certainly rival the US in terms of their prominence in international trade. And people kind of expect that the respective roles of their currencies should reflect those GDP shares and trade shares where both Eurozone and China fall down is in terms of not having the capital markets that rival the US in terms of size, depth and liquidity. And so the US dollar’s role is essentially a function of the dominant role that the US has in global finance. Yeah, and I think that’s always going to be more important in determining the role that the US dollar plays. Certainly, when the Euro was launched in 1999 there were expectations that it would rival the US dollar and the ECB produces a an index which essentially tries to measure the role of the euro in global finance. So in terms of FX turnover, currency of denomination for debt securities, currency of denomination for global trade. And it does pick up a little bit immediately following the Euro’s launch. But of course, with all the problems in the eurozone and the Eurozone debt crisis, that role has essentially flatlined more recently. So I’d say the Euro has basically disappointed the expectations that were held for it in terms of taking on a global role, and the same with China. So China launched a campaign to internationalise the renminbi and toyed around with a more flexible exchange rate setting around about 2015 2016 but very quickly walked away from it when the exchange rate started to exhibit more volatility than they would like, and so they’ve clamped down in terms of exchange rate setting. They’re still running a managed exchange rate regime and a closed capital account, yeah, and if you’ve got a closed capital account, I think that’s always going to limit the prospects for internationalisation of your currency. And we saw exactly the same thing with the yen as well. In the late 1990s early 2000s the Japanese Ministry of Finance had this idea that they would internationalise the yen, make it the main currency of denomination for trade in the Asia region. They wanted to set up an Asian Monetary Fund without participation with the United States. And all of those efforts really went nowhere. Yeah.

Gene Tunny  29:59

Yeah. I think it’s Yeah, very good point, Steve. And I just remembered what I was going to note before, because why I thought that was interesting, that post of yours talking about how the US has become an oil exporter, and you were explaining why, more recently, the Australian dollar relative to the US, hasn’t got up to the highs that it got up to in the first in mining boom, mark one in the 2000s so where it got to parity, I think at one time. So I think that was a really good explanation of that.

Stephen Kirchner  30:36

I think the contrast is quite dramatic, because we had a big terms of trade boom around about 2011 when, as you say, the Australian dollar got about parity with the US. Well, the terms of trade actually got even higher in 2022 In fact, they were the highest terms of trades going back to about 1860 and yet you certainly don’t see that in the Australian dollar exchange rate. And so the difference is, by 2022 we had this situation where the US had become a very substantial oil exporter, and that just really changed the relationship between commodity prices and the Australian dollar. Yeah, yeah,

Gene Tunny  31:15

good stuff. Just for clarity. And I think this is a simple, I think this is a quick question, the capital control. So you’re talking about how they’ve got a closed capital account. So they’re, they’re limiting the the exchange of of their currency for others, they’re all, they’re limiting people’s ability to pull money out of China is that, is that what people will be concerned about and why they’re limiting the ability of investors to repatriate funds home? Is that why it it may be limited in its potential to be a reserve currency?

Stephen Kirchner  31:59

Yeah. I mean, part of it is just a function of having a managed exchange rate regime that you need to control your capital flows in order to do that, I think it’s worth pointing out that a lot of the outbound capital controls are really not targeting foreign investors. They’re targeting Chinese savers, who they worry might send, there might be capital flight from the Chinese themselves to offshore, and so they place strict limits on the amount of money you can take out of the country.

Gene Tunny  32:35

Yeah, good point. And we’re, we’re a significant recipient of that, aren’t we? I mean, if there was a lot more cap, if there was that capital flight, or a lot more of it, then, yeah, a lot of it would go into Australian real estate, I expect. So yeah, that’s more of a comment, right? Final question, Stephen, there’s a lot of talk about the breakdown of this agreement. That was apparent, I think, is it Jim Rickards, who I’m trying to remember, who goes on about this, but apparently there was some agreement in 1974 between Richard Nixon and the Saudis that all oil sales would be denominated in US dollars. And that agreement has expired. And so there, there are people arguing that this will have profound implications for the US dollar and the US economy. Are you across that issue? And what are your thoughts on it?

Stephen Kirchner  33:34

Yeah, I think people make too much of this issue of in which currency is global trade in goods and services denominated and there’s certainly been moves in the past to re denominate more of the global oil trade and other currencies, including euros. But I mean, in this sense, I think, you know money, the exchange rate is really just a veil. Ultimately, the demand for the US dollar is a function of people either wanting to purchase US goods and services or wanting to purchase US assets. And so that’s where the demand comes from. You can, and that’s a real that’s a real demand. You can denominate global trade in whatever currency you like. There’s no reason why the Saudis and the Chinese could not denominate their trade in oil in renby, for example. But ultimately, the US, US dollar exchange rate is going to reflect the demand for US goods and services and US assets. So, you know, I don’t think it really matters. Is that much what the currency of denomination is. So to give an example, a lot of our iron ore exports would be denominated effectively in US dollars, because it’s a US dollar market. But I don’t think that affects the issue of the demand for the Australian dollar, because ultimately, that money, to the extent that it comes back to Australia, has to be converted into Australian dollars. So yeah, the demand for Australian dollars still reflects the demand for international demand for our iron ore. Yeah,

Gene Tunny  35:38

I think that’s a good answer. I was just thinking about it then. I mean, so if you think about it, Say yes, say the Saudis are accepting US dollars. So they, they sell their oil, they get the US dollars, and then they’ll, they will want to convert it to either their own currency, or they’ll want to convert it to pounds because they want to buy properties in Knightsbridge or or Mayfair or wherever, or wherever they want to invest in around the world. So I think, I think that’s a fair point to make. That’s a, yeah, I think that’s a really good perspective, righto Steven, it’s been illuminating. I’ve really enjoyed this conversation, and I’ll put a link to your great newsletter, institutional economics. I think you’ll Yeah, you’re actually doing some really deep analysis. You’re thinking carefully about these issues, the theoretical considerations, the empiric so I’ve been really impressed by it, and I would recommend it. Are there any any final comments or any reactions to anything I’ve said in this conversation before we wrap up, please.

Stephen Kirchner  36:49

I think that’s been great. Gene. Thanks very much for having me back on.

Gene Tunny  36:52

Oh, it’s been terrific, Stephen. And yeah, keep up the great work, and hopefully we’ll catch up with you again soon.

Stephen Kirchner  36:59

Thanks very much. You.

Credits

Thanks to the show’s sponsor, Gene’s consultancy business, www.adepteconomics.com.au. Full transcripts are available a few days after the episode is first published at www.economicsexplored.com. Economics Explored is available via Apple PodcastsGoogle Podcast, and other podcasting platforms

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Podcast episode

Popularizing Keynes: How Alvin Hansen and Evsey Domar Shaped Post-War Macroeconomics – EP245

In this episode, show host Gene Tunny explores the influential theories of economists Alvin Hansen, the “American Keynes”, and Evsey Domar. The episode was inspired by a first edition copy of Hansen and Perloff’s 1944 book “State and Local Finance in the National Economy” that Gene was gifted. It includes a handwritten inscription from Hansen to Domar, his student at Harvard. Key topics include the Keynesian IS-LM model, the secular stagnation hypothesis, and the Harrod-Domar growth model. The episode provides a rich historical context and examines the relevance of these theories to today’s economic challenges.
If you have any questions, comments, or suggestions, please email us at contact@economicsexplored.com  or send a voice message via https://www.speakpipe.com/economicsexplored.

You can listen to the episode via the embedded player below or via podcasting apps including Google PodcastsApple Podcast and Spotify.

What’s covered in EP245

  • Book by Alvin Hansen and Harvey Perloff on State and Local Finance in the National Economy. (0:00)
  • Alvin Hansen’s contributions to economics, including popularizing Keynes’s theory and teaching influential students such as Paul Samuelson and Evsey Domar. (5:06)
  • IS-LM model. (11:13)
  • Keynesian economics and secular stagnation hypothesis. (17:42)
  • Fiscal policy and its impact on the economy. (25:28)
  • Domar’s life and growth model. (32:29)
  • Harrod-Domar model and its implications for economic policy. (39:00)
  • Economic growth models and their limitations. (45:22)

Takeaways

  1. Secular Stagnation Hypothesis: Hansen’s theory suggesting that mature economies could face prolonged periods of low growth due to structural factors.
  2. IS-LM Model: Developed by Hansen and Hicks, this model became a foundational tool in macroeconomics for analyzing the effects of fiscal and monetary policy.
  3. Fiscal Perversity Hypothesis: Hansen and Perloff’s analysis showing that state and local fiscal policies can sometimes exacerbate economic downturns.
  4. Harrod-Domar Growth Model: An important Keynesian model that emphasizes the relationship between investment and economic growth, though not fully explaining long-term growth.
  5. Legacy and Influence: Both Hansen and Domar significantly shaped the development of economic theory and policy, influencing key areas such as social security and public investment strategies.

Links relevant to the conversation

Inscription from Hansen to Domar on Gene’s copy of State and Local Finance in the National Economy:

https://drive.google.com/file/d/167cJbNhxBJpsKRwSYGHxbjupX1Q3Iacx/view?usp=sharing

William Easterly’s paper on the Harrod-Domar model:

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=11020

Fiscal perversity papers:

Fabrizio Carmignani’s article “Can public expenditure stabilize output? Multipliers and

policy interdependence in Queensland and Australia”:

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0313592615300242?via%3Dihub

Tamim Bayoumi and Barry Eichengreen’s paper “Restraining Yourself: The Implications of Fiscal Rules for Economic Stabilization”:

https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/024/1995/001/article-A002-en.xml

An abridged version of Skidelsky’s three-volume biography of Keynes:

https://www.penguin.com.au/books/john-maynard-keynes-9780143036159

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Transcript: Popularizing Keynes: How Alvin Hansen and Evsey Domar Shaped Post-War Macroeconomics – EP245

N.B. This is a lightly edited version of a transcript originally created using the AI application otter.ai. It may not be 100 percent accurate, but should be pretty close. If you’d like to quote from it, please check the quoted segment in the recording.

Gene Tunny  00:03

But if it’s the case that the households they’ve got, they’ve got plenty of goods and services, they’re living comfortably, then they might want to save more than businesses want to invest. And this creates a problem in the Keynesian model. Welcome to the economics explored podcast, a frank and fearless exploration of important economic issues. I’m your host, Gene Tunny. I’m a professional economist and former Australian Treasury official. The aim of this show is to help you better understand the big economic issues affecting all our lives. We do this by considering the theory evidence and by hearing a wide range of views. I’m delighted that you can join me for this episode. Please check out the show notes for relevant information. Now on to the show. Hello. This episode is about a book that I was gifted recently. It’s a book with a connection to two great mid 20th century economists. So these are economists who will be well known to anyone who’s studied macroeconomics, to say at least an intermediate level. The book is Alvin H Anson and Harvey s Perloff, state and local finance in the national economy. It was published by Norton in 1944 so during the Second World War. Now this book is meaningful to me because I read it during my economics honours year, and the fiscal perversity hypothesis that is presented in this book that was the topic of my honours thesis. So I’ll talk about that a bit later. The book that I’ve got. It’s a first edition of first printing, and it has a signed inscription from Hansen to his student, FCD Domar, who later became a famous economist in his own right. The inscription reads to FCD Domar with kindness. Regards. Elvin H Hanson, now going to the note in the book that came from the bookshop where this book was purchased. It’s it’s from Peter Harrington in London. The note tells us that the recipient, ebsy Domar, 1914 to 1997 was a prominent Russian Keynesian economist. Alvin Hansen, sometimes referred to as the American Keynes was a prominent public policy advisor in the Roosevelt and Truman administrations. This volume, written for the general reader, analysed the US economic conditions at the end of the Second World War and offered concrete advice for the development of local and national economies as the US entered the post war era. Okay, well, I mean, they the war was still going, but, I mean, fair enough. I mean, the Americans probably knew that they were going to win that war at the time, although, of course, there was still a lot more death and destruction to come. Okay, so I was really excited to get this book, just because of that, that connection to these, you know, very famous economists at the time of its publication, at the time of the publication of the book in 1944 alfon Hansen was a renowned figure. He was professor of political economy at Harvard University, and he was Special Economic Advisor to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Now, Hansen lived from 1887 to 1975 and I’ll provide some more biographical details later. Hansen’s co author on this book was Harvey s Perloff. Now he was the junior of the two he was, he was an economist at the Fed, and he ended up going on to be in a being an advisor to President Kennedy, and he became Dean of the Graduate School of Architecture and Urban Planning at UCLA, and he died in 1983 this this book, it adds to my growing economic memorabilia collection, and I’ll probably do some future episodes on other pieces I have so. One of those is a chart on wartime economic planning from the Great British Australian economist Colin Clark. So I want to cover that one as well in a future episode. And I really like having these connections, no matter how small to great economists from the past. It reminds me of the great achievements that economists have made historically, and it gives us something all to aspire to. Now I want to talk about why Alvin Hansen and FC DOMA, why they are important economists, economists, why they’re important economists that we should all be familiar with. Now, before we get into it, I just want to say that this episode is brought to you by Lumo coffee, seriously healthy, organic coffee with Tripoli antioxidants of regular coffee. There’s a 10% discount for economics explored, listeners using the prono code 10. Explored. Check out the show notes for details. Okay, let’s begin by talking about Alvin Hansen, who I said, is the American canes. I mean, he’s a really big deal. He’s been credited with helping to create both the US Social Security system, so he was an advisor around the time that was created in the in the 30s during the Roosevelt administration, and he was, well, he’s also been credited with having contributed to the creation of the Council of Economic Advisors to the US president, more than anyone else. And this is what I think he’s he’s most famous for. He helped popularise Keynes’s General Theory. So Keynes’s General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, he helped popularise that in the US and as a consequence, through out the world. Well, essentially because, you know, of the influence of the United States, and also the fact that the leading economics textbook in the post war period was Paul Samuelson’s economics, which was, yeah, I mean, how many editions? I mean, over a dozen editions. And Samuelson was a student of Hanson’s, okay, so Elvin Harvey Hanson. He was born in 1887 in Viborg, Viborg, V, I, B, O, R, G, I’ve possibly got that pronunciation wrong, South Dakota. He graduated from Yankton College in 1910 and then he studied at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, where he completed his PhD in 1918 his academic career began at Brown University, where he taught, and then moved to University of Minnesota, and he was there from 1919 to 1937 and in 1937 that’s when he moved to Harvard, and he became professor of political economy, And he held that position until he retired in 1957 now, obviously, if you’re at a place like Harvard, you’re going to have very good students. And he ended Hansen ended up teaching some very, very famous economists. I mentioned Paul Samuelson, before who was a Nobel Laureate in economics, you know, major contributions to economic theory. I should cover Samuelson in some more detail in a future episode. And the other student, and this is to to whom Hanson gave this, this copy of state and local finance in the national economy was FC Domar, and he’s known for developing the Harrod Domar model of economic growth. Well, he developed it independent of Roy Harrod, who we’ll talk about later. And you know, this is a very significant model of economic growth. It’s very important in the the history of macroeconomics, even if it’s not regarded as a, as a, you know, a model that actually describes the process of economic growth is a big, bit of a controversy about it. It’s it’s fallen out of favour. But that said it was very important in the development of our thinking about, well, the macro economy and about economic growth in that post war period. So I think it’s important that we all know about it, and we do recognise the contribution that Domar made in developing that model. Okay, so Hansen, he passed away on June 6, 1975 in Alexandria, Virginia. In which case it means he basically passed away the week before I was born, a few days different but, yeah, roughly a week before I was born, righto, so let’s go through three of Alvin Hansen’s major contributions, the first of his major contributions is the development or the the representation of Keynesian theory in a very stylized model of The macro economy. And he did this along with British economist John Hicks, who, who really, you know, first set this out in a in an article called Mr Keynes and the classics, and then Hansen developed his own presentation of it. But they’re very similar. I mean, it’s essentially the same model. It’s one at the same time as one of the most celebrated and also one of the one of the most controversial models of macroeconomics. It’s the IS LM model. So islm, and this is a workhorse model for macroeconomists. And when you read reports from, say, OECD or IMF or World Bank, and you read their discussion of macroeconomics, or if you listen to commentators in the media, underlying a lot of the commentary and analysis is Essentially a very basic islm model, and this model, in the model, I stands for investment, S for savings, L stands for liquidity preference, which is money demand, so people have a desire to hold money for its liquidity benefits. And M stands for money supply. Okay, so this is, this is a very important model. And you know what it what it shows is it will show how, say, an expansion of government spending will, will increase GDP, but depending on various parameters that could be crowded out because interest rates would increase, and that there is this offsetting crowding out effects. And then there’s debates about what those those parameters are and just how effective government spending is. And then you can also analyse what happens if you change the money supply. So if there’s a, you know, if there’s a expansionary monetary policy or a contractionary policy. So this is a model that is, that is widely used, but then it’s, it’s controversial because it, it doesn’t really take into account the fact that prices can adjust and that that can, you know, help an economy get restore itself to to full employment. It doesn’t take in the closed economy version. It doesn’t take into account international trade, capital flows, exchange rate effects. And this is what Tony Macon has said. And, you know, he’s argued that islm For particularly for a small, open economy like Australia, islm is in a very, a very good model. And he’s been very critical of that. And I’ve had Tony on I had him on the show. Unfortunately, Tony passed away a few years ago, but the episode I recorded with him in 2020 a fiscal vaccine for covid 19 is still available. So if you haven’t listened to that yet, please check it out. It’s really great. Okay, so that’s a bit of a discussion of islm. And I mean, as I said, controversial model, but there’s even a controversy over whether it actually captures the essence of what Keynes was saying. So depending on your viewpoint, islm either crisply captures the essence of Keynes’s theory or it’s a bastardization of that which Mrs Keynes’s main contributions. But that really is beyond the scope of this episode, even though it’s it’s an interesting little, little episode in the history of economic thought, and indeed, I may even think about covering it in the future. So if you’d be interested in hearing about that, then let me know, and I can dive more into islm and why it’s why it’s such an important model trying to try and give more of an explanation of it. Okay, we might move on to the next. Next major contribution of Alvin Hansen, and this is this secular stagnation hypothesis. This was presented in various forms by Hansen, and one of the famous presentations was in a 1938 American Economic Association presidential address. And the idea is that if you’ve got a mature economy, you may end up with prolonged periods of very low growth or no economic growth due to structural factors. And he identified a few structural factors that could lead to this, this secular stagnation, he called it, including the closure of the frontier, so the end of territorial expansion in the US. So he, he argued that that reduced opportunities for investment in economic growth. There was slowing population growth at the time. I mean, post war, there was a baby boom. So that was, well, that ended up being one factor, which meant that post war, America didn’t experience secular stagnation. So we’ll talk about that soon. And then also the, you know, there’s the possibility that technological progress could could slow down. And at various times in history, you do get that feeling that the the rate of technological progress is slowed down. There was a big, you know, wave of invention in the late 19th century and early early 20th century, as we really harnessed electromagnetism and automation the assembly line, and yes, there was a Real wave of technological progress. And you know, you could argue that that slowed down, and that’s where, you know, that could drive secular stagnation. And Robert Gordon is who’s a American economist, he’s argued that more recently, we’ve had a slowdown in invention and the, you know, rate of technological progress, although, of course, that’s going to be controversial, because now we’ve got AI, haven’t we? You know that’s there’s a huge debate over that. We might have to cover that in another episode too. But for our purposes, what matters is that these factors could mean that you end up always having this excess of desired savings over investment. So at the full employment level of output, at the full employment level of GDP. So the essence of, you know this, you can think of this in Keynesian terms, because the essence of Keynes’s theory, and this is captured in islm. It’s that at the level of GDP that would fully employ the population, it could be the case that households want to save a much higher amount in so in dollar terms, then businesses are willing to invest. So you get a particular level of GDP. You think about what that means in terms of title income, because GDP generates the income of the community, that’s the national income, and then households want to save out of that. But if it’s the case that the households they’ve got, they’ve got plenty of goods and services, they’re living comfortably, then they might want to save more than businesses want to invest. And this creates a problem in the Keynesian model, because, well, essentially GDP. In this think about GDP and generating income. So you can think about this from two perspectives. If you think about it from the perspective the income perspective, then total income less consumption spending of the households that is equal to the amount of that households want to save in that period. So let’s call that big S. That’s the level of savings. But if you look at GDP from the production side, GDP that is equal to consumption spending plus investment spending. Well, sorry, this is from the expenditure side. But what happens is that the amount of output produced in the economy adjusts to the total amount of expenditure or aggregate demand. So this is the key. This is one of the key mechanisms. In the Keynesian model. So what you end up having in the Keynesian model is that the level of GDP is determined in the short run by the level of aggregate demand, so the sum of consumption and investment spending in Keynes’s model, there’s no adjustment mechanism that ensures that the level of aggregate demand is always equal, or actually moves back towards the level of GDP that would fully employ the population. So this is a this is one of the major points in the Keynesian model that you know that and you can think about this. You can think about secular stagnation as reflecting a situation where it’s always the case that the level of savings that households want to want to take exceeds the level of investments that business will make. So why this? Again, why this is a problem? You can think about GDP as equal to consumption plus saving, or you can think about GDP as consumption plus investment. We’re ignoring government for the moment. This is a closed economy model, and if it’s the case that at that full employment level of GDP, that big S is less than the big I on the other side, well the level of expenditure ends up being insufficient to purchase the output that would be produced at that full employment level. And what ends up happening then is that the level of GDP falls, it adjusts, it contracts to reach an equilibrium where the level of savings ex post, so to speak. I think that’s the terminology they use, so the realised level of saving ends up equal to the level of investment spending by businesses, and that’s where you get that equilibrium. And what Hansen was arguing with this secular stagnation hypothesis, is that if you’ve got a situation where you’ve got this, you know, very high level of savings, but there’s insufficient desire by businesses to invest for the reasons he describes. Then you have this, this mismatch, and the economy won’t reach that full employment level, and you end up in this secular stagnation situation. Now you know, that can be interpreted as a Keynesian concept, and it led to pessimistic views regarding the prospects for the post war economy. And there are all sorts of, you know, there were predictions by by Hansen, and I think Paul Samuelson was, was also concerned about this, and he wrote about it in his textbook. He always sort of saw it as a possibility that this sort of thing could occur. But luckily, we we ended up having robust post war economic growth. So the secular stagnation hypothesis did not, did not come to fruition. And you know, reasons for that? Well, actually, we had a baby boom. For one, there was a there was a big demand for for new housing and and new infrastructure to accommodate the growing population. There was also, you know, they weren’t. There were technological advancements for the war. It’s not as if technological progress stopped. We had Dino major advances in in jet aeroplanes, for example, Boeing 747, and then we had, I mean, what else I mean? Look at, you know, developments in in computing after the war. So lots of technological advancement in those you know, there’s a lot of advancement in those 30 years after the war, so that, you know, then we get up to 1973 that that time, that period, and we have this slowdown, and then there all sorts of economic problems in the 70s, but at least for the first few decades, the roughly the 30 glorious years, as they they call it in France, we had strong economic growth throughout the advanced economies. And there was also the reconstruction effort in Europe, the Marshall Plan. We had the Japanese economic miracle after the war. So there were all sorts of things which meant that this whole secular stagnation didn’t happen. Okay, we’ll take a short break here for a word from our sponsor

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Gene Tunny  25:27

now. Back to the show. Now, incidentally, I should note that Larry Summers, the famous American economist, US Treasury Secretary at the end of the Clinton administration, Harvard professor, celebrated economist, he revived this concept of secular stagnation in the 2010s to characterise the slow recovery from the financial crisis. Now, again, you know something that’s going to it’s a controversial hypothesis, and we’ll probably have to cover that in a future episode. The point of this, what I’ve been talking about, is to note that, well, you know, we had Alvin Hansen 80 years ago or so hypothesise this for the US in the post war period. And it’s an interesting hypothesis. Luckily, it, it didn’t occur. Of course, you know, I think we should respect the intellectual contribution from a great economic thinker such as Albert Hanson, who has made so many, you know, he has done so much to advance our understanding of the macro economy and how it works and the business cycle, even if you know a particular hypothesis, hypothesis of his did not turn out. Now, one hypothesis of his that actually did turn out and is a correct hypothesis is the fiscal high perversity hypothesis, which is what I talked about at the start of this episode, and I might talk about this now. This is the hypothesis that was advanced in the book state and local finance in the national economy that has been the inspiration for this episode. And so this is in the 1944 book, and this is based on Hansen and Perloff analysis of of data from the the late 20s through the 30s and into the early 40s. And what they found was that the the fiscal policies of the state and local governments, and state and local governments are often, you know, economists may not, they often don’t pay them the attention that they deserve, even though, in aggregate, they do constitute a, you know, a very large amount of spending. What they found was that how the state and local governments were running their budgets, they were having destabilising effects on the economy. Now, if you’ve been listening to this show, or you’ve studied economics, or just from you know, you’ve absorbed this from elsewhere. I mean, you know that the whole the Keynesian view is that fiscal policy should be run in a counter cyclical fashion, so that when the economy goes into a recession, then you have a budget deficit, and then that helps, you know, that helps prevent the economy from being stuck in a slump. Governments will try to pump prime they will try to stimulate the economy through increasing the budget deficit, through spending measures or cutting taxes. But what Hansen and Perloff found is that for these state and local governments, they were actually doing the opposite. They were engaging in pro cyclical fiscal policy, in which case fiscal policy, so by their spending and taxation decisions, was actually making downturns worse, and it was actually, you know, adding to the the momentum in the recovery, or it was, it was, you know, arguably it could be, you know, there’s a risk there that then governments could be contributing to to inflation. But then, you know, they didn’t really that the period they were covering, there was probably little risk of that. They were more concerned about the the impact in depression. So in that period that we talk about, there was both the Great Depression from the, you know, 1929 through the the, you know, the early years of the 1930s and then there was the recession of 1937 1938 in the US. So they’re the the major events that that Hansen and Perloff were looking at, and they were. Noticing that fiscal policy for many states was actually going the wrong direction. It was contractionary in a time of downturn, and the reason for that was various constraints on state and local budgets, whereby, well, state governments, many state, I mean, dozens of state governments, it’s they have in the US, they have various balanced budget requirements. Okay? And so this can be lead to perverse fiscal policy, because if you’re trying to if, if the economy’s in a slump, and you’re getting more less tax revenue because of that, then to respect this balanced budget requirement, you may have to cut spending or increase taxes, which is the opposite of what the the standard Keynesian prescription is. And so uh, Hansen was arguing that state and local fiscal policies were behaving in a perverse fashion, and that the state and local politicians, they should recognise this and adopt a more, you know, sensible, adopt more sensible fiscal policies. And you know this, this is actually something that is still, can still be a problem today. And there are a couple of studies I’ll put links to in the show notes that that demonstrate that we have seen some fiscal perversity by US states and by Australian states in recent decades. And yes, interesting hypothesis, and it shows just the impact of what particular, particular constraints, particular rules can be. So again, very interesting analysis from Elvin Hansen. And you know something, you know he made a contribution that is still influencing economists and informing research to this day. Okay, so that’s, that’s about all I’ve got to say about Alvin Hansen. We’d better move on to his student, FC Domar. Now, hopefully I’m pronouncing his first name, right? If I’m not if, if anyone knows Russian, then please get in touch and inform me how to how to say that correctly. So. FC Domar, April 16, 1914 to April 119, 97 he was a Russian American economist. He was renowned for his contributions to economic growth theory, comparative economics and economic history. He was born in a town in what is now Poland. It was part of the Russian Empire at the time, if I’ve got that right. And he was raised in Harbin, Manchuria. Now he ended up growing up in Manchuria, is because his family moved there in 1916 his father was a small scale businessman, and says, Here is a Menshevik. So a Social Democrat, Menshevik, so I suppose he would have, well, he wouldn’t have been popular during the revolution, because the Bolsheviks ended up taking over and from the Mensheviks. So I don’t know whether he saw what was coming. But anyway, they relocated from from Russian from Russian Poland at the time to Manchuria, and the town they went to, it was a significant hub for the Chinese Eastern Railway, which was built by Russians and and there was a substantial Russian community with Russian newspapers, theatres, and even Russian laws and administration. So, yeah, I mean, just incredible, when you think about it. I mean, one minute you’re in Poland, and then the next year, growing up in Manchuria, yeah, that would have been an extraordinary upbringing for sure. Domar immigrated to the United States in 1936 and he earned degrees from UCLA, the University of Michigan and Harvard University, where he completed his PhD in Economics in 1947 so and through his career, he had positions at the Federal Reserve Board, the Carnegie Institute of Technology, the University of Chicago, Johns Hopkins and MIT, where he became the Ford international professor of economics. So, I mean, you know, all of those institutions are very, very well known, very prestigious. So, you know, he had a he had an amazing career. He’s best known for what’s called the Harrod Domar growth model. Now, this was developed independently of the British economy. Most Roy Harrod, who is famous for this model and also for writing the first biography of John Maynard Keynes. So Harrod knew Keynes, and could obviously provide a lot of insights into his life. I’ve never read that Keynes biography, but it’s cited in other Keynes biographies I’ve read, I think the best, incidentally, if you, if you’re interested, the best biography of Germano Keynes is probably Robert skidelsky’s Three volume biography, absolutely brilliant, and yeah, really provides a lot of insights into how you know what Keynes was thinking how he came to his his views, just the extraordinary life he led. And is working for the Treasury in Britain and then advising prime ministers and presidents and, you know, helping create the post war economic system. Just extraordinary life. But this isn’t about Keynes. This is about Domar. So let me get back onto it, as well as economic growth. He, he was important in our measurement of productivity growth, of technological change. There’s a concept called Domar aggregation. He did work on the Soviet economy, public debt, and the economics of serfdom and slavery. So something I might have to delve into that in a future ever. So that sounds fascinating, but we just don’t have time to cover that today. Daimar was a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and he served as vice president of the American Economic Association. He passed away in Concord, Massachusetts in 1997 Righto, let’s, let’s end this episode by talking about the Harrod Domar growth model. This is a Keynesian model. This is the model you get if you think about the implications of Keynes’s theory over several years, if you don’t just have this static model. So islm is a static model, and so is the Keynesian cross model, which is a much simpler representation of Keynes’s theory and doesn’t have the interest rate in it like islm does, if you think about Keynes’s model, or what Keynes was driving at in a dynamic setting, then you end up with, effectively, Harrod Domar growth model. And this is a Keynesian model, a growth model, in which there’s a there’s a razor’s edge, they talk about a razor’s edge solution, and what has to happen to maintain full employment is that you need capital investment. So investment spending by businesses on on capital goods, on buildings, on plant and equipment that needs to grow at a sufficient rate to absorb the additional savings that come with a higher GDP. So the idea is that you get additional capital investment, and then that expands your potential GDP. That expands the level of GDP at full employment. And there needs to be, there needs to be additional investment in the future, like the the amount of investment has to grow so that that is absorbed, so that ends up, it absorbs the savings at that higher level of GDP. And if that doesn’t happen, then the economy will fall into a slump. On the other hand, if there’s, if there’s too much investment, if a level investment ends up being too high, then the economy is going to have persistent inflation. Okay, so it’s a it’s a very it’s a model where you you could actually have a pessimistic reading of it. However, there’s another, another spin on it, which I’ll go through now. And the interesting thing about Harrod DOMA, so it it’s a model in which the secular stagnation that we talked about earlier, it’s possible, but it’s not certain. So the way that Mark blog, Mark blog, B, L, A, U, G, he was a famous economic historian. He wrote this absolutely amazing book called economic theory in retrospect, which is just essential reading for anyone who wants to study economics. I think he was at LSE better go back and figure out how to pronounce his name properly. I think I’ve always pronounced it, blog, Mark blog, he summarised the Harrod Domar model like this. The main points of it, the secular stagnation is not inevitable. Investment adds capacity to the economy, but this does not. Necessarily mean insufficient demand in the future. And what the model illustrates is that there’s always some rate of investment that’s high enough to create demand for the additional GDP of the previous levels of the previous period’s level of investment. Okay, so there was an amount of investment last year that expands the ability the economy to produce output in the next year. And that means a more savings by households. And then you need more investment in the next period than you had in the period before blogs. Blogs argument where the way he interprets the Harrod Domar model is that you can always find some rate of investment, or some growth of in capital investment that will actually create that demand for the additional GDP. So it’s not necessarily the case that the secular stagnation has to occur. You can get around it with the sufficiently high level of investment, I suppose. Well, you’re thinking, Well, that’s obvious. That’s essentially. That was the problem with secular stagnation. You don’t have enough in investment. He developed that in a 1946 model, and then in a 1949 paper and Econometrica, he concluded, where he talked about these growth issues as well, he concluded with some thoughts on, well, what does this all mean for policy? Does this? And you know, this is a very Keynesian way of looking at it, and this gives us an idea of, you know, how economists were thinking in this post war period. And there was a lot of, there was a lot of, you know, I guess, optimism about what governments could do to help keep economies on track, this idea of fine tuning the economy, so to speak. And as I’ve talked about in other episodes, and the experience of the 1970s and late, you know, and later episodes, I’d argue, has convinced many economists that this whole fine tuning thing is it’s not really the recipe for for a prosperous economy. And again, that’s a, you know, there’s a big debate about that as everything. So we’ll cover that again in a future episode. But, you know, I’m very sceptical of of fine tuning and discretionary fiscal policy, as you’re probably aware anyway, let’s, uh, let’s discuss what Domar wrote in that 1949 Econometrica paper, he talked about policies which would help an economy, you know, have the level of investment that is needed so to have investment increasing as the as the economy grows. And he wrote about various methods of encouraging private investments, such as low interest rates, incentive taxation, liberal loss offsets for income tax purposes, etc. A guaranteed growth of income as a method of creating investment opportunities should be explored in this connection. A guaranteed growth of income as a method of creating investment opportunities should be explored in this connection. I wonder if he’s talking about universal basic income or something like that. That’s interesting. I’ll have to think about that. I didn’t pick up that sentence The first time I read this paragraph, but that’s quite interesting. I mean, he’s maybe talking about Social Security or something like that, or, you know, I mean, the UBI people might take some they might be encouraged by that, like to think more about that. And the final thing he writes is, there is no inherent reason why public investment should not play a more important role as well. So that’s a very Keynesian notion. So the idea that if the private sector is not investing enough, then the solution is, let’s have the government step in and undertake that capital investment, undertake the public works to make sure that we’ve got enough aggregate demand to purchase the level of, you know, output that would, that would have it full employment. Okay, so very Keynesian model haradoma. It’s the first representation of, well, it’s the, it’s the it essentially represents the Keynesian model in a dynamic setting. So thinking about what does, what does the Keynesian model look like from year to year, if you, if you don’t just have a static model, you think about the implications of investment in the period previous period for your potential GDP, and what that means the. Aggregate demand has to, has to grow by what the level of investment spending has to grow by to be able to keep your economy at full employment. So, very, very clever model. I mean, it’s, you know, it’s one of those models that you learn about when you’re studying economics and you study the mathematics of it. It’s, it’s very elegant. However, it’s not a model of long term growth. It turns out it doesn’t actually tell us anything about what really drives long run growth. And for that, we need the solo Swan model, the neoclassical growth model, and we need to have, you know, an assumption around technological progress. So we need to think about technological progress now. There have been extensions of solo swan. There’s endogenous growth theory, which tries to model that technological progress. Well, again, another something for a future episode. The basic idea is that the Harrod Domar model is a, it’s a Keynesian model. It’s not really about long run growth. It’s about, it’s about the the macro economy over a period of, say, a few years or so. It’s it’s not about the long run, which is, you know, over 1020, 30, or even longer years. That’s, that’s what we tend to think of, think of when we’re thinking about models of economic growth and paradoma really isn’t that there’s a really brilliant paper by one of my favourite economists, William Easterly, who was an expert on foreign aid. He worked in, actually, he was in the World Bank, and he developed very well views on what the World Bank and, you know, what other organised international organisations were doing that were actually, you know, that ran counter to to the standard prescriptions. He’s a fascinating character, really good economist, so according to easterly in a 1997 World Bank paper, and I’ll link to that in the show notes. So 11 years later, so he’s writing about, he’s writing about domar’s 1946 paper here easterly writes that 11 years later, complaining of an ever guilty conscience he Domar disavowed the original model altogether. He said his purpose was to comment upon an esoteric debate on business cycles, not to derive an empirically meaningful rate of growth. He said his model made no sense for long run growth. Domar endorsed the new growth model of Robert Solow, which would dominate economists theoretical approach to growth for the next three decades. Okay, so that just shows his his intellectual calibre, his his confidence. He’s willing to admit okay, even though this is this models made me famous. It actually, you shouldn’t be reading too much into it, because it was on this well, how he describes what he describes as an esoteric it was relevant to an esoteric debate on business cycle, so it’s nothing to do with long run growth. However, you know, easterly noted that despite Domar even disavowing it as a model of long run growth, that Harrod Domar framework, or the model, ended up being influential in development economics, and it ended up, you know, encouraging development economic economists to characterise the economic development challenge in developing economies around the world as, you know, one of insufficient capital investment as as a challenge where that could be overcome by uh, concessional loans, by foreign aid, by assistance from the western economies to help, you know, stimulate investment or to to develop, you know, major, uh, capital investment projects and new hydroelectric dams, railways, uh, whatever, and he, yeah, he was very sceptic. He blamed, well, he thinks that the Harrod Domar model was influential in in that thinking, or that, that way of thinking about the economy, very Keynesian way of of thinking about it. And you know, easterly, he’s a noted critic of of a lot of the policies that World Bank and other international financial institutions aid institutions have been have been running in the post war period. And he’s more you know, he prefers free market, bottom up solutions rather than top down solutions. So really fascinating thinker, again, possibly a topic for a future podcast. So if you want to learn more about about these issues, then let me know. Please get in touch. And please get in touch with any questions you have or thoughts on this episode. I’ve tried to cover some fairly theoretical concepts this episode, and you know, it’s very possible I haven’t done them justice, or there are things that I didn’t explain as well as I could have explained. So please let me know what they are. If you’ve got your own views on any of these, these issues. So your own views on islm and what the contribution is, what the controversy is about, islm, you know, let me know what you think of that as a model of the economy. Let me know what you think about Keynes or secular stagnation. We can have think more more. We can talk more about what Larry Summers was saying in the 2010s that could be fascinating. And also models of economic growth, if you want to hear, learn more about how economists have been thinking about economic growth, and particularly this new growth theory, or endogenous growth theory, where we’re trying to model what’s driving economic growth in you know, to what extent is it improving your human capital? To what extent is it R and D and innovation, improving technology, the level of technology in an economy? To what extent is it? Institutional factors, rule of law, democracy, etc. There’s been a big literature on that in the last, oh, gee, nearly 40 years now since Paul Romer’s, uh, 1986 paper. Thing was 86 anyway, that’s, that’s something else we could talk about. Anyway. I think I’ve come to the end of this episode. I really love this book that I’ve been given, that have been gifted state and local finance in the national economy by Alvin Hansen and Harvey s Perloff. And it’s just great having this connection to those, those big names, Elvin Hansen and FC Domar. I’m looking at the inscription right now to FCD Domar with kindest regards. Elvin H Hanson, I’ll, I’ll put a some images of the book and the inscription in the show notes so you can check that out. Okay, thanks for listening. I really appreciate it, and I look forward to hearing from you. Thank you, righto. Thanks for listening to this episode of economics explored if you have any questions, comments or suggestions, please get in touch. I’d love to hear from you. You can send me an email via contact@economicsexplored.com or a voicemail via SpeakPipe. You can find the link in the show notes. If you’ve enjoyed the show, I’d be grateful if you could tell anyone you think would be interested about it. Word of mouth is one of the main ways that people learn about the show. Finally, if your podcasting app lets you, then please write a review and leave a rating. Thanks for listening. I hope you can join me again next week. You music.

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Podcast episode

Economic Freedom and Efficiency: Lessons from Australia’s Competition Reforms – EP244

Gene Tunny is joined by Darren Brady Nelson to discuss the evolution of competition policy in Australia over the past few decades. Darren draws on his experience as an economist in the NSW Treasury and the Queensland Competition Authority. Gene and Darren reflect on the successes of the original National Competition Policy reforms and assess the more limited scope of the subsequent competition policy review. Darren analyzes CPI data to understand rising living costs and argues for reducing government interventions. The conversation also covers unintended policy consequences (e.g. fraud in disability services provision), the US Founding Fathers’ vision for limited government, and debates around the appropriate roles and sizes of government in Australia and the US. 

If you have any questions, comments, or suggestions, please email us at contact@economicsexplored.com  or send a voice message via https://www.speakpipe.com/economicsexplored

You can listen to the episode via the embedded player below or via podcasting apps including Google PodcastsApple Podcast and Spotify.

What’s covered in EP244

  • Australian competition policy history and reforms. (0:00)
  • Free market competition and its impact on living standards. (7:56)
  • Economic policy and its impact on individuals, including a tragic story from Karen Chester illustrating the costs of high tariffs. (12:31)
  • Economic policy reforms in Australia during the 1980s and 1990s, including the Hilmer report and National Competition Policy (16:08)
  • The benefits and costs of National Competition Policy in Australia. (23:36)
  • Sequels and the original, with examples from movies and economics. (31:51)
  • Competition policy and its benefits, challenges, and potential reforms in Australia. (35:27)
  • Cost of living and government interventions. (40:12)
  • Government intervention in various sectors, including energy, childcare, and alcohol/tobacco. (44:42)
  • Government policies and their unintended consequences, including fraud in disability support programs. (49:23)
  • The size and role of government in Australia and the US, focusing on the founding fathers’ intentions. (53:43)
  • Competition policy in Australia and the US, focusing on regulation and deregulation. (1:00:10)
  • Economics, regulation, and antitrust law with a focus on Australia and the US. (1:06:07)

Takeaways

  1. National Competition Policy (NCP) significantly improved economic efficiency and consumer benefits in Australia.
  2. Reforms under NCP included corporatization and privatization of government-owned businesses, and opening up markets such as telecommunications and airlines to competition, leading to lower prices and better services in many cases.
  3. Despite being from a traditionally left-wing political party, the Hawke-Keating Government was crucial in initiating market-friendly reforms.
  4. Future competition policy reforms face challenges due to political and lobbying pressures, especially in regulated sectors like pharmacies.
  5. Transparent and rational community service obligations were key to ensuring fair distribution of competition policy benefits. 

Lumo Coffee promotion

10% of Lumo Coffee’s Seriously Healthy Organic Coffee until 30 June 2024.

Website: https://www.lumocoffee.com/10EXPLORED 

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Links relevant to the conversation

Where you can find Darren’s submission to the Productivity Commission’s National Competition Policy analysis inquiry:

https://www.pc.gov.au/inquiries/current/competition-analysis/submissions

AFR article “PC’s Karen Chester’s love of economics born of despair” (pay-walled):

https://www.afr.com/politics/pcs-karen-chesters-love-of-economics-born-of-despair-20161206-gt4poh

Whitlam Era book featuring Gene’s article on Whitlam and the Economy:

https://www.connorcourtpublishing.com.au/THE-WHITLAM-ERA-A-REAPPRAISAL-OF-GOVERNMENT-POLITICS-AND-POLICY_p_511.html

Productivity Commission’s 2005 NCP review:

https://www.pc.gov.au/inquiries/completed/national-competition-policy/report/ncp.pdf

Episode featuring John Nantz, Free Markets & Limited Government: Lessons from the Founding Fathers for Today  – EP218: 

https://economicsexplored.com/2023/12/14/free-markets-limited-government-lessons-from-the-founding-fathers-for-today-ep218/

Transcript: Economic Freedom and Efficiency: Lessons from Australia’s Competition Reforms – EP244

N.B. This is a lightly edited version of a transcript originally created using the AI application otter.ai. It may not be 100 percent accurate, but should be pretty close. If you’d like to quote from it, please check the quoted segment in the recording.

Darren Brady Nelson  00:03

socialism ultimately doesn’t work because it doesn’t create prices, right? It doesn’t have prices give that, you know, and to also jump into high IQ, you know, because prices obviously this mix of information and incentives at the exact same time, right? When government does something, you can pretend to have prices, just like the Soviet Union pretended to have prices, but they weren’t real, you know, they didn’t need to reflect, you know, allocation of resources they didn’t, you know, they certainly didn’t inform entrepreneurs or consumers properly and all that sort of stuff.

Gene Tunny  00:42

Welcome to the economics explored podcast, a frank and fearless exploration of important economic issues. I’m your host, Gene Tunny. I’m a professional economist and former Australian Treasury official. The aim of this show is to help you better understand the big economic issues affecting all our lives. We do this by considering the theory evidence and by hearing a wide range of views. I’m delighted that you can join me for this episode, please check out the show notes for relevant information. Now on to the show. Hello, and thanks for tuning in to the show this episode, we’re going to be talking about national competition policy. But before we get into it, I’ve got to let you know this episode is brought to you by LUMO. Coffee seriously healthy or Ganic. Coffee. There’s a 10% discount for economics explored listeners, you can find the details in the show notes, the promo code is 10. explored, that’s in all caps. So definitely check it out. I couldn’t recommend it. Right. Oh, we’d better get into the show. I’m joined today by Darren Brady Nelson. Darren, good to have you back on the show. It’s been a while.

Darren Brady Nelson  01:51

Yeah. Good to be back. Good to see you. And yeah, I’m pretty excited about the topic. It’s a good one, one, near and dear to my heart.

Gene Tunny  02:01

Yeah. Well, let’s, let’s talk about that. Darren, I mean, you’ve got a background in competition policy, haven’t you from your time in New South Wales, treasury and elsewhere? Can you tell us a bit about that place?

Darren Brady Nelson  02:11

Yeah, essentially, it was my first job at a university at New South Wales treasury, an economist and you know, 1995 when national competition policy kicked off, so, you know, absolutely great time to join something like New South Wales treasury, because at that stage, you know, the Commonwealth wasn’t really doing much on that front. Because, I mean, it was the state who had all sort of the government businesses and a lot of that stuff that needed the reform international competition policy. And, you know, obviously, New South Wales being the biggest state, not I mean, that doesn’t necessarily mean they will lead the way on things, but at the time, they were because, you know, both labour and liberal were kind of, you know, amenable to these types of reforms. And at the time, that was Bob Carr’s Labour government, and in particular, you know, I’d say the late great treasurer, Michael Egan, you know, was was in charge, and he was, you know, very, very instrumental and very interested in these reforms. Gotcha.

Gene Tunny  03:12

Okay. So let’s might be good to just go over some of the history of competition policy. So by competition policy, we mean, measures to promote greater competition, because generally, competition I mean, there’s competition is a good thing in terms of making the serve the economy more efficient, we get cheaper services, cheaper goods, generally better quality, too. So there’s a there’s, there’s a virtue, a competition is a virtue. And it before that we had back in Australia, we had this. I mean, we were very highly regulated. We had a lot of government owned businesses, I suppose. You know, we still have some, but could you paint a picture? Darren, what was what were things like before national competition policy here in Australia? Well, to be fair,

Darren Brady Nelson  04:00

actually, things were already moving in that direction. As you would probably recall to with, you know, the Hawke Keating government’s Minister, you know, I remember people, you know, particularly liberals or whatever he said, kind of say, I can’t remember exact phrase, but basically, they were doing the sort of reforms that the Liberals should have done but they didn’t do under like, Malcolm Fraser. And so, now, how can Keating kicked off a lot of great stuff, you know, typically, I think banking and financial forms, you know, various sort of international trade reforms, currency reforms, labour reforms, and then, you know, sort of the competition policy, you know, kind of came out of that. I think so, it was also perhaps inspired by what was happening with Roger nomics. In New Zealand, and also what was happening, you know, in the UK with under Thatcher and the US under Reagan. You know, as experts As you know, what was happening, you know, in the 70s, and prior to that, but I understand, I think you have a better handle on that. But, you know, just how uncompetitive and protected markets were both domestically and internationally, including, you know, obviously, you know, the the two airline policy, the one big monopoly of what was it called prior to tell strike anywhere? Telecom? Telecom? Yeah. So I think, yeah, the telecom sort of reforms have been right before national competition policy, but then they kind of rolled into competition policy as well. And, um, you know, later on, kind of when competition policy, maybe five years or something after that, things like airports started to kind of roll in as well. So the regional competition policy was very much focused on infrastructure, in particular, government owned infrastructure, at state level in particular, but, you know, maybe to a lesser extent, local government, we can kind of touch on that. But, you know, terms of what Queensland did some interesting stuff that the other states didn’t do, in terms of competition policy, for instance, basically, in a nutshell, they they copied what was happening at the federal level, and, and basically tried to incentivize local governments to do sort of similar reforms, you know, with water and sewerage and various other sorts of local government owned businesses, or least local government heavily regulated businesses. And a key component about national competition policy, maybe, I don’t think this was with the other earlier reforms, and they haven’t really done it since is the Commonwealth made payments available? So they basically had these incentive payments, combination of incentives and, and compensation because, you know, to reform something, it’s not cost free, obviously, you know, to reform these things, you know, cost some money to do it in the first place. And then Queensland replicated that model and had money on offer for local governments. So after New South Wales treasury, I worked for the Queensland competition authority, and they were in charge of that programme, that national competition policy where state interacts and incentivize local government. So and I don’t think any of the other states did that. So definitely, you know, we’ll get to this. But you know, if any, if there’s a national competition policy 3.0, I think you have to have that sort of payment system in place, which was at the national level was run by the national competition Council. And then, you know, the QC just kind of replicated that sort of model. And we can obviously, at some stage, you know, I think we first met around the time the national competition policy 2.0 was happening with the Harper review. Yeah. So, yeah. It just for the audience in the Hilmer review was a thing that first led to the original competition policy. As you obviously recall, yeah.

Gene Tunny  07:56

Hmm. You know, we might talk about that in a minute. I just want to go over some of the background. So you mentioned Hawke and Keating. And that’s right, that was a very Suppose you say reformist government or it. And it was a very brave government because it was a Labour government. And so Labour’s traditionally the left wing party in Australia, but yet it fell upon the Hawke and Keating governments in the 80s and 90s, to adopt reforms that you would think you will do their free mark there in the direction of the free market, which was terrific and cutting tariffs and you’re reforming markets. So ending to airline policy, financial deregulation, and that two airline policy, there’s a great story. Well, it’s a terrible story really, when you think about it, but it’s a story by Karen Chester, who was deputy head of the a triple C poor car and got into a bit of trouble early this year. I’m not sure where that that’s all that there was some controversy, but we’ll just ignore that for the moment. She because she’s a great economist and she’s a former Queenslander, she, she told the story at the 75th anniversary or 70th anniversary of the Economics Department at UQ. Customs House whereby when her grandfather, there was a grandfather died in in Perth in the early 80s. And you know that her mother, they were living out of Salisbury or somewhere there her mother couldn’t afford to fly over to the funeral because of the high cost of airfares in real terms because of the restriction of competition. And I mean, I don’t know if you converted it to today’s dollars that it’d be in the 1000s of editor you know, it’d be very costly to fly to would it be very costly to fly from Brisbane to Perth? I think it was Perth back in those days. So it’s just you know, it was just extraordinarily costly and caused all sorts of social problems that that terrible policy so I think that was something that was worth definitely worth reforming. I think that was Karen Chester I’m sorry if it if it was at Cardiff, I’ve got the story wrong but that’s that’s the That’s what I remember something you know, there was a vivid story I may have the facts a bit distorted but it was out very real, real story that just struck me Oh, that’s a that’s a really good example of just how poor economic policy can cost people. So I think that’s, that’s a good illustration. And then I always remember how we always used to have it I would be told I don’t make have to longer phone call with your, your maid in Brisbane is when I was living in Townsville, because of the cost of the cost of the phone calls. The secret subscriber Trump dial dialling phone calls STD calls, just ridiculous when you think about it now, and we’ve managed to reform and bring all of those costs down?

Darren Brady Nelson  10:49

Well, yeah, just to jump off of that, I mean, you know, free market competition is the greatest, you know, sort of mechanism there is for alleviating poverty, for you know, getting rid of it to for the most part, I mean, I mean, you’re not going to get rid of relative if you like, you know, the relative poverty, like, you know, someone has more stuff than me, but, you know, to actually lower costs and make things that were previously unaffordable, affordable. You know, that’s obviously what happened, you know, with the industrial revolution, you know, sort of in England, and then spreads throughout, you know, sort of the English speaking world and Western Europe. And obviously, that’s the same sort of thing that China allowed to happen to, you know, to a much greater degree, you know, I guess, roughly sort of early 90s, I guess, to about the GFC, roughly, you know, so, obviously, that everybody knows how many people, you know, people know that there’s a lot of people were lifted out of poverty through that process as well. And always works, you know, so, you know, some people have this impression, if you allow markets to kind of operate more with less regulations and less tax, that that somehow just makes the rich richer, and the poor, poor, it’s the exact opposite. You know, it’s usually the cartels and stuff, that’s, you know, sort of, I mean, will create, if you like, more unearned wealth, you know, amongst a smaller batch of people, whereas, you know, sure, there’ll be millionaires and billionaires, if you like, under a free market competition system, but they would have earned it like Steve Jobs learned by just providing a good product at a reasonable price, an innovative product, you know, of a high quality product, all that sort of stuff. Yeah, yeah,

Gene Tunny  12:32

yeah, exactly. Exactly. I’ve just found the story about Karen Chester in the financial review, so I’ll link it in the show notes. It’s a it’s a really, you know, incredible illustration, but it was about her. It was about a mother. So Miss Chester’s mother had squirrelled squirrelled away her savings for two years in hopes of buying a return ticket to Perth from their home in the Daggy Brisbane suburb of Salisbury to visit her own mother for the last time, but the cost of clothing was three times higher in real terms than it is today with tariffs of more than 40%. And domestic air travel was four times more costly. Under the two airline policy, a perfect storm for my mother who ended up riding the squirrel tin to reclaim this no flight to Paris. She never saw her mother again. This Chester’s told the conference. And that’s just the that’s just a tragic, you know, really sad story and just shows the human cost of bad economic policy. So, you know, a lot of people accuse us like they accused me I’m always being accused or you’re a neoliberal or You’re heartless. You’re an economic rationalist. And I just pushed back well, okay, these, actually, the policies you’re advocating for are the Heartless policies, right?

Darren Brady Nelson  13:44

Yeah, well, look, if they’re calling you that, I don’t know what they’re calling me. Even more free market, if you like. There was a piece I wrote for this either came in financial review. One of the editors is our mutual friend, Dr. Dan Mitchell. And yeah, so I wrote this piece that, you know, it’s about more than than competition policy, but certainly competition policy played a big role. But in there, I kind of look back, you know, certainly the 1980s. But also start out with a little bit. I was trying to remember the term but I found it and I wrote about it. You probably heard this term, the Australian settlement. Yeah. Yeah. Which apparently was from the early 1900s to the early 1970s. And to actually be fair, interestingly enough, I think some of that tariff reform that you mentioned, actually started under Whitlam deity. Interestingly enough, yeah. Somewhat, you know, you might even think it counterintuitive, I guess. So, you know, that could be also something you could possibly link to, if I can find if I can find a link to it. Yeah. Well, I can tell you that. Yeah, sorry. Go. I can

Gene Tunny  14:58

tell you about the Australian settled because that was Paul Kelly’s conceptualization of it in the classic book about the reforms in the 80s called the end of certainty. And I mean, his thesis was that what we had from your right from around the, from Federation through to the, essentially the early 80s, although it started to be dismantled in the 70s was the Australian settlement. There were three elements of it. And I think it’s three, they’re basically the tariff protection. And then there was the was a conciliation and arbitration, the, you know, the living wage or the, you know, the heavy regulation in the labour market. And then the third element of it was controversially White Australia Policy.

Darren Brady Nelson  15:43

Oh, okay. That was the third. Okay. I didn’t write about that. I wrote about the, the Labour and the tariffs. 

Gene Tunny  15:50

It was, I think that was the third element. But yeah, and essentially, we had to abolish the White Australia policy, because it’s obviously it’s abhorrent, really. And it’s, it’s against the UN convention or whatever we signed. And, and therefore, after that, we then like the in the 70s. So the Whitlam I mean, for all his faults, I mean, I wrote a chapter on the Whitlam government in Scott Price’s book on the Whitlam era. And, I mean, look, they were irresponsible in in many ways, but they did a lot of good things, too. They actually started the reform of government owned businesses. That was when they broke up the old Postmaster General’s department, we had a big government department that delivered the mail and also took care of telecommunications. So they broke that up and formed Australia Post and telecom, which then pave the way to corporatization and then privatisation of Telstra. And then they also cut they had a 25% tariff cut. And that was recommended by Nicholas Gruen’s father. So Nick’s been on the show before I work with him a lot, really great economist, his brother, David runs ABS, I worked for David to back in the Treasury. And there, you know, Nick and David’s dad, he recommended a 25% tariff cut, but that was lodged from what I can tell. Part of it was for micro economic reasons. But another part of it was for macro economic reasons, because the government was involved in embarked on this huge expansion of the federal government. And if you want to make sure you’ve got the resources to do that, you want to you want to get some of them from input. So you need to take pressure off the domestic economy by allowing greater imports, which is and the way to do that is by cutting tariffs. So it was partly for macro reasons, too.

Darren Brady Nelson  17:28

But there was also the in a fixed exchange rate era. Yeah,

Gene Tunny  17:32

yeah, exactly. Yeah. Yeah. So there’s a I mean, it’s a whole different world, the way they thought about economic policy back then it’s, yeah, it’s a really different era. And then we go into the end of the 80s. And yep, you’re right. We have those, those great reforms from Hawke and Keating are backed by John Howard and the opposition. So credit all around. And then we get to Hilmer. So can you tell us a bit about the Hilmer report? who like it was Fred Hilmer? Wasn’t he was a professor, was he a professor at UNSW? Or I knew or somewhere?

Darren Brady Nelson  18:04

Um, yeah, look, I wasn’t involved, you know, like, I came in afterwards. And obviously, I read the report. And yeah, but you’re right, your, your memory is correct, he’s, he was a professor at UNSW. I don’t know, the whole genesis of that, that’s something I’ve never kind of really looked into. I kind of came in, you know, to make it up, you know, to, to, you know, put it into operation. So, I got in, you know, as like a, you know, brand new, you know, baby economist, and I was helping, you know, sort of implement that from, you know, the state of New South Wales point of view. And in particular, I was involved in kind of all aspects of it, but I in particular, was involved in competitive neutrality, if you remember, remember that there was kind of all these, basically, everything was trying to achieve, I think you alluded to, or maybe even said, it was trying to, you know, move things in the direction of competition, if you like, are allowed to move into the direction of competition. But, you know, it had, you know, you know, Hilmer made recommendations, I’m pretty sure most of it was accepted. And it was turned into these these agreements that were between the Commonwealth and the States. And they came up with things like model legislation that I think they, they wouldn’t run to the state of South Australia, for some reason, I don’t know, the whole reason why South Australia, but then you all the states would have the same, you know, pass the same sort of act. And it also involves, you know, sort of, as you mentioned, these incentive payments, which was, I think, crucial, you know, that I think the agreements were great, obviously, legislation was was important and part of that these various competition policy acts around the around the country, and it had certain aspects competitive neutrality, which was about, you know, you know, government businesses competing on a level playing field. Basically, they had all these different mechanisms for making sure that you know, that they had, for instance, tax equivalence, so they weren’t paying for Commonwealth income tax, so they had to have like an equivalent of it. I think it even got to a point where the ATR was actually the one, you know, processing that, but they were actually just giving the money right back to the relevant state.

Gene Tunny  20:15

You mean, the Australian Taxation Office?

Darren Brady Nelson  20:18

Ato, you’re right. Yeah. Yeah. HR that’s in the United States called the Americans for tax reform, not the same place. Yeah.

Gene Tunny  20:27

Just for clarity, the reason that they didn’t have like, they technically didn’t have to pay income tax, but all the corporate company tax because these businesses were owned by state governments, and state governments under the Constitution. I think there was a famous high court case, that rule that the Commonwealth can impose taxes on state governments or state owned entities, is that the case? And so they had to effectively pretend to pay tax? Correct?

Darren Brady Nelson  20:53

Great. Yeah. And they were also a few, like, pretending to pay dividends and stuff to shareholders. So you know, they corporatize them, and the shareholders were, like, you know, often the New South Wales treasurer and some other Minister, that type of thing. So that, you know, I mean, keep that, in reality wasn’t the really big thing. You know, it was like, you know, particularly when they, but it was all part of the process of, you know, like, Victoria kind of went down further path of privatising some of the other states didn’t do that they kind of corporatized and tried to make it so that, you know, they were no longer kind of a monopoly in their market, or, or if they were in there that, you know, they weren’t just dominated with a whole bunch of government advantages of various sorts. So, so can we better tune it neutrality was kind of my thing, in particular, at first, and then even when I went to the TCA, that was kind of the first thing I was starting to do there was to be involved in, you know, there sort of opera operationalizing competitive neutrality in Queensland, and then then kind of moved into more of the trying to get the local governments to do their sort of, if you like, their fair share of reforms, you know, because they had government owned businesses of various sorts, particularly water and sewage in particular, but it wasn’t, there was other ones as well, there was, you know, various waste management and all sorts of other stuff, too. So, you know, and I think they also had things like a more formalised, look, if you’re going to keep these things, and you’re going to designate these things as monopolies, well, then you need to have like a proper regulatory system, you know, proper regulator goes through a process that doesn’t just rubber stamp you, you know, gold plating your networks, and that’s, you know, charging people high prices. So, you know, wasn’t a perfect system, but, you know, considering what, you know, what, you know, what it was prior to that it was a huge improvement. And unfortunately, you know, we can cover, you know, when the Harper review camera, I’ll have a review, really, it was very unheroic. And it was like, mainly tweaking, if you like, Australia’s version of antitrust laws, you know, basically, you know, a triple C related, you know, competitive conduct related laws. Although another thing that happened, the first NCP was they opened up, they allowed I believe government businesses could they were subject to the a triple C’s, anti competitive conduct laws. So, you know, government, unless it was literally, you know, Crown activities, you know, actual government activities and not actually business activities. The actual business activities, whether they corporatize it or not, could be subject to a triple C’s jurisdiction.

Gene Tunny  23:36

Okay. And now in terms of the businesses that were affected, we had and you talked about corporatization and so that’s when effectively the government, it takes the the operations out of a government agency or a board. So been in Queensland oil in Queensland and other parts of Australia. We had electricity delivered by boards. We had the southeast Queensland electricity board the North Queensland electricity board, Norquist, that’s the one I remember growing up. And, you know, it’s effectively a gap

Darren Brady Nelson  24:06

veterans Pacific power in New South Wales. Yeah.

Gene Tunny  24:09

And then and they, their government agencies delivering these, you know, these utility services. And, and, you know, I mean, I think, you know, I mean, the power would certainly had power. I mean, I think we used to have more blackouts back then or brownouts and things, partly because of industrial action at times that the theory is or and I think there is evidence that supports this, that generally in businesses where there’s that heavy government involvement or overlay or control, they’re less efficient, there’s more tendency to overstaffing. And the quality of service is lower now, you know, and so I’m very sympathetic to that. And so, you know, I guess businesses that were corporatized electricity, businesses, ports and railways, et cetera, and then private As a nation, something else and privatisation can be controversial. Maybe we can talk about that later. But what do you see? What do you think that whole period that national competition policy period was a success? How do you how do you rate it? Darren?

Darren Brady Nelson  25:15

Yeah, look, I think overall, you know, kind of using it, like, I’ve seen a lot of economists like to kind of think in terms of cost benefit analysis, I think it was clearly, you know, quite a big death benefit. I mean, the Productivity Commission, you know, did did a number of studies over the years, I think they did one kind of originally 9095 kind of predicting what it might look like, and then they did, they did a kind of an impact analysis in 99, and then did another one. And 2005. And, but I remember, I believe I was looking at the one 2005. And, and, you know, they were they kind of looked at them, they factored in, you know, the, the incentive payments, for instance, because, you know, that should be a part of the costs, obviously, but, you know, they came to some conclusion that it was basically the, the net benefits were essentially about 100 times the costs, you know, so we’re talking kind of, you know, biblical proportions of net benefits, we’re not talking about like, just slightly of net benefit, which you still might do anyway, you know, if it’s, if it’s somewhat a net benefit, you know, because obviously, cost benefit analysis doesn’t make the decision for you necessarily, but it might suggest, hey, look, it’s it’s got a net benefit may not be a big one, you know, then maybe do it, but this ended up being, you know, just amazing, you know, even though that it still had plenty of flaws and could have been done better. But yeah, it was, you know, just the GDP return through, you know, a lot of price reductions, basically, you know, particularly in these infra infrastructure related entities, which, you know, we’re electricity, gas, rail, all sorts of ports, I there was even airports came into it eventually. Just it was amazing, you know, you know, it was ran for about a 10 year period and, and the returns, you know, to the Australian economy, and particularly, you know, going back to your point about you know, just like sort of middle class and lower and lower income people just got amazing benefits out of it because of the low prices and you know, not just a low prices, but the better quality and the better service and all that that came with it, more quantities of things, etc.

Gene Tunny  27:24

Yeah. So what I’ll do is I’ll put a link in the show notes to the Productivity Commission’s 2005 review of NCP where they go over a lot of the empirical evidence and they conclude that benefits from NCP from national competition policy have flowed to both low and high income earners, and to country as well as city, Australia, though some households have been adversely affected by how higher prices for particular services and some smaller regional communities have experienced employment reductions. So I guess what they’re getting at there is that I mean, to it, to an extent some of these efficiency reforms meant that some consumers who were being cross subsidised in the past had to pay more for services such as electricity or water or whatever, or rail services actually. And rail services is a good illustration, I mean, bad illustration for these communities that were affected. But I mean, one of the things the Labour government here in Queensland had to do and they copped out and to their credit, they copped a lot. They copped a lot of criticism for this, because this was against their, you know, their voting base in a way. They ended up having to rationalise the railway services in the 90s. This was the GaAs Labour government, which is completely you know, it was a it was very rational, economic, it was, you know, it had a really good framework. It’s different from the current, you know, previous subsequent Labour governments that that we’ve had here in Queensland, very different flavour. But it basically rationalised a lot of those passenger rail services to far flung places in Queensland where there’s just no one, you know, there might be one or two people cashing the train or maybe no one on some services. So they cut a lot of those services that was hugely controversial. And also they scaled down railway workshops in different parts of the state where there wasn’t really the work to be done. And again, very controversial. And so I guess what I’m trying to say is that these measures, while we think, you know, they’re generally for the whole community, they’re a good thing, they will have some impacts, there could be some people who are adversely affected when we don’t want to be to, you know, just see the world through rose coloured glasses. So that’s just one point I’d make there. Do you have any thoughts on that? Darren?

Darren Brady Nelson  29:39

Well, the Productivity Commission is you kind of, you know, mentioned or certainly alluded to, I mean, they did distributional sort of analysis as well. So it wasn’t it like a straight up to Australia getting that benefit, you know, you have to obviously go a little bit more disaggregated than that and they did, but also part of the competition policy. A key part of it was community service obligations. So basically to take a more a more transparent and rational approach to subsidising stuff. So, you know, at the end of the day governments could make, you know, could like justify with sensible, you know, like they go look at it and go look, there’s, there’s, there’s these externalities, there’s these public good aspects, but at least it made it more transparent and you kind of could, and then you could see it on the books, okay, this is what we’re spending on it, and you can make a better decision. If you’re, you know, fine, we’re going to keep this going. But here’s, here’s the costs and benefits associated with it. So, you know, cost benefit analysis and community service obligations. were, you know, a thread is well, throughout NCP. So, I think, you know, I think, you know, that should make it also, again, if they bring it back, if you use that sort of stuff again, yeah, it should make it more attractive to, you know, abroad, sort of basic constituents. So, yeah, you know, that that’s certainly hopefully something that if they do go ahead with an NCP, three 3.0, which obviously, we don’t know if they will or not, because Productivity Commission is currently just doing kind of analysis, sort of like they did in 1995. Except that 95 Everybody agreed to do it. But so they said, Okay, everybody’s agreed to do was kind of like project what this might look like, was now, it’s not a done deal that they’re actually going to do it. But the Productivity Commission has been given a tough task to kind of like, a very tough task, because they knew exactly what NCP was was going to entail. And then they tried it and it’s still not an easy job, then forecast what that will look like over the next 10 years. But now they got a harder task, like, well, what is NCP might entail? And let’s try to forecast what that’s going to look like in terms of, you know, the benefits and costs and distributions of that. Yeah, yeah, we

Gene Tunny  31:51

might talk about that in just a bit lighter because I want to talk about NCP two first, but you do make a good point. And I think what the PC is hoping and they sort of this is suggested in the terms of reference for that NCP three inquiry that the government or the the Council for federal financial relations or whatever it is, there’s some body that represents the states and the Commonwealth is going to give it a programme for reform, but based on you know, my, I guess we can talk about this later, but I’m not hopeful it’ll be very comprehensive. I think it’ll be pretty high level and it’ll be it’ll be challenging for them. So we’re gonna talk about that a bit later. But I want to ask you about what like, we talked about NCP one, and then there’s NCP two so is this a? Is this the traditional case where the original is better than the sequel? It’s not like Empire Strikes Back or Godfather Part Two, like, this is a case where the original is actually better than the sequel? Yeah.

Darren Brady Nelson  32:48

I’m not sure if nothing jumped in my head. Where is it? What’s a good move example where the original is like, far, far, far, far better than the sequel? Because that’s what the case was NCP to

Gene Tunny  32:59

Georgia thinks the classic example Halloween. You’re

Darren Brady Nelson  33:01

right. Actually, jaws would be a good one.

Gene Tunny  33:05

Friday the 13th Yeah, I would definitely

Darren Brady Nelson  33:07

not Alien and Aliens. Because those two were like, really awesome. And just different from each other. Yeah. And so it’s not casting aspersions on on Harper, which, but I think, you know, the terms of reference was just very heroic and very narrow and very, like, it was more for like, competition lawyers, you know, it’s like, you know, great, I guess the here’s some fiddling around the edges. I guess it’s improved things. I don’t know. But yeah, it’s nothing like the first NCP and it’s kind of sad that it kind of is the 2.0. But that’s all that’s all right. Sometimes. 3.0 is or, you know, can can can ever have a really big comeback. Even if the second one wasn’t that great. So, I’m sure I’m pretty sure there’s been a movie to where, you know, I can jump in my head later, but there was there was one more like the first move. Maybe it looks the back to the future ones. Yeah, that’s it. The first one was obviously great. The second one was like, the third one was like, hey, that might be great. Again, you might remember that. Yeah. Okay. I had a different interior ones. One went back in time, and they had the cowboys and Yeah, you like that one guy? Yeah, I think I think most not everybody, but I think most people recognise that. Even if it wasn’t quite on par with the first one was, you know, vastly better than the second one anyone?

Gene Tunny  34:25

Yeah, that’s probably right. The second one’s the one that gave us the hoverboard though, wasn’t it? That’s where he has the he’s on the whole give us the hoverboard. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Now, yeah. Okay, that’s a nice, great films from the 80s 70s and 80s. We were talking about takes you back. Okay, we’ll take a short break here for a word from our sponsor.

Female speaker  34:49

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Gene Tunny  35:18

Now back to the show. Okay, so we’re talking about NCP 2.0. And well, let

Darren Brady Nelson  35:27

me get something that you said earlier, you said like competition is a virtue. I mean, one thing one statement that I remember you on the first NCP doing it, and they kept on being repeated. I think it was written down somewhere as well, basically, I think it might have been in the agreements, actually, the the NCP agreements, the various inter governmental agreement, but you know, there was basically a phrase along the lines of, you know, competition is not an end in itself, but a means to an end. And then you know, that that end being obviously, really, ultimately, consumer welfare if you like, you know, sort of like lower product prices, greater productivity, greater innovation, all these sorts of things. So, hey, look, I largely agree that I think I think competition itself has some aspects that, you know, if you like, are good in themselves, you know, just like working, even though like people, even economists tend to overstate that working is all about ultimately having more leisure or being able to buy more stuff, while actually working in itself is a good thing, too. I think competition, although, yes, it is really more about, you know, obviously, providing that discipline to the market that governments just can’t do. They can’t replicate it with price controls, again, they certainly can’t replicate it through taxing more stuff or even owning things. But you know, but But yeah, it’s largely a means to an end, but it does have some virtue qualities in themselves, I think.

Gene Tunny  36:52

Yeah, yeah, exactly. I guess that’s what I was trying to get at, in part. Because, you know, just to me that I don’t know whether it was Adam Smith, or Frederick Hyack. Essentially, or maybe it was Milton Friedman making the moral case for, for competition for free markets. And don’t just look at it as a as a means to an end see value in the process itself in the in the freedom and the Liberty. So that’s the one of the points I was trying to make. Yeah, it

Darren Brady Nelson  37:19

certainly would have been, you know, a point, you know, for sure made by iron Rand or something, you know, even more so.

Gene Tunny  37:25

Hmm. Yeah, yeah. Yeah, for sure, for sure. Now, just on the hopper review, just, it just got me thinking. One of the problems I think we’ve we’ve had in Australia is that we’ve done the things that were obvious to do, let’s reform all of these really inefficient government businesses, and let’s improve competition in telecommunications, and airlines, and we’ll deliver big gains to consumers, which we have. Part of the problem is that once you do the big things, you get into a lot of these more difficult things. And then you got politics involved in the lobbyists. And I mean, for years have been talking about the need to reform things like pharmacies and get rid of rules which prevent new pharmacies from opening up there all sorts of rules to control how many pharmacies you’re gonna have in an area, and you come up, you come against the industry groups as they are, this is terrible. This is bad for regional areas or whatever. So, I mean, that’s what I see is one of the problems and that’s where I think this latest, NCP 3.0 will come to grief because the particularly this government, which is, I mean, it’s a Labour Government, and it’s, you know, because of its political constituency, it has to do things that are favourable for the union movement and demand that you know, it’s nothing wrong with unions. The thing is, though, that some of the measures that they will adopt will not necessarily be good for economic efficiency. So that’s, I think that’s one of the challenges that we’ve we’ve got with current NCP before we get into well, we might talk about that later. But a bit ask you’ve, you’ve made a submission to this NCP analysis inquiry that the Productivity Commission is, is conducting at the moment, so I’ll just read out the terms of reference. Just to SET set this up. The Commission will undertake a study to assess reform options proposed by a Commonwealth state and territories as part of the revitalised national competition policy, to understand the economic and other benefits to the Australian community as well as the government revenue impacts, while the reform options are yet to be agreed by CFR and that’s that Commonwealth Federal Financial relations body. It is important that they tackle shared priorities such as addressing cost of living pressures, that’s great. And adapting to the netzero transition, digitalization expansion of the care and support economy and creating a more dynamic business environment. So that’s what we’re going to get out of this inquiry and you You decided to make a submission to this inquiry? You’re one of the 14 or so submissions on the website. Why did you want to make a submission to the inquiry? Darren? And what are your main points in that submission? Please?

Darren Brady Nelson  40:14

Well, as I mentioned in the beginning, it’s kind of something that’s near and dear to my heart. And, and also, obviously, cost of living, you know, that’s a particular have been a problem for quite some time. You know, I worked for a senator Malcolm Roberts, in his first term in the Senate. And, you know, kind of one of the big focuses, you know, that I had when I was working for him was cost of living, and, you know, sort of used to do a lot of sort of, you know, speech notes and help with media releases, and also kind of, you know, kind of sort of looking at the statistics that kind of show what’s going on on that front. It also helps with, you know, setting up we did a well, you will you will remember this because you spoke at it. We did we did, I think it’s the first ever Australian cost of living summit, I have never found one that they’ve done before. I know they’ve done some kind of more recently, or since if you like. So, you know, we obviously had a great cast of speakers, including, you know, the late great, Tony makin sort of mutual friend of ours. And yeah, I mean, Dan Mitchell came out for that. It was yeah, it had like a lot of great speakers. And obviously, you know, a bit of entertainment at the end with Ross Cameron, and, and, oh, yeah. Mark Latham. Yeah, Mark. So, and I think Liberty Fest was actually the next day, I think you were probably at that, too. I mentioned, I’m not sure if he spoke at it or not. But

Gene Tunny  41:41

I didn’t go to that. I haven’t had a lot of involvement in or maybe I dropped in to say hello to someone. But maybe I said a lie to you. But I didn’t. I tend not to. I liked your cost of living Summit. Because there was a real there was a lot of economic content there. I I mean, I don’t have any problem with Liberty fest. I think it’s an interesting concept. It’s just, it’s a bit more political than I say, there’s a lot more politics and economics, I’ve found with some of those events, so I tend not to go to them a lot.

Darren Brady Nelson  42:09

Yeah, so So the cost of living Summit, so it’s so obviously, something that I’ve been, you know, as I suppose a lot of economists would be, depending on what you focus on, you know, I’ve had a great interest in that. I just wanted to get on the record, you know, look, you know, I didn’t want to sort of spin too many wheels wasting time. So basically, to be fair to the audience, I did, I spent most of that submission, just quoting myself, you know, I wrote a whole bunch of stuff on cost of living and kind of related matters. And that’s okay, because academics do that all the time, where they sit there and quote themselves, so I’m not an academic. So, but look, I caught myself and I, you know, kind of, you know, went through in kind of a logic, so I didn’t, you know, one thing I did do is I want original thing if you like, and it’s like, completely original, but I thought I’d focus on kind of CPI, you know, like putting aside, it’s, you know, it has its foibles as a statistic, you know, you know, really kind of represents 40% or 50% of the prices that are out there, but that’s fine. Look, you know, so I focus on CPI, I’ve just got the ABS data, and I wanted to kind of go as far back as I could, and go up to obviously, as update as I could and just kind of look at, you know, what are the what, and I looked at it on an industry by industry basis, obviously, you can look at it different ways, capital cities, and all sorts of different ways. But I like to look at stuff on an industry basis or a policy basis, if that’s an option. So that but you know, it kind of intuitively was the sort of stuff I expected, you know, the suffered, government is heavily involved in one way or another, either heavily regulating it, maybe even providing those services, or in the case of, for instance, alcohol and tobacco. It’s taxing it whether you think it should or should not, obviously, people have kind of, you know, health and externality reasons that they justify that. But anyway, I didn’t want to go there. First, I just wanted to see what you know, what’s the landscape look like? So, you know, I was able to provide a lot of that. So I think I looked at it, kind of three sections was kind of you kind of what’s the economics of this, particularly the cost of living was my focus? What’s the data that would be in the CPI stuff? And then then, you know, kind of what’s looking at, you know, what’s driving it? Because my thesis, obviously, is government interventions, for the most part, are driving that. Now. Look, you can say some of these government interventions are justified, well, okay. But still, it’s going to drive up the cost of living, you may think, you know, climate change is the most urgent thing we need to do. Well, if you bet it’s still gonna jack up electricity prices, right? You may want them to be jacked up, but they’re gonna be jacked up. So I don’t think too many economists can disagree that, you know, that’s a factor, right? You may say, Oh, it’s a justifiable factor, I will say differently, but, you know, so I wanted to get there and get that just kind of all on the record, you know, just kind of my my thoughts on it. And you know, As someone who knows something about competition policy, I, you know, obviously as I started out in that world, and I’ve kind of done a lot of similar work, you know, over the years in that, you know, basically in that space either in Australia with utilities and utility regulators, and you know, some of the industry associations, etc. And then kind of more recently, over the past decade more think tanks, both Australian and American. So I just kind of, you know, look, you know, I guess I was a little bit more optimistic, perhaps, that I should have been, yeah, that’s gonna happen. But the point was still, like, look, I want to get on the record, you know, hey, you know, and it’s, you know, in fiscal policy, regulatory policy brings your policy of Reno’s that’s a factor, but I also want to get on the record that fiscal policy is a factor, obviously, they mentioned the terms of reference, you know, I want to go on the record that there’s such a thing as the Laffer curve. So, you know, you government, you know, can get some benefits out of, if you like pro competition reforms, you know, you can, you can get more revenue through the door than just trying to tax people at higher rates, and then monetary policy, which I know, no one’s really going to touch. But it’s a factor, you know, like housing, for instance, is a classic, you know, where you print a lot of money jacks up the demand for housing, then you do stuff, like have heavy environmental regulations inspired by climate change, and you restrict the supply of land use and all that sort of stuff, and then throw in another factor that don’t make much, you know, sort of have been, you know, having, you know, mass immigration, you know, brings in that a lot of just demand for housing as well. So you’ve got a lot of stuff going on. And look, things need you looked at, amongst Even today, there will still be low hanging fruit as you sort of, you know, you didn’t use that term, but you were alluding to low hanging fruit. And that’s fine, you know, prioritise the, the, the, you know, find where there’s kind of a big economic bang, and low political resistance. And obviously, those are the places you can tackle first, and you leave the, you know, the stuff that’s got less economic bang, and high political resistance. And, you know, obviously, there’ll be stuff in between. So, you know, look, I’m, you know, I’m pragmatic, you know, I don’t expect, you know, like, either bring in an entirely free market tomorrow, or don’t do anything. So, you know, the sort of practicals that we can do. Yeah.

Gene Tunny  47:23

And so what you did was did you replicate? There’s a famous chart, I think, that was prepared for the UK by someone, I think it was that Institute of Economic Affairs, or Adam Smith Institute, I can’t remember the exact Institute where they show for the UK, that those heavily regulated sectors are the ones with the highest increase in CPI, that with the highest inflation rates, and I’ll try and track that down. You’ve effectively done that for Australia. Have you said things like, what is it its energy, its childcare, etc? And you mentioned alcohol and tobacco? I’ve got something to say about that in a moment. But as I was

Darren Brady Nelson  47:56

saying, Yeah, well, no, it was the IPA, they did it for Australia, but the report was from, like, 2018, or something. So it certainly lines up with I think they wanted to even greater detail, you know, like really highlighting, you know, what are the areas of high intervention? You know, that’s kind of the analysis that I kind of alluded to, but I wanted to get, you know, there’s data going up to 2023. And I also want to go further back in time. So yeah, the IPA thing was for Australia, and it’s a great diagram. You know, things haven’t changed, you know, like, the logic still, you know, sort of stands at test time. I don’t think they touched monetary policy in there, but they certainly did fiscal and regulatory policy, if you like, I like to think of, you know, in terms of a big three government policies, because, you know, really, government’s instruments are those three things. So if you talking about industry policy or competition policy, they’re still using those three, you know, potentially they cut across those three big areas of policy. Obviously, within fiscal policy, there’s, there’s, you know, spending and, and tax and that sort of thing, but I kind of like to think of it in those three kind of big levers, if you like that, that government has, basically, basically getting out of the ways is ultimately what I’m suggesting in my submission is reducing government’s interventions. As much as possible.

Gene Tunny  49:23

Yeah. So the big three, just for clarity, fiscal policy, monetary policy, regulation, or regulatory regulatory, very good regulatory

Darren Brady Nelson  49:30

policy. Regulatory is basically laws. It’s command and control, right? Yeah. No, do this. Don’t do that. You know, that’s basically and obviously, that’s what most laws are about are regulations. Yeah.

Gene Tunny  49:40

I liked how you mentioned tobacco because one of the Not that I’m advocating for tobacco. But one of the things I’ve noticed, and this is a big story in Australia at the moment because we’ve jacked up the excise on tobacco, just a massively high levels. And you know, it’s $40 Whatever it is for a packet of cigarettes, I don’t know I don’t buy cigarettes, but it’s a lot like 30 to $40 Depending on how many cigarettes you get. And what’s happening is it’s actually encouraged a black market and organised crime is in tobacco. And so we’ve had there all these gangland incidents there are you know, tobacco stores that haven’t paid the I don’t know the protection money that are getting firebomb dried. And, and I don’t know, I don’t know if this is organised crime. But around the corner from me on Wickham terrace, there was a tobacco and vape store that was that caught fire toward the end of last year. Right. So this is happening across Australia. And it’s a consequence of excessive excise on tobacco. But yeah, I covered that in my one of my recent episodes on taxation. So just so you might be interested in that. I don’t know if you’ve been following that at all. Uh,

Darren Brady Nelson  50:52

no, I wasn’t aware of that. I mean, like, I mean, I guess I shouldn’t be surprised as an economist, but it’s still kind of shocking, anyway. Yeah, I guess another thing we should mention, you know, whether you link to it or not, but, you know, Frederic Bastiat, you know, sort of, or his essay, I believe, you know, where he talks about, you know, unintended consequences from these government policies. That would be the classic. And the unintended consequences are almost always bad. They’re not usually good ones. Right. So I should even mention that, you know, that that can even segue into you know, people remembering that there’s such thing as public choice economics, which, which ultimately talks about the economics of government, and also government failure, that would be an example of government failure. Now think the public choice people use this language. But you know, what, externalities today, don’t just exist in markets exist with governments as well, they have externalities, they have a lot of negative externalities to like this policies.

Gene Tunny  51:52

Yeah. I mean, we’ve got multiple examples here in Australia at the moment, I mean, I’d love to bring Frederic Bastiat back, like Jurassic Park style, or wherever you do it. Australia. And, you know, he could write, write, write about all of the, just the insanity? I mean, what are the there’ll be the NDIS is the big problem we’ve got at the moment. And

Darren Brady Nelson  52:18

classic unintended consequences. Yeah, and

Gene Tunny  52:21

I don’t know if the latest story is that you’ve got all of these dodgy operators, because they see, oh, there’s this huge pot of money, let’s open up a disability support business, and then they find someone who’s disabled or they go, you know, they have a condition that gets them out of the NDIS. And then their money pot right there, you know, this is a Yeah, it’s there on the gravy train this, this Disability Support Agency, that’s essentially, you know, getting a share of the package. And the worst case, and they’re saying that there are some providers, they will go to the NDIS recipient, they will go to the ATM the automatic teller machine, and they went, they’ll get, they’ll pull the money out, and then they’ll sell on drugs they’ll sell they’re the person they’re supposed to be helping drugs. So there’s at least one or two cases of that, it’s just yeah, and there are these reports of very high percentages of, of NDIS providers. So the, the businesses that are looking after the disabled people managing their packages, they’re, you know, very large number a huge amount of fraud, at least $2 billion worth of fraud is just extraordinary. And

Darren Brady Nelson  53:33

it’s just gonna balloon anyway, without all that sort of stuff. Because, remember, originally just looking at the definition of disability and legislation, it’s so ridiculously broad. You know, it’s, I think, that Mitchell’s had these good cartoons about like, you know, you know, like when you have like, kind of mainly a market and it’s kind of pulling a small cart of the welfare state, you know, can it can handle it, but then when, you know, then when it gets reversed when like, most everybody’s on welfare, that doesn’t work, you know, that doesn’t work, you know, because money has to be generated, you know, the wealth has to be generated in the marketplace, because government doesn’t create any wealth raw.

Gene Tunny  54:09

I mean, I guess, yeah, I mean, government activity does contribute to GDP and governments can invento so well, no, I mean, yeah, I guess this is this is an interesting philosophical question because governments can actually create productive investment or productive capital stock carded or it can you know, it can help provide the capital stock the public capital the the roads and the infrastructure to to help enable business so

Darren Brady Nelson  54:39

well, okay. Yeah, yeah. But even that is Yeah, look, yeah, that’s a little bit you know, at least a more debatable topic then then then some things that government gets involved in obviously. But, but if not getting back to NCP Yeah, they, you know, the see then was like, okay, whether they can or cannot do it, which I So they did. They certainly don’t do it very well. And you know, it’s very expensive. So, and they do it in a very bureaucratic fashion. As you know, Ludwig von Mises wrote about in his his great little pamphlet on bureaucracy. You know, I think that’s a that’s a timeless sort of pamphlets, you know. And even that links back to his original work on socialism, which was the point basically, that socialism ultimately doesn’t work because it doesn’t create prices, right? It doesn’t have Yeah, price. Yeah, to give that input, you know, and to also jump into Hayek, you know, because price is obviously this mix of information and incentives at the exact same time, right. And when government does something, it can pretend to have prices, just like the Soviet Union pretended to have prices, but they weren’t real, you know, they didn’t, yeah, it really didn’t reflect, you know, allocation of resources. They didn’t, you know, they they certainly didn’t inform entrepreneurs or consumers properly, and all that sort of stuff. So, let you know, there’s obviously grey areas, if you like, I personally think, you know, as someone who studied economic history at university that really, you know, something that becomes more like the nightwatchman is more what government should be doing. And that also gels with, you know, not just the, you know, what was clearly written down in the US Constitution. But the the Australian isn’t as clear about that. But that’s was largely the philosophy to have Australia, the 19 century. And at least going into the 20th century, and then obviously, things changed with the, as you mentioned, the the Australian settlement, etc.

Gene Tunny  56:38

Yeah, well, I guess, you know, as well as I do that the Constitution or the the federal government and the state governments we had at the time of Federation are much more limited than what was government it was, would have been 10, or maybe 15% of GDP at the most. And now it’s 35 to 40%. Right. So like, we had a much smaller government. And I don’t think the founders wouldn’t have come, they would not have realised just the massive expansion of government power that we’ve had, particularly at the federal level. And that came through the 20th century, that the company that was associated with high court decisions in a way or, you know, the federal government taking over income PAC taxpayer over the war, and then keeping that power due to a high court decision, various other decisions related to the external affairs power, which means that the federal government has very, it’s got authority over environmental matters. And then we’ve got the health and welfare Amendment to the Constitution, and after the Second World War, that that facilitates the increase the rise of the welfare state. So the whole bunch of things that happened through referenda, and through high court interpretation that has expanded the role of government. And I guess that happened all around the world. It wasn’t just in Australia, it happened in the US and UK. And partly that was in response to the depression, there was the New Deal in the States, as you know. So yeah, I mean, the founders had no, they would not have conceived the scale of government that we have today. In my view, we’ll look

Darren Brady Nelson  58:13

at it in the US it happened even much earlier, it happened, you know, particular 1913 or Woodrow Wilson, when three things in particular happen, which was the the Federal Reserve Act, the income tax amendment. Previously, the federal government didn’t have any income tax powers. And the other thing, which is getting probably a little bit more esoteric, but prior to 1913, the states appointed senators, they weren’t elected. That changed. Yeah, the Founding Fathers had had, you know, went in great detail, obviously to the Federalist Papers, why they had that as well as why they had a whole bunch of stuff, because they wanted us was set up as a constitutional republic, not a open slathered democracy. Right. So the only thing that was at the federal level that could be Democrat directly elected was the House of Representatives, because even today, the President’s not technically directly elected. The electoral college. So anyways, all it was all with the aim of keeping the federal government small. Yeah,

Gene Tunny  59:20

yeah, exactly.

Darren Brady Nelson  59:22

And you’re basically like, you know, local government was supposed to be the most important than the states, then the feds, so that was kind of an you know, surely didn’t completely copy that. But it’s somewhat did in philosophy, because it certainly looked at that and combined that kind of with, you know, with the Westminster system, obviously, the UK sort of thing. So yeah. Yeah, yeah.

Gene Tunny  59:44

You just reminded me I’ve actually had a guest on John Nance. I think it was. He wrote a book about the vision of the founding fathers and I had him on the show and we talked exactly about that what you were saying about the vision of the founders, the limited government, more state or more local particularly local a favoured local solution. So I’ll put a link in the show notes. I thought that was a great episode. Right. Oh, Darren, we better start wrapping up. This has been a great conversation as usual. We it becomes very expensive and wide ranging. So yeah, again, thanks for thanks for that. We it’s good to good to kick these ideas around. And NCP. 3.0. What sort of things? Do you think it will? Well, it could involve or ideally could involve now, as background, I think all the federal government at the moment has in mind, because of all the political constraints that are faced, I mean, they’ve had to pass the very restrictive industrial relations regulations, or they brought in this closing loopholes bill. Last year, I wrote a paper for CIS about it. It’s introducing all these regulations for the gig economy for labour hire for casuals, and I think it’s the wrong direction. But that’s, you know, we can talk about that another time. The current federal government because they’re constrained so much by their the Polit. The politics, I think what they’ll do is focus on very narrow things like non compete agreements, they’re very, they’re they’ve come out strong against agreements in con in employment agreements, which mean okay, if you work your you work for my law firm for so many years, you, you can’t then go and work for one of my rivals for three years or whatever. They’re, and they’re claiming that these agreements are becoming very commonplace, and even in employment agreements for hairdressers, etc. So I think they’ll come out against that. They might, I don’t know, they might try and get a divestiture power, I think it’s cool the power to like, give the honourable see more power to break up. Companies that are that are that they think are exerting market power. So there might be some things around that. But it’s all still clear. Maybe there’s some things about harmonisation of licences for different occupations, that sort of thing. More work on that, we’ll we’ll have to wait and see. But it doesn’t look like it’ll be a huge deal to me. What are your thoughts on where competition policy in Australia and also in America? If you if you’ve got thoughts on that as well? What do you think are the most important directions to go in for the benefit of, of the economy in the community? Darren?

Darren Brady Nelson  1:02:22

I think just in a general sense, they’ve they’ve allowed kind of almost, you know, I mean, technically, they’ve never, no one’s ever really deregulated, if you like, but you know, to extent they did, they’ve, they’ve just reregulated over time. They’ve re subsidised over time, and often not in any sort of transparent or logical way or anything backed by cost benefit analysis, of course, you know, that that never really took off the way it should have, you know, like to have these proper routes, look at this properly. And if nothing else, just have a transparent process, you know, like, why we’re doing this and all that, and what’s the cost so that people can, you know, at least go vote on that if you’d like, at some stage. So let you know, you know, I wanted to point out just to look at all the CPIs look at look at all the stuff that’s going up. And guess what, it’s the stuff just like IPA pointed out, you know, a number of years back, it’s all the stuff that you have heaps of, you know, interventions in a various sorts. So obviously, you know, I think, yeah, I’m guessing, I think you’re right, it’s probably going to be rather than, say, a Hilmer 2.0, it’s gonna be a Harper 2.0, which is like, nothing special, you know, playing around on the edges, and all that stuff, which is, you know, narrow competition law. So, you know, so but I put it in summation, you know, that, you know, maybe someday, because I always remember, you know, working in policy, you guys might have talked about this, too, when you were with the Commonwealth treasury, you kind of put up like, really what you’d like to do, okay, you can’t get it through at the moment, but you haven’t in that shelf, you remember talking about the drawer, the shelf and like, then you’re always ready to pull it out, you know? Sure, you might have to dust it off, and all that sort of stuff. So that’s what I did. I just put that in there, you know, that? I guess, you know, maybe I was a little too optimistic, you know, but, but it’s there, and maybe some other people put in some really good ideas as well. I’m not saying obviously, I have all the ideas or whatever. But, you know, the the methodology that I was suggesting, was certainly, you know, obviously, what’s tackle the stuff where the prices are going outrageous, let’s at least look at it. And okay, what do you have a justification for it? Or even if you do have a justification, you know, you can always do things better, you know, like, do you really need this aspect of this regulation to achieve what you’re trying to achieve? And you know, that sort of stuff. So and then, you know, and I wrote a 2020 paper on kind of competition policy is something that could be applied in the US as well, because obviously, we’re both federal Federalist systems and all that sort of stuff. And I certainly recommended, you know, going down I’m using the sort of competition payments type of approach, rather than, strangely enough the US often, even though it has a reputation for being more free market oriented, yes, some stuff, but a lot of stuff. They’re very kind of socialistic, you know, particularly infrastructure, airports, they’re all local government owned, and no one’s ever seriously thought about doing something different, you know, for instance, or they have all these kinds of government on port authorities around around the country. So, you know, I sort of wrote that 2020 paper, you know, hey, but, you know, this is, the US could copy this fairly easily. So, yeah. So, but, you know, heavily like in Australia, it really depends on obviously, who wins elections. So, you know, it depends on who who wins in 2024. You know, at the federal level, you know, what sort of reforms may or may not happen? And, you know, and obviously, you know, Trump, for instance, you know, is a mix of things, you know, he’s not like a strange guy, like, he’s not like, he’s just Ronald Reagan coming back into power or something like that. So, you know, he does have some pro market orientation on some stuff and other stuff, not as much. Yeah,

Gene Tunny  1:06:07

I think that’s, that’s a fair assessment just on. I mean, I don’t know whether the if there was a change of government, Australia, whether that would make much difference for competition, because, you know, the LIBS the Liberal Party, it has its own political. There’s constraints on it. I mean, you know, industry like the pharmacy lobbies probably, you know, the Liberal Party is probably got pharmacists, a lot of pharmacists, as members and all those type of constraints, they’re constrained as well, and what they could do, so I wouldn’t necessarily say they’re, they would do much better than the current governor, although they wouldn’t have introduced those terrible industrial relations laws. I could say that I think that’s pretty clear. But yeah,

Darren Brady Nelson  1:06:51

yeah, but I mean, just like, you know, like, you know, just like treasurer, Paul Keating is out walking in the door for labour and neither is treasurer, or Peter Costello walking in the door for the libs, it seems at this stage. A

Gene Tunny  1:07:03

couple other things I want to pick up on. You mentioned the, like the fact that these, you’re hoping your submission has a long shelf life. That’s what that’s what the people of the PC, they often think maybe this report is not going to get read now, or the government will pay attention, but it will have a long shelf life. And the classic example of that was the Campbell Inquiry Report, in 1981. Under the Fraser government, you’re talking about Malcolm Fraser government, which lasted what was it eight years after Whitlam? And it’s widely seen as a missed opportunity for to undertake the types of reforms that Hawke and Keating ended up undertaking. They had the inquiry. So there was that financial systems inquiry by Campbell in 1981. Yeah, and then apparently, that just went into Treasurer John Howard’s office and sat on the shelf. So, you know, this is something that later gets picked up by treasurer, Paul Keating, okay, and then they deregulate the financial system. And then we have, you know, bring in foreign banks, and we have a lot of the restrictions taken away, and then we have, you know, much greater provision of credit for consumers and businesses and, you know, in a way that there were positives with that there also, it also meant, arguably, it may have led to that 1980s, boom, in a way and then the crash. But anyway, that’s another issue. We could talk about another time. But I think generally, we think that those type of measures were favourable and economically beneficial. I think that’s a good example of something that was that had a long shelf life and the government didn’t the initial government that received the inquiry, didn’t know what to do with it. But then later, the subsequent federal government was able to do something with it, which I thought was so that illustrates that point. Just finally on the US, have you been following what Lena Khan has been up to FTC, Federal Trade Commission, she’s the Biden appointee. She said a lot of things about Amazon. She’s She’s an advocate for aggressive anti Trump policy. She is currently investigating the merger between Kroger and Albertsons. Have you looked at it? Do you have any views on what she’s up to?

Darren Brady Nelson  1:09:02

I haven’t No, I have not been following her. I mean, I guess, you know, in a more general sense, nothing to do with with her particular. Again, you can if you want to, you can link to it. You know, I’ve written for that. That antitrust Lawyer magazine. concurrences. Yeah. Which is, has an audience in North America and Europe mainly. And I wrote sort of a kind of an economics of free market economics approach, if you’d like to that. So you know, you can kind of see what I’ve, where I lay out, not just kind of the theory of what I think I mean, so kind of, here’s kind of what the mainstream economics, if you like, says about this sort of thing. Yeah. And then I can’t use it, mainly within Austrian school approach, but not just an Austrian theoretical approach. Yes. But there’s also, you know, one of the Austrian economists is like all over the detail of antitrust, you know, in terms of like the, you know, in terms of what’s actually happening And then the cases, and then what the legislation look like since it first came in. And basically just going through also the data as well, like. So basically, I have a fairly dim view of antitrust law tends to be very political, it basically they tend to go after their political enemies of the current administration, or at least they want to make, or even if it’s not their enemies, they they use it to for political, you know, voting purposes, like, you know, to look good. And some upcoming election, right, we went after these people that our voters don’t like, for whatever reason. And they largely don’t go after you even, you know, I’m no fan of Bill Gates today. But, you know, like Microsoft, when they were going after them, they were not abusing their monopoly power, you know, they’re offering a product that was, you know, at a reasonable price. And often, the price was going down over time, which was exactly the case of Standard Oil, when they first went, you know, when the anti trust laws first came in, you know, they weren’t actually, you know, they were dominating a market, but they were actually reducing their prices, and increasing their quantity. And some say the quality was going up as well over time. So, I think, you know, the evidence really doesn’t support, you know, the antitrust laws make much of a difference, and often actually, sometimes have the opposite effect. So it doesn’t sound like I would really necessarily supporter, I would say, usually need to go back to the as we discussed, I think once upon a time that was it, that section 230 or whatever, that that, under a different piece of legislation gives, you know, a bit of, you know, sort of monopoly power to big tech, and social media in particular. That they, they’re off revisiting that that sort of regulation that actually helps give them a bit of that sort of monopoly power, or that ability to feel like at least having an informal cartel,

Gene Tunny  1:11:59

rah, rah. Yeah, and I think your point, this is the point you’re making your submission, look at what underlying regulations are driving these phenomena that we see before you think that I have the solution is, is more government intervention? So I think that’s, that’s a fair point. And it’s just, it just occurred to me, I mean, childcare. That’s an example where we’ve got all of these regulations about the quality of childcare, the educational qualifications of childcare workers, and that’s something that just drives up the cost. And then, you know, it ends up being subsidised by the federal government. And so then that, you know, increases the burden on on taxpayers. Yeah, there’s a little uh,

Darren Brady Nelson  1:12:33

basically, I think, David Friedman, I think it’s David Freeman, or I got it right. But Milton Friedman son, who’s also quite a good economist, he goes through some good evidence on like, tax season, whatever. The analogy of like, what’s, what’s forced everybody to have a Cadillac, right? Instead of allowing some people to buy a Cadillac, some people will buy, you know, a small Toyota or whatever, you know, so, you know, the just basically just in that just basically squeezes people out of the marketplace. Yeah,

Gene Tunny  1:13:01

yeah, exactly. Okay. Darren, there’s been a comprehensive conversation. Any final thoughts before we close?

Darren Brady Nelson  1:13:09

No, look, you know, yeah, we just gotta keep on, you know, you’re doing your great part of, if you like, you know, getting these reports that are sometimes just going to be, you know, in the drawer for rater later use as well. So, you know, we just keep you have to keep on fighting for, you know, sort of truth and freedom, I suppose.

Gene Tunny  1:13:29

Very good. Darren Bradley Nelson. Thanks so much for your time. I really enjoyed the conversation. And I think we’ll have to have a couple more rounds. There are a couple of juicy philosophical issues and historical issues I’d like to come back to and talk about with you. So again, thanks so much for your time. Thank you rato thanks for listening to this episode of economics explored. If you have any questions, comments or suggestions, please get in touch. I’d love to hear from you. You can send me an email via contact at economics explore.com Or a voicemail via SpeakPipe. You can find the link in the show notes. If you’ve enjoyed the show, I’d be grateful if you could tell anyone you think would be interested about it. Word of mouth is one of the main ways that people learn about the show. Finally, if your podcasting outlets you then please write a review and leave a rating. Thanks for listening. I hope you can join me again next week.

Obsidian  1:14:35

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Credits

Thanks to Obsidian Productions for mixing the episode and to the show’s sponsor, Gene’s consultancy business, www.adepteconomics.com.au. Full transcripts are available a few days after the episode is first published at www.economicsexplored.com. Economics Explored is available via Apple PodcastsGoogle Podcast, and other podcasting platforms.

Categories
Podcast episode

The Revival of Industrial Policy: Should Governments Pick Winners? – EP243

This episode explores the resurgence of industrial policy in the US and Australia. We critically analyze whether government interventions can truly shape industries or if they are doomed to repeat past mistakes, such as those experienced during the 1970s and with the Concorde project. The episode includes clips featuring Saxon Davidson from the Institute of Public Affairs and Eamonn Butler from the Adam Smith Institute. 

If you have any questions, comments, or suggestions, please email us at contact@economicsexplored.com  or send a voice message via https://www.speakpipe.com/economicsexplored.

You can listen to the episode via the embedded player below or via podcasting apps including Google PodcastsApple Podcast and Spotify.

What’s covered in EP243

  • Introduction to Industrial policy and its potential consequences. (0:00)
  • Budget, inflation, and economic policies in Australia. (8:34)
  • Climate change policy and government incentives for renewable energy. (13:59)
  • Australian economy, productivity, and government intervention. (19:44)
  • UK’s economic struggles in the 1970s, including strikes. (29:41)
  • The failure of the Concorde supersonic jet project. (35:59)
  • Failures of activist industrial policy – e.g. in Australia’s car industry. (49:16)

Takeaways

  1. Revival of Industrial Policy: Governments in the US and Australia are reintroducing industrial policies to shape their economies, sparking debate among economists.
  2. Historical Lessons: The economic turmoil of the 1970s and failures such as the Concorde serve as cautionary tales against heavy government intervention in industry.
  3. Climate Policy Challenges: The push for renewable energy in Australia raises concerns about the rapid transition and its impact on the economy and energy grid reliability.
  4. Productivity Focus: Effective economic policies should enhance productivity through structural reforms rather than picking winners.
  5. Government’s Role: While there is a place for government to address market failures, extensive intervention often leads to inefficiencies and unintended consequences. 

Links relevant to the conversation

Australian Taxpayers’ Alliance Budget Chat:

https://www.youtube.com/live/MYX35Lk_ZYA?si=0kJzBt47Yh_5sUnS

Gene’s CIS issues analysis paper on the Australian budget, co-authored with Robert Carling:

https://www.cis.org.au/publication/budget-fails-important-policy-tests/

Episode with Eamonn Butler on Thatcher:

https://economics-explained.simplecast.com/episodes/adam-smith-and-margaret-thatcher-with-dr-eamonn-butler-1oXNvQg_

Episode on Concorde:

https://economicsexplored.com/2022/03/20/concordes-economic-lessons-a-closer-look-ep131/

Previous episodes on Australia’s energy transition:

https://economicsexplored.com/2023/08/24/australias-net-zero-transition-successes-challenges-w-andrew-murdoch-arche-energy-ep202/

https://economicsexplored.com/2022/12/19/aussie-energy-crisis-net-zero-transition-w-josh-stabler-energy-edge-ep170/

Australia’s Hydrogen Production and Critical Minerals Tax Incentives:

https://www.ato.gov.au/about-ato/new-legislation/in-detail/businesses/hydrogen-production-and-critical-minerals-tax-incentives

Lumo Coffee promotion

10% of Lumo Coffee’s Seriously Healthy Organic Coffee until 30 June 2024.

Website: https://www.lumocoffee.com/10EXPLORED 

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Transcript: The Revival of Industrial Policy: Should Governments Pick Winners? – EP243

N.B. This is a lightly edited version of a transcript originally created using the AI application otter.ai. It may not be 100 percent accurate, but should be pretty close. If you’d like to quote from it, please check the quoted segment in the recording.

Eamonn Butler  00:04

Mrs Thatcher realised that we couldn’t go on like that. She knew it would be painful and but she was determined enough that the country would go through that pain and it will come out better the other side, which it did.

Gene Tunny  00:23

Welcome to the economics explored podcast, a frank and fearless exploration of important economic issues. I’m your host gene Tunny. I’m a professional economist and former Australian Treasury official. The aim of this show is to help you better understand the big economic issues affecting all our lives. We do this by considering the theory evidence and by hearing a wide range of views. I’m delighted that you can join me for this episode, please check out the show notes for relevant information. Now on to the show. Hello, and welcome to the show. Before we get started, I want to give a big shout out to our sponsor for this episode Lumo coffee Lumo is seriously healthy organic coffee that you don’t want to miss out on. You can use the promo code 10 explored in all caps to get 10% off. But hurry, it’s only for a limited time. Check out the details in the show notes. K. Now let’s get into the episode. Something I’ve been thinking a lot about lately is the revival of what’s called industrial policy. In the US, the Biden administration, it’s introduced the chips Act and the inflation Reduction Act. They’ve featured activist industrial policy measures designed to promote domestic microprocessor manufacturing and green industries. In Australia, the Federal Labour government has introduced a future made in Australia plan and that was highlighted in the latest federal budget which was handed down a few weeks ago by the Australian treasurer Jim Chalmers, as a former Treasury official, and indeed, as one who managed treasuries industry policy unit for a little while. I have some fairly strong views on industrial policy. So I thought it would be good to cover the rise of industrial policy or the revival of it on the show. So just to clarify industrial policy, that’s where the government tries to deliberately shape the structure, the industry mix of the economy. So forget about comparative advantage, the invisible hand, the government’s attitude is that the market is failing to give us the highly productive industries that we need. So that the government is going to pull the policy levers to change the industry mix. So that’s the idea and it’s going to use various tools at its disposal. It’s going to use tax policy, tax incentives, subsidies, regulations, etc, to bring about the industry mix that that it desires. Historically, I mean, one way of doing that was through protectionist measures, such as tariffs to, to protect domestic in industries, particularly so called infant industries, but tariffs have fallen out of favour. And increasingly, we’re seeing other types of measures used, so particularly tax incentives, they tend to be a feature of modern activist industrial policy. Now, all this sounds terrific in visionary speeches by politicians. But when you think about it a little, especially using economic logic, and when you consider the historical experience, you’ll realise that activist industrial policy isn’t a great idea, after all, which is that’s going to be the basic message of this episode. And to help demonstrate that, in this episode, I’m going to feature some clips from conversations that I’ve had on industrial policy. Some of the clips are from outside of the show. They’re, they’re from a conversation I had with my colleague, John Humphries, John is at the Australian taxpayers Alliance. And we occasionally do a live stream on YouTube and Facebook, where we talk about economic and budget issues. So I’ll feature some clips from that. And I’ll also feature a couple of clips from previous economic system explored episodes. And finally, I will wrap up with some of my thoughts on industrial policy. Okay, now, the first clip I want to play, it’s from that conversation that I had with John Humphries from Australian taxpayers Alliance. And we also had Saxon Davidson from the Institute of Public Affairs on the show. Now, the full conversation, we had the full budget chat, this was the day after the 2024 25 Australian federal budget. So it was around mid May 2024, the full conversation is on YouTube. And I’ll put a link in the show notes if you’d like to watch the whole thing. It’s, it’s a great conversation. Unfortunately, John’s audio was a bit a bit distorted at times because of internet connectivity issues. But it’s still a great, a great video to watch. And we had Senator Malcolm Roberts and also Senator Matt Canavan on as as guests for part of it. So definitely worth checking out. Now, because John’s audio was distorted, I couldn’t reply the bit that sets up this clip, that what John was saying in in it was that the Australian treasurer, Jim Chalmers, has adopted a Shi Jing ping model of the economy. So John being very provocative there. Now, at the same time, John says that the that’s the vision that the treasurer is setting out for the spending for that is largely going to occur in future budget year, so not the current budget year 2425. But beyond that, and so therefore, in John’s view, the current budget itself wasn’t particularly in this interesting. So with that context, let me play the clip.

John Humphreys  06:59

That’s me being a black pill. Maybe there’s a downer here. What am I missing?

Gene Tunny  07:07

Oh, look, I think you’re missing quite a lot. Yeah. I mean, I think this is quite a consequential budget. I mean, I wouldn’t be compare a job as to shooting pig or to whoever else you did, quite yet. I mean, maybe actly. I mean, I think we’re talking about the sort of post war, you know, semi socialist governments of that Li, et cetera, where they wanted to take over the commanding heights. And I think we’re going back towards that maybe not full on communist but, you know, certainly a greater role for government in the economy than we’ve seen. So I think this is where he’s really implementing it. And it’s also, you know, this is his big play. I mean, this is his big play for the leadership. If he pulls this off, he’s going to be seen as a political genius. I mean, he’s got this really clever way of are I so clever, I’m going to bring down CPI arithmetically. And, um, you know, hopefully that convinces Michelle Bullock to cut rates later in the year or just before the election. So look, he’s, he’s playing, he’s making a big play. This is his play for the leadership. I think he could be too clever by half for the reasons we’ve, you know, alluded to already. But yeah, I think this is a very consequential you know, it’s a stark break from the past from previous, even previous, you know, recent from the Rudd administration or from certainly from Paul Keating, it’s a big change.

John Humphreys  08:27

I just clarify that. Xi Jinping is a communist. I think he’s a different sort of non capitalist, but that’s a different issue. Sorry.

Saxon Davidson  08:34

I think I agree with Jane. I think this is a an outline, for the vision for the future of how Jim Chalmers or perhaps even Anthony Albanese views it, you know, where this is rethinking it. This was all in his essay that he wrote about 18 months ago. This is a rethinking capitalism and vision for the future. It’s no mistake, that when the future mate for Australia policy was announced that Albanese referenced the different models from overseas, you know, the IRA, the European Economic defence strategy. Same with the Japanese economic security idea, the SBR act, whereas the Japanese say it’s rethinking capitalism. It’s a new way of capitalism. And this is actually how Jim Chalmers views it as well. This is a vision for the future of budget. This is why it’s an interesting budget is I do have to leave soon, but I’ll leave it at that and say, it’s a instead of Wait, it’s a vision for the future. This is if you have to lose vision for the future.

John Humphreys  09:37

If you have to leave soon. I take that as not immediately. So one last question if you’ll indulge me his vision of the future, but why is it wrong? If we need all these investments, and the money is lack ing and we need to go in a direction? What’s wrong with this policy? The future made in Australia.

Saxon Davidson  09:53

Well, because we’ve seen it before. This is you know, the 1970s protectionist policies have gone back to the few Chuck, like, we’ve seen it before it entered the era of stagflation. And then that’s why that’s how the great economic free thinkers emerged. In the 1980s, we’ve seen this happen before, we’ve seen this movie before. And when productivity is such a such a low in productivity growth is so low and private investment is so low in the economy. You know, as I said, before, rising tide lifts all boats, there are going to be plenty of Australians left behind in this new capitalist netzero future. And we know this, because, you know, no matter how many how much more green energy is brought into the market, or into the energy grid, how I mean, electricity bills are still up, power bills are still up, people are still suffering, this new vision is not a vision that is sustainable. And what actually concerns me more is the is the idea that, you know, after this election, we might be in the, we might be experiencing a very unstable government, which could actually bring forward these policies further to the left if they are in cohorts with the teals and the greens.

Gene Tunny  11:06

Okay, that was that was good stuff from Saxon. I particularly liked his point about the problems in the 1970s. And we’ll return to that soon. One thing I should clarify, in that clip is this point, might the point I was making about how I think Jim Chalmers has been too clever by half now, one of the features of the budget was this $300 electricity bill rebate that was being offered across Australia, and this is on top of some assistance that’s been provided by Well, the Queensland Government and possibly another, or maybe some other state governments will provide assistance. So Queensland Government’s providing the $1,000 rebate. And the idea is that these, these rebates or these subsidies for electricity, that’s going to reduce the the electricity bills of consumers, and it’s because of that it’s going to reduce CPI inflation. And, you know, this is a bit of a hatch. This is what I call that in the note I wrote for the Centre for independent studies with, with Rob Carlin that I’ll, I’ll quote from later. And I mean, it’s a bit of a trick. It’s not really doing anything to address underlying inflationary pressures. And I mean, this, you know, no, no economists have any credibility actually backed? What, what the government was doing here? I mean, I think, I think most economists, I mean, it well, we’re all sceptical, I mean, how, how is spending more money, the solution to inflation, it just doesn’t make any sense. So that’s what I was. I was referring to there. So you can check out that cis issues analysis paper on the budget, I’ll put a link in the show notes for more on that. Another point, I should note regarding what Saxon was saying there, and he was, you know, he I think he was alluding to, or referring to a conversation or point that Senator Malcolm Robertson had previously made, there’s this concern that in Australia where, you know, arguably, we’re pushing too fast in the direction of renewable energy. And that’s been driven by a lot of the policy measures that are really, you know, heavily pushing us in that direction. And, you know, I’m not saying I wouldn’t want to say that we shouldn’t respond to climate change. I do think climate change is, is something that we do need to respond to. But I think there is a legitimate debate, however, about how quickly we do that and what the right policy response is. Now, the way economists think about it, and this was certainly the view in Treasury when I was there is that we shouldn’t be picking winners are picking in particular, or favouring particular types of technology or trying to direct it. The, you know, the response or micromanage the response. What governments should be doing is to the extent that there is this externality from greenhouse gas emissions, we should put a price on that externality which is the idea of a carbon price. And you can do that in various well. I’ll come to In ways you can have an emissions trading scheme, you can, you can create a market, and then you have a carbon price that falls out of that or you can have a carbon tax. And those are alternative ways of of putting a price on carbon dioxide emissions or co2 equivalent emissions. Now, you know that most economists would say that is the best way to do it, if you’re going to do something about it. And, you know, that’s sending the signal to the market, that there’s a cost to the environment of, of this pollution. And you leave it up to the industry to sort out the most cost effective way to reduce those emissions, you don’t go and, you know, actively promote particular solutions. And in in Australia, there’s a, there’s a growing concern that maybe we’ve been pushing too hard on renewables policy, measures and subsidies etc, have favoured renewables. And we’ve had, we’ve had to faster pace of development. And that’s creating issues for the reliability of the electricity grid. Now, I’ve talked about these issues with with previous guests. So I might put a link in the show notes, where I’ve I’ve covered that. So just just saying, I don’t want to be accused of being a denialist not caring about climate change, I recognise it is an issue. I’m just saying we need to think intelligently about how we respond to it. And in my view, we’re probably we’re probably not adopting the right measures. And certainly all of these new industrial policy or in measures, particularly some we’ve seen in this latest budget, where we’ve got these generous tax incentives for hydrogen production in critical minerals. Where the government is is, is saying, Well, we think these are the industries of the future. I mean, they may well be but hydrogen, renewable hydrogen, that certainly you could say it’s an unproven technology, or commercially unproven, we’re not sure whether we will be able to develop a commercially viable hydrogen industry. And does it make sense for the government to have this tax incentive just for that industry to try to promote the growth of that industry, the movement of resources into that into that industry and away from sectors which actually could be more productive and which aren’t receiving the subsidy? That’s what I’d be wondering. And there has been a bit of criticism of, of this measure the particularly the hydrogen production incentive, because there are some and critical minerals to because there are some well known billionaires who will likely benefit from those measures. And one name that comes up is Andrew Twiggy, Forrest. And there’s been accusations that these tax incentives are millions, for billionaires. So there’s a really interesting debate going on about that at the moment. Right. Oh, I mean, one thing I should note is that those incentives are worth a lot of money. And I’ll put some links in the show notes regarding that. I mean, they’re talking about billions of dollars of subsidies. So check out the show notes for all of the details. Okay, now, let’s hear some more from Saxon about the budget and what he thinks it should have done rather than pursuing these industrial policies. And as you’re listening, just note that the ringing that you can hear that was a bell ringing in Parliament House in Canberra, that was telling members of the House of Representatives to get back to the chamber. So it’s on the audio, we can hear it, because one of the people on the call was Queensland Senator Malcolm Roberts, he joins us from his office in Parliament House and the bell was ringing in the background. So it’s very loud. He’s in the Senate, but he could still hear the bell. Right. Oh, let’s, let’s see this other clip.

Saxon Davidson  19:43

This budget is interesting because it actually lays bare the lack of a productivity agenda that the current government have, you cannot deal with inflation and the anaemic economic growth that we are currently suffering unless you have a productivity agenda because our rising tide lifts all boats. That is actually how you deal with the cost of living, not with handout how to hand out inflationary spending after inflationary spending, and the lack of productivity agenda is really laid out with this future, this protectionist future made in Australia policy. It is shovelling money out of, well, essentially shovelling money out of our other industries, to put to pick winners and to put into the production of solar panels and other subsidised green energy policies. Senator Roberts was correct that a lot of our productivity issues can be solved by removing a policy of net zero emissions by 2050. You know, this government repeatedly over regulates and overburdens our most productive industries that being mining agriculture, gas, coal, iron ore, and then get them to basically create these previous two surpluses about but they’re not structural surpluses, they’re actually we have entrenched deficits, which the government is hiding behind the political euphemism, unavoidable spending. Besides servicing the debt and national defence, I don’t believe there is actually ever such a thing as unavoidable spending. But I’ll leave it there because I know we’re short for time, but we can sort of Yeah, go on from there. Sex.

Gene Tunny  21:19

And can I ask about your productivity agenda? So you identified you think energy is one of those areas, you’re you’d be against all of these net zero emission policies to get to that target? Is there anything else that your productivity agenda? Well,

Saxon Davidson  21:35

I’d reverse a lot of the industrial relation laws that have been passed in the past couple of years, particularly because we actually got a worker shortage, we don’t actually, it is actually counterintuitive to make our labour laws more rigid than they currently are, especially when they were already rigid before this current government entered power in May 2022. For example, there are bountiful of red tape and tax laws that apply to Australians who wish to work but cannot, such as Australian veterans pensioners and students on the Youth Allowance. people receiving those benefits face a tax rate as high as 66% Starting July one thanks to the stage three tax cuts. And that’s because their their benefits and combined their combined benefits and income is is automatically bound to the lowest tax threshold. But also, if a pensioner for example, if they work a day and a half or minimum wage, they’re all of a sudden caught by a 50% taper rate to their benefits, which means they pay a start in July won a 66% effective marginal tax rate for working. This is why only 3% of pensioners are currently in the workforce. And there was no plan to address this in this current budget. When I play research looked at New Zealand and their equivalent tax system where pensioners are not accountable under the same tax rate. They actually pay a minimum tax rate of about 10.5%. Should they choose to work on their combined pension and their income. And this IRS had found that this was the major reason why, why they haven’t suffered a worker shortage crisis. Since COVID. Our worker shortage and productivity sort of solution is actually mass migration. And it simply hasn’t worked. We still have a worker shortage. And as Senator Roberts alluded to, we’re in a per capita recession. The slice of the pie is getting larger, but the slice of the pie is getting small.

Gene Tunny  23:38

Right? Oh, that’s more great stuff there from Saxon so well done Saxon. Saxon is definitely an Australian economist to look out for in the future. And I what I thought was good about that is I think, Saxon highlighting an area where New Zealand is doing something better than Australia. I think that’s, that’s very effective in an argument because nothing is going to annoy Australians more than hearing that New Zealand is doing something better than us. So given our friendly rivalry, I should say with our Kiwi cousins. Okay, we’ll take a short break here for a word from our sponsor.

Female speaker  24:29

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Gene Tunny  24:58

Now back to the show. So what I also like there is Saxons talking about productivity. And he’s emphasising that, well, we shouldn’t be trying to pick winners and, and, you know, have the government favouring one sector over the other. I mean, we should be looking at these more fundamental what we should be looking at what economists would call framework policies or structural policies. And this was always the view we had in, in Treasury. I mean, yeah, sure, you can have policies that price externalities or policies that promote something that is generally beneficial, such as innovation where there might be a market failure, which means you don’t get enough of it. But these policies should be economy wide, you shouldn’t be favouring one industry over the other, what you should be doing is getting the right economic framework policies in place. And so those are policies that promote competition, those are policies that that you know, promote a efficient or flexible labour market. So I mean, we want you know, we need some basic protections in the labour market, I mean, we don’t want people exploited, but at the same time, the more you regulate the labour market, the more difficult you make it, the more expensive you can make labour, particularly low skilled labour, and the more difficult it becomes, and, and particularly if we have all of these rules around, unfair dismissal, etc, it can make employers reluctant to, to hire workers. And I think, I think sextons Making some, some fair points there about the tax system. And the welfare system, we’ve got to be careful how we design those policies. I think that’s good stuff from Saxon, he’s pointing us in the direction of what we should be looking at when we’re thinking about how do we make our economy more productive. So very good. Now, recall from the previous clip, not that one, the one before that Saxon mentioned how we’d seen this movie before. So this movie of heavy government intervention, and Saxon mentioned the economic turmoil of the 1970s, and how that was related to the interventionist policies of governments. Now, that brought to mind a conversation that I had on the show in late 2020, with Amon Butler, co founder of the Adam Smith Institute. We talked about how Margaret Thatcher so the UK Prime Minister, how she came to power after the post war, UK socialist economic model broke down in the 1970s. So let me play you a clip from that episode for you. After I watched the season four of the crown, so the Netflix series on the royal family, and Gillian Anderson plays, Margaret Thatcher, the pm the Iron Lady, and I think her performance is amazing. She really, I think she nails the mannerisms of Margaret Thatcher and the voice. But the depiction of fascia seems a bit slanted or bias to me. It focuses on a lot on the social dislocation that the series suggests were was caused by her policies. People are unemployed and struggling. And it contrast that with well, that Thatcher and also the Queen, and they, it suggests that they’re detached from it all. And there’s this episode where Fagan who was the the unemployed man, I think he was who broke into Buckingham Palace and ended up speaking with a queen for 10 minutes, it paints a very sympathetic portrait of him, in contrast to Thatcher. So I wanted to speak with someone in the UK about just what the situation was like in Britain in the in the 70s. Would you be able to describe that, please, amen. So we can understand how Facha got into power. What What was she trying to, to address?

Eamonn Butler  29:40

Well, I can I can describe that very easily because I wasn’t the only one. What am I? Well, two of my colleagues did exactly the same. In the mid 1970s, I joined the brain drain, because I went to America, because I thought there was no future in The UK that the trade unions were running country, people were seriously saying that it was going to end up nearer to an Eastern European country as they were there, rather than a Western European country. And a lot of us thought that there’s no point in sticking around here. And so a lot of us immigrated, large numbers of people simply left the country. And of course, large amounts of money left the country as well. But investors thought there’s no point in keeping your money in Britain. It’s a big world and your investments in Britain look dire. But I mean, in 1939, when Mrs. Thatcher took office, the state controlled everything. When you woke up in the morning, obviously, you wake up to or the BBC, which is a state organisation, of course, you still do. But you wake up to that on perhaps your alarm radio, which is powered by electricity, which was produced by the states, you go downstairs and you, you put your state produced egg into a state produce saucepan and you fill it with state produce water, and you will put it on your state produce gas oven, using state produced gas and so on, you would take your kids to the school in your state car or your state bus. And every part of your life was run by the state because they control all of the key industries, coal, shipbuilding, steel, transport, everything. And of course, the trouble is that when you give people monopolies, they abused them. And these were state monopolies and they were abused. And the the product was expensive, particularly for taxpayers who had to pay for all these things. And everything was run through the convenience of the workforce. And so the trade unions became exceedingly powerful. And of course, they had special legal privileges as well that had been granted them so they could, they could have wildcat strikes and secondary picketing, and nobody could do anything about it. If you pick it came around your your factory, there was nothing you could do, even if you weren’t involved in the dispute. So they they knew that they could bring the entire country to a halt. And, you know, they, during Mr. Sanchez time, they very nearly succeeded. But she realised that that had to be taken on that. People blame her for unemployment, particularly in the north of England where coal mines were closed down and steel mills close. But that wasn’t her fault. The problem was that we had wasted our time and energy and money on these industries decades before, that it was cheaper in 79, to load coal from take coal from Australia, and landed in Southampton than it was to pull it out of the mines in South Wales. It just made no economic sense at all. So Mrs. Thatcher realised that we couldn’t go on like that. And she knew it would be painful. And but she was determined enough that the country would go through that pain and it will come out better the other side, which it did, yes,

Gene Tunny  33:16

yes. So do you remember or were you in the States at the time the so called Winter of discontent, there’s a there’s a photo in this book, the commanding heights by Daniel Yergin, and a co author is a photo of Leicester Square. In the West End in London, it’s been used as a garbage tip, in this so called Winter of discontent. 1978 79. So before Margaret Thatcher was elected, was that because of the gobos, the garbageman were on strike, whether it just strikes across the country, before Thatcher got in.

Eamonn Butler  33:57

Everybody was on strike because the Labour government which lasted until the middle of 1979, realised that it had run out of money, and that it couldn’t keep on paying higher and higher wages to public sector workers, which was most of the workforce. And the Prime Minister James Callaghan famously said that at the Labour Party Conference, and there was an outrage that and so the trade unions, protesting that they weren’t getting pay rises, basically knew that they could bring the country to a halt so that they would put that pressure on the government in order to get higher wages and better conditions. And the government simply said, No, we can’t do that. There isn’t any money. So then, everybody went, I mean, that the whole public sector was was hit by strikes and it wasn’t just garbage in Leicester Square in the middle of London, which I remember very well. And in fact, I think we did a little report on, on how to get out of that crisis. And we use the same photograph of the garbage and rats running around in in the centre of the tourist centre of London, if you can believe that. And then went on Barrett. And there was a famous case where somebody was being transported to hospital over the Yorkshire Dales, in the snow. And the the ambulance drivers got a message that they were now on strike, they had to down tools. So this was he stopped out, make her way home. And it’s that sort of feeling. Business and so it was a winter of discontent. And it was it was a dire period. And I think that convinced the British public, we couldn’t go on like this, we actually had to, to do something else. And Mrs. Thatcher was clear in her vision that something needed to be done and, and so that’s why people voted for it.

Gene Tunny  36:07

Okay, so I think that’s a good reminder of why there was a change, of course, in in economic policy in the 1980s. In Britain, under Thatcher in the US under Reagan, and in Australia under Hawke and Keating, the old interventionist why that wasn’t working? Well, arguably, it never worked. We should remember that. We should remember that when we hear all of these growing calls for more government intervention for industrial policy in particular, which is the topic of this episode. Now, another clip, I want to play, it relates to one of the great failures of of industrial policies. I think there are many failures. There, there are too many to go through this episode. I mean, maybe I’ll come back. I mean, you know, I should probably mention, you could argue there are some successes, but I think the the failures are more numerous. And, and probably more likely, because if if something is commercial, if it’s economic to invest in, then the private sector is probably going to be undertaking it already. It’s going to be investing in it. So you have to argue that are there some market failure that’s preventing that and, I mean, you know, that can be that can be difficult to argue. So yeah, I mean, generally I’m very sceptical and I think the evidence is weighted toward the failures and one of the great failures of industrial policy was the Concorde. Supersonic aeroplane. So the Concorde supersonic aeroplane, as we know, it was an economic proposition. It, it flew for maybe, well, a few decades, it’s no longer flying. It just wasn’t commercial for either British Airways or, or Air France, I think it was. Now Concorde. It was developed in an era when there was a great belief that governments could shape the future of industry, particularly by encouraging r&d and the take up of technology. The UK Labour leader, later Prime Minister Harold Wilson, he gave what was by all accounts and electrifying speech in 1963, to the Labour Party Conference, about how his government would use the white heat of technology to transform Britain’s economy. It was a grand vision and Concord was an important part of that vision of that vision to transform Britain’s economy. So, you know, this was a vision that was you know, it started before Wilson, but, you know, there was almost a pre war Well, sorry, there was almost a post war consensus between the Conservatives and labour regarding the role of government, the role of government to steer the economy but Wilson really crystallised that, in that that famous speech of his and Concorde ends up being overseen by Wilson’s government for during the late the mid to late 60s. And and so I think it’s it really is an important part of that, of that vision of, of the white heat of technology, trends forming the economy. Okay, I spoke about Concord with my adept economics colleague Arturo Espinosa in a march 2022 episodes. So let’s take a listen to this clip. And if you want to learn more about Concord, then definitely check out this episode. But let’s hear the clip. We might chat about what Concorde is, I just want to make sure that if you’re listening, and you’re unfamiliar with Concorde, and I’m guessing you probably know a little bit about it, because it’s such an iconic aircraft, and it’s such a beautiful design really sleek and the delta wing. And that, that knows that. That it’s like a beak, isn’t it like the beak of a bird? I think they call it a droop nose, because it can, it can move around. So depending on what stage of the flight you are, it will either be in the rock than the standard position or it will drop down. So I think when they were coming into land, they would they would drop it down just to improve their visibility. So yeah, it’s got a it’s got an interesting nose there. And yes, it’s, as you mentioned, it’s supersonic. So it can travel faster than the speed of sound. And I think actually travel about two times the speed of sound. So at Mach two, so supersonic when I was chatting with Tim, I said, Oh, is it hypersonic? And now it’s not hypersonic. So Tim corrected me it was supersonic. So supersonic is faster than the speed of sound. And hypersonic is five times the speed of sound, at least I think there are some hypersonic missiles that have been developed that have that I’ve seen while I’ve seen in the news reports. Okay, so yeah, Concorde was it was a joint project, it was a joint venture in a way between the British and the French governments. And the name for it came from an agreement that they reached in the early 1960s, I think was a treaty was signed on 29th of November 1962. And so what you had was, this is something that came out of the 1950s. And you had both there were British and French companies that were investigating supersonic, air travel, and I think the Americans were looking at it too, but the British and French, they reached an agreement whereby there would be a joint project because there was a British company that was looking at it, the British Aircraft Corporation, and that was being funded by the British government. So they were providing funds for research and development by that British Aircraft Corporation. And there was also a French company, which was state owned sued aviation, which later became Aerospatiale. They were looking at it too. And so the two governments got together and decided to enter this joint venture for Concorde, whereby they would jointly develop this aircraft that shared the development costs. And they would also they would split the production of it across Britain and France, too, with a view to creating jobs and all that. So it was a British and French government project. And I mean, I would argue that this is a good example, that there’s there’s a few economic principles which come out of the whole Concorde experience. And we talked about the sunk cost fallacy. Well, the fact you should ignore sunk costs. One, one principle, or close to a principle, I would argue is that governments need to be very careful about going into business. I mean, governments really, governments really shouldn’t be picking winners or picking projects. They should be doing the core business of government, I mean, National Defence and the justice system and mean, arguably some assistance for health and education, rather than trying to develop a new supersonic aeroplane. I mean, when you’ve got governments making these decisions and funding r&d for this sort of thing. I mean, it’s, it’s probably more likely it’s not going to be a commercial proposition, and it’s going to be a waste of money. So that would be one thing. I would argue Do you have any, any thoughts on that tomorrow, of course,

Arturo Espinoza Bocangel  44:37

and that there is an interesting point. So in order to see what is the real scope of the government, right, definitely the government should focus on other issues that are more relevant for people instead of promoting this kind of embarrassment that as we We have seen is worth a failure in terms of economic business perspective, right. So, I think,

Gene Tunny  45:11

yeah, I mean, it’s the sort of thing I mean, it could have, who knows? I mean, maybe, maybe if things weren’t right, and the oil price didn’t increase three or four times over what it was previously, after 1973. Maybe the the economics of the whole project would have been better. And it could have been, it could have been more of a mass proposition. I think the mass market proposition, I think the problem that they ended up having was that it became a real niche product. It was really only wealthy people, pop stars and, you know, CEOs of Fortune 500 companies who could actually afford to fly on Concorde. As we can talk about LIDAR. I mean, I think tickets ended up being about in today’s dollars, I mean, I think over 10,000 US dollars, really, I mean, expensive tickets. Yeah. And so you really have to have a you really have to have deep pockets either don’t you have to be someone who really doesn’t care how much they’re spending, or it’s just absolutely time critical that you need to get from New York, New York to London or the other way or Paris to New York, you need to get there in three hours or so. It was a good fly incredibly quickly. Now, I think the figures I’ve seen is that, so this thing’s flying it basically two times the speed of sound, whereas a Boeing 747 flies at point eight four times the speed of sound, so it’s not supersonic. So it can fly about to the Boeing 747 can fly about 900 kilometres an hour, whereas the Concorde could fly at 2172 kilometres an hour. So just incredible. And it’s 60,000 feet too, so Wouldn’t that be amazing to have been to have been up that high? And so it really ended up just becoming a transport option for the rich and famous in a way. And I mean, one example of that, Have you have you heard the story about the Live Aid concert and Phil Collins, how he used Concorde to fly from the Live Aid concert in London at Wembley Stadium. And so he performed at Wembley, and then he hopped on the Concorde. He got a chopper from Wembley to Heathrow Airport, and helped on the Concorde and then got the Concorde. The JFK, and then he ended up getting it was. It’s pretty, it’s a huge logistical job. Where is it? Yeah. And he took a British Airways Concorde flight to New York City before taking another helicopter to Philadelphia, just so he could perform at at the stadium and in Philadelphia, which I think might have might have been JFK Stadium in Philadelphia. That was in 1985, July 1985. So the big Live Aid concert for I think it was to raise funds for to help address or alleviate the suffering of people in famine in Ethiopia, if I remember correctly. So yeah, that’s one of the famous examples of the use of the Concorde. Que so, yes. The Concorde. I mean, it was such a beautiful aeroplane, but just didn’t stack up. Unfortunately. I mean, maybe one day we will have commercial supersonic travel. That would be amazing. But it didn’t work out. For for the Concorde. Right. Oh, to wrap up, I would like to first quote from that issues analysis paper for the Centre for independent studies that I talked about before. This is a paper I wrote with Robert Carlin. And in that paper, we wrote that activist industrial policy has chalked up numerous failures in history, including a domestic car industry that ultimately was unviable despite decades of tariff protection and billions of assistance with his embrace of activist industry policy. chamas is ignoring history lessons, both here and overseas. So yep. I was referring to the car industry in Australia, which is was, you know, Australia was proud of its current history. And we produced some great cars at times, particularly in the 1970s. And there was, you know, there was a great rivalry between Ford and Holden, at that was featured in the famous race at Mount Panorama in Bathurst. But alas, we just the policy settings weren’t the right policy settings. And we didn’t get a sustainable car industry, we had a car industry that could only be viable with with government support, and ultimately, even the government support that was being provided was insufficient to keep the industry going. So we don’t have any of the major car manufacturers here in Australia anymore. So that’s, that’s a lesson about, you know, the challenges of industrial policy, just how well, if you’ve listened to this episode, you will understand that I don’t think it’s a good idea at all. I’ll end with another quote. And it’s from no less than authority, then Adam Smith, walk a lot of passages in Adam Smith’s writings, this one is still fresh. It’s one of my favourites. And it’s one that I think that everyone in political office, they should ponder it every time that they consider some new intervention in the economy. So this is what Adam Smith wrote over 250 years ago. Little else is required to carry a state to the highest degree of opulence from the lowest barbarism, but peace, easy taxes, and a tolerable administration of justice, all the rest being brought about by the natural course of things. All governments which thought this natural course which force things into another channel, or which endeavour to arrest the progress of society at a particular point, unnatural and to support themselves are obliged to be oppressive, and tyrannical. That’s brilliant, isn’t it? I imagine that economists will still be quoting Adam Smith in 250 years time, and will have accumulated many more examples of the failures of activist industrial policy. Although I should be hopeful that economists will eventually win the argument against politicians with their grand visions of transforming the economy. I live in hope rato thanks for listening to this episode of economics explored. If you have any questions, comments or suggestions, please get in touch. I’d love to hear from you. You can send me an email via contact at economics explore.com Or a voicemail via SpeakPipe. You can find the link in the show notes. If you’ve enjoyed the show, I’d be grateful if you could tell anyone you think would be interested about it. Word of mouth is one of the main ways that people learn about the show. Finally, if your podcasting app lets you then please write a review and later writing. Thanks for listening. I hope you can join me again next week.

Obsidian  53:37

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Credits

Thanks to Obsidian Productions for mixing the episode and to the show’s sponsor, Gene’s consultancy business, www.adepteconomics.com.au. Full transcripts are available a few days after the episode is first published at www.economicsexplored.com. Economics Explored is available via Apple PodcastsGoogle Podcast, and other podcasting platforms.

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Podcast episode

Helping Seattle Aquarium & Others Go to Net Zero and Beyond w/ Daniel Lawse, Verdis Group – EP242

Daniel Lawse, Chief Century Thinker at Verdis Group, helps many organizations, such as Seattle Aquarium, become more sustainable and contribute positively to the environment. Daniel joins Gene Tunny to discuss how organisations can make meaningful climate and environmental actions. They cover so-called regenerative practices, the journey from sustainability to net-zero emissions, and the crucial role of long-term strategic planning. They also discuss the degrowth movement and how Warren Buffett’s annual Berkshire Hathaway meeting boosts local businesses in Omaha, where Verdis Group is based. 

If you have any questions, comments, or suggestions, please email us at contact@economicsexplored.com  or send a voice message via https://www.speakpipe.com/economicsexplored.

You can listen to the episode via the embedded player below or via podcasting apps including Google PodcastsApple Podcast and Spotify.

What’s covered in EP242

  • Introduction. (0:00)
  • Climate action plans and sustainability implementation for organizations. (3:05)
  • Regenerative systems, circular economy, and ecosystem types. (10:29)
  • Sustainability and environmental economics, enlightened self-interest and long-term thinking. (16:09)
  • Sustainable growth and development, comparing nature’s regenerative approach with human economies. (23:15)
  • Growth vs degrowth. (29:20)
  • Warren Buffett’s impact on Omaha. (34:20)

Takeaways

  1. Through climate action plans, organizations can take practical steps to reduce their environmental impacts and work towards goals like net zero emissions.
  2. Shifting mindsets from short-term to long-term thinking and considering impacts on future generations can drive more sustainable decision-making.
  3. Nature provides many examples of regenerative and circular systems that organizations can learn from using approaches like biomimicry.
  4. Enlightened self-interest and purpose-driven values can be strong motivators for sustainability action in addition to regulatory requirements.
  5. Balancing economic and environmental considerations is an important topic for debate. 

Links relevant to the conversation

Verdis Group: https://verdisgroup.com/ 

Seattle Aquarium case study: https://verdisgroup.com/case_studies/seattle-aquarium/ 

Patagonia – Don’t Buy This Jacket, Black Friday and the New York Times: 

https://www.patagonia.com.au/blogs/stories/don-t-buy-this-jacket-black-friday-and-the-new-york-times

Books on the role of energy in growth and relevant to the degrowth debate

https://www.e-elgar.com/shop/gbp/the-economic-growth-engine-9781849804356.html

https://www.amazon.com.au/Civilization-Distinguished-Professor-Emeritus-University/dp/0262035774

https://www.amazon.com.au/Growth-Microorganisms-Megacities-Vaclav-Smil/dp/0262042835

Previous episode on degrowth:

https://economicsexplored.com/2023/10/06/growth-or-degrowth-w-oliver-hartwich-nz-initiative-ep208/

Lumo Coffee promotion

10% of Lumo Coffee’s Seriously Healthy Organic Coffee until 30 June 2024.

Website: https://www.lumocoffee.com/10EXPLORED 

Promo code: 10EXPLORED

Transcript: Helping Seattle Aquarium & Others Go to Net Zero and Beyond w/ Daniel Lawse, Verdis Group – EP242

N.B. This is a lightly edited version of a transcript originally created using the AI application otter.ai. It may not be 100 percent accurate, but should be pretty close. If you’d like to quote from it, please check the quoted segment in the recording.

Daniel Lawse  00:03

The Planet Earth is a relatively closed system, except for Sunlight. Sunlight is an energy input coming into the planet. And if we can figure out photosynthesis like nature has, we will have an abundant source of energy. So put a pin in that for a minute. Yeah.

Gene Tunny  00:28

Welcome to the economics explored podcast, a frank and fearless exploration of important economic issues. I’m your host gene Tunny. I’m a professional economist and former Australian Treasury official. The aim of this show is to help you better understand the big economic issues affecting all our lives. We do this by considering the theory evidence and by hearing a wide range of views. I’m delighted that you can join me for this episode, please check out the show notes for relevant information. Now on to the show. Hello, and welcome to the show. Today we’re joined by Daniel lossy, the chief century thinker at Virtus group, where he works with a diverse range of organisations including airports, zoos and aquariums to embed environmental sustainability into their business practices. Daniel aims to make climate action meaningful and impactful, steering clear of mere greenwashing. He wants his clients to achieve genuine environmental improvements. If you’re a regular listener, you’ll know that I’ve been thinking a lot about how we balance economic and environmental considerations. To what extent are the unavoidable trade offs? To what extent are their win win solutions. I’m keen to hear a wide range of perspectives and to learn about practical measures that different organisations are taking. Okay, I’d love to hear your thoughts about the discussion that I have with Daniel today. My contact details are in the show notes, so please get in touch. Before we get into it, I need to say that this episode is presented by Lumo coffee. So Lumo coffee is the coffee company set up by my occasional co host, Tim Hughes, who if you’re a regular listener, you’ll probably remember from his previous appearances on the show Luma was a specialty grade organic coffee with triple the antioxidants of regular coffee. I drink it regularly and I can confirm it’s actually very good. So if you’re a coffee drinker, then please consider getting some Lumo coffee. Tim’s offering a 10% discount on Lumo coffee purchases until 30th of June 2024. Check out the show notes for the promo code and for details of where you can buy Lumo coffee. Seriously healthy organic coffee. Check it out. Daniel aussi Welcome to the programme.

Daniel Lawse  02:50

Thank you so much Jean. Happy to be here.

Gene Tunny  02:53

Excellent. So Daniel, you’re the chief century thinker at Virtus group. You’re based in Omaha in Nebraska. Could you tell us a little bit about what you do at Virtus group? And where do you work is across the Midwest across the US around the world? Can you tell us a bit about Virtus group, please?

Daniel Lawse  03:17

Yeah, Veritas group, we do climate action that counts. We co create a world where everybody can thrive and is resilient. And that’s kind of like our purpose. But what that actually means is we work with a lot of large, complex organisations across the United States, on climate action plans sustainability implementation, we both help them think strategically and we help them do things and drive towards their goals. So planning and implementation, everything from netzero pathways and other decarbonisation planning to implementing emissions reductions and governance structures to effectively integrate and align sustainability across an organisation.

Gene Tunny  04:01

Right? And what does a climate action plan look like? Do you have any examples with people you work with them? And to the extent that you’re able to talk about client work?

Daniel Lawse  04:12

Yeah, climate action plans are a fantastic kind of I’ll talk generally and then I’ll bring it specifically. So it’s really simple a plan, any good plan is assessing where you are today, identifying where you want to go in the future, that vision piece and then having a roadmap or steps to get from here to there. So a good example is the Seattle Aquarium. We started actually with them. It was a sustainability plan. That over the course of the project turned into a regenerative plan because they realised that sustainability wasn’t going far enough for them. We could talk about that later. Yeah. And so we were baselining things like what’s your energy use? What are your waste? That’s outgoing think of a systems flow diagram, what are the inputs into the organisation? What are the outputs out so procurement and purchase Seen electricity and natural gas and other fuels that you’re using for in a case of aquarium, they not only have vehicles like fleet vehicles, but they also have boats, because they’re out doing research on the water and working working on the ocean. We have a really fun tool called the sustainability engagement surveys. So one of the baselines we take as the pulse of organisational sustainability, how do people understand it? How are they acting? Do they have sustainable behaviours? We asked them how their peers are modelling sustainable behaviours, because most people will over report what they think they’re doing from a sustainability perspective. And under report what their peers are. And the truth is usually somewhere in between. We asked to about how do they understand their organization’s commitment to sustainability. So there’s some some perception pieces there. And then that’s like as a score from zero to 100. And it gives them a baseline of, hey, we’re at 45. So we really want to get to 60, that might be a goal that they set. And then there are strategies that you can do to further engage your employees create different mechanisms where they can share ideas, take actions in their department. So engagement, transportation is another big one that has a sustainability impact. How are people coming and going commuting to your place? If it’s a zoo, and aquarium which we work with a lot of those? What What about the guests? Are they coming by foot? Are they coming by in Seattle, a lot of people get off of the cruise ships and walk over. It’s a destination from cruise goers. But understanding how your guests are coming and going. water use is another big one, right? What’s the water coming in? What’s the water going out? How are you using it? The pumps that are moving it around the heating and cooling for, especially with aquariums right life support equipment, making sure that we have the right temperature water and quality of water for the animals that are in their habitats. So that’s the baseline piece. And then it’s really like, what’s the goal, what’s your vision is it to, we always encourage everybody to set a netzero goal. And then we work with them for what year that would be some people are able to set a net zero emissions target in a few years from now, because they already done a lot and they’re on a clean grid or they have on site renewables and others set it further out. 2035 2040 2050 is the latest we really let anybody go wrong. But we use a science based target initiative to inform that net zero emissions pathway mapping. And then we do strategies. But one of the things that I think sets us apart is that we believe that people participate in what they helped create. And so we’re very people positive and complexity conscious. In our approach, we engage a lot of individuals across an organisation so that they have ownership of the plan that’s been written. It’s not just a plan that sits on a shelf. Yeah, gotcha. Okay with the

Gene Tunny  07:50

the aquarium. And that’s really, that’s really interesting. I’m just thinking about it. So. But do they have renewable energy? Are they are they using renewable power? You may have mentioned this, I’m sorry, I forgot? Do they? Do they recycle their water? What are some of the practical measures that they’re taking?

Daniel Lawse  08:08

Yeah, so the Seattle Aquarium in particular, is primarily powered by hydro electric. So clean energy, right up in the Pacific Northwest. And so any electrification that they can do, will be moving them towards their net zero emissions goal. So anything they can take off of natural gas and move towards electric is going to be one of the strategies that they’re implementing. They’re opening up a new ocean pavilion this year. And they were really thoughtful about what are the systems that we’re going to have in this building? How are they going to be run early on, because this building, it takes years to design these things? It was in the design phase while the sustainability regenerative plan was underway. And so there were some really good conversations about if we want to be net zero if we want to be even regenerative. What does that mean for this building that we’re constructing right now today, or designing that will be around for 50 to 100 years, right? When you when you’re an aquarium, you build buildings to last. And so they they change some of the system design so that it would be more sustainable because of their planning efforts. You You asked about water. One of the things that an aquarium or zoo can do with water is have recirculation and life support systems. Years ago, when zoos and aquariums were built, you’d have these pools and you dump and fill them right when they got dirty, you drain them out, clean them, and then put new water in. And the best practice now is really to have recirculation filter systems, water quality monitors and management so that you’re really just topping off any evaporation from a water use. And while you think about there are pumps on site that are moving that water more regularly, what you forget to think about is that when you’re dumping and filling, the water utility is used In a lot of electricity and energy to clean that water and move that water, so it’s, while the organisation might use a little bit more electricity for life support system. From an environmental footprint standpoint, it’s far better to have recirculation and life support systems than to dump and fill.

Gene Tunny  10:18

Gotcha. Okay. And you talk about moving from sustainability or to regenerative plans? What do you mean by regenerative?

Daniel Lawse  10:28

That’s a great question. And I don’t know that I have a straight answer for it.

Gene Tunny  10:32

That’s okay. Is it circular economy? Is that the sort of thing you’re talking about? It

Daniel Lawse  10:36

is, it’s a variety of things. Like the most simple way I can think about regenerative is if you have a spectrum where degenerative is on one side and regenerative is on the other sustainability is right in the middle. So degenerative is you’re doing harm whether it’s intentional or not. Sustainability is doing no harm. Right? Yeah. I mean, here’s, here’s a good way to think about it. Do you want a sustainable relationship with your loved ones? Well,

Gene Tunny  11:01

I think you want to, you want to be growing, you want to be improving it over time, don’t you? So? Yeah,

Daniel Lawse  11:06

at a minimum sustainable relationship would be good, right? Yeah. But you named it right? Something that’s growing, that’s alive, that’s thriving, that’s what regenerative, it’s, it’s, it’s doing more good. It’s generating more good and we can get into the nuances of, well, in a truly regenerative system, I take a lot of wisdom from nature, right, biomimicry, living systems, nature has been doing this experiment called Life for 3.8 billion years, it’s learned a few things that we could, we could learn from it. And so a regenerative system in nature is think of a type three ecosystem, which is like a mature forest, or a mature coral reef, or a mature prairie. Every organism in there is giving back more than it’s consuming. The tree while it’s taking nutrients from the soil, and rainwater, it’s growing, and it’s providing shelter. And it’s providing compost when the leaves drop and turn back into soil. So it’s creating more good than its consumption. And so, and humans don’t have to do anything about that the system itself is regenerating itself. There’s a human aspect where maybe it’s restorative, where humans believe we have to come in and we have to change and fix things. And that’s better than sustainable in many ways. But a truly regenerative system is like, how can we create the conditions where life thrives human life, animal life, plant life. And that’s kind of the philosophical way of thinking that the practical piece you mentioned, it’s circular economy is one of those like in nature, there is no waste. One animals, bird poop is fertiliser. It’s a nutrient cycle rather than a waste stream. And so that’s one way to think about it from a mission standpoint, how do you be net positive with your emissions? Can you generate even more renewable energy than you consume so that you’re being a net benefit to the grid? Can you become more efficient, so that you don’t need as much and if you had, if you had the renewable energy for what that met your needs, but then you become more efficient, now you’re actually giving back to the grid. And it’s so regeneration also implies that you never can be done. It’s always moving sustainability, in the nuance implies that, like, we can become sustainable, we can achieve this goal, and then we’ve made it and we don’t have to do anything else. Regeneration means like, it’s ongoing. It requires constant nurturing. And so that’s why it’s hard to say specifically what it is. But it’s a way of thinking that allows people to engage and wrestle with a question rather than a statement. Yeah.

Gene Tunny  13:49

Yeah. Fair enough. And this term, you use top three ecosystem? Is that a term from a ecology or ecological sciences or environmental science? Okay, I’ll have to look that up. Oh, I haven’t encountered that before. Well,

Daniel Lawse  14:02

it so let me paint the picture. There’s a type one and type two and type three ecosystem and it helps understand so think of a forest type three, which are thriving, generous ecosystem, but a type one ecosystem is like a dandelion. Its annual seeds, organisms and a type one ecosystem spend a lot, a little bit of energy over a lot of offspring, because they know they’re not going to last very long. It’s weeds. It’s insects that are really prolific, and they live a short amount of time most of them die. But in that process of dandelions, scattering seeds, or locusts, breeding and consuming and devastating, they’re actually building soil, which allows for a type two ecosystem to emerge that has more perennials. So the the plants are putting more energy into the root system, and not just reproduction, so that they can last longer, right, they can last through drought, they can last through different environmental changes. As. And then as those shrubs are growing and other, you know, higher, higher complexity mammals are coming into the ecosystem and making homes and creating habitats, then that creates the conditions where trees can actually grow and take root and mature over time. And then you get to the type three ecosystem and the type three ecosystem is going to last potentially 1000s of years, if you think about the rain forest, right, yeah, they can even withstand some levels of disruption, kind of the the biggest disruption when we think about the forest example is a forest fire, right? If a fire comes through and wipes out, all of the trees are most of them. That carbon that was in the trees is now in the soil somewhere in the air, you’ve got a rich soil base. And it’s actually part of an adaptive cycle when you go from a type three to a type one, where you release a lot of energy, but it provides sunlight and nutrients for new seeds to take root that weren’t there. And it takes a while to get back to that mature forest. But that will go through the type one, type two and type three ecosystems. So I’m always talking to organisations about how do you create an organisation that’s a type three ecosystem, that’s more generous than it is consumptive?

Gene Tunny  16:08

Yeah. Okay. I want to ask you about this net zero pathway. So yeah, that’s a I mean, that’s a bold goal, for some organisations is going to be a lot harder than others. And there are going to be some industrial businesses, or, you know, factories, which is probably, you know, almost impossible. What drives the decision making that these organisations you work with? I mean, is this something only for nonprofits where there’s people on the board who, you know, who have these these values that they’re committed to? Net Zero? Is it enlightened self interest by some organisations? What’s driving the behaviour? Daniel?

Daniel Lawse  16:51

That’s a great question with some really good seeds planted. It’s a number of factors, right. In some cases, it’s regulation. If you have to measure your scope one and two emissions, then you might set a goal around it, or you might be required to power plants and utilities in the US are being regulated to reduce emissions. We typically work with people who are more purpose driven, we do have a lot of nonprofits, we do a lot of work with zoos and aquariums, we’re conservation as part of their mission. And they’re literally seeing the corals bleaching and the habitats being destroyed from climate change that is foreseen, that’s putting pressure on extinction rates. So there’s a purpose driven, I would say that for some, it is what I would call or what you said enlightened self interest, right? I firmly believe that a truly sustainable or regenerative business is actually a really robust and thriving business, even economically. And so as leaders gain an understanding that sustainability isn’t just costing them money, but it’s adding value for talent, attraction and retention. It’s adding value for customers, it creates a good story for them to market and share if they’re truly doing it not greenwashing. And so it does become this enlightened self interest of we’re going to do this because it’s the right thing to do. But it’s also good for us. It makes our company more efficient. It makes us more effective. At the end of the day, if I if I could take a segue here into environment, environmental economics, right? Yeah. So often, I see people forget that the economy really exists to serve humans. Right? It’s the exchange of goods and services. Most fundamentally, if we humans aren’t around, there’s no goods and services that need to be exchanged. So if you take away humans, the economy doesn’t exist. But so often we talk about it as it’s like, we’re at service to the economy, what’s the health of the economy? If the economy has these reports and numbers, then we’re going to hurt because we’re the people. But even beyond the people, we don’t exist without a healthy environment. If there’s not clean air, clean water, a stable climate, people could go extinct. And without people, there’s no economy, so re prioritising or just reordering. It’s not the economy and we’re at the service of the economy, and we’ve got to make the economy hum. It’s actually the environment has to be healthy for people to be healthy. And when people are healthy, then we can have an economy and the economy should serve us. Yep. So if you take that to the business level, enlightened business leaders realise that a good environment is actually good for the people and is good for their bottom line. It’s the triple bottom line two people planet and profits. There’s a sweet spot where they all overlap.

Gene Tunny  19:45

Okay, we’ll take a short break here for a word from our sponsor.

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Gene Tunny  20:20

Now back to the show. Now these don’t have to be clients of yours and possibly they’re not. But are there any major corporates or you know, exemplars of, of, you know, what you see as doing the right thing? I mean, what are some, there’s some companies out there that you’re impressed by that you can identify that might be helpful for us to think about, you know, some of the you know, what some of these companies are doing what what are some of the, the ones that are leading the way?

Daniel Lawse  20:52

Yeah, that’s a good question. There honestly, are so many out there, so many more than when we first started doing this work 15 years ago. Patagonia, you know, that’s kind of an easy one to call out. They even talk about Don’t be consumers buy our product once and let it last a lifetime. And we’ll even repair it. They’re really embodying the circular economy. They even market of buying nothing day, on Black Friday, because they said, it’s more important for you as humans to go and be with family and go outside and enjoy nature than to go shopping, because you have a day off of work. They’re a really good example and model to look to who enlightened self interest. They’re thriving as a business. Yeah, they’re doing phenomenally. I’m trying to think so kind of tying this to the previous question of what motivates people, one of the shifts that we’ve seen been in the Midwest of the US, which is relatively conservative, which is funny, because conservation is the same root word conserve, as in conservative and conservation. Most people started hiring us because they wanted to save money. They wanted to reduce utilities and save money. Yeah, great. There’s environmental benefits, we didn’t need to talk about that. Then it evolved to the reason that these leaders wanted to do more was because they wanted to be seen as leaders in their community. Yeah, and they wanted to leave a legacy, they started to realise, like, Hey, I’m gonna retire in five years, or 10 years, and I have grandkids now, and they’re talking about their future and the planet are heating up. What’s the legacy that I am leaving? So kind of to generalise a characteristic? Is anybody who’s thinking about what legacy are they leaving? And what is the future of AR this long term thinking? What’s the future of my children and grandchildren and not just their own, but other people’s the future generations? That’s going to be a company that’s doing things right, when they shift from short term thinking to long term thinking. You kind of stumped me on which companies? Because I don’t I don’t think about companies all the time, I usually think about the principles and the philosophies that they operate under technologies. I don’t know any more of those. I think Patagonia

Gene Tunny  23:14

is a good example. I’ll have to look into that Buy Nothing Day. I mean, we wouldn’t want to have too many bye nothing days, or the economy would collapse. So I mean, as much as I do accept your points about? Look, I mean, it’s, you know, clearly, it’s not just about the mindless pursuit of GDP, I don’t think any economist would say, that’s what we want to have. It is about well being. And we do need to think about the environment. And yeah, and one of the issues that I’ve been thinking about quite a bit, and I’d love your thoughts on it. There’s a big debate at the moment about it’s probably been going for 50 years, actually, now that I think about it, it’s just, it’s just sort of revived in the last five years or so there’s this concept of degrowth, you’re aware of the whole degrowth movement? There’s a concern really, yeah. So there’s this growing concern that all well, we’re reaching all of these planetary limits, or we’re exceeding them and we’re at, you know, we’re consuming enough for to planet earth or something like that. They’re all these sort of factoids out there like that. And, you know, an economist, the general approach to that economists take is that well, we’ve been here before, and there was a whole Limits to Growth Club of Rome stuff in the 70s. And, and that really didn’t. That was just a bit of doom saying, and, you know, we actually seem to innovate our way out of problems and in all of this talk is just a bit of catastrophize it’s I’m wondering, I mean, do you have any thoughts on? I mean, maybe this is a bit you’re really focused on businesses, maybe this is more, you know, this is a sort of question that you really can’t answer. But do you have any thoughts on this whole D growth versus growth? Debate?

Daniel Lawse  25:12

I’ve got a thoughts. I don’t know if they’re any good. I go back to how does nature do it? Yeah, right. And I think that there’s an interesting differentiation between the word growth and the word development. And I think of humans, right at a certain point, I stopped growing, I’m not growing any taller, maybe I’m growing wider, depending on my diet. But I’m not really growing as a organism. But I am continuing to develop, I’m getting smarter. I’m exposing myself to new ideas. I’m learning new skills and trades and whatnot. So I like the idea of how can we develop ourselves, and that should continue for a lifetime. But I do wonder if continuous growth is normal, and I don’t see any place in nature, where continuous growth is normal, it’s cyclical, right? So at some point, any organism peaks, and then it eventually dies. Any ecosystem will ever achieve? Well, not necessarily, but many ecosystems can achieve this type three ecosystem. And even in that there still is released and, you know, miniature disruptive things that occur. But that’s really what I go to like, if I think about what’s, what’s the regenerative economy, it’s a type three ecosystem. That type three ecosystem isn’t just growing and growing and growing. It’s dynamic and changing. And there’s an energy flow within that ecosystem, right? If we break it down to fundamental energy, of poop, and fertiliser and plants and harvesting sunlight and pulling nutrients from the soil. Man, you’ve got me going, this is exciting. Oh, yeah, you guys, right? I think about you know, we the planet Earth is a relatively closed system, except for Sunlight. Sunlight is an energy input coming into the planet. And if we can figure out photosynthesis, like nature has, we will have an abundant source of energy. So put a pin in that for a minute. Yeah, if you look at the population of the world over history, it was typically in the one to 2 billion population range for most of history. And it was only a few 100 years ago, if you look at the population charts. That population really started to skyrocket. Why is that? Why were we able to innovate our way out of the last kind of doomsday? What was that the 1970s limits to growth? It was because of an excessive amount of energy in the form of fossil fuels. Yes, raw fossil fuels are ancient sunlight. It’s really detest sunlight in the form of plants and dinosaurs that have been compacted over millions of years, to be an energy dense source of material on this planet. We mined that drilled that took it out of the ground, and burned through millions of years of sunlight to create the economy that we have today. Is that sustainable? I don’t know. I mean, there’s conversations about peak resources, anything, right? There’s not an infinite amount of oil on the planet, there’s not an infinite amount of coal. Is there a lot more? I used to follow that stuff really closely. I’m not in the weeds enough to start quoting statistics on it, but there’s a finite amount. And so one of the questions I ponder is, was it the cheap energy dense fossil fuel that allowed rapid growth, fertilisers, mechanisation of agriculture, because you can’t have population growth without food? And yeah, and is it truly sustainable? And I would say at some point, it’s not I don’t know any organism on the planet that has had unsustained growth and never had a hey, we’re going to peak the rainforests are the closest that that have an ecosystem that hasn’t been devastated by fire, but humans are doing a pretty good number chopping those rainforest trees down? Yeah, certainly

Gene Tunny  29:20

in in South America and in Brazil and the Amazon that is a big, big concern. I mean, we’ve we’ve protected them here in Australia, which is great. We’ve got some beautiful rain forests around well, in the rare my part of the world and also in near Brisbane, Lamington National Park and then up in the Daintree in North Queensland, that all through North Queensland, really there’s some great rainforests. So yes, I understand the importance of those. Yeah, thanks for your perspective. Daniels. It’s something I think about a lot. And I think that point about the contribution of fossil fuels. That’s, that’s an important one to the economy we have today what? And you know, that impacts been studied by various people. I might put some links in the show notes, Robert Ayers, I think it was and then fast love smell, who is Bill Gates as you know, favourite writer, he’s done a great book on growth. And he’s looked at, you know, he’s been thinking about the extent to which we can continue on exponential growth and what the ultimate limits are. So I’m I put my put some links in the show notes, it’s something I’m going to come back to on the show, because it’s an issue I’m fascinated by.

Daniel Lawse  30:37

Well, I’m just curious, are there any thinkers out there that think exponential growth can continue?

Gene Tunny  30:46

I mean, not in it’s probably not forever? I mean, that would be a bit. I mean, not forever, within the current constraints, I think that would be absurd. Because I mean, you basically have to assume, I mean, you have to have some sort of technological innovation or some expansion of the frontier. I mean, maybe if we move to other planets, or we start mining asteroids, you know what I mean? I mean, that’s on a long enough timeframe, all of that may become possible. I guess the debate is whether, like, are we facing those limits within the next few decades? And if we are that would, that would lend weight to the arguments of the environmental movement of the greens party, various parties around the world that we need to have, you know, rapid, we need to have a massive cut in our standard of living to be able to protect the planet. I mean, I don’t agree with that. I’m just sitting out, I think what you’d have to believe, to come up with that point of view.

Daniel Lawse  31:52

You know, that reminds me of another example that’s very organizationally focused of how do we think about growth versus development and how we think matters. If you really fundamentally look to kind of philosophy, our worldviews frame, how we go about our business, our day to day actions. So take an airport in Europe, who’s landlocked, and has some of the highest volume of flights in the world? Their mindset is not that they’re an airport, that is an infrastructure company, right? That build stuff so planes can land and people can go and on their way and materials can be exchanged. Their mindset, it is more like a technology firm of optimization. How do we optimise the space that we have? That’s a very different mentality than take a US airport that has a lot of land area around it. Who thinks Okay, well, we want to increase passenger numbers, we should build more runways and more terminals and gates. Yeah. And that, that, to me is maybe a microcosm of this conversation that you’re having about D growth versus growth. And maybe it’s how we think about growth. I think we’re always going to have this hankering for more, can we do something better or something more? Businesses often say, if you’re not growing, you’re dying. I honestly struggle with that philosophically and wonder, is there a regenerative business that isn’t growing but isn’t dying, but it is developing? I don’t know. But going back to the airport example, like an optimised airport is going to say we’ve got 100 gates, we’re going to make use of every minute of the day to maximise that, yeah, an airport that operates with more land space may say, like, you know what, in order to grow, we’ve got 100 gates. But airport air, the aeroplane partners really only want to use them in the peak hours of the morning, where business travel is, and then the afternoon and a few evening ones. And they’re not maximising all the hours of the day. And so then the airport airlines say we want to add 10 more flights and they say, shoot, we don’t have enough gates. So we need to build more gates. Instead of saying we need to just think differently about when the planes are taking off and when you’re scheduling. So there’s definitely a mindset that can lead to a growth means build more, spend more versus growth means optimising what we already have.

Gene Tunny  34:19

Yeah, yeah. I like the idea of optimising that’s, that’s very good. Excellent. Daniel, it’s been great. Really, really enjoying the conversation. We’ll probably have to wrap up, wrap up soon. Before we go, I’ve got to ask given you’re in Omaha, and this is a economic show. Do you ever see Mr. Buffett around town?

Daniel Lawse  34:42

Have I seen him personally? I don’t think I have but I’ve been in one of his favourite restaurants before where he eats pretty regularly. And you know, we host the Berkshire Hathaway every single year. So see all of the tourists who come in for that. The shareholders who come in and My wife owns a little tea shop. So that always gets a little bit more business during those Berkshire days. But I’ve not bumped into Warren myself personally, that’s

Gene Tunny  35:08

just Just thought I’d ask given when, when people hear Omaha, they’ll think that, you know, that’s often the first thing, rightly or wrongly people people think of in their minds, particularly if they’re in economics or finance or so to sort out ask.

Daniel Lawse  35:23

Well, on some levels, I think Warren’s actually a pretty sustainably minded person, we can argue lots of other things. But here’s the example. I drive past his house on a regular basis. Right, he does not live in a gated community mansion. He’s lived in the same house, I think for over 50 years. And he’s done some upgrades to it and add a few additions. But it is a very, what I would call a modest house in a nice neighbourhood of Omaha, but like, probably hundreds of 1000s of people drive past his house and would never know what’s even his. So the fact that he doesn’t go and just consume and build a big house because he has the money and he could, and I don’t I don’t believe he owns that many homes or second homes or third homes, he owns a couple different locations. But there are some people who have a lot of Wells who own a lot of homes that they travel and vacation to so in that regard, he’s making a sustainable choice by living in a in a modest house that he’s had for decades and maintaining it and regenerating it, perhaps we might if we want to throw that in there. Instead of tearing it down and and creating something new and bigger.

Gene Tunny  36:33

Oh, it’s, it’s a good story. I mean, he’s, he’s, he’s embodying the, you know, the, the virtues or the, the, the high point or what’s the right word to describe it he’s in he’s in borrowing. He’s embodying those, the real great values of capitalism or where it’s about saving and investing. So So that’s terrific. Good, I can last Yeah. Like it lasts. Good on Warren Buffett. Very good. Okay. Danny Lawson. This has been a great conversation. Any final points before we close?

Daniel Lawse  37:04

I love your questions. Jean, I think it’s so important to be aware of how we think, because it really does matter. And there are four critical shifts that I see at play and all the sustainability work that we do. And I’ve talked about probably all of them but shifting our mindset from a closed system to an open system, right? We’re not alone in this world. And so let’s acknowledge the impact that other organisations and communities and businesses have on us. The shift from like this mechanistic worldview to a living and dynamic worldview, like, change is the only constant thing in life and when we recognise that I’m a living being and organisations are made up of humans, so we’re more living. We’re more like a garden that needs nurturing intending, then a business is a machine that you just take a part out and replace it right, let’s let’s humanise our organisations is that a dehumanise them. The third is the shift from really feeling like and thinking like we’re separate from everybody else and shifting more to this interconnected way of being recognising that my actions have impacts on you, whether intentionally or not, when we do an organisational policy, it’s it can shift things in good ways, unknown ways and unknown ways. And then the last one is the short term thinking the long term thinking, I’ll end with this. The seventh generation principle comes from the Iroquois nation, the first peoples of the US, or of North America, I apologise. And they said, the decisions that we make for our community, we need to think about what is the impact going to be on seven generations, which, you know, it’s about 150 years, you can’t even predict that far out. But it forced them to think about what’s the long term impact of the decisions that are made at Council. I challenge your listeners to imagine a world where their elected presidents council members representatives didn’t think about the next election cycle and being reelected, but thought in seven generations, what would be different? Yeah. And what would be different if our business leaders weren’t thinking about quarterly profits, short term feedback loops, and instead thought forward seven generations? What, how different would our businesses look? And how different would our communities be? If we had leaders who are thinking in seven generations changes everything in, I think, pretty good ways.

Gene Tunny  39:24

Okay, that’s fascinating. And I’ve looked that up the seventh generation principle, very good. Daniel also really enjoyed the conversation and hope, you know, keep up the good work, and I hope we can catch up in the future because I’d love to explore this whole concept of D growth, etc, growth versus D growth. And, you know, just how do we balance all of these competing considerations? And I mean, can we get to a win win? That that’s, you know, with the economy and environment and society in the future, so that’s something I want to explore some more. So, very good. Thanks so much for your time really enjoyed it.

Daniel Lawse  40:05

Absolutely gene. Thanks for all the great questions and good ideas you spark in the world with this podcast

Gene Tunny  40:11

rato thanks for listening to this episode of economics explored. If you have any questions, comments or suggestions, please get in touch. I’d love to hear from you. You can send me an email via contact at economics explore.com Or a voicemail via SpeakPipe. You can find the link in the show notes. If you’ve enjoyed the show, I’d be grateful if you could tell anyone you think would be interested about it. Word of mouth is one of the main ways that people learn about the show. Finally, if you’re podcasting outlets you then please write a review and leave a rating. Thanks for listening. I hope you can join me again next week.

40:58

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Credits

Thanks to Obsidian Productions for mixing the episode and to the show’s sponsor, Gene’s consultancy business, www.adepteconomics.com.au. Full transcripts are available a few days after the episode is first published at www.economicsexplored.com. Economics Explored is available via Apple PodcastsGoogle Podcast, and other podcasting platforms.

Categories
Podcast episode

The Limits of Fiscal Policy: Insights from Tony Makin, Alex Robson & others – EP222

This episode on the limits of fiscal policy features highlights from host Gene Tunny’s past conversations with the late Australian economist Professor Tony Makin and former OECD Ambassador Alex Robson. In the discussions, Tony Makin provides a balanced and insightful analysis of Australia’s fiscal response to the COVID-19 pandemic, critiquing programs like JobKeeper while recognizing some justification. He and Alex Robson discuss the importance of considering the open economy impacts of fiscal stimulus and the long-term burdens of debt. The episode looks to validate Makin’s warnings about the limits of discretionary fiscal policy through subsequent evidence and events. Gene summarizes the JobKeeper evaluation results and what happened in the Australian housing market following the pandemic fiscal stimulus. 

Please contact us with any questions, comments and suggestions by emailing us at contact@economicsexplored.com or sending a voice message via https://www.speakpipe.com/economicsexplored.

You can listen to the episode via the embedded player below or via podcasting apps including Google PodcastsApple Podcast and Spotify.

What’s covered in EP222

  • Fiscal policy limits and its impacts: introduction (0:03)
  • Economic stimulus measures during the COVID-19 pandemic. (9:36)
  • JobKeeper program design and targeting. (15:44)
  • JobKeeper program’s effectiveness and infrastructure spending challenges. (21:31)
  • Keynesian economics and infrastructure spending. (27:50)
  • Fiscal policy and its impact on the economy. (33:13)
  • Fiscal policy and its unintended consequences. (40:12)
  • The economic impact of public debt with Tony Makin and Alex Robson. (48:31)
  • Fiscal policy and its impact on the economy: wrap up. (53:39)

Takeaways

  1. Fiscal stimulus packages must be carefully designed and limited in size to avoid unintended consequences.
  2. The nature of the workforce is important to consider when implementing fiscal policy, as not all workers can easily transfer to different industries.
  3. The burden of public debt, including interest payments, can have long-term impacts on national income and economic growth.
  4. The effectiveness of fiscal policy in an open economy is influenced by factors such as capital mobility and exchange rates.
  5. Tony Makin was a leading advocate for sensible fiscal policy in Australia, and his contributions to the field are greatly missed.

Episodes the highlights are clipped from

EP119: What Tony Makin taught us about macroeconomics – Economics Explored 
A Fiscal Vaccine for COVID-19 with Tony Makin – new podcast episode | Queensland Economy Watch

Links relevant to the conversation

Fiscal policy papers by Tony Makin:

The Effectiveness of Federal Fiscal Policy: A Review

(PDF) Australia’s Competitiveness: Reversing the Slide 

 A Fiscal Vaccine for COVID-19

Treasury analysis of JobKeeper:

Independent Evaluation of the JobKeeper Payment Final Report | Treasury.gov.au

The employment effects of JobKeeper receipt | Treasury.gov.au  

News regarding unintended consequences of fiscal stimulus:

Building company collapses into liquidation days before Christmas, impacting four Guzman Y Gomez sites

Transcript: The Limits of Fiscal Policy: Insights from Tony Makin, Alex Robson & others – EP222

N.B. This is a lightly edited version of a transcript originally created using the AI application otter.ai. It may not be 100 percent accurate, but should be pretty close. If you’d like to quote from it, please check the quoted segment in the recording.

Tony Makin  00:03

For instance, baristas who’ve lost their jobs are not necessarily going to be one want to be out there on the road as a construction worker, financial sector employees and not wanting to be perhaps putting paint bets and ceilings. So the the nature of the workforce is important. We can’t just treat the labour force as this homogenous entity where people can transfer across to any sort of industry at whim.

Gene Tunny  00:39

Welcome to the economics explored podcast, a frank and fearless exploration of important economic issues. I’m your host, Gene Tunny. I’m a professional economist and former Australian Treasury official. The aim of this show is to help you better understand the big economic issues affecting all our lives. We do this by considering the theory evidence and by hearing a wide range of views. I’m delighted that you can join me for this episode, please check out the show notes for relevant information. Now on to the show. Hello, in this episode, I’m going to talk about the limits of fiscal policy. So that’s the use of government spending and taxation to influence the economy. So to try to smooth out the business cycle or to respond to some big shock, like the pandemic or the financial crisis. During the pandemic, in particular, we saw heavy use of fiscal policy by governments around the world. While some stimulus may have been warranted, we’re starting to really see some of the adverse consequences of fiscal stimulus packages in different countries. So you could argue that are a good part of the inflation that we’ve seen in the last couple of years that was due to the, you know, these massive fiscal policy responses that occurred that, that injected all of this additional money into household and business bank accounts, and we ended up with too much money chasing too few goods, which is that that classic explanation of inflation. We’ve also seen high public debts. So big increase in debt worldwide. And then we’ve got the growing burden of interest payments on government budgets. We’ve also seen impacts like what you’d call crowding out, we’ve seen supply side impacts, or constraints really starting to, to bite, particularly in the building industry. So some of these, these unintended consequences, you could say, maybe they should have been foreseen, they’re really starting to have an impact, particularly here in Australia, we’ve seen an impact on the building industry on its costs, and that’s affecting firm viability. So there’s all this extra demand, and there’s only so much supply out there. And, you know, supply can only respond in, it can’t respond automatically or instantly, to to this additional demand. So we’ve seen a big increase in in costs in that sector, and then that’s having all sorts of adverse impacts and you know, builders are closing down and then the people who are getting their houses built, they’re badly impacted, too. So that’s, that’s one of the things we’re seeing here in Australia that I’m going to talk about. Early in the pandemic, Professor Tony Macon of Griffith University in Australia. So Tony was based on the Gold Coast, which is south of Brisbane, where I am so early in the pandemic tiny warned about the adverse consequences of fiscal stimulus in Episode 41 of the podcast. So in one of the earlier episodes of this show, in June 2020, I spoke with Tony about his analysis of Australia’s fiscal response to the pandemic. He prepared that for the Centre for independent studies, which is a think tank in Sydney. So the CIS it’s one that I’m an adjunct Fellow at and I’ve had a lot to do with over the years. I’m gonna play some clips from that conversation I had with Tony, in, you know what turned out to be one of the early Months of the pandemic. So, I mean, things started going, going crazy. And when was it March 2020. So that’s a, it’s just a few months after, after that. We had a big a major fiscal policy response by the end of March in Australia, if I remember. And so we’re starting to see some of the, you know, the less desirable features of that already in in June when I spoke with Tony. Okay, so I’m going to play some clips from that conversation to illustrate some really important points about the limits of fiscal policy. So I’m not saying that activist fiscal policy is everywhere and always bad. I think what I want to say is that you’ve really got to be careful with it, you’ve got to think about, well, what’s going to be the ongoing impact on your interest payments? Could could there be any crowding out? Could there be unintended consequences? Could you actually be destabilising the economy in the future? You may be trying to stabilise it now, but could you actually make things worse than they otherwise would be in in the future? So they’re the types of considerations I think are important with with fiscal policy? Okay, one thing I have to say is that tiny Macon is sadly, no longer with us. He died unexpectedly in November 2021. So, in addition to playing some highlights from my fiscal policy conversation with Tony, I’m also going to play some highlights from my conversation about Tony’s legacy that I had with Alex Robson in Episode 119, from December 2021. So I think they’re worth that’s worth sticking around. For. Alex is a you know, he’s a former collaborator with Tony, he wrote some papers with him. And he’s also Australia’s former ambassador to the OECD in Paris, which is really top job in economics. Yeah, so Alex, Alex is a great person to hear from and he has a lot of excellent observations about about Tony. Okay, let’s play the first clip, which it features Tony’s critique of the massive job keeper, payroll subsidy programme that we have in Australia. I think that much of Tony’s critique has been supported by the facts. So new evidence, or what we’ve learned about how Job keeper rolled out and, you know, the impacts that it had. And also, I think that the review of the programme that my old deputy secretary in the treasury, Nigel Ray, so Nigel did a review of it. Last year, I think that that review that brings out some of these, well, that’s supportive of some of the criticisms that that that Tony made, although, of course, it’s it’s going to be measured. And you know, Nigel, is not someone who’s going to come out and say, Look, this is, you know, this is terrible, you really stuff this up, he’s going to be very measured about it all. There’s also a treasury research paper that’s relevant here. And I’ll have more to say about them after I play the clip. Tony, I’d like to ask about the Australian response, I thought you made some really great observations about the different elements of the response. So there was the job keeper programme, the payroll subsidy programme. And then there were there were cash handouts. And there’s also some bringing forward of infrastructure spending. You made some really insightful remarks regarding the efficacy regarding the merits of the different elements of the Australian Government response. And I think there are lessons that can apply to responses across the world, would you be able to take us through what those those insights and lessons that you made workplace turning?

Tony Makin  09:36

Yeah, well, I made a distinction between fiscal responses that were targeting the aggregate supply side of the economy, and, in the paper, endorse those in principle and in particular, we’re talking about job Keeper which I think is a great innovation. We’ve not seen a scheme like like that, before, it’s not original to Australia, Australia copied what was happening in the UK and New Zealand and one or two other European economies. And the innovation was to see firms as a source of employment. Correct. And to alleviate the pressure on firms and their employees in particular, by providing a direct subsidy to the firm. So it was a supply side initiative, more than a demand side initiative, it was helping aggregate supply, it wasn’t an element that he was sought to increase CRI or it was increasing G, of course, but it was it was it was aimed at the firm’s production. So that was an innovation. And I think there’s a prototype there for future fiscal responses in heaven. Let’s hope we don’t have similar sorts of crises. But it’s it’s a preferred means as opposed to the aggregate demand side response. And a, we’re in the form of two cash transfers or cash handouts, as we saw in response to the GFC trying to in the Keynesian ways stimulate spending, and the purpose of stimulating the spending is to enhance employment. So it’s a roundabout way of trying to enhance employment. I think it has the features of a of a subsidy to retailers in effect, because they’re the ones that they’ve been at most. And in any case, if there is spending and evidence shows that such handouts tend to be largely saved, but if they are spent, they are spent on imports. And they’re funded by borrowing from overseas, which has to be paid in the future. So there were two responses there that were trying to sustain employment one was the direct one to Job keeper. Good marks for that one. And then there was another one on top of that, which was the cash handouts, which was a roundabout way of of sustaining employment when there was another policy in place for that purpose.

Gene Tunny  12:24

Yep. So this job keeper, it was originally costed at one 30 billion, it turns out all it it may only cost 70 billion, there was a forecasting error. But that’s that’s, that’s tangential to our discussion. You did know that while job keeper is more justifiable than other stimulus or emergency measures, there are still concerns with the design of job keeper. Could you take us through some of those please, Tony,

Tony Makin  12:57

our look, the key one is the industry is involved. The questions about casuals being paid more on job teper than they were otherwise earning. So they’re being paid more not to work than to work. I think that’s the key floor with the with the programme. And hopefully that will be fixed when the Treasury completes its review very soon. I guess it’s also questions about eligibility and the the the rule that was there for downturn in, in sales, some of those aspects of it could be possibly fine tuned, but I think it is a useful prototype that can be improved.

Gene Tunny  13:49

Yep. If they if they did it again, I’m sure they would better targeted, and they might target it to the industries that are most affected, such as hospitality, tourism, retail, possibly not professional services, which, you know, appear to be, well not as badly affected as some other sectors. So the the key lesson is that this needs to be better targeted. The problem was from what I can tell this was developed within a week, possibly under a week when at toward the end of March, when they realised that they needed something like this because all of the employer groups were coming to the the government ministers and telling them we need this or we’re going to have to sack millions of people. So I think that’s what drove it. It was done very quickly.

Tony Makin  14:43

Yes. And also the alternative was to put enormous pressure on the on the Employment Benefits Scheme. people queuing up for benefits that would have been a major headache as well. Absolutely.

Gene Tunny  14:56

I think one of the great points you made in the paper was Sir. Regarding the cash handouts, we want to get people out spending, but the public health advice is saying actually stay home, we don’t want you to go out. So I thought that was a really interesting point. And actually, yes, that’s right. So the goal of these emergency measures should be to sustain businesses to keep people in employment during this challenging time. It’s not necessarily, though, and the way to do that is not necessarily to give people money to go out and, and spend on new flat screen TVs, which are imported. So that’s, I think that’s a good point that you’ve made. Okay, so that was Tony on job keeper, which was the payroll subsidy programme we had in Australia. And yep, Tony was, Tony was right about the some of the problems with that programme. Um, overall, I mean, I think that was a very balanced assessment of Tony’s he did recognise that to an extent, it could have been justifiable if it was better targeted. So he wasn’t ruling it out completely. He just had the had some concerns about the design. So I think that was a very, you know, measured, balanced assessment of job keeper from tiny, and another measured and balanced assessment of job caper came from Nigel Ray, who, as I mentioned, was my boss in the treasury. So really, really great public servant, Nigel. And, yep, I think he’s written a great report on job keeper. In the independent evaluation of the job keeper payment final report, he prepared that for the Treasury, I’ll put a link in the show notes. It was broadly supportive of the programme. But Nigel, you know, he had to acknowledge there are some serious issues with it with the design of it. And so what did he conclude? Let’s, let’s go through it. So one of the major conclusions was that a more flexible policy designed during the first phase of job keeper. So I think that was the first six months. A lot of the detail is, it’s hard for me to remember at this stage, but I think that he’s talking about the first six months of the programme. They rolled it out for six months, and then they had another six months of it. A more flexible policy designed during the first phase of job keeper would have enabled an earlier move from prospective to retrospective eligibility thresholds. For example, After three months, this would have allowed better targeting of payments beyond the initial three months and lower the costs of the programme. Okay, so what he’s, what he’s talking about there is that when it was rolled out, basically, you know, accountants would apply for their clients that apply to the ATO, and the accountants would be asking their clients, okay, well, what do you think’s gonna happen to your turnover over the next six months, so when whatever the whatever it was, maybe was quarterly basis, and, you know, you’d think, Oh, well, we’re gonna have this major pandemic. So yeah, we think we’re gonna get smashed. And so there are a lot of, you know, firms that applied for job keeper and got this job keep it like this very generous, turned out wage subsidy, that, you know, they really didn’t end up needing and they didn’t have that turnover reduction that they were forecasting and that they, you know, they’re they advise the ATO that they would, they would have, but there was no way for the ATO to claw that, to claw that back. So, yeah, what Nigel’s getting out there is that you could have designed it in a way that limited the fiscal cost by actually seeing, you know, what happened to the businesses like after a few months and then adjusting the payments after that. So I think that’s what he’s getting out there. It relied a lot on what businesses and their accountants were forecasting would be the impact of the pandemic on their, their turnover. And for many businesses that didn’t actually they didn’t experience the big revenue reductions or the turnover reductions that that they were forecasting, you needed to forecast a particular percentage reduction in in your turnover. I can’t remember off the top my head if I can find it. I’ll put it in the show notes. Righto. So and the second major finding from Nigel regarding job keeper he noted that a tiered payment structure One that is proportionate to previous earnings is better targeted than a flat payment. And this is getting at that concern that Tony had that there were quite a few part time. People, part time employees who may have maybe they were working a couple of days a week in, in a business and they, you know, they were earning an award wage that wasn’t much more than the national minimum wage. Suddenly, because of this payment for a job keeper was that it was more gee, it must have been at sort of trying to approximate a might have been a full time wage for a person roughly on minimum wage or something like that. I can’t remember exactly. But it was much higher, then, you know, some it’ll be more money than someone be would be earning if they’re only working a couple of days a week, part time. And so the idea was, let’s make this simple. Let’s get this out to the people who need it. Let’s not worry too much about trying to make it more targeted, because we don’t have time to do that. And what it meant is that you had and this is the point time he’s making you had many part time people actually earning more with job keeper, then they would have learned otherwise. So yeah, that was a really poorly designed part of job keeper. Also relevant regarding job keeper is a recent Treasury research paper and this came out. So this came out late on Friday, the 22nd of December, okay, so the Friday before Christmas 2023. And Peter Tula, who’s my colleague at the CIS, so Peter is the chief economist at CIS. He tweeted on the Friday that the fact that Treasury releases it late on Friday 22nd December suggests that it embarrasses somebody. So Peter was suggesting that this paper from the Treasury by Natasha Bradshaw, Nathan Deutsche and Lachlan vos, or vas, it’s titled The employment effects of job paper receipt, Peter suggesting it must be embarrassing someone. So what does it what’s embarrassing about it? So the main findings from it. So I’ll put a link in the show notes, you can check out what they’ve done. They’ve done some clever things with a, you know, a data set on businesses that where they can try to infer what’s actually going on, it’s rather clever paper. So check that out. Our findings suggest that at its height in early 2020, job keep it directly preserved between 300,000 to 700,000. Jobs. Right. Okay. So that’s, that’s reasonable. I mean, that’s, you know, if that if it was 700,000. And, you know, that could have pushed the unemployment rate up to near 10% or something, they’ve got an estimate of what then what that would have been, and put that in the show notes. So, you know, that’s a, that’s a big deal. But then if it’s only 300,000, well, okay, is that, you know, how effective was that? So I guess, maybe that’s something you could, you could say, justifies the cost of the programme, which was in the order of $100 billion or so that’s, you know, that’s something you could argue about. So, you know, I’d say somewhere between 300,000 to 700,000 jobs, that compares with around three and a half million employees covered by the scheme at its peak. So I think when the government was rolling it out, initially, it it was suggesting it could save something around, you know, 700,000 jobs or so. If it actually is about 300,000, then well, that makes you wonder, you know, was that good value for money? So maybe that’s something that they’re embarrassed about? I’m not sure. I mean, you could say Oh, well, hundreds of 1000s of jobs, maybe it was worth it. That would be their their argument. What could be the potentially embarrassing bit about the paper is a finding that is in the footnote. It’s a one of the footnotes. And this finding is it’s on page two suggestive evidence. That job keeper receipt made casual workers less likely to be employed over a year later. So they found suggestive evidence that job keeper receipt made casual workers less likely to be employed over a year later. So the effects are far smaller and less statistically significant than the positive effects found during early 2020. But are not implausible they could reflect income effects on labour force participation given job keep a lead to some workers having substantially higher incomes than they otherwise would have. Okay. So this is that point about these, you know, these part time workers getting all of this additional, additional cash so many, many casual workers would only be working part time, they would be, you know, they could be working in a bar or at a cafe, and they’re getting much more money than they would have expected. So they’ve got all this extra money in their bank accounts. And so what they do a year later, is, you know, for many of them, they go, okay, but there’s extra cash, maybe I don’t need to work as many hours at the bar or the cafe, I’m going to spend more time on my studies or, or on a hobby, or I’m going to go overseas. So that’s what they’re, they’re driving out there. So this is really illustrative of how you can have these unintended consequences with fiscal policy. So maybe that’s what’s what’s embarrassing about the paper. So check it out. I think it’s a good paper, it illustrates a neat little econometric technique that I might talk about in a future episode. Okay, so that’s, that’s plenty on job keeper, the payroll subsidy programme and the the challenges or the problems you have when you don’t design a programme properly, of course, they had to do it very quickly. Next time, let’s hope they have a much better design, if there is a next time hope there isn’t a next time. If there is it needs to be better designed. The second clip that I want to play from my chat with Tony is about infrastructure spending. So with job keeping, we were talking about this payroll subsidy and you know, often, often the fiscal stimulus comes in the form of cash payments to households or businesses with the payroll subsidy programme, which then had to be paid to the employees. Some fiscal stimulus comes in the form of infrastructure spending, public works, that sort of thing. And I think Tony’s right there, that can also be problematic, you’ve really got to think about that. And that is the topic of this second clip from tiny, so I will play that now.

Tony Makin  27:50

infrastructure spending can be beneficial. And it has lasting benefits. And what it does not do is deteriorate the government balance sheet, as does the spending on cash handouts and other forms of consumption related government stimulus. What infrastructure does is it creates an asset there on the government’s balance sheet that matches the borrowing, it still has to be funded by borrowing, we started with a budget deficit. So all of his extra spending has to be funded by borrowing. And so there’s an asset there, so the balance sheet won’t deteriorate, to the extent otherwise. But again, it needs to be quality spending, it needs to pass certain tests, the crude Keynesian idea would be again, just to spend on anything. And being holes in the ground, as you mentioned earlier, is a form of crude Keynesianism, which, which could well be sort of portrayed as a form of infrastructure spending if it’s working on the road somewhere. But the point about infrastructure spending is it does have to pass the test where the benefits the present value of the benefits of the project, exceed the costs. And one other point to make about infrastructure spending. And this is one feature of government spending, the Keynes instanced in his work originally right back in the 1930s, but he talked about Public Works, which is effectively what we call infrastructure today. But the difference between then and now when they talk about boosting infrastructure spending is that the nature of the workforce has changed dramatically. I mean, people these days, have certain skills. It’s a highly variegated work workforce, people doing different things. And the assumption in Keynes’s theory was you increase spending on public works, then you have workers easily transferred from jobs that they’ve lost places of employment where they used to be in factories and other areas of unskilled work and they can easily be transferred to, you know, working on the road, so to speak. But these days, that seems far fetched, because for instance, baristas who’ve lost their jobs are not necessarily going to be one want to be out there on the road as a construction worker, financial sector employees, and not wanting to be perhaps putting pink bats in ceilings. So the the nature of the workforce is important. We can’t just treat the labour force as this homogenous entity where people can transfer across to any sort of industry at work. And there’s also I mean, there’s, there’s information costs there. There’s transactions costs, which which make the whole process a little bit trickier than than it sounds in terms of increasing employment.

Gene Tunny  31:08

Yeah, it’s not like it was in the 30s when you could get a whole bunch of unskilled or semi skilled workers, unemployed workers and have them carve out a walking track in the national park or something like that. Exactly. Right. Yeah, yeah. Okay, we’ll take a short break here for a word from our sponsor.

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Gene Tunny  32:06

Now back to the show. Okay, so another really balanced and insightful clip from tiny. And one of the things Tony was talking about in this clip is Keynesianism, so the ideas associated with John Maynard Keynes, the great British economist, and there’s a particular I guess, a school of thought or there’s a crude Keynesianism often in the way that you know, some, some economists or well, not not many economists, I think most economists recognise the the limits of fiscal policies, the problem with too much discretionary policy with Hey, you got to be careful with it. But there are there still are some we could say crude Keynesians and in in politics, too, there are some people with these these crude Keynesian ideas and they become quite popular during times of crises. And you know, Tony was someone in Australia who was always, always pushing back against that crude Keynesian view and trying to explain what are the what are the potential offsetting impacts, you know, how can interest rates respond, exchange rate, what’s the response to fiscal stimulus and particularly in an open economy like Australia’s Okay, so I’ll play the next highlight in which Tony covers that. So,

Tony Makin  33:42

in the open economy, where you introduce capital flows, exports imports, exchange rates, and emphasising in particular the exchange rate, then you can have a counter model to crude Keynesianism and the best known approach is the so called Mundell Fleming model, which is which features in intermediate macro economics textbooks. And it really just builds upon the IS LM model that Hicks invented by introducing capital flows and exchange rates and net exports. So, listeners may well be familiar with with that model, but simply says that if you increase government spending, you’re going to increase the budget deficit there’s going to be more spending in the economy, but that for a given money supply is going to tend to push up domestic interest rates relative to foreign interest rates and that will induce capital inflow foreigners will be flooding into buy these bonds that are paying a slightly higher interest rate than in their own countries, and that capital inflow will appreciate the currencies. And we’re talking about a floating exchange rate here. And that appreciation will worsen competitiveness because in the short run, price levels are fixed. So a nominal appreciation will translate to a real appreciation. And that loss of competitiveness will crowd out net exports. And this is exactly what we saw. Post GFC. And I’ve written written on this. It’s part of the Treasury external paper. But the exchange rate appreciated massively. As the fiscal stimulus was being rolled out and just look at the national accounts, and you’ll see that the swing variable, there was net exports that went down due due to the loss of competitiveness. That’s, that’s one open economy perspective. And I think that model has been borne out empirically, with reference to Australia’s previous experience, post GFC.

Gene Tunny  36:10

Yeah, so I’ll put a link to that paper of yours, which I think was in agenda. And you also wrote a paper for the minerals Council. One thing which was what one thing that’s really interesting, tiny is that your original minerals Council paper was criticised by the Treasury Secretary, Dr. Martin Parkinson, my old boss at the time. But then a couple of years later, you wrote a paper for the Treasury under the new secretary, John Fraser, essentially, almost refuting what Dr. Pockets and wrote in that rather extraordinary refutation of your minerals Council paper.

Tony Makin  36:58

Yes, yes. It’s quite curious and evidence that economists disagree, even heads of treasury disagree and their economic thinking. So yes, Martin Parkinson issued a press release criticising my minerals Council paper, which was mostly about Australia’s competitiveness. It was not focused, essentially on fiscal policy. That was a part of it. But that’s what caught the criticism from Treasury. And then subsequent to that, when John Fraser Parkinson, successor became Treasury head, he commissioned me to write a paper for Treasury, and that is available from their website, Treasury, external paper where I elaborated on the aspects in the minerals Council paper about fiscal policy and and raise some of these issues about accounting models to to crude Keynesianism. Yeah.

Gene Tunny  37:58

It’s interesting, because I mean, we both worked for Treasury it at different times, though. And I remember the traditional Treasury view is that we have to be careful about fiscal policy because it could end up being destabilising is the open economy impacts that you’ve mentioned, there’s also the problem that you don’t know whether you’re intervening at the right time. The problem that, you know, the stimulus might come on when the economy is recovering anyway. And then it’s, you know, it’s not really necessary. So there are these lags involved. What happened, I think, during the GFC, or the global financial crisis, was that the Treasury people thought, and you know, the, the politicians Kevin Rudd, the Prime Minister, Wayne Swan, the Treasurer, they thought, well, we’ve got this huge shock coming from overseas, we’ve got to do something. So we’re just going to throw as much money at the problem as we can to save the economy. That seems to be the logic and know all of those old concerns about discretionary fiscal policy, what we call discretionary fiscal policy, as distinct from automatic stabilisers such as unemployment benefits, which increase during recessions or the fact that your tax revenues fall during recessions. That all view that discretionary fiscal policy is insensible. That was just thrown out the window. And we’re seeing it again now. So what do you do you have any views on why treasury? The Treasury line on fiscal policy has changed, Tony?

Tony Makin  39:35

Well, I think it’s become crude, Keynesian. And there’s another example that you hadn’t mentioned, and it was the response to the Asian financial crisis, which was also a major, a cataclysmic event at the time in terms of what happened to asset prices and, and we by then had been heavily dependent on the Asia Pacific For our for our trade, not so with the GFC. Because our trade with North North America, the North Atlantic region was minimal compared to Asia. And yet the responses were completely different. In the first instance, there was virtually no fiscal response, there was a strong monetary response, which allowed the exchange rate to stay at a highly depreciated level, which, which soars through that crisis, we didn’t experience a recession that time. And that was what was happening with the global financial crisis, the exchange rate collapse, not as much as it did during the Asian financial crisis. But the government of the day then panicked, reflecting the panic in the US, and by that time, interestingly, the International Monetary Fund had a change course. And it’s thinking it has traditionally been influenced by Chicago economists and had always highlighted in my time working there highlighted problems with activist fiscal policy, including the lags problem that you’ve you’ve mentioned, but there had been this major reversal of thinking at those levels. And the Australian government here, panicked as a consequence of the crisis where we did not where it should not have given that the banking system here didn’t collapse in the same way as it did. In the United States. I fully endorse the the underwriting of the system or the banking system at the time, but the fiscal stimulus was, was completely over the top in my view.

Gene Tunny  41:46

Okay, I really loved that clip of my chat with Tony about fiscal stimulus, I think the comparison he makes or the contrast he makes between how Australia responded to the Asian financial crisis, which as he knows, was a huge deal. Particularly in in Southeast Asia. I mean, it had huge impacts on a major Well, an important economy to the north of us, Indonesia, which, you know, country I’ve had a little bit to do with, particularly with their finance ministry. And it led to effectively to the overthrow of the Suharto regime that they had there. So huge, huge impacts in that region. And yet, Australia responded differently, as Tony was explaining, but by the time of the financial crisis, the thinking in in Treasury, and and also it was a government of a different political persuasion, too. So that may have had something to do with the response. Right. Okay. So we’ve talked about crude Keynesianism. The other thing? Oh, yes, one. One thing I want to mention here is that I’ve been talking about how there are these unintended consequences of fiscal policy that that we can see. And I think that was particularly the case with, with one of the packages that was part of the pandemic response here, which was home builder, which was this home builder grant to two people who were, you know, building or renovating a home. So they had a home builder grant there was about, I think it was two and a half billion dollars. I’ve got that in my notes. And it’s ended up having these, you know, a really adverse impact on the building sector now. So there was a really crisp report from this was on news.com.au. This was on Christmas Eve, Kassar building group collapses into liquidation receivership owing $3.7 million, Guzman and Gomez. So jiwaji sites impacted. And so it’s a nice little as well, you know, it’s not nice, but it’s a good illustration of these unintended consequences. So I’ll just read some, I’ll put it in the show notes. And I’ll just read. I’ll just read some of the main points because I think it does illustrate, you know, what can go wrong if you’re not thinking through what the consequences of your policies can be. So ASIC is the Australian Securities and Investments Commission. So that regulates companies here in Australia. So ASIC insolvencies, statistics show 2213 building companies collapsed during the 20 to 23. financial year, there was a 72% increase on the previous 12 months. The alarming trend has been blamed on a perfect storm of factors including fixed price contracts, escalating costs, supply chain disruptions and tradie shortages. So tradie that’s the what we call tradespersons here in Australia. I’m not sure if you use that term in other countries, if you’re in the state So the UK, for example, the previous Morison government’s home builder grant, which was introduced in June 2020, handed out $2.52 billion to owner occupiers who wanted to build a substantially renovated home it turbocharged the sector, more than 130,000 Customers signed on to the programme with many trainees agreeing to the work under fixed price contracts, it soon became unsustainable as prices began to soar. Okay, so there was this crowding out. And you know, the, the builders or the tradies, they were relying on supply, you know, whether, you know, they may, they may have had to subcontract to other trainees, or they may have been, you know, they may need to purchase the supplies, so plumbing supplies or timber, and they may have been thinking, Oh, well, we’ll just quote based on the prices at the moment. And then suddenly, there’s this additional demand a huge amount of additional demand, and their prices increase for all those input costs. And they’ve signed these contracts to do the work at a particular rate. And these jobs are no longer viable for them. And so now what we’re seeing is we’re seeing these these building companies and collapsing, they’re just going into, into receivership liquidation administration. Yep. So bad results from that. So I’ll put a link in the show notes to that really important piece of information there. This is my final clip from Tony, from my conversation with Tony that had in June 2020. It relates to the ongoing burden of the debt. So those interest payments that, you know, that takes money out of your budget, that’s money that you can’t spend on health and education, for example, and this is something that I think it’s not sufficiently appreciated by decision makers during times of crisis. Okay, so I think, you know, there’s, there’s this need to respond, there’s this, there’s this panic, we think this is, this is the big issue we’re going to deal with. Okay. Sure. Except I accept that. But I think decision makers really have to think more about the long term implications. Okay, because, you know, this, this crisis will pass, presumably, I mean, you don’t want to be, too, you know, obviously, we need to be realistic. But generally, these things will pass, we’ll get to the the other side of it. And I suppose we, we probably should have expected that we would get over this pandemic. I mean, it has been, it has been dreadful, and you know, lots of people have died from it. So I’m not willing to downplay it. But we should have thought that yep, there will be life after the pandemic, and there will be this ongoing burden. Okay. So let’s play the next clip, the final clip from Tony on debt. What do you see as the the problem with this is this buildup of debt isn’t there, and there’s the problem, we have to pay for it, or we have to service that debt and a lot of that money is going to go overseas. You’ve also mentioned the impact on economic growth. What evidence is there regarding the impact on economic performance and growth of a buildup of public debt, which is in Australia is easily going to exceed $1 trillion within a few years?

Tony Makin  48:31

Yes, well, there’s certainly going to be the impact on national income because there’ll be a pure drain from national income of the public interest paid abroad, and we’re talking about 10s of billions there that will just be subtracted from national income to service to service the debt that we will have and that that drain will likely exceed. If it’s a trillion dollar debt, it’s likely to be about eight times the foreign aid budget and a multiple of, of what’s spent on the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme and, and a host of other other government programmes. So there’s going to be a direct impact there. But there’s been a number of elaborate econometric studies done. And you’ll find them in the literature. I won’t instance all the authors, but the IMF has done work on this. I’ve actually done had a paper published with a PhD student of mine, looking at Asian economies, and there seems to be a consensus empirically, that a 10% increase in public debt. Other things are saying well, contract, GDP growth, that’s conventionally defined GDP by point two of a percent. So that might not sound much but new compound that through it can be quite significant. After a few years.

Gene Tunny  49:55

What would be the mechanism there tiny would it be the fact that too due to service this debt, you might have to have taxes higher than otherwise. And these taxes, haven’t they lead to an efficiency loss. There’s an efficiency loss with taxation, because you’re discouraging people from working or investing. Could that be one of the mechanisms?

Tony Makin  50:15

Yeah, absolutely. The interest rate is going to play a play a role as well. But the there’s going to be a deadweight losses of the future taxes are going to harm future income. There’s no question about that. But also, there’s other studies have shown that the the the interest rate will will increase by seven basis points, or 1% increase in the public debt to GDP ratio tends to in these studies show that the interest rate tends to go up by about five basis points or up to five basis points. But the mechanism through tax is important, but also, through expectations, if you’ve got this big debt overhang, public debt overhang that’s going to affect expectations. And we can invoke Ricardo there in terms of what what he said for for households having to attend to to save more, but also firms and it’s not something that Ricardo instance, I think it’s important that investment investment is likely to be weak due to the uncertainty that business has about future tax liabilities in the face of an enormous public debt. And then lastly, there’s the impact on future generations that Thomas Jefferson, a founding father of the United States instance, and that the the future generations are going to have to pay for the repayment of the massive debt that’s that’s arisen due to the fiscal response. Yep.

Gene Tunny  52:02

Okay, so that was really interesting from tiny there. Now, some of that was the point he was making about expectations and what you call Ricardian equivalence, I think we’ll have to cover that in a future episode, because there’s a big controversy about that, and to what extent that actually, that actually happens. So, yeah, we’ll we’ll cover that in a future episode. The other stuff, you know, the, I think it’s the other points are really undeniable, really about the the interest burden of the debt and what that does the budget. So I think that’s, that’s well said, from tiny Okay, so that’s, that’s it from my conversation with Tony. What I’d like to do now is I like to play some clips from Alex Robson, who I mentioned before, Alex is out of the amazing Korea. He was an economic adviser to former Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull has been Australia’s ambassador to the OECD in Paris. And like me, he hails from Townsville in North Queensland. So yeah, I was really glad to catch up with Alex. Well, I wasn’t glad because it was a terrible event. But it was good that I could catch up with Alex after Tony’s passing to discuss Tony’s legacy. So here’s Alex on tinies legacy.

Alex Robson  53:38

I mean, in a closed economy, the assumption is you’ve got no capital inflows or outflows. And so the exchange rate then doesn’t really matter. So what Mondale and Fleming showed in the 60s Was that actually, if you just change that assumption, and then allow for the exchange rate to change, and capital inflows and outflows to occur, and that has been impacted by by imports and exports. And so with policy, say, for fiscal policy, you get this leakage into and out of exports and imports. And so if your sales are up, for example, boosting government spending or reducing taxes that will then have effects on interest rates, exchange rates and exports, so and then an open economy like Australia, that obviously matters quite a bit. And so the critical thing lever there that that changes, or you know, a lot of those predictions of the standard sort of pump priming model, we think about your government goes out and spends more money and has these multiplier effects and so on is this assumption of capital mobility and how it affects the exchange rate. And once you have that, you get a completely different predictions about the effectiveness of these different policy instruments. So and and Tony was always really good at just constantly reminding people of this and and I think it’s the tend to be something which was taught. It’s been taught, obviously, in universities for a long time, but it didn’t seem to quite make it into the, into the policymakers sort of calculus in in in Canberra. And so that was just one of Tony’s big things was just to remind people and of that. And I think, you know, I mean, we saw that during the GFC. With respect to exports, we saw it with respect to the exchange rate, there were big changes going on. And the point is that, you know, Australia is affected by everything else that’s going on in the world. And that’s why places like the OECD and IMF are always talking about coordinating fiscal policy, because, you know, otherwise, you get these leakages across across countries, and you may not get the impacts that you’re trying to achieve.

Gene Tunny  55:50

Okay, and here’s the second clip from Alex. So my conversation with Alex, I

Alex Robson  55:56

mean, thinking about, he had a good mix of very good technical economic skills. I mean, he wasn’t a heavily mathematical person, but he did use those tools when he needed them. And, but also very much an applied focus to policy questions of the day that that mattered. And it wasn’t something where he, you know, there’d be a policy issue. And so I’m now going to think about that. It was, you know, he’d been thinking about these things for a long time. And then when they tended to come up again, and again, he was ready with the arguments that he divided, quite a lot of thought to. So it was wasn’t like he was sort of chasing these different policies. She was, I think he just spent a career thinking about the big macro topics. And they just come back again and again, in Australia. And and it was we were fortunate, I think, to have him as a voice during these tumultuous times in the big macro debates of the 90s. And then during the GFC. And then more recently, as well, yeah, I think, yeah, thinking about his career, it was a good mix of contributions to the academic literature, technical skills, but then also translating that into policy commentary and advice that really stood him apart from a lot of economists today.

Gene Tunny  57:10

Okay, so we’ve come to the end of the episode. I think that the experience of many economies over the last couple of years has provided validation for the criticisms of fiscal policy of activist fiscal policy that came from economists such as the late Tony makin. The takeaway from this episode is that fiscal stimulus packages need to be very carefully designed and limited in their size, if you are going to implement them. There’s a legitimate argument that they’re best avoided altogether, but I would reserve the right to use them in some cases. And even Tony did suggest that there may have been justification was something like Job keeper, but a more targeted in better designed version of it. Okay, so, to wrap up, it’s really pleased me to be able to go back into the archives and to to find these great highlights from my conversation with tiny, tiny making. He was the leading advocate for sensible fiscal policy and Australia for for many years, and he is sorely missed. Thanks for listening. rato thanks for listening to this episode of economics explored. If you have any questions, comments or suggestions, please get in touch. I’d love to hear from you. You can send me an email via contact at economics explore.com Or a voicemail via SpeakPipe. You can find the link in the show notes. If you’ve enjoyed the show, I’d be grateful if you could tell anyone you think would be interested about it. Word of mouth is one of the main ways that people learn about the show. Finally, if your podcasting app lets you then please write a review and leave a rating. Thanks for listening. I hope you can join me again next week.

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Thanks to Obsidian Productions for mixing the episode and to the show’s sponsor, Gene’s consultancy business www.adepteconomics.com.au. Full transcripts are available a few days after the episode is first published at www.economicsexplored.com. Economics Explored is available via Apple PodcastsGoogle Podcast, and other podcasting platforms.

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Podcast episode

The Paradox of Debt w/ Richard Vague, ex-Sec. of Banking & Securities, Pennsylvania – EP195

Economics Explored host Gene Tunny chats with Richard Vague, a prominent American businessman and investor, about his new book, “The Paradox of Debt: A New Path to Prosperity Without Crisis.” Richard, who has previously written about “The Case for a Debt Jubilee”, shares powerful insights into the benefits and drawbacks of debt, discussing how it can help grow household wealth while also promoting economic instability and rising inequality. He also offers thought-provoking ideas for helping households and businesses manage and reduce their debts. 

Please get in touch with any questions, comments and suggestions by emailing us at contact@economicsexplored.com or sending a voice message via https://www.speakpipe.com/economicsexplored

Note: this episode was recorded in mid-June 2023, i.e. before the Supreme Court decision regarding student loan relief, which is why the decision isn’t mentioned in this conversation. 

You can listen to the episode via the embedded player below or via podcasting apps including Google PodcastsApple PodcastsSpotify, and Stitcher.

About this episode’s guest: Richard Vague

Richard Vague served most recently as Secretary of Banking and Securities for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. As the author of The Paradox of Debt (2023), The Case for a Debt Jubilee (2021), A Brief History of Doom (2019), and The Next Economic Disaster (2014), Richard Vague established himself as a clear and independent voice in the ongoing conversation about the role of private sector debt in the global economy.

What’s covered in EP195

  • [00:04:39] Debt and the global financial crisis. 
  • [00:11:23] Debt always grows faster than the economy, Richard argues.
  • [00:12:53] Increased debt and higher net worth. 
  • [00:17:23] Paradox of debt and inequality. 
  • [00:23:01] Type one and type two debt. 
  • [00:28:50] Regional banking crisis in the US. 
  • [00:32:13] The paradox of debt: summary. 
  • [00:35:10] Debt forgiveness in the private sector. 
  • [00:41:43] Debt restructuring in banking. 
  • [00:47:48] A win-win-win solution. 
  • [00:49:53] Massive job training as something Richard would like to see.

Links relevant to the conversation

Where you can buy Richard’s new book The Debt Paradox: A New Path to Prosperity Without Crisis:

https://www.amazon.com.au/Paradox-Debt-Prosperity-Without-Crisis/dp/1512825328

Richard’s previous book The Case for a Debt Jubilee:

https://www.amazon.com.au/Case-Debt-Jubilee-Richard-Vague/dp/1509548734

Gene’s conversation with Allen Morrison about the Enterprise China model which he mentions this episode:

https://economicsexplored.com/2022/12/26/enterprise-china-what-western-businesses-need-to-know-w-prof-allen-morrison-ep171/

Transcript:
The Paradox of Debt w/ Richard Vague, ex-Sec. of Banking & Securities, Pennsylvania – EP195

N.B. This is a lightly edited version of a transcript originally created using the AI application otter.ai. It was then looked at by a human, Tim Hughes from Adept Economics, to correct anything an otter might miss. It may not be 100 percent accurate, but should be pretty close. If you’d like to quote from it, please check the quoted segment in the recording.

Gene Tunny  00:06

Welcome to the Economics Explored podcast, a frank and fearless exploration of important economic issues. I’m your host Gene Tunny. I’m a professional economist and former Australian Treasury official. The aim of this show is to help you better understand the big economic issues affecting all our lives. We do this by considering the theory evidence and by hearing a wide range of views. I’m delighted that you can join me for this episode, please check out the show notes for relevant information. Now on to the show.

Hello, thanks for tuning into the show. This episode I chat with Richard Vague about his new book, The Paradox of Debt, a new path to prosperity without crisis. Richard Vague is a prominent American businessman and investor. He’s a former secretary of Banking and Securities for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. He sits on the University of Pennsylvania Board of Trustees as well as on the boards of other prestigious organisations such as the Institute for New Economic Thinking. As you’ll discover Richard has some powerful insights into the good and bad aspects of debt. He talks about how it helps grow household wealth, while also promoting economic instability and rising inequality. Richard offers some thought-provoking ideas for helping households and businesses de-leverage and get their debts under control. Richard’s book is definitely worth a read. So I’d encourage you to grab a copy of it after you listen to this episode. I’ll include a link to the Amazon page for the book in the show notes. Okay, let’s get into the episode. I hope you enjoy my conversation with Richard Vague on the paradox of debt.

Richard Vague. Thanks for joining me on the programme.

Richard Vague  01:54

Thank you so much for having me.

Gene Tunny  01:55

Excellent. Richard, I’m keen to speak with you about your new book The Paradox of Debt. Debt’s a huge issue around the world. I’ve had recent shows on the debt ceiling in the US and and also the, what they’re calling the emerging economy debt crisis, there’s been a lot of discussion about that. And it’s one of those things that seems to come back every now and then we have these, these debt crises in various places. And in your book, you’ve got, I think, a good description of historically what’s been happening in this, this process that we’ll talk about. Could I ask to start off with what made you want to write this book? What motivated you to write the paradox of debt?

Richard Vague  02:42

Well, thank you so much for asking. And thanks, again, for having me on your show. We had done a lot of work for a number of years about financial crises be it in the Great Depression, or the great financial crisis of 2008, and so forth. And really, all of those are tied up in private debt and really rapid escalations of private debt. And we wrote a book called A Brief History of Doom that chronicled the 43 largest financial crises in the world over the last 200 years. And as we went around and presented that folks would love what we had to say, but ask you know, what about the other side of the balance sheet? You know, what about the assets that these individuals have? And? And can you put this together with the government debt story that we normally spend more time on? So I after hearing that for a few years, I finally said, well, that those questions are legitimate, they’re productive. So let’s roll up our sleeves. And let’s get into it. Let’s look at the entire balance sheet of countries of the sectors within those countries. And that’s this book.

Gene Tunny  03:54

Okay. So you wrote a previous book, and you’ve been speaking with various different people about that. And this gave you the idea. You’ve had a distinguished career in business and public service. Are you taking lessons from that? Are there things you that you saw in your career that have helped inform this book that you’ve written?

Richard Vague  04:14

Absolutely, you know we were in the banking business. So I studied debt, from the context of being a president of a bank. For years and years and years. It’s all I did, but I didn’t think you know, when you’re CEO of a company, you really thinking about the results of that company, and you don’t step back and think about the equation as a whole. And so that’s that really changed in 2000 and 5,6,7, when we began to see this tsunami of mortgage debt in the United States that ultimately ended up being the great global financial crisis. So we I honed my ability to look at debt and my interest in debt over an entire 30 year career, but it took the GFC for me want to step back and look at it holistically.

Gene Tunny  05:11

Gotcha. Right. Okay. And you mentioned the balance sheet. So you wanted to look at all of the you want to look at the debt, you wanted to look at the, well the liabilities for the people who owe the money. But you also wanted to look at the the assets. So is that part of the problem is the problem that a lot of the money that was borrowed was spent on unproductive investments? Is that is that one of the issues that you’ve been looking at?

Richard Vague  05:41

Well, yeah, and I want to be careful with the word unproductive. There. But yes, when you see a great financial crises, as we’ve had in this country, many, many times, we had one in the Great Depression, we had one and the 1980s, we of course, had one in 2008. You see lenders lending too much. And really, what we see is they’re doing loans that in normal circumstances would be just fine, mortgage loans, commercial real estate loans, but they overdo it. They do too many mortgage loans, they do too much construction debt. And not just a little bit too much, an egregious amount too much. So let’s take the 08 crisis, mortgage loans in 2002, were 5 trillion in the US by 2007. They’re 10 trade. So they doubled in five years. Well, you had to be a blind man to miss that. Or you had to have economic theories that excluded debt as a variable. And that’s really the way the Mac, the Orthodox macro economics profession looks at the economy, then their models don’t even take debt as a factor. So if you were looking at debt, it was easy to spot. It was egregious. And clearly, it’s one of the things we study.

Gene Tunny  07:16

Okay, so a couple of things that I’d like to discuss, Richard, what do you mean by their models? Don’t consider debt is a factor is that you? Are you saying that they’re too short term that they’re not thinking about the longer term and debt is in the short term, maybe you can get away with a buildup of debt. But in the long term, there can be a reckoning. So I just want to understand exactly what you’re saying there?

Richard Vague  07:41

Well, it’s surprising. But what’s called the DSGE model, which is the core model used by the Federal Reserve and academic economists everywhere, simply does not have bank and other forms of debt as a variable in the model, period. And you know, as as a career banker, I find that shocking. I’m not sure how you can study an economy without studying debt. But that is, in fact, the case. And it’s pervasive in orthodox economics. And that’s the very simple, straightforward reason that, you know, in 2005, and six and seven orthodox economists, were absolutely sanguine about the economy. At the very moment, it was about fall apart.

Gene Tunny  08:35

Yeah, yeah. I understand what you’re saying. And, and that’s true. So you’re talking about these DSGE models, these dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models of the economy. And yet you look at the macro models that the central banks run, and yeah, I mean, they’ve got a lot on inflation expectations on they’ve got their, their Phillips Curve and their Taylor rule. So they’ve got all of these traditional macro economic equations in them. But yeah, I have to look at what our RBA our Reserve Bank of Australia is doing here. But yep, I take your point and understand what you’re saying there. Now, I might have to have another look at that. And, yeah, I mean, I agree about in the lead up to the financial crisis. I mean, what was extraordinary about that I was in the when I was in the treasury at the time. So we were following it from the government perspective, also what was happening in the private sector, of course, because that was relevant to the state of the economy, government revenue, and what we’d have to borrow. But yeah, I remember just how much it did take a lot of people by surprise that suddenly everyone was talking about Hyman Minsky again. And someone who was considered a heterodox economist. And suddenly, everyone’s talking about the Minsky moment. So yeah, very, incredibly revealing time that one. So yeah, that’s more of a comment.

Richard Vague  09:56

Yeah, what I would say is, you know, I spent my career as a financial analyst, you know, as a as a bank executive, as a bank CEO, as in any of these capacities, you look at companies and industries, in the context of a balance sheet and income statement. And all any economy is, is the sum of the individuals and businesses and other institutions, primarily government institutions. In it, you just add those all up, and you have the aggregate balance sheet of the country. And so, you know, not coming up through a traditional economics route. I just took it as a given that the proper way to study an economy is the way I studied businesses and industries as a financial analyst. And this book, The Paradox of debt is that exercise, we just go in, and we look at it the way, you know, a financial analyst would look at it. And you’ll see for all seven of the largest countries in the world, we have assets, liability, income and expense, and we draw conclusions from that.

Gene Tunny  11:12

Okay. From that framework, Richard, what would you say are your key insights, and how that are different from the traditional way of looking at it?

Richard Vague  11:23

Well, one of the key insights is that debt always grows faster than the economy itself. And I spent decades in my banking career not even thinking about that. But to the extent I did, assuming that debt, you know, ebb and flow that it went up went down. But you know, over time, it was in a similar rein. That’s not even remotely true. Debt always grows faster than the economy. And we see that in the seven largest economies in the world that together constitute 60 plus percent of GDP. In the US, you know, circa 1980, debt to GDP, total debt, government debt, and private sector debt was 125% of GDP. Today, it’s more than double that level. So there’s no equilibrium, we are getting more and more leveraged as economic entities. So that’s the first thing that kind of hit you in the face, like a two by four, you know, we’re getting more and more leveraged. One of the other things that really is, you know, a central conclusion of this book, and again, was something that I hadn’t thought about, but is abundantly ever evident from the data is, the more debt you have, the higher the net worth of households go? So in 1980, at the time, you know, total debts 125% household net worth is about, let’s call it 350% of GDP. Here we are, you know, what is it 40 Something years later, debt has doubled. Net Worth, the net worth after subtracting debt of households is now almost 600%. So we should we actually demonstrate in the book that debt increased debt actually causes asset values to go up? And, you know, that’s good news insofar as it goes, but we also see show that it, it severely increases inequality, because the top 10% are the primary asset holders. So they’re seeing their net worth go up, you know, abundantly and folks kind of in the middle class and below, are not seeing increases in their net worth to GDP.

Gene Tunny  13:51

Gotcha. Okay. So yeah, a few things there. The so you talk about the tendency of debt to grow faster than the economy, and you’re talking about both private and public sector debt?

Richard Vague 14:03

The two added together.

Gene Tunny 14:06

Okay. And that you call this a debt staircase? Is that correct?

Richard Vague  14:11

Yeah, we’re very intentional about that, because most people call it the debt cycle. And while that’s, you know, somewhat accurate, it implies that debt returns to the previous level. Well, that essentially never happens. Debt will go up rapidly and then might come down, you know, a little bit it almost never comes down at all, frankly, and only in a calamity. And then it might plateau for a little while, and then it rapidly ascends again, to an entire new level. So we felt like debt cycle in a certain sense was misleading. So debt staircase really talks about we jump up to a new level plateau jump up in either higher level. That’s really been the history of debt in most countries.

Gene Tunny  15:05

Yeah. So I think this is that Ray Dalio, his idea of a debt cycle. I’m trying to remember who you are, I guess plenty of people, commentators talk about a debt cycle and leveraging

Richard Vague  15:16

it’s a natural tendency to think of things going up and down like a sine curve or something.

Gene Tunny  15:21

Yeah gotcha. Okay. Now, I want to go back to this, yeah, this tendency to go more and more into debt. And you mentioned that it does increase net worth. household net worth over time, and it’s increasing inequality. Yeah, I guess I’d probably Yeah, maybe I think too much in terms of the cycle. So I guess the story, many commentators or economists will tell us is the boom bust cycle. And there’s the exuberance, the over exuberance, and there’s too much lending, because there, there’s just too much optimism or frothiness, about the state of the economy and potential investments. And we see this time and time again, whether it’s railroads or whether it’s IT, whether it’s housing, there’s a there’s a new boom, and that’s when all the new debt gets created. So I’m just wondering, but it sounds like it’s not just a boom and bust phenomenon is it, you’re saying that this is something that actually has a there’s a trend increase in, in debt over time,

Richard Vague  16:30

you’re hitting the nail on the head, you know, I think that when people say boom, bust cycle, debt cycle, things like that, they kind of the unspoken implication is things return to the way they were previously. But that’s simply not the case. We instead, we have a boom, we have a bust, but we’re at an entirely new and higher level of leverage or indebtedness.

Gene Tunny  16:58

Hmm. Okay, I might ask you about this, what you call the paradox of debt. In your epilogue, you’ve got a really great summary of what this is. So I’ll just read this out, because I think this is really, really great. “This has revealed the paradox of debt, debt builds household net worth while also increasing inequality is essential for economic growth, and yet in excess leads all but inevitably to periodic economic calamity and stagnation. As a result, the paradox of debt portends the certainty of economic challenges and difficulties going forward, unless we are willing to get creative, and ambitious.” So I think that’s a really great summary of your of your arguments in this book, I want to unpack that I’d like to ask first, could you just explain again, how does this it builds household net worth, I get that because households are borrowing to invest in housing, but also in some other assets. But it also increases inequality. How does that work, Richard? How does it increase inequality at the same time?

Richard Vague  18:11

Well, this gets back to the relative distribution of stocks in real estate. Right now in the United States, household net worth is about $150 trillion. Let’s put that in perspective. Aggregate government debt is 31 trillion. So you can see household net worth really dwarfs anything else, it’s the biggest factor in any economy, and typically somewhere near 70%. So at least 60%, maybe near 70% of all household net worth is two things. Real Estate net of the debt to acquire that real estate, and stocks net of the debt to acquire those stocks. So your wealth really boils down typically, to those two things, your ownership of stocks and real estate. Well, the top 10% of households in the United States own 65% of all the stocks and real estate in the country. The bottom 60% That’s six zero % That’s surely most if not all of the middle class, collectively only own 14% one four % of all the stocks and real estate. So if stocks and real estate values go up, well then inequality by definition increases. And I think that is the fundamental equation in every developed economy. Debt goes up pushing asset values up. And since assets are held unequally, inequality widens.

Gene Tunny  20:04

And is it access to credit to then? And obviously the I guess the wealthier you are, the higher income, the more access, you have to credit. And that allows you to grow your wealth that way?

Richard Vague  20:15

Well, certainly that’s part of it. But even if we took the extreme example, where somebody in the top 10%, you know, had an asset had real estate, and a company selling goods, it is often the debt that the bottom 60% are accruing, or acquiring to buy the goods from the top 10% that contribute to this rising inequality. You know, famously, Apple didn’t really have much debt as a company and still doesn’t. But I guarantee you that the financing that’s provided to its customers, are what allow them to buy all the laptops and Macs and iPhones and, and other goods. I actually was a banker that provided some of that at one point in my career. So it’s the debt of the 60% that are buying the goods owned by from companies owned by the top 10%. That is part of this equation as well.

Gene Tunny  21:18

Right. And that’s, it sounds like that’s a sign that a lot of that is consumer debt. And so it’s not good debt, so to speak. So. Okay, what I want to understand which I’d love to know, your views on to what extent is this a good bet for the different players in the economy? So it sounds like so households seem to be on? Well, so far, they’ve Well, at least the the top 10% And maybe a larger share, they’ve done well out of this out of, you know, borrowing to invest? It’s, it’s been beneficial to them. I mean, that we’ve, you’ve had a housing crash, and you had one in LA, of course. So it’s not always, it’s not always smooth, but in general, have households benefited from it? What about business? I mean, clearly, some businesses have been able to access finance to grow, but then you do mention that, you know, this can lead to periods of economic stagnation. You talk about this debt, there’s a tax buyer, so the debt is favoured in the tax system in the states relative to equity finance. So how do you think about all of this in terms of is it rational to the whole debt? Or is it? How do you think about this? What about for business? And what about for government trying to regulate all of this, the central bank looking at it? I mean, to what extent should we be concerned about this growth of debt? There’s a lot there sorry, that I’m trying to understand the rationality, what your views are on that, please?

Richard Vague  22:52

Well, I would, what we do in the book is we divide debt, private sector debt into two categories. Type one debt and type two debt. And type one debt is debt for spending on new things, you know, and type two debt is spending to acquire an asset. Now, I’m being a little simplest, overly simplistic here. But, you know, from my perspective, if you borrow to go on a vacation, that debts a little bit more problematic, than if you buy you borrow to buy a house, or a company or something like that, you know, you might, you know, buy a small, you know, gift shop, or a retail store, you might borrow to buy a house or buy a rental property, those have a better chance of increasing your wealth, then the debt you incur to buy that motorcycle you’ve always wanted or go on that trip to Haiti, or what have you, and that that’s a little bit too simplistic, but directionally, I think, that would reveal the direction of our thinking about, you know, what debt we would encourage individuals to enter into and not.

Gene Tunny  24:17

Okay, so that’s for individuals, you mentioned this tax, this the tax system and how that works and how it favours debt finance. Is this part of the story? Is this does this mean that companies end up borrowing too much money and then to an extent, they can then invest in unproductive assets? Is this part of the story this, this tax treatment of the debt because of the interest payments are tax deductible and therefore, the other reforms? Is there any reform to that system that you see to the tax system that you you would propose?

Richard Vague  24:56

Well, you know, this is I think, is something that’s been debated endlessly for a long time. But you know, the, what we want to do, I think, and I think this would be true of all of us, I don’t think you’d find a lot of disagreement around this, what we want to do is we want to encourage stock ownership. And what we would like to somewhat avoid is the accumulation of too much debt. The irony is that the tax code would drive us in the opposite direction, because, you know, much of the interest we incur on debt is tax deductible. That’s a little less true than it was a generation ago. But it’s still, you know, broadly true. And at the same time, companies are double taxed, you know, on the stock side of things, so, you know, they’re taxed on earnings, and then the holder of the equity is taxed on dividends, but it’s famously referred to as double taxation. So, you know, I don’t think changing that changes the world irrevocably or radically, but I think at the margin, if we switch that around, you know, and made, you know, took away the tax penalty on the equity side and took away the remainder of the advantage on the borrowing side. At the margin, it would make a difference over time.

Gene Tunny  26:23

Okay, yep. So, so some difference, but it wouldn’t be the it wouldn’t completely solve this.

Richard Vague  26:29

It’s not the magic bullet

Gene Tunny  26:31

Not the magic bullet. Okay. Okay. Fair enough. Right. Well, I want to ask now about back to your, your summary of the paradox of debt. So “paradox of debt portends the certainty of economic challenges and difficulties going forward unless we are willing to get creative and ambitious” first, how bad could those economic challenges get? So when we were talking about risk, see you talk about how this debts leading inevitably to periodic economic calamity, calamity and stagnation? Are you seeing another financial crisis down the track for the US and the global economy?

Richard Vague  27:10

Well, we measure that by how rapidly the escalation in private debt to GDP is in a short period of time. And we do not see that as a problem in the US at the moment. It’s certainly a problem in China. You know, the Evergrande debacle that we all read about this past year was a direct result of an escalation in the equivalent of private so you know, there’s no private sector in China to speak up. But, you know, non government debt or the equivalent of private debt has shot up since 2008, in China in an unprecedented way. And I think one of the things you have there as a result is something on the order of 100 million empty dwellings, buildings were built in the interest of economic growth, that there are overcapacity, and thus, there are no buyers for so, you know, I think most western economies developed economies right now are not in danger of an imminent financial crisis. I think China’s got got its hands full.

Gene Tunny  28:23

Right, right. Yeah, yeah, absolutely. Good point about China. I had a guest from the business school in Arizona, I think it was on last year to talk about the enterprise China model where just the close links between the business in China and the the the administration over there, so you know, good, good point about that. What about the regional banking crisis in the US? Is that something you’re concerned about? Richard? That’s something that’s been talked about recently.

Richard Vague  29:00

Yeah, it’s it’s a minor concern. It’s not a major concern. You know, there were some banks that broke the, one of the fundamental laws of banking. In banking, you’re supposed to match the maturity of assets and liabilities. You know, I entered banking as a young cub in the late 1970s. And, you know, I think one of the very first reports I was asked to prepare was the asset and liability matching report. So if it, you know, 5% of your assets, were at a 10 year maturity, then 5% of your liabilities were supposed to be at a 10 year maturity, and if 30% of your assets were at a, you know, one month or less maturity, you know, 30% of your liability, so, it matched so that if interest rates went up or down, the spread between the two would be relatively constant. What you didn’t want to have is a lot of long term assets, five year, ten year twenty year bonds, for example, funded by zero maturity liabilities, checking accounts, basically, or what we call demand deposits in the industry. You didn’t want to have that. Because if interest rates go up sharply, you’re screwed. That’s not a new concept. That’s banking 101. Well, what happened was interest rates were so low, and you had certain institutions like Silicon Valley Bank, who had way more deposits than they needed or should have had. And it was actually a penalty to them, because the yield on those assets was so low. Well, what you do to increase the yield on your excess assets is to buy long bonds. It’s the tempt, it’s like, you know, the forbidden fruit in the garden of Eden, you’re not supposed to do that. And everybody knows, you’re not supposed to do that. And yet they did it. And they did it in a huge way, they made a huge bet, has nothing to do with credit quality, has nothing to do with, you know, the fundamentals of the banking system as a whole. It represents their falling to the temptation in a in a gigantic way. And they weren’t the only ones. But it’s not so pervasive, that it’s a sustaining threat to the US banking system, it’s, you can go look at any banks, you know, call reports and other financial information. And we know exactly how much of this misbehaviour occurred and which institutions that occurred in and it’ll it’ll hurt, it’ll hurt a few and it’s hurting a few. It does not represent, you know, I’m gonna put a put a dimension on it. It’s a several 100 billion dollar problem in in an industry that has well over 2 trillion in capital, so it’s not a sustainable growth.

Gene Tunny  32:05

Okay. Okay. That’s, that’s fair enough. I’ll go back to your points on the paradox of debt. Yes, the creative and ambitious solutions you talk about, one of the things you talk about is a debt jubilee? Could you please explain what you mean by that, Richard?

Richard Vague  32:23

Yeah, this is, this is a hard problem. If as the evidence shows, debt always grows faster than GDP, You’ve almost got an engineering problem. You know, it’s as if you were designing an engine, and you found out after you had built it, that the temperature of that engine grows perpetually? Well, as an engineer, you could predict that that engine is going to explode from time to time. So you would introduce some kind of exhaust system or heat valve escape system to try to combat or overcome the perpetual increase in the temperature of that engine. I think we’ve got the same problem. You know, in modern developed economies, they always get more leverage. And so we’ve got, you know, put put your ideology aside put, you know, put all you’ve learned aside, you’ve got a problem here. And, and unless we solve it, we’re going to continue to have a couple of things happen, we’re going to have periodic crises. And we’re going to continue to have a slower and slower economic growth, as businesses and individuals get, you know, what I would call stultified by high levels of death. That leaves you with kind of only one solution, and that is ways of taking away debts that do not involve paying down that debt. Because paying down debt and aggregate just produces GDP, right. So we get into this quite a bit in the book. But there’s no easy way to do this. So I propose, you know, I kind of go out on a limb and try and propose some areas that maybe hopefully will provoke some thinking. So for example, student debt, which has gone from in the United States, a couple of 100 billion dollars to over one and a half trillion dollars really within a very short period of time. So you got all these students who graduate and then you know, lug around too much student debt for the next 20 or 30 or 40 years of their life. How about a programme where even I don’t support a programme of just forgiving all that debt, because it penalises the folks that were that did pay their debt. But I do think a programme whereby we let them do you know, a certain amount of voluntary community or civic work, you know, over, you know, five or 10 year period as a way to get relief on their student debt is something that we could consider. So, right now, if you graduate with student debt, and you enter government service, and you stay there for 10 years and you make 10 years worth of payments, you get whatever’s remaining of your student debt forgiven? Well, let’s, let’s create something that’s similar to that for the private sector. If you did 800 hours of community service, let’s say, after 10 years, the remainder of your student debt would be gone. That’s what I mean, when I say let’s get creative. Let’s try to think of ways to do this.

Gene Tunny  35:43

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Gene Tunny  36:18

Now back to the show. So debt jubilee is about debt forgiveness in in some form or another and there might be some community service for two so people could reduce their student debt. What about a more broader programme of debt forgiveness? Is that what you’re proposing in the private sector debt banks forgiving part of the debt? How does it all work?

Richard Vague  36:44

Here’s another idea. Because like I said, I stopped short of just getting a magic wand out and forgiving everyone debt, which, by the way, is what in ancient civilizations, rulers would do. And I think, you know, guys like Michael Hudson and your countrymen, Mike, Steve Keen and others have have talked about, you know, this is Hammurabi, this is Ancient Egypt, this is even ancient China. We don’t have that luxury. So let’s get creative. And, you know, another possible programme would be, after the ’08 crisis, when, you know, it was probably on the order of 15 million mortgages in the United States that were underwater by 10% or more. How about kind of a debt debt to equity exchange, you know, if the lender would write the mortgage down to the new current market value, appraised value. So maybe you bought a house that was 300,000. And now it’s only worth 200,000, you’ve still got a $300,000 mortgage? If the lender will write it down to that new value, and write your payments down proportionately? Well, then you would, in exchange, give the lender certain ownership of the house, which would be realised only on the event of a sale of the house. So they would get the upside. And the way the government could facilitate that is by going to the lender and saying, if you do this, we won’t make you take that as a hit against earnings in the current period. We’ll let you amortise that over, pick a number 30 years. So it’s kind of a win win win at that point that the bank deals with problem loans, the individual gets a lower payment. And the lender has the potential upside down the road if the house is sold.

Gene Tunny  38:49

Okay. Okay. So you’re talking about something that is voluntary, you’re not going to compel banks or lenders to to forgive part of their loans or force them into restructuring your you want this voluntary, but there may be some policy tweaks that could facilitate this restructuring. Is that the argument that you’re making, Richard?

Richard Vague  39:12

Yeah, to make it real, legislatively realistic or feasible? You, you have to construct it. So it there’s something in it for everybody.

Gene Tunny  39:22

Gotcha. Gotcha. And I think one of the interesting points you make is that, look, debt’s a contract. Do you quote, Dave Graeber on this, if I remember correctly, and look, these things get renegotiated. Well, throughout history, we see various periods in which there’s restructuring of debt. I mean, what’s extraordinary is that, you know, some countries seem to the periodically defaulting or and then there’s restructuring and then the banks keep lend to them 20 years later, and then you go through the same thing.

Richard Vague  39:55

Yeah contracts are contracts, you know that you know, if you are a data servicing provider and somebody wants you to write a programme and have it done by August 1, and you don’t have it done by August 1, you haven’t done by the following February. That’s not a moral failure. And, you know, but somehow, and folks like Hudson would argue for good reason. People have conflated morality with performance in a commercial contract. So if an individual doesn’t repay their debt, that’s, that’s a moral flaw or moral moral failing. Well, in my career, I was in banking for 37 years and debt contracts with companies get renegotiated all the time, you know, the company, you know, was manufacturing XYZ product and a competitor came along selling for half of what XYZ was being sold for, and we all knew that this debt was never going to repay. And if we absolutely enforced that repayment, we would cause the company to fail and get zero of our money back. Well, instead, we restructured the note so that we get paid half of what we rode back, the country could company could survive and compete. So you know, a rational restructuring of debt goes on in the banking industry all the time, all day, every day. And I think the light bulb that went on for me was, you know, 10 years or so ago when David Graeber’s book, delightful book, you know, ‘Debt: The First 5000 Years’ and he, and he just says, you know, this is not a moral issue. This is a contractual issue.

Gene Tunny  41:43

Yeah, yeah. Want to ask, What about the policy changes? So you in a official position, you’re in a very senior position in Pennsylvania, but I imagine that this would require a federal change regulatory or legislative changes do have you thought about what, what could be done at a policy level to help smooth things to help make it easier to help make it easier for restructuring to to help households and businesses deal with this higher debt that that we’ve seen?

Richard Vague  42:19

I think the federal regulators in the Fed in particular have this ability. And there are a couple of famous instances of this. And to me, the most famous and applicable would have been in the early 1980s, when the New York money centre banks had been making lots of loans to less developed countries, the predominance of which were in South America. And, you know, they got to a point where the what were called LDC or less developed country debt was equal to, I think so, you know, well over 100%, of the capital of those New York money centre banks. So, you know, 150, 100, and the number that comes to mind is 170% was a big, big number, such that when things turn because of interest rates and the rising price of oil, if the regulator’s had come in and enforced their normal rules, all the New York banks would have failed, which, you know, by the way, would not have been a good thing for the country for, New York, for anybody. And so Paul Volcker, one of the giants of economic history came in, this was in the days before Twitter, and all those other ways in which information leaks, so porously, called those bankers into a room and said, We’re not going you know, you kind of put a fence around this, we’re not going to deduct these loans, from, you know, our analysis of your capital reserve adequacy. But you guys better get busy. And over the next several years, all your earnings ought to go towards building up reserves, again, so much of this as you can muster over the next few years. And then whenever you get a big enough cushion, we want you to write it down. That is exactly the kind of thing and by the way, they did this in a more structured and overt way relative to the savings and loan industry, which at that exact time had a very similar problem. That’s a way the regulators can step in the case of the LDCs. It was a regulatory matter. In the case of the same Solomons, it was actually a legislative matter. But those are ways you can do this. And sure enough, but I can I think it was 86 or 87 when Citibank announced a billion dollar write down of its LDC debt? Well, it shocked the world. But it related to a conversation that actually been held four years earlier. And for Citibank to do that was actually an announcement, they were now in good shape, rather than an announcement that they were in bad shape. They’d been forced do the same thing in 82 they would have failed. They had four years worth of earnings to cushion that. And it was it was actually a positive cleanup sign.

Gene Tunny  45:30

Yeah, yeah. So just, just to be clear, I mean, the reason I’m just just want to make sure I understand this properly in your, in your view as a banker, so what’s the, how are bankers looking at this when they do agree to a restructure or write down, they’re figuring that we can extend the term of the loan, or maybe we can cut the interest rate, or we take a haircut ourselves, we write down some of the value, they figure that well, this makes it more likely that they’ll actually be able to pay us back the full amount is that they’ll survive? Is that the logic from a bankers perspective?

Richard Vague  46:03

Yeah, if you’re the banker, the first thing, let’s just say it’s $100,000 write down, if you’re allowed to take that over 30 years, the hit to earnings this year is what? Roughly $3,000 instead of $100,000. You know, the second thing I would do in that case, is let them take the full deduction for a tax standpoint, because you know, most companies have regulatory accounting and tax accounting are two separate things. So they don’t have to take it, from a regulatory standpoint, they get to take it from a tax standpoint. So probably from a current earnings standpoint, at that point, they’re just fine. But in the meantime, the consumer who was struggling with their, you know, their loan now has a loan, they can make payments on adequately. So they they go from having a credit that is a troubled, questionable credit, to a credit, that is a solid credit. As it relates to the consumer, the household, they now have breathing room, they can go back to being kind of a regular participant in the economy, they now have a little extra money not only to make their payment, but to go on vacation and go out to restaurants and this that the other. And their give up is seven years down the road when they sell their house and they they get a gain of you know, $50,000 or whatever they might have give a third or a half of that to the bank, whatever they negotiated. So it makes it comfortable and possible for everyone. That’s why think of it is kind of a win win win.

Gene Tunny  47:50

Yeah. Okay. Very good. Richard, we’re coming to the end of our time. Any final thoughts, any additional thoughts on what other policy measures may be desirable? Or that you’re someone who’s concerned about the inequality in the US? And, you know, clearly that has grown over the last few decades? Are there any other policy measures you’d be recommending to address that?

Richard Vague  48:14

Well, I would make the observation that if the bottom 60% of the US population only holds 14% of the stocks and real estate, that you can probably afford to actually give tax incentives? You know, because we talked earlier about just modifying the penalties. But how about a tax credit, if you buy stock or a tax credit, if you buy real estate, for those, that bottom 60% It’s such a small number, that you have the room to do that without affecting the tax receipts of the government by much, if any, might actually be a positive there. So I make the point that there’s the latitude to create incentives for accumulating asset ownership among that group that we could be taking advantage of that will probably that we’re not. And there’s other things in that final chapter that we touch on too. And they may all be terrible ideas. Hopefully, some of them are good ideas. But, you know, having set up the problem in the first 90% of the book, we we take a stab at, you know, maybe some ways to deal with it in the last chapter.

Gene Tunny  49:29

Yeah, yeah. So, I mean, we talked about forgiveness or the debt jubilee as a possibility, renegotiations. Then you mentioned some, you’re trying to encourage asset ownership and then there are some others one other one or two that you you’d like to highlight.

Richard Vague  49:45

You know, it kind of kind of gets off the subject a little bit, but I put it in there anyway. I think there needs to be massive job training because if you want the bottom 60% to accumulate assets, you got to give them a little more income. We got a situation in the US that I think it’s parallel, at least to a certain extent elsewhere, that we’ve got a lot of jobs that need training that are going unfilled. We got a lot of under under employed people that don’t don’t qualify for that job that feels to me like a perfect place for government to step in, in conjunction with the private sector, and especially the companies and underwrite that, you know, I think it’s kind of the spiritual equivalent of, in the US what we call the GI Bill, where after World War Two, we underwrote college education for pretty much all the returning soldiers. And I think that helped fuel the increased size of the middle class and the 50s and 60s, I think there’s that opportunity here.

Gene Tunny  50:47

Okay. Well, Richard, thanks so much. And I’ll put a link in the show notes to your book. And yeah, I’d encourage people to buy it and read it. So it’s published by the University of Pennsylvania Press.

Richard Vague 51:16

Yes.

Gene Tunny 51:18

Very good. So very distinguished publisher, and yeah, well researched, and lots of lots of good facts and figures. And yeah, very interesting analysis. And, but very good. But Richard, thanks so much for your time. I really appreciate it. And good luck with the book sales. Yes. And I hope you, you get a lot of a lot of readers and a lot of people are engaging with you on the issues, and I certainly enjoyed our conversation. So again, thanks so much.

Richard Vague  51:29

It’s a privilege and I’m all thanks go to you.

Gene Tunny  51:32

Very good. Thanks, Richard.

Richard Vague 51:36

Bye bye

Gene Tunny 51:39

Righto, thanks for listening to this episode of Economics Explored. If you have any questions, comments or suggestions, please get in touch. I’d love to hear from you. You can send me an email via contact@economicsexplored.com Or a voicemail via SpeakPipe. You can find the link in the show notes. If you’ve enjoyed the show, I’d be grateful if you could tell anyone you think would be interested about it. Word of mouth is one of the main ways that people learn about the show. Finally, if your podcasting app lets you then please write a review and leave a rating. Thanks for listening. I hope you can join me again next week.

52:23

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Podcast episode

GDP & the National Accounts: What they are and why they matter w/ Brendan Markey-Towler – EP153

The National Accounts are a huge intellectual achievement and an incredibly useful set of data, including GDP and its components. Chatting about the National Accounts with Economics Explored host Gene Tunny is fellow economist Dr Brendan Markey-Towler, author of the Substack newsletter Australian Economy Tracker. Brendan explains how the National Accounts help us track the current state of the economy as well as longer-term trends, such as shrinking manufacturing sectors and growing services sectors in many advanced economies.

You can listen to the episode via the embedded player below or via podcasting apps including Google PodcastsApple PodcastsSpotify, and Stitcher.

Links relevant to the conversation

Brendan’s Australian Economy Tracker Newsletter

Brendan’s post discussed in this episode

Planet Money episode on Simon Kuznets

Australian Financial Review article (pay-walled, alas) which reported “Federal government business generated $1.7 billion in revenue for the big four accounting and consulting firms over the past five years – though the government has a different take on the contract value of that business.”

Transcript: ROI of education: how economists estimate it + US economic update – EP152

N.B. This is a lightly edited version of a transcript originally created using the AI application otter.ai. It may not be 100 percent accurate, but should be pretty close. If you’d like to quote from it, please check the quoted segment in the recording.

Gene Tunny  00:01

Coming up on Economics Explored.

Brendan Markey-Towler  00:04

So, that’s where we get the view that Australia is less and less a country that makes things and builds things. Construction, manufacturing declining as a share of GDP.

Gene Tunny  00:16

Welcome to the Economics Explored podcast, a frank and fearless exploration of important economic issues. I’m your host, Gene Tunny. I’m a professional economist based in Brisbane, Australia, and I’m a former Australian Treasury official. 

This is episode 153 on GDP and the National Accounts. What they are and why they matter. 

Chatting about the national accounts with me this episode, is my good friend and fellow economist, Dr. Brendan Markey-Towler, who started a new sub stack newsletter, Australian Economy Tracker. Brendan explains how the national accounts help us track the current state of the economy, as well as longer term trends, such as shrinking manufacturing sectors and growing services sectors in many advanced economies. 

In the show notes, you can find relevant links and any clarifications. Please send any comments or questions to contact@economicsexplored.com. I’d love to hear from you. I’ve been very grateful for all the comments on recent episodes. Your comments really helped me figure out the issues that you’re interested in, and the types of guests that you’re interested in hearing from. So, please keep the comments coming to me.

Right oh! Now for my conversation with Brendan Markey-Towler on the national accounts. Thanks to my audio engineer, Josh Crotts for his assistance in producing this episode. I hope you enjoy it. Brendan Markey-Towler, welcome back to the program.

Brendan Markey-Towler  01:43

Gene, it’s always a pleasure to be here. Sorry, I’m a bit husky today, but I’ve bruised my throat. I’d like to pretend that it was under heroic circumstances, but it was not.

Gene Tunny  01:52

Okay, well, thanks for participating. I understand it’s not damaging your throat, you’re able to talk, you’ve been talking all day. And you’re still happy to talk.

Brendan Markey-Towler  02:01

I could talk under wet cement, mate. So, a bruised throat isn’t going to stop me.

Gene Tunny  02:07

Well, you know, now, you can get a job as a rugby league commentator, possibly?

Brendan Markey-Towler 02:14

That’s true. I’m more of a union man. Yeah, but I will go with league. That’s good. 

Gene Tunny  02:18

Right oh, okay. So, the topic of today, national accounts, what it is, why it matters? You’ve started a sub stack and one of your first pieces that came out on the sub stack was on the national accounts. And you displayed a level of enthusiasm for the national accounts that is very rare. And it actually reminded me of just how marvelous the set of data – the national accounts are, and what a superb intellectual achievement. 

So, going back to the work of Simon Kuznets, and Colin Clark, who, was it Stone as well, Richard Stone, who formulated the methodology financial accounts, and then it was like a system a toss by the UN. So, I think, what your note did was it really helped us; well, it really reminded me of just how impressive those national accounts are. So, could you just tell us first, what you were trying to do in that note? And what’s your sort of general take on the national accounts, please, Brendan? Why do you think they’re so important?

Brendan Markey-Towler  03:28

Partly to justify why I had no friends at school. Because I get excited about nerdy stuff like this. But look, when you actually know what the national accounts are, they’re extremely interesting. And what they really do is they aim to provide a snapshot of the activity within an economy over a set period of time. So, in Australia, and throughout almost the world, I’m not sure of any country that doesn’t do it this way. It gives you a snapshot of all the activity that went on in an economy over the previous quarter. And the central number that depicts that activity is the number that we call gross domestic product. And gross domestic product is a measure of how much wealth was added to the economy, how much production, how much activity, and under the three great categories production, exchange, and income, or earning. That’s what the national accounts do. And they add that up into a single number, GDP. And that tells you how much activity went on in the economy over that quarter. 

Now, where it gets really interesting, is that number not alone would be kind of cool. And we talk about the GDP growth rate. That’s what we mean when you hear on the news that people say economic growth or the economy grew by, that’s what they meant that GDP number increasing or decreasing. But where it gets really interesting is that we approach GDP in three ways. And you can think of this as looking at the economy as the same thing, but from three different directions. And that changes the way that you interpret that number. So, we call these GDP I, or at least I call them GDP I, GDP O, and GDP E. That is, GDP expenditure, GDP income and GDP output. 

And what those numbers are doing are adding up GDP, the activity in the economy, looking at that activity from one to three ways: as a production, as an expenditure, and as an income, right. So, if you think about it this way, when you go down and you buy something that’s dear to our heart, here in Queensland, you go down into buy your coffee, there’s three things going on, there’s three ways that they get that same transaction gets measured and add to GDP. From the expenditure side, the expenditure that you make, when you buy that coffee goes into GDP E, and we add all of those up together, and we get GDP. That expenditure becomes income from the perspective of the person behind the bar. And that gets added up into GDP income. 

And there’s also an interesting concept of gross value add, which is how much value has been produced by that transaction. The way that we measure that in GDP O, is we take the value of the output that was sold and subtract the value of the inputs that went into it. And that by definition, that’s the value that was added. 

So, that’s the three ways that we add up GDP and we get an interesting view of the economy from that. A little bit further breaking that down, obviously, you can break that down to the level of the individual transaction. But the you know, you don’t get a huge amount of information that you get so much information, you have no information. So, we categorize at a high level, these different activities to get a sense of what’s driving GDP. So, within GDP E, the expenditure, which is the most popular and most focused on of the national accounts measures of GDP, we break down expenditure by consumption, investment; in Australia, we break down by housing, as well, government expenditure, both consumption and investment, and net exports.

Gene Tunny  07:34

And by investment, we mean capital investment, we mean expenditure on capital goods. So, we mean, new housing developments, or we mean, new, non-residential buildings, new schools, new factories, new capital equipment that’s purchase.

Brendan Markey-Towler  07:55

That’s right. Yeah. So, in Australia, we call it gross fixed capital investment, which is at the addition to the capital stock of the country in the capital stock of the country is; in Australia, again, we trade a little, perhaps, oddly, that we add housing into that. But factories, equipment; we actually add intellectual property as well. So, science and technology research get added into that figure. And so that’s what we that’s, that’s the way that we break down the economy. 

So, when we break down GDP E that way consumption, investment, government spending net exports, we get a sense of which sector of the demand side of the economy is pulling the economy along. Is it household consumption? Is it buying new houses or building new houses? Is it businesses investing? Is it government consuming, spending money? Or is it government investing? Or is it coming from the international sector? And that gives us a lot of information about the activity within a country, it also gives us information about what might be dragging economic growth as well. So, that’s expenditure. 

Another really interesting measure, well, I mean they’re all interesting, but the second measure GDP O – GDP output, sometimes called GDP gross value add, gives us a sense more of the supply side of the economy. 

So, expenditure gives us a view of what’s driving the economy on the demand side. GDP O gives us a view of what’s driving the supply side. So, we get GDP in Australia, broken down by industry. And that’s where it gets really interesting because we can see which industries are adding the most to GDP. So, that’s cool. We can say, oh, mining adding more? Or how much is mining adding to GDP and how much is it driving or dragging on GDP? Ditto for professional scientific and technical services is another one that we use, agriculture and fishing, public administration safety; how much are these sectors adding to GDP and how much are they dragging or driving GDP. And then finally, the GDP I number. This is typically not quite as informative as the others, which is kind of ironic because it’s the easiest to add up because we just look at the tax returns. GDP I, breaks down GDP by income. And in Australia, we do it by what we’d call the greatest states of Australian society. So, wage earners, non-financial corporations, financial corporations, and government. And we can get a view of who’s earning the income within GDP. How what of that GDP that’s expended and outputted. Where is the income from that activity accruing to? Is it accruing to wages? Is it accruing to company profits? If it’s an accruing company profits, is it occurring to financial or non-financial companies? So, that’s some of the really interesting stuff that we get from GDP, it gives us this, really, especially in Australia, because our accounts are quite amazing.

Gene Tunny  11:05

Yeah, we’ve got some of the best in the world for sure. 

Brendan Markey-Towler  11:09

They really are and we get a really rich view of what’s driving and dragging the Australian economy. What’s creating the wealth in our economy and what’s potentially dragging on the wealth of our economy. And kind of, we get a sense as well, where it’s going.

Gene Tunny  11:26

Okay, so the few things I want to talk about there, Brendan. Okay, so you mentioned that GDP; well, is it an approximation of the addition to wealth? Let me think about this. I mean, part of it is in addition to wealth, to the extent that you’re increasing the capital stock, but then part of it is consumed, and then part of the investment is consumption of fixed capital. So, I mean, it’s national income really, isn’t it? I mean, it’s related to wealth. Yes. So, it’s certainly related to that. It gives us a picture of our national income. I think national income was the original term for it, wasn’t it?

Brendan Markey-Towler  12:11

Yes, although national income gets a little trickier because the we focus on GDP, because it’s really limited to the geographical definition of the country. And that distinction was made early on in the development of the methodology, because national income is a bit fuzzier because it’s typically added up by nationals, rather than by where the activity occurred. So, that’s why the classic example that we give in an economics course, is that national income for a country like Luxembourg is, I think, Ireland, sorry. National income for a country like Ireland is actually much higher than its GDP, because a lot of its nationals live overseas. So, there’s few distinctions that we make within it. But really, what it’s giving you is a view of the activity that’s occurred in the economy, the economy being that system of human behavior, why we produce and exchange stuff that we need for everyday life. And so obviously, that adds to the stock of wealth in the economy, because some of that gets consumed and taken out and other elements of it gets allocated to the national wealth. 

So, yeah, it’s a flow metric in the classic distinction between stocks and flows. It a reflection of the consumption and investment activity in an economy during a particular period.

Gene Tunny  13:40

Yes, it was developed during, well; the need for it became obvious during the 30s, when they were trying to quantify the extent of the Great Depression, I think Kuznets produced a report for the US federal government that strangely became a best seller. I mean, it was the first time someone had produced numbers like this. There’s a great planet money episode on that. I’ll try and find it and link to it in the show notes.

Brendan Markey-Towler  14:09

Well, that’s a good point, right? Because before then everyone kind of knew when times were good, or times were bad. And so, you could tell there were panics and manias and crashes as Charles Kindleberger famously said, but before the national accounts were developed, we never really were able to quantify what that was. And a lot of this was crystallized by John Maynard Keynes, his famous book, The General Theory of Interest, money and employment. I’ve got that wrong, interest money I think I got three. I’m one of the few in my in my generation, I think who actually read the book, which is, which is why it’s embarrassing I can’t remember the name because we always refer to it as the general theory.  And what Keynes was trying to do there was give a theory of why we experienced these manias, panics and crashes, you know, boom and bust. And the problem was that when he wrote it, he was dealing with a lot of abstract thoughts and that needed to be measured. And I’ll actually give a little plug here for our home state of Queensland because Queensland was at the forefront of this, currently the building out at UQ, which houses the School of Economics, the University of Queensland, the School of Economics there is housed in the Colin Clark building, which is kind of ironic because Colin Clark didn’t become an academic at UQ until much later in life, I think around the 1980s. But Colin Clark was at the forefront of developing the methodology, not only for what the national accounts are, but how you actually design the surveys that add up those numbers and find out what the numbers are. 

Gene Tunny  15:49

And he’s quoted in Keynes’s book because Keynes used his estimates of consumption spending for Great Britain, if I remember correctly, in the general theory. 

Brendan Markey-Towler  16:01

And it’s kind of funny. So, Colin Clark who came out here to Australia and did a tour of Australia and he was the hotshot wizkid political economist from Cambridge. And he met with all of the premiers because back in those days, we understood the constitution. So, the premiers were much more powerful than the prime minister. And when he came up here to Queensland, the premier at the time William Forgan Smith, which the alumni of UQ will know, is that is the main building at the University of Queensland. Kind of, a nice little coincidence. Forgan Smith basically said to him, look, do you want to come and be my adviser on all things economics? As Forgan Smith was a great reformer and trying to develop the Queensland economy, he needed to be able to measure the size of the Queensland economy: what was driving, what was dragging, what was causing development, what was dragging on development. And there’s a famous letter that Colin Clark writes back to Keynes to say, I’ve been offered a job to basically become the shadow premier of Queensland. I’m not going to turn that down. And Keynes, I think said something to the effect of where is Queensland. So, then, Colin Clark came out, join the Queensland Statistical Bureau and, he was instrumental in the development of the national accounts and as a point to why the national accounts are so important. While Colin Clark was doing that, he’s obviously thinking about what goes into an economy? What is an economy? What exactly does it mean to say an economy? Because when you actually; we all kind of know what it is, is the economy stupid?

Gene Tunny  17:44

It’s an abstraction, isn’t it? 

Brendan Markey-Towler  17:47

But it is an abstraction. And so, he had to think about, Okay, what does it actually mean? What is an economy, what counts as economic activity? And this is becoming very pertinent again, in these days, where we’re talking about things like Facebook and Amazon and Google where a lot of the activity that goes on there, we sort of think of as economic but it doesn’t measure it. But what happens as a result of Colin Clark thinking through these questions, is he’s starting to develop views of how economic development occurs. So, he ends up writing a large book, which sort of became a classic and development economics on how economies develop, what the basis for economic development are, what the settings for economic policy should be to encourage development. Particularly important question here in Queensland, which was a quite underdeveloped economy at the time.

And as a result, he became a very close adviser to Bob Santamaria, who those diehard fans of Australian politics will know was instrumental in the foundation of the Democratic Labor Party. So, this is the guy who invented a lot of the methodology behind the national accounts. So, when you understand something at that level, when you understand what an economy is, when you know how to measure it, imperfect as that measure may be, you get really rich insights into how an economy is tracking over time. And you get really rich insights as a result that develop over a long period of time of working with these things of what drives economic growth. You can situate those numbers in a history that tells you why the economy is growing, or why it’s not.

Gene Tunny  19:32

Yeah. Where do you get that Colin Clark story from? Is that in that book you keep talking about by, was it Millmow?. 

Brendan Markey-Towler  19:38

Yeah. Alex Millmow, A History of Australasian Economics Thought. I think that’s where I got it from. Yes, it is where I got it from. It’s a really good book because Alex points out that a lot of Australia’s economic contributions to economic thought came from really practical questions like this. How do we measure?

Gene Tunny  19:57

Absolutely. Yeah, yeah, absolutely. Okay, we’ll take a short break here for a word from our sponsor.

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Gene Tunny  20:36

Now back to the show. Okay, now, I did want to go back to the point you made about the difficulty of well, the issues around the modern economy and the India head, etcetera. There was a great lecture that John Quiggin, who’s a professor at UQ. And if any Australian economist is going to win a Nobel Prize, it’d be John. I mean, he’s one of the most cited academic economists that Australia has. I mean, maybe, Warrick McKibben could win one. So, but yeah, certainly, John is;

Brendan Markey-Towler  21:11

I always like for John Foster personally.,

Gene Tunny  21:15

Well, John Quiggin, is incredibly distinguished economist and his view at the this lecture he gave was that the problem with GDP is that it’s gross, its domestic and its product. Okay, so we’ve already talked about the domestic issue. So, the fact that you could have a lot of production, but if all your incomes remitted overseas, okay, because it’s just foreign mining companies producing and sending profits home, and then you may not see all of that benefit. But the point he was making is it because its product, and it’s measured at market prices, what you could be missing out on is consumer surplus, you’re not necessarily measuring the benefit to consumers, because all of these products are provided for, well, a lot of them for free. But yet, the foreign company makes money out of you in some other ways, because it’s monetizing your attention, isn’t it?

Brendan Markey-Towler  22:11

Yeah. And so, this is a debate that’s been really reopened, it’s been a perennial debate in economics, and there’s a lot of interesting ideas floating around, inspired by it, which is that when we talked about, you know, how GDP is added up, we talked about the exchange, okay. But the only way that we really observe and exchange is by the exchange of money, right? So, the price multiplied by the quantity of goods or services sold. Now, the problem merges; what happens in a world full of freemium models? What happens in a world where the price of a Facebook membership is zero? That sort of kind of, well, I don’t particularly like Facebook. So, you know, I would challenge just how much consumer surplus is creating, but there’s, you know, many people would argue that there is a value added.

Gene Tunny  23:11

I think TikTok is creating the most at the moment. Especially among the younger generation..

Brendan Markey-Towler  23:16

Massively, yeah. the only thing that shows up in the national accounts from Facebook, Google, TikTok, Instagram, is the data sales. That’s the only thing that shows up in the national accounts. I mean, apart from the marketplace exchanges that go on as well in the Facebook marketplace, and so on like that. But really, it’s ultimately the advertising for Google the sales of data from all of them. That’s the only thing that shows up in the national accounts. So, but there’s more than that, as well. Another problem, And Peter Thiel has recently raised this issue.

Gene Tunny  23:53

Oh, the billionaire? Right.

Brendan Markey-Towler  23:57

The chap who founded PayPal, he thinks that we’ve actually had no economic growth or very little economic growth in the past 70 years. And the reason he says that is because he contends that what is observed as economic growth in the past 70 years, is actually just us bringing production and exchange; valuable production exchange that used to happen in the home, into markets. So, cooking, cleaning, keeping the house in order, gardening; all this stuff gets done on marketplaces, rather than in the home. And that’s a bias in GDP. It doesn’t measure that stuff because it’s not on a marketplace. It can’t be observed. So, that’s another argument. 

You know that GDP doesn’t measure the actual value that’s being created. Now, the problem ultimately is, this goes back to a problem of micro economic theory, which is what is utility? And what is consumer surplus? And actually, from my perspective, why I ultimately say, look, let’s stick with GDP. It’s the worst measure we have, except for all the other things. Some countries have toyed with measuring gross national happiness. You know, New Zealand is toying with that at the moment, Bhutan famously measured it. The UN uses the Human Development Index, which is a weighting of GDP per capita literacy rates and life expectancy, I think.

Gene Tunny  25:31

All of which are highly correlated, aren’t those?

Brendan Markey-Towler  25:33

Yeah, and so, that was a March Ascends Brainchild, Jagdish Bhagwati famously said, well, yeah, they’re correlated. So, what are we talking about here? So, all those debates over replacing GDP ultimately, were reduced to a deep, deep philosophical problem, which economists are not well placed to solve, which is, what is value? What is good, what is true, what is beautiful? And I got some views on that. But as an economist, I ain’t got nothing to say about that. And so, when economists start dabbling in it, you kind of go, I used to be a fan of the happiness literature. But now I read and go, ah, this is, you know, it’s very simplistic. We’re going to use subjective wellbeing measures to add up Gross National Happiness. Okay, fine, that’s a really subjective and not very tangible measure. Whereas I can look out the window and see the cranes on the skyline here in Brisbane and see that’s an objective, measurable thing.

Gene Tunny  26:37

Well, it stood the test of time, hasn’t it? So, we’ve been using it for decades now. And there’s a general feeling that it does capture the state of the economy reasonably well. I mean, there are going to be people who grumble about it from time to time, but generally well, in Australia, at least when we had the recession, I mean, I always remember the 91 recession, because I was in high school at the time. And like, things just look bleak for anyone who was in high school and wanted to get a job. But then that was the period when retention rates at high school really ramped up. So, it was it was telling us something important there and it tends to; like it could give false signals, there’s a big debate at the moment over what’s happening in the US. But then look, the economy’s looks like it is slowing to an extent. There’s the impact of the Federal Reserve hikes. So, let’s wait and see how it all plays out. I mean, my feeling is, it’s generally a pretty good indicator of the state of the economy. 

Brendan Markey-Towler  27:38

I look bad, I’m a Queenslander first, Australian second, and as a result, I do have a bias which is towards tangible reality. Right, feelings are very ephemeral. And feelings are important, right? They are very important, but they’re really difficult to measure. And they’re very subjective, and they can be easily manipulated. Now, GDP can be manipulated as well, depending on how you count things up. But at the end of the day, it’s stuff that’s being produced stuff that’s being consumed. And it’s tangible, observable goods and services. So, insofar as I really have a criticism of GDP, my major criticism is that it really; I agree with Peter Thiel largely, biases us away from realizing the value that is produced in a house. 

And look, I’ve got a young, I’ve got a four-month-old son now so and my wife is at home, taking care of that. And I tell you what, that is incredibly mind blowing valuable work that she’s doing; doesn’t show up anywhere in GDP. Now, that doesn’t negate GDP. Because I think the solution to that is really, let’s just realize what GDP is actually measuring. Now, that does work in a political debate, because in politics and the way that the media works, you need a number and you need that number to be growing, otherwise, elections get lost, and so on and so forth. But when you’re, you know, when you’re doing grown up analysis instead of politics, I think the solution is to look at what GDP is actually measuring. It’s not a measure of value and if you think of it that way, then you’re wrong. Stop thinking of it like that. Think of it as it’s a measure of the production of stuff and the exchange of stuff within the economy, within the market that we can observe. Don’t try and start thinking about as a measure of all of the economic activity that ever happens in an economy. Just recognize the limitations, it doesn’t measure this stuff that goes on the household and that’s incredibly important.

Gene Tunny  29:51

Yeah, fair enough. That’s a good point. I’ll have to come in another episode to this issue of what’s in GDP? What’s out? What does it all mean? I’ll try and have that discussion in a future episode because there is a couple of other things I wanted to pick up on from your note; your note reminded me of a couple of things. And it’s the fact that this system is so beautiful, I mean, we end up getting from two different directions, possibly two different sets of data. I mean, we can look at what spend on consumption goods, final consumption goods, now, we have to be careful, we’re talking about final consumption goods and final investment goods, because what we’re trying to do is avoid double counting, we’re trying to get; because there are a lot of business to business transactions, businesses selling to other businesses inputs, so you have to take care of all that and make sure you’re not double counting title output, you want the expenditure on final goods and services. 

So, if you look at that, that ends up telling you what GDP is, once you add exports, subtract imports, because, well, if you import something, then you don’t have to produce it here. So, there could be stuff that shows up a consumption spending or an investment spending that’s imported, and we didn’t produce it here. So, you have to subtract it. And likewise, if we’re exporting something, well, we produced it here, we know we produced it here, then that adds to our output. But then, you look at spending data, on the other hand, you can look at income data. So, you are saying, look at the wages data, look at the profits data. And yeah, I guess it is coming from the ITR. I’m not sure exactly where the IBS gets it from. But I mean, that’s a likely source. I do surveys of businesses.

I’d have to check exactly how much they’re using ATO data, but I know they do surveys of businesses to get that information. They’ve got a household expenditure survey, they’ve got surveys of, well I guess they got their business server; I’d be looking at what they spending on capital goods. Looking at what they’re earning. And so, they build up this picture of earnings that way, and also the gross value added in the business. Which as you described, is their revenue less their production costs, and wages are part of the value added to. So, wages plus the gross operating surplus, is your value added in the business?

Brendan Markey-Towler  32:21

Yeah, it’s a very slippery definition, because it’s not quite profits. But it’s, you know, the value of inputs minus the value of outputs. And that by definition has to be the value that is added by that business to the economy, insofar as we can measure it.

Gene Tunny  32:35

This is because we’re talking about gross domestic product. So, we haven’t subtracted for the depreciation of capital stock, because some of the investment that occurs is just replacing existing capital stock. So, the building wears out and we have to replace it.

Brendan Markey-Towler  32:52

Too hard. We set that aside. Depreciation is very funny thing to talk about.

Gene Tunny  32:56

Right? Yeah. Well, we’ll leave that for now. You got time just to chat about your great quote? I should have brought it in earlier. You use these different perspectives on GDP to provide a really nice summary of what’s been happening in Australia. I thought this was very good. Exactly. Okay, so after you analyze where the growth has occurred, and you know, it’d be good if you could explain this at the moment. You concluded this; to put it somewhat tribally, Australia is less and less a country that derives its wealth from making and building things. Still a country that makes its wealth by digging stuff out of the ground and renting houses, and more and more a country that consults and cares. Could you please explain how you came to that conclusion, Brendan?

Brendan Markey-Towler  33:53

Well, you so what I did there, this is one of the most informative aspects of the national accounts I’m very interested; everyone focuses on the demand side of the economy, because we’re all Keynesian.

Gene Tunny  34:07

What we’ve been heavily influenced by Keynes, yes. There’s no doubt about that, whether we’re Keynesian. So, that’s another question. You can go ahead. Yes.  

Brendan Markey-Towler  34:13

We are all Keynesians. But the supply side of the economy is super interesting. See which sectors of the economy are generating the wealth. Now, the way that you can do that is by looking at gross value add, right. So, then you take the gross value added by each industry divided by the total GDP and you get the share of GDP, economic activity, economic value that is being created by that industry. And you can track that over time. Now, the problem with that data why almost no one really uses it? Some people do, but almost no one does. And you’ve used it, Gene, is that there’s a lot there, the ABS breaks the economy down by I think its 20 sectors. possibly 25. So, you’ve got to kind of cut it down to get some useful insights from it. 

So, the way I did it was alright, let’s cut out everything that’s less than 5% of the economy and look only at things that produce more than 5% of Australian GDP. Now, no sector really produces more than about 15. But there’s a clear standout. And there are clear standout trends once you do that, and you clean the graph up by eliminating all the Martin “minor sectors”. And you see some very strong trends. 

Trend number one that’s quite striking, and I should emphasize, this is all by real data. So, we hold prices constant to see what’s going on at the volumetric level in each of these sectors. So, we hold P constant, and we look at what’s changing in Q. Q is for quantity. And so, there’s benefits and costs to doing that. But it’s valuable as an exercise as long as you’re aware of the limitations of doing that. First interesting thing, manufacturing and construction are in decline in Australia. They’re not producing as much value add. In volumetric terms, they’re not producing as much value add anymore. They’ve been declining for the past 10 years as a share of GDP. So, that’s where we get the view that Australia is less and less a country that makes things and builds things; construction, manufacturing declining as a share of GDP.

Gene Tunny  36:30

So, with manufacturing, we had a car industry once, we subsidized a car industry, we tried to buy ourselves a car industry, and it just could not be viable on its own. And there wasn’t any more money we could throw at it to keep it open. 

Brendan Markey-Towler  36:48

And you look at somewhere like Maroubra or Ipswich. Which would you know, once kind of manufacturing ish areas in Queensland. Maroubra main manufacturing now is government contracts, building bullets for the Australian Army.

Gene Tunny  37:03

And do they build trains, still?

Brendan Markey-Towler  37:06

They do now. Yes, Maroubra now has a trains contract to build trains for the Queensland Government as well. And I think Ipswich still has a little bit of a train industry as well. But really not too much, by the way of price manufacturers. It’s not to say that it doesn’t exist, and it’s not to say that it’s very valuable. Queensland, for instance, has very vibrant medical manufacturing sector. That’s kind of grown up on the back of our extremely good hospitals and medical research. But generally, across Australia, the story is one of the car industries; we don’t really make stuff anymore. It’s just not competitive to build stuff. And so, that number is reflecting something that you see a lot when you go down to Fortitude Valley here, which, you know, the state would like to think Silicon Valley. Yes. Anyway, it’s Fortitude Valley, Queensland Silicon Valley, you see that a lot of the companies there just want to grow big enough that they can afford to offshore their manufacturing elsewhere. And the classic one is, I think Trivium, the electric car battery manufacturer, which is, as soon as they got big enough, they got a loan from the Queensland Government and then went to build factories in Tennessee.

Gene Tunny  38:17

Is that right? Is that a good use of taxpayers’ money?

Brendan Markey-Towler  38:21

Well, I’m completely agnostic on that. So, that’s what’s that number is reflecting. Similarly, construction,  this runs a bit counter to the crane index that we’re seeing in the city at the moment, but construction has been adding less and less to the economy. It’s not just large construction projects, but construction is declining as a share of GDP. 

Gene Tunny  38:48

Well, I’ll have to look at this. But I think what could be explained is 10 years ago, we had that massive project up in Gladstone at Curtis Island where we built the three LNG terminals or what are they? Refrigeration or liquification facilities. They turn the methane that comes from the coal field, the coal seams to liquefy it so, they can put it on a boat economically and ship it to Japan or Korea. And that was like $70 billion.

And it basically doubled the level of capital expenditure in Queensland at the time. It’s absolutely extraordinary.

Brendan Markey-Towler  39:31

There’s a huge effort on part of government corporations to get that going. 

Gene Tunny  39:35

And then in the southern states, maybe a few years later, I can’t remember the time; we had that big apartment construction boom. So, that could be explained. I’ll have to look at the data but go on. 

Brendan Markey-Towler  39:48

And that’s what’s really good about the national accounts is kind of counter to what you’re seeing if you’re walking around, particularly, Brisbane at the moment. The number of cranes in the sky is astounding, but this is why statistics are important because what’s local loss to a particular area is not necessarily true of the entire country. And what’s even true of a particular sector of construction, residential construction, government construction is not necessarily true, it might mean that we’re not building that many mines, which ties into the second point, which is, although it has declined in volumetric terms, the mining sector is still the single biggest contributor to Australian real GDP. And it’s not close, it’s way up; I forget the exact number, but it’s well up towards 10% of the entire Australian economy value added is produced by the mining sector. 

So, that’s, you know, digging stuff out of the ground, selling it to various countries around the world.. Behind that really interesting sector is, is the rental sector. So, a lot of value added in the Australian economy. It’s the only sector that holds candle to mining is the rental sector where people are building houses and renting them.

Gene Tunny  41:03

Okay. So, when you analyzed that, did you look at the industry, is it rental services? Or did you look at what’s in the national accounts as; there’s rental income, isn’t there? What do they call it? Trying to remember what the label is in the national accounts, but they impute rent for owner occupied dwellings as well, in that sector. If I remember correctly.

Brendan Markey-Towler  41:29

Rental services. I’m pretty sure is the exact name of the sector.

Gene Tunny  41:33

Looking at it by industry. Okay. Yeah.

Brendan Markey-Towler  41:36

So, that’s an important point, right? Because rent to also shows up as an income segment as well. Not nearly as big there. But the value add is quite large. And so that’s saying, you know, the Australian economy is very much one that is dominated at the moment, by digging stuff up out of the ground, and then sending it offshore, and providing housing for people. Those are the two biggest sectors of the Australian economy. And then, finally, the very long-term trend, we come to the third part of that bond ma that you so ably quaffed, which is, surprisingly, the sectors that are growing fastest as a share of the Australian economy are; you’ll have to double check me on this, but I’m pretty sure it’s called health care and social assistance.. And professional scientific and technical services. Those have gone quite strongly over the last few years as a share of GDP. 

Scientific and Technical Services is obvious enough, right? That’s the IT department and you know, the lab.

Gene Tunny  42:45

There’s professional too. 

Brendan Markey-Towler  42:49

Yeah. Professional Services is the big one. So, this is your consultancy lawyers. So on and so forth, right. It’s Eagle street, the consulting firms along Eagle street.

Gene Tunny  42:58

Where we are in Brisbane, in the top end of town, would you call it the big end of town? You’re sitting in water from place to the moment and the offices of Hopko Gannon, thanks, again for allowing us to use.

Brendan Markey-Towler  43:13

And so this area is growing really strong. I forget where the legal services are counted among professional service.

Gene Tunny  43:18

But I think I would be Yeah, sure.

Brendan Markey-Towler  43:21

They might be under administration, administrative services. But professional, scientific and technical services, basically, scientific and technical can kind of be in house. But a huge majority of that professional services is consulting, right? So, Australia is doing a lot more consulting as a share of GDP.

Gene Tunny  43:40

And this is business to business, typically? Business-to-business consulting services or business to government.

Brendan Markey-Towler  43:47

Business to government is the big one, especially here in Queensland right now. That’s not backed by a number. But that’s you know, that’s kind of;

Gene Tunny  43:58

There are numbers for the Australian Government. I’ll put them in the show notes, because I looked at what the Australian government has spent on the Big Four consulting firms like KPMG and PwC. And it’s hundreds of millions a year, right? It’s big money. 

Brendan Markey-Towler  44:12

And then, you go step below and the state governments will probably be even bigger again, because every consulting project by the Department of Public Works now gets a cut benefit cost analysis written by one of the big firms, right. So, just because of the procurement rules around that, so professional, scientific and technical services really growing as a segment of GDP, but also health care and social assistance. And so that I would posit is really a reflection of the ageing population. Ageing population, you need more health care and social assistance, certainly. That sector is growing very strongly – aged care.

Gene Tunny  44:49

Yeah. Which is NDIS too, the National Disability Insurance Scheme.

Brendan Markey-Towler  44:53

Absolutely massive, huge boom. You throw a stone in Brisbane and you hit NDIS provider, which is really not good, you shouldn’t do that because that’s naughty. And that getting on the back of Yeah, health departments are in Queensland; Queensland Health is the largest single employer in the state. That’s a massive sector. It’s a $20 billion in the state budget. That’s a big number, right? And we’re always trying to spend more on it. So, very big sector that. So, those are the two real growth sectors in the Australian economy. And again, I should stress by volumetric measures, right? So, notice that that kind of cuts against the mining booms like us, and that goes to the difference between real and nominal GDP. Real being a volumetric thing where we’re trying to hold prices constant, and the reason we do that is because nominal GDP could be growing because the actual underlying productive capacity of the economy is growing, or because inflation is growing. And real GDP tries to say, what’s the underlying volumetric productive capacity of the economy? How’s that growing and contracting. And in that measure, you really see the big growth sectors, mining is actually declining as a volumetric share of GDP as a share of real GDP, but it’s still the biggest by far professional, scientific and technical services, and healthcare and social assistance really, really growing. Yeah, that’s where the saying, that’s where my little trite way of putting it came from. Australia is less and less a country that makes things and build things. It’s still very much a country that digs stuff out of the ground and provides housing, but it’s more and more something of a white collar economy.

Gene Tunny  46:43

Oh, yeah. It’s postindustrial. We’re moving more to services. Yeah.

Brendan Markey-Towler  46:49

Natural I mean, with the natural resources sector.

Gene Tunny  46:52

Yeah. that’s right. And I mean, because the world wants to buy our resources. And for the last year or so, they’ve been paying ridiculously high prices for them. It’s an open question over whether we want to sell it. Right. Well, yes. I mean, there’s the big issues there of course that we don’t have time for.

You’ve been very generous with your time, Brendan

Brendan Markey-Towler  47:22

You are very generous letting me on the podcast to talk to people again, Gene.

Gene Tunny  47:27

You’re a great talker. Always enjoy having you on.

Brendan Markey-Towler  47:30

Even with the bruised throat? Like I told you, I could talk through a wet cement.

Gene Tunny  47:35

Very good. So, any final points before we wrap up?

Brendan Markey-Towler  47:39

No, it just ends up on I ended up with the note of circling back to where we started, which is don’t underestimate the national accounts. They’re a really, really, really interesting data set. They give us such a rich view. We didn’t even talk tonight about how in Australia, they break down by state as well, so, we can get an even richer view of how the different states are doing because you know, Australian economy tracker – my blog.

Gene Tunny  48:06

Okay, right. On Sub stack, is it?.

Brendan Markey-Towler  48:09

Yeah, on Sub stack. Please subscribe and contribute to the Markey-Towler retirement fund. It’s founded on two points, which is that one, the perfect graph says more than a doctoral thesis and two, there’s no such thing as an Australian economy. There’s actually six different city state economies and two territories. So, the national accounts in Australia are amazing, not just because of the depth of analysis, they allow us on the supply side of the economy, but on the demand side as well. We get some really, really rich version. So, a plug to remember has to diehard nerds who didn’t have friends at school, but now we have the national accounts.

Gene Tunny  48:53

I’m sure you had friends at school, Brendan. Brendan Markey-Towler, that’s been terrific. I really enjoyed talking to you about the national accounts. 

Brendan Markey-Towler  

I really enjoyed talking to you, Gene. Thanks for having me. 

Gene Tunny  

Okay, that’s the end of this episode of Economics Explored. I hope you enjoyed it. If so, please tell your family and friends and leave a comment or give us a rating on your podcast app. If you have any comments, questions, suggestions, you can feel free to send them to contact@economicsexplored.com and we’ll aim to address them in a future episode. Thanks for listening. Till next week, goodbye.

Credits

Thanks to Josh Crotts for mixing the episode and to the show’s sponsor, Gene’s consultancy business www.adepteconomics.com.auPlease consider signing up to receive our email updates and to access our e-book Top Ten Insights from Economics at www.economicsexplored.com. Also, please get in touch with any questions, comments and suggestions by emailing us at contact@economicsexplored.com or sending a voice message via https://www.speakpipe.com/economicsexplored. Economics Explored is available via Apple PodcastsGoogle Podcast, and other podcasting platforms.