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Podcast episode

Does Free Trade Benefit Everyone? A Deep Dive into the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem – EP272

Is free trade always good for workers? Gene Tunny explores the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, which shows how trade can lower wages for some while benefiting others. He discusses key economic insights from Wolfgang Stolper and Paul Samuelson, real-world historical examples, and the implications for today’s global trade debates. 

If you have any questions, comments, or suggestions for Gene, please email him at contact@economicsexplored.com.

You can listen to the episode via the embedded player below or via podcasting apps including Apple Podcast and Spotify.

Timestamps for EP272

  • Introduction (0:00)
  • Explanation of Comparative Advantage and Free Trade (1:50)
  • Background on Wolfgang Stolper and Paul Samuelson (5:50)
  • The Heckscher-Ohlin Model and Indirect Factor Arbitrage (16:37)
  • Stolper-Samuelson Theorem and Its Implications (26:35)
  • Empirical Evidence and Historical Applications (31:53)
  • Conclusion and Future Directions (32:19)

Takeaways

  1. Free Trade Creates Winners and Losers – The Stolper-Samuelson theorem predicts that free trade benefits the owners of a country’s relatively abundant factors (e.g., capitalists in capital-rich countries) but can harm the owners of relatively scarce factors (e.g., workers in industrialised economies).
  2. Economic Theory Still Favors Free Trade Overall – While trade can hurt specific groups, economists argue that overall national income rises, making it possible (though not always politically feasible) to compensate the losers.
  3. Historical Evidence Supports the Underlying Theory – Examples from 19th-century trade patterns show factor price convergence, with land rents rising in the U.S. while falling in Britain due to increased trade.
  4. Trade Policy Shapes Political Alliances – Farmers in land-rich nations like Australia and the USA often supported free trade, while industrial workers in capital-rich nations tended to favor protectionism.

Links relevant to the conversation

The previous episode with Ian Fletcher:

https://economicsexplored.com/2025/01/21/industrial-policy-vs-free-trade-w-ian-fletcher-coalition-for-a-prosperous-america-ep271/

Stolper and Samuelson’s 1941 paper “Protection and Real Wages”:

https://academic.oup.com/restud/article-abstract/9/1/58/1588589

William Bernstein’s book “A Splendid Exchange: How Trade Shaped the World”:

https://www.amazon.com.au/Splendid-Exchange-Trade-Shaped-World/dp/0802144160

Roger Backhouse’s book “Founder of Modern Economics: Paul A. Samuelson: Volume 1: Becoming Samuelson, 1915-1948”:

https://www.amazon.com.au/Founder-Modern-Economics-Samuelson-1915-1948/dp/0190664096

Edward Leamer’s paper on the Hecksher-Ohlin model in theory and practice:

https://ies.princeton.edu/pdf/S77.pdf

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Full transcripts are available a few days after the episode is first published at www.economicsexplored.com.

Transcript: Does Free Trade Benefit Everyone? A Deep Dive into the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem – EP272

N.B. This is a lightly edited version of a transcript originally created using the AI application otter.ai. It may not be 100 percent accurate, but should be pretty close. If you’d like to quote from it, please check the quoted segment in the recording.

Gene Tunny  00:00

Gene, welcome to the economics explored podcast, a frank and fearless exploration of important economic issues. I’m your host, Gene, Tunny, I’m a professional economist and former Australian Treasury official. The aim of this show is to help you better understand the big economic issues affecting all our lives. We do this by considering the theory evidence and by hearing a wide range of views. I’m delighted that you can join me for this episode. Please check out the show notes for relevant information. Now on to the show. Hello and welcome to the show. In this episode, I want to talk about an important issue that came up in my conversation with Ian Fletcher last episode. That was an episode on industrial policy. The issue is the distributional impact of international trade. So how does trade affect different groups within the community? Many commentators have expressed concerns over the impacts of China’s emergence as a new global manufacturing power and exporter in the 2000s have expressed concerns on that, the impact of that on workers in the US and other advanced economies. Before that, in the 90s, there were concerns about the impact of NAFTA, the North American Free Trade Agreement there were, there was a famous interview with Ross Perot. I think it was a presidential candidate who said NAFTA represented it was a giant sucking sound out of America, by which he meant jobs and an investment would would go south to Mexico. Now economists generally support free trade. We see free trade as benefiting consumers. It means lower prices. It’s better from a macro economic perspective, because economists can specialize according to their comparative advantage. That’s the critical intellectual contribution of David Ricardo, so the famous British classical economist in the early 19th century, so countries can specialize in goods that they produce at lower opportunity costs relative to their trading partners. They can sell those goods to their trading partners and buy products that are better produced by their trading partners. So products that their trading partners have a lower opportunity cost of producing relative to to the other country. Now this means that production across all countries together is higher, and it means that there’s an opportunity for countries to gain from international trade. So I have an explanation of comparative advantage. I have some illustrations in my Top 10 Principles of Economics ebook. You can get that off my my website. It’s probably a topic we should come back to and spend a whole episode on and go through a few illustrations, but for now, we’ll just acknowledge that, as Ian Fletcher pointed out last week, the the case for free trade depends on this, this concept of comparative advantage. I think it was Paul Samuelson who famously said something along the lines of comparative advantages, is one principle in economics that is both undeniably true and non trivial. So something along those lines and Samuelson is going to get mentioned in this episode, of course, because this episode, we’re looking at a famous theorem that he was partly responsible for, called the Stolper Samuelson theorem. And this helps us understand the distributional consequences of international trade. So because of this theorem, economists aren’t so naive, they’re not so ignorant that they they will expect that everyone’s better off under free trade. That would be just too optimistic, right? The fact that some groups in the community can be made worse off by free trade has long been recognized. Well, well, it’s been recognized since the Stolper Samuelson theorem was. Presented in the early 1940s and what this theorem does is it predicts the winners and losers of international trade. It explains why, among other things, manufacturing unions typically favor tariff protection, why farmers typically favor free trade, although not always. It depends on the conditions in particular countries, as we’ll talk about. It depends on whether a particular factor of production can be considered scarce or abundant in that country relative to the situation in the rest of the world. So this is where it gets a it gets a bit tricky, but I’ll try and give some examples that explain this important, important theorem. So it’s named after two economists, Wolfgang Stolper, who lived from 1912 to 2002 and Paul Samuelson, who lived from 1915 to 2009 Samuelson will be familiar to anyone who’s studied economics, even at the introductory econ 101 level, he was definitely the more famous of the two. He won the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1970 however, as I’ll explain, the Stolper Samuelson theorem actually came out of an insight of Stolper. So Stolper, Stolper deserves a lot of the credit for this theorem, as possibly does Paul Samuelson’s wife, Marion, who didn’t get enough credit at the time for her contribution. She typed up the paper that she had she was a student of economics herself, and she’d written some some articles on international trade previously. And so it looks like she might, by typing up the article, she may have improved it in some way. There’s a bit of debate about that that’s covered in the there’s this great book that I’m drawing on extensively in this, in explaining the Stolper Samuelson theorem. It’s a book by Roger Backhouse, who’s a historian of economics, Paul Samuelson, founder of modern economics, founder of modern economics. So that’s definitely worth reading among another book I’ll mention later. Let’s begin with Stolper. So Wolfgang Stolper, he was a German American economist. He was born in Vienna in 1912 so in the days of Austria, Hungary, the Empire, he moved to the United States and studied for a PhD under the renowned economist Joseph Schumpeter at Harvard University. It was at Harvard that Stolper met Samuelson. We’ll talk about that a bit later. He spent much of his career teaching at the University of Michigan, where he influenced many future economists and beyond his great contribution to the theory of international trade, the Stolper Samuelson theorem. He was also known for writing an insightful biography of his mentor, Joseph Schumpeter. Schumpeter is also a fame I mean, he’s a super famous economist responsible for the idea of creative destruction. We’ve probably talked about that on the show, and if I haven’t, I better make sure I do that soon. Very, very important concept. Schumpeter made some great contributions to the study of innovation, to the study of economic growth and development, and he made some rather profound observations about the progress of economies over time. How he saw there was a tendency, a move toward socialism, away from laissez faire capitalism. So it’s lots of interesting contributions. We’ll have to come back to Schumpeter another time now. Paul Samuelson, he was an American economist. He was celebrated for transforming the discipline through rigorous mathematical modeling. He was born in Gary, Indiana, studied at the University of Chicago before earning his PhD at Harvard. His academic reputation, well, a lot of it, I mean, I guess he’s, you know, he’s made a huge amount of contributions, but his, his initial great contribution was a book published in nine. 147 called Foundations of economic analysis, which was an amazing exposition of how you can apply mathematical tools to economics. It unified a range of different areas in economics, so very profound contribution to economics. He spent much of his career at MIT and shaped the field for generations with his innovative research and influential teaching. And I mean he touched, ended up touching or affecting or teaching millions of students, really, through his famous textbook economics and introductory analysis that went through, it’d be over a dozen editions and generations of of college students have been have been taught using that textbook. As I mentioned, the renowned historian of economics, Roger Backhouse, he’s described Samuelson as the founder of modern economics, and that relies largely on Samuelson’s application of mathematics to economics, and so an approach to economics that has has been very influential. So we have to talk about how the Stolper Samuelson theorem came about. It was published in 1941 in the Review of Economic Studies, which is one of the top economics journals in the world. Comes out of Oxford, has both. I mean, I think it would started out as as a British American project, so you had economists in Britain and America collaborating on it. I mean, that have editors from all over the world now. But it’s, it’s a major economics Journal, the paper by Stolper and Samuelson. It was titled protection and real wages. Incidentally, I should note that when this paper, when they wrote the paper, and they said they first submitted it to the American Economic Review, which is the leading economics journal or one of the leading ones in the world. It’s the Journal of the American Economic Association. It was rejected by the AEA because it was seen as highly theoretical and not particularly practical. So yeah, really odd decision by the editors. I guess maybe it wasn’t obvious at the time the implications of this paper, because it is, it is an absolute brilliant paper. It’s one of those papers you read it, or you read you under, or you learn the theorem, and you go, wow, that’s really insightful. That’s something I may not have thought of. And it’s one of those, one of those pieces of economics that I think really makes you fall in love with the discipline, at least it’s one of those, one of those great contributions that I often think about as as really, you know, showing the power of of economics like Samuelson. Stolper was a Harvard graduate student. They lived near each other. So this is Cambridge, Massachusetts, in the greater Boston area. And Samuelson recollected the following about the origin of the Stolper Samuelson theorem. This is in back house’s book, and it’s written by Samuelson. And I might as I’m reading it, I’ll just, I’ll offer some clarifications as we’re going through it. One day in the late 1930s Stolper mentioned to me a curiosity, old Taussig. So Taussig was a famous economist at the time. He asserts that free trade raises American wages by drawing workers into the sectors of maximum comparative advantage. How do we square this with Olin’s notion? So Olin is a famous Swedish economist, how do we square this with Olin’s notion that the input America is most niggardly endowed with can have its return lowered by free trade, in comparison with autarky? Autarky is a situation of no trade, I should note. And so Samuelson reflects on this. This is a question from Wolfgang Stolper. He’s asked Samuelson, well, hang on, Taussig saying one thing trades going to raise wages of for Americans, but then. It. There’s another economist who points out, well, hang on, it could be the fact that trade reduces wages, or at least of some workers through Well, I mean, we’ll talk about this later, but the idea is trade actually means that laborers in the US end up competing with laborers overseas, whose labor is embodied in the products that that are imported. So this is a very good question that that Stolper has asked. And so Samuelson goes on in his recollection, he writes, The point was a new one to me. I said, you’ve got something there. Work it out. He did. And in the course of his explorations, we talked endlessly about the many ramifications of the problem. The analysis soon went beyond the point about free trade, which naturally fell into place after one had sorted out the issues. So that is the story of how we ended up with the Stolper Samuelson theorem regarding Olin. That’s Bertolt Olin. He’s a Swedish economist, as I mentioned, he was a politician. And if you, if you’ve studied economics, to say, a third year level or a graduate level, you you’d no doubt recognize that Olin is the Olin in the famous Heckscher Ohlin model of international trade. So we did talk about that, because the Stolper Samuelson theorem comes out of the Heckscher Ohlin model of international trade. In fact, I think what we call nowadays the Heckscher Ohlin model was first formalized in the paper by stopper and Samuelson. I seem to recall reading that in in some of the some of the articles I was reading while preparing for this episode. So to understand Stolper Samuelson, you need to understand the basics of the Heckscher Ohlin model. And I think one of the best explanations of this that I’ve read, it’s it’s in a paper or a chapter in a book I’ll link to it in the show notes. It’s it’s by Edward lemur, who was a professor of economics at UCLA, and he explains how the key to understanding Heckscher Ohlin is to understand that traded goods are essentially bundles of factors of production, so land labor and capital. So the land labor and capital that go into them, think about the the goods that are traded internationally. So if it’s a car or if it’s wheat, then you’ve got combinations of land, labor and capital going into those in in different in different ratios. So wheat, for example, that’s going to be embodying a ton of wheat is going to embody, you know, probably more land then, than a car for for example. So, and, you know, likewise, something that’s very labor intensive is going to embody more labor than something that is capital intensive to produce. So think about commodities being bundles of factors of production. Model predicts that countries specialize in producing goods that use factors they have in abundance. The theorem states that countries will export goods that use their abundant factors and they will import goods that use factors that they lack. Okay, so if you’re a country with a lot of land or a lot of land suitable for agriculture as Australia has, then you’re more likely to be exporting goods that rely on those that abundant factor well, such as wheat, such as beef, etc. So, I mean, it seems rather obvious. Yes, but it’s important to have a formal model like this, because then it allows you to to generate fascinating theorems like the Heckscher Ohlin theorem. This is the really important part of Heckscher Ohlin, in my view, or one of the key lessons from it, and this is what leads us to Stolper Samuelson. This is a point that that that Lima makes, that the the Heckscher Ohlin model really implies what you call indirect factor arbitrage. So it’s a way of taking advantage of lower well more abundant, lower cost resources or factors of production in other countries, and effectively importing them into your own country, so that could be taking advantage of abundant land in another country, taking advantage of abundant labor in another country, that is where there’s lower so the abundant land would have lower rents, the abundant labor would have lower wages. International Trade allows a country to to benefit from that, and what we what we see is that the empirical evidence tends to support this convergence of factor prices, although maybe not as strongly as as a abstract model would predict, but there is certainly evidence that this has occurred over time. So there is evidence of this factor price convergence occurring to an extent, and there’s a great example in one of the books that is a good source for this conversation on the Stolper Samuelson theorem. The book is called a splendid exchange, how trade shaped the world, and it’s by William Bernstein. So really terrific book. It was nominated for, I think it’s Goldman Sachs, Financial Times, Business Book of the Year in 2008 so really highly regarded book, and it has this fascinating bit of data in it on the convergence of rents for land between the United States and Europe in the 19th century. This is based on research by economic historians Kevin O’Rourke and Jeffrey Williamson. O’Rourke and Williamson found that between 1870 and 1913 us rents rose 249% while British rents fell 43% so what was going on is with international trade in this period before the First World War, that’s generally regarded as the sort of high point of free trade in the 19th century. What you had is this convergence, because you had goods produced using abundant land in the US, they could then be sold into Britain and Europe. They would be competing with the agricultural products produced on the the land in in Britain and Europe, which was relatively scarce relative to the other factors of production, like labor and capital. And so there’s this competition that drives down the rents in Britain, or this trade that drives down the rents, and it increases the returns in the US, because the US produces, the farmers are they have a larger market now they can sell into Britain and Europe. So what we had was, well, this is, this is associated with the free trade error. It’s also due to cheap, cheaper transport, development of railways and I suppose, steamships, etc. And what we had was the cheap transport leading to Britain and Europe being flooded with grain and meat. From the US. So prices were driven down, and that lowered the value of the farmland in the old world and increased it in the new so that’s an example of this factor price convergence. It’s consistent with hex Olin. Okay. Now this, this is suggesting, you know one of these, one of the well, what is the key insight of the the heck sure Olin model that the predicted impact on on the returns to the factor so whether it’s rent or whether it’s wages, that depends on how abundant or scarce the factor of production is in a particular country relative to so in their famous paper, in a simplified and abstract model, initially with two countries and two commodities, but you can, you can generalize this. It’s all, there’s a, I won’t go into it here, but I think it this theorem is generally considered robust to different assumptions. So in this simplified and abstract model, the theorem proves that if labor is the scarce factor of production, then protection, so the application of a tariff can raise wages in in the country. But what it’s doing is it’s it’s effectively redistributing income from capital to to labor. William Bernstein, the neurologist, the finance writer whose book I mentioned previously, he has used this Stolper Samuelson theorem to explain the impacts of international trade in different places and times. And I’ll put a link in the show notes to the book, because it really is a brilliant exposition of this theorem and how useful it is in explaining different episodes in in economic history. And it really brings this Stolper Samuelson theorem, which, if you read it in an in an international economics textbook, you go, Well, I guess that’s that’s really interesting. However, it may not have the color, the life that that it gets when you when you read it in a, you know, very well written book aimed at a, at a, you know, an audience that’s not of people studying economics or academics. It’s aimed at an educated, lay person audience. It’s a very good book, and I like Bernstein’s explanation of Stolper Samuelson, so I’m going to read it, and we’ll just so we’ll just go through the logic of it. Bernstein writes, If labor is scarce in nation a and abundant in nation B, then wages will be lower in B. So think of a as an advanced economy where, relative, to say, an emerging economy with a with a high population, but very little capital, very little well relative to the the advanced nation, nation a, then wages will be lower in B, so okay, and labor intensive products made in B will consequently be cheaper there as well. With free trade, merchants and consumers will prefer the less expensive goods made in B to those made in a. So imagine those less expensive goods could be T shirts that are that are being manufactured in B relative to to A. So they’re manufactured in the emerging economy rather than the advanced economy. So workers in in B will benefit, and workers in a will lose. Okay, so if there’s international trade, then nation a starts buying the product produced by the abundant labor, which could be T shirts in Country B, and that benefits the workers in B, but it it, it harms or the workers in a. So that what the Stolper Samuelson theorem shows is that they will have lower wages relative to the situation if you had had protected that that sector or that the production of that commodity using that. Factor labor that is relatively scarce in nation a, the advanced economy relative to capital relative to other countries, nation a has more capital less labor, whereas nation B, the emerging economy, has an economy where there’s much more labor relative to to capital. So that’s, that’s a simplified explanation of what’s happening with Stolper Samuelson and Bernstein goes on to to say that this is true of the other two factors as well. Free trade helps farmers in countries with abundant land. Okay, so that would be Australia, the United States historically. Well, it was the United States for in the late 19th century, for sure. And it hurts those so we’re talking about free trade, it hurts those factors in country. It hurts, sorry. It hurts those in countries with scarce land, and it helps capitalists in rich nations. So it hurts farmers in countries with scarce land and it helps capitalists in rich nations with abundant capital and Hertz capitalists in poor nations. So what you’ll see is that this stealth or Samuelson theorem can give you some really interesting predictions into what will happen if you either go from a situation of free trade to imposing a tariff, or go from a system of protection and then going to free trade. It’ll give you a sense of who will win and lose. Now, it’s not always perfect, because other things can change in economy. There can be technological change. There could be changing demand for a product. Globally, for some reason, there’s there’s a whole bunch of other things that could move this is all, all else equal, ceteris paribus, as economists say it’s, it’s a prediction from a model. At a point in time you change your trade policy, this is what’s going to happen. But of course, other course, other things can happen, which mean that, in practice, these predictions may not end up occurring. Okay, so that’s, uh, that’s Stolper Samuelson. It doesn’t mean that economists are wrong to argue for free trade. So I think this is, this is something that Stolper and Samuelson themselves made sure that they emphasized, because they wouldn’t want to be the economists that turned economists away from free trade, not at all. And hence they wrote a conclusion that clarified that fact. So this is the final paragraph from the Stolper Samuelson paper. I’m going to leave out a few words that are actually their qualifications or their extensions of of the the argument, but I don’t we’ll just get they’ll probably just go off on a tangent if I start talking about those. So I’ll just leave out a few words, so you can go to the the paragraph the article, and just check out. Check it out. But I’m going to give you the essence of what they say here. And this is, this is them responding to to what was called the pauper labor type of argument for protection, which is essentially that, well, if you have free trade, your workers will, indirectly end up competing with a whole bunch of, well, you know, lots millions of workers in in other economies, so emerging, developing economies that have lower wages. So that’s the the pauper labor type argument for protection. Okay, so they begin. We have shown that there is a grain of truth in the poor labor type of argument for protection. Thus in Australia, where land may perhaps be said to be abundant relative to labor, protection might possibly raise the real income of labor. The same may have been true in colonial America. We are anxious to point out that our argument provides no political ammunition for the protectionist it has been shown that the harm which free trade inflicts upon one factor of production is necessarily less than the gain to the other in. Hence, it is always possible to bribe the suffering factor by subsidy or other redistributive devices so as to leave all the factors better off as a result of trade. So this is the really good point about free trade. So free trade is making the pie bigger, but it doesn’t necessarily mean that the size or the slice that each group in the community gets. It doesn’t necessarily mean that that slice is bigger, even though the whole pie is bigger, but there is the opportunity to recut the pie so that everyone gets a bigger slice of pie. In economics, this is called the keldor Hicks criterion, after Nicholas, keldor and John Hicks, famous economists. Hicks was British, keldor was, I think it was Hungarian. But they’re both both famous economists. And there’s this potential, well, it’s also known as a potential Pareto improvement, technically, Pareto optimal and a Pareto optimum. Optimum in economics is where neither party can be made better off without making the other party worse off. So free trade does offer you that opportunity, but in practice, you may not see that redistribution occurring. You could see well as, as I talked about with Ian in the previous episode, you could see the the China shock, for example, that ends up, you know, causing significant job losses in, in in America, in, you know, outside of, outside of the capitals as so in in regional America, and you know, people you know, made they don’t get significant support. Social Security benefits are not, you know, they can be rather lacking in the US. The US doesn’t have a public health care system, as we do in Australia or the UK or Europe. And so these economic shocks can have, can have really profound and long, lasting consequences on on communities that that feel those shocks from from trade and look, I mean, economists have to acknowledge that, and I think Stolper Samuelson really helps us understand those impacts of trade and understand which groups in the community will be affected. Okay, so before we go, I’d just like to talk about the empirical basis of Stolper Samuelson. I think I’ve probably done a bit of that already, but, but let’s just, let’s just go over it again, my feeling or my sense, reviewing the literature. And there’s a, there’s a huge economic literature on the impacts of trade. We may need to have another episode going on over it after because, you know, I’ve spent, you know, a fair, you know, quite a lot of time this episode trying to just explain the logic of Stolper Samuelson as best I can, and it may be that I need to come back and do that again, so I’ll be interested in your thoughts on Stolper Samuelson. Does it make sense to you? Is, does how I describe it make sense? Do you think I, if you’re a fellow economist, do you think I actually got it right, or whether, whether issues with how I explained it, just let me know. So you’ll find my contact details of the show notes. I’ll be interested in hearing from you. I’d say, I would say that the the evidence is moderately supportive of the theorem. I think it you do see through economic history, stalled by Samuelson effects. And I mean, it’s, it’s going to be as much evidence supportive of the theory as, as you’ll see for for any, for most theorems in economics that that come out of these abstract models. So I am, I would say, I think that the Stolper Samuelson theorem is, is a good theorem. It’s a great bit, a great piece of of of economic theory. It’s part of the toolkit for economists in understanding the the impacts of protection. Versus free trade. So I think it’s a really good theorem. Bernstein, in his book, explained it exchange. He he argues, or he thinks it has a lot of explanatory power and economic history, and I gave the example of convergence of of rents before. And I’ll just go through this explanation or this elaboration from him, because I think this is really, really useful. Before 1870 England had, relative to other nations, abundant capital and labor and scarce land. By contrast, the United States had relatively scarce capital and labor, but abundant land. I mean, that makes sense, doesn’t it? Because, I mean, Britain is much smaller than the US and in the, in the, you know, 19th century, the US still had, you know, had huge, huge territory, so that makes sense. And then Bernstein goes on to say, right that tariffs rose dramatically during the period that period around the world, especially in the United States after the Civil War, but trade grew more free as rapidly decreasing. Shipping costs more than compensated for the higher tariffs the stopper Samuelson theorem predicts that the main beneficiaries of increased trade would be the owners of abundant factors in each nation, capitalist and laborers in England and landowners, that is, farmers in the United States, this is precisely what happened, and thus it was no coincidence that all these groups favored free trade. Okay, so according to Stolper Samuelson, the increased trade in this period that would benefit. It would benefit the capitalists and laborers in England, because they were abundant relative to to land. So capital and labor, there was plenty of it relative to the land in England, so they could take advantage of of trade and the landowners in the US, well, they would benefit because they were abundant. So Bernstein writes, that’s precisely what happened. And thus it was no coincidence that all these groups favored free trade. Likewise. It’s no surprise that the owners of scarce factors in each nation, English landowners and American laborers and capitalists sought protection. Okay? And he goes on to to explain that in in continental Europe, the nations had scarce capital and land but abundant labor. So Stolper Samuelson predicts falling transport costs after 1870 would have generated a wave of protectionism by Continental capitalists and farmers and farmers and again, the theory is dead on. European farmers reacted vehemently and brought to an end the free trade era that began with the corn law repeal, repeal in 1846 and the Cobden Chevalier treaty. So that was the Anglo French free trade area in 1860 right? So might have to come back in another episode and just go over the history of of free trade versus protectionism in that period, because it’s all rather, seems a bit messy, doesn’t it? Because, like, my impression is that, and this is the argument that that’s made by Polanyi. And the great transformation is that the pre World War One era was an era of of, of, you know, free trade relative to what came after. It initially well during the inter war period, and then in in early years after World War Two, then. But it does there are, there are cases where there were tariffs, there was protection, as is suggested here. So I think I might have to come back to that period and just really unpack what’s going on, just so we understand, because this is critical, in terms of understanding well, are tariffs important or critical, or do they help economic development? Because, well, there’s this, there’s now, there’s this debate about, will tariffs, can tariff support so called infant industries, and I mean the the rhetoric coming out of, uh. Politicians. So President Trump, he refers to William McKinley. He talks about the tariff king. And there’s a view that the tariffs were a contributing factor to economic growth, to economic development during that period. Now I’m skeptical of that view, and I think there’s evidence that the US had started taking off before those tariffs were imposed, but I do acknowledge that, you know, there’s a lot of a lot of evidence to review, and I think we probably should come back to that in a future episode, but for now, hopefully I’ve given you a flavor of of how you can use Stolper Samuelson to to understand what’s happened at different periods in history. And Bernstein has this terrific table in his book on Stolper Samuelson categories, and he’s he’s done his best to identify in different periods of time what the abundant factors, the abundant factors that favor free trade have been, versus the scarce factors that favor protectionism. And he’s identified, say, the US before 1900 the abundant factor was land, the scarce factors were labor and capital. And so therefore that explains why, before 1900 labor and capital would have favored protectionism, and the farmers would have favored free trade, and then after 1900 in his view, land and capital are the abundant factors. I think this is that’s fair enough relative to to other countries, and so they’re going to be favoring free trade versus protection versus labor. So labor as the scarce factor, it favors protectionism. So this goes to explain why, particularly manufacturing unions in industrial countries tend to favor protection, because it does involve a redistribution in their favor. Okay, so, gee, there’s a whole bunch of other evidence of we could talk about, but I better leave it there, because I think we’ve covered quite a bit of ground, and hopefully I’ve given you a sense of what the the key implications of Stolper Samuelson are, and how it can be used to understand or to predict the impacts of of a change in trade policy. So I think it’s a very important theorem. I wanted to get it into into the podcast so we can come back to it in future episodes and talk about a bit more look at the evidence. Also, as I mentioned, I want to go back to that 19th century period and really understand what’s going on there, because it’s coming back into the the political debate. There’s talk about William McKinley being the tariff King, and you know, our tariffs an important part, or are they a way that you can, you can stimulate your your economic growth and and development. So, I mean, I would say no, and I think there’s plenty of examples. I mean, I don’t think economic theory supports that, and I don’t, and I think examples around the world, they don’t support it either. So we’ll talk about that in a in another episode. Okay, so thanks for listening to this discussion of the stole plus Samuelson theorem. As always, if you’ve got any thoughts on it, have any questions, want me to clarify anything? Think I’ve that I that I need to fix something up in my exposition of it. Then, yep, please get in touch so you can find my contact details in the show notes, you can email me contact@economicsexplored.com.. Thanks for listening.

Credits

Thanks to the show’s sponsor, Gene’s consultancy business, www.adepteconomics.com.au. Full transcripts are available a few days after the episode is first published at www.economicsexplored.com. Economics Explored is available via Apple Podcasts and other podcasting platforms.

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Podcast episode

Industrial Policy vs Free Trade w/ Ian Fletcher, Coalition for a Prosperous America – EP271

Ian Fletcher, co-author of Industrial Policy for the United States, published by Cambridge University Press, joins the show to argue free trade does not always serve national interests. Fletcher defines industrial policy as government intervention to support better industries, emphasizing that some industries are inherently more valuable. Fletcher highlights successful industrial policies in Japan, Korea, and Germany. He also discusses the role of tariffs in protecting domestic industries, using the example of U.S. electric vehicle tariffs on Chinese imports. 

If you have any questions, comments, or suggestions for Gene, please email him at contact@economicsexplored.com.

You can listen to the episode via the embedded player below or via podcasting apps including Apple Podcast and Spotify.

Here is a clip from the video recording of the podcast episode:

About this episode’s guest: Ian Fletcher

Ian Fletcher is an Advisory Board Member for Coalition for a Prosperous America. He is the author of Free Trade Doesn’t Work (2010) and a co-author of The Conservative Case Against Free Trade. He was Senior Economist at the Coalition for a Prosperous America and a Research Fellow at the US Business and Industry Council. He was educated at Columbia and Chicago.

Timestamps for EP271

  • Introduction (0:00)
  • Defining Industrial Policy (3:31)
  • Ian Fletcher’s Journey into Industrial Policy (6:48)
  • Better Industries and Manufacturing (11:27)
  • Arguments Against Free Trade (18:10)
  • Case Studies and Successes of Industrial Policy (28:07)
  • Tariffs and Modern Industrial Policy (48:21)
  • Taiwan’s Success Story (51:46)
  • Conclusion and Final Thoughts (53:51)

Takeaways

  1. Industrial Policy Defined: Industrial policy focuses on nurturing high-value industries that provide higher wages and foster innovation.
  2. Free Trade Critique: While free trade reduces consumer costs, it can lead to job losses, regional economic disparities, and reliance on foreign manufacturing.
  3. Global Lessons: Successful industrial policies in countries like Taiwan and Germany show strategic government intervention can be successful in some instances, while failures in the UK and India underscore the risks of mismanagement.
  4. Technology Pipeline: Ian Fletcher argues that a robust pipeline connecting scientific research to commercialization is critical for maintaining competitiveness in manufacturing and innovation.

Links relevant to the conversation

Ian’s book “Industrial Policy for the United States: Winning the Competition for Good Jobs and High-Value Industries”:

https://www.amazon.com.au/Industrial-Policy-United-States-Competition/dp/1009243071

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Transcript: Industrial Policy vs Free Trade w/ Ian Fletcher, Coalition for a Prosperous America – EP271

N.B. This is a lightly edited version of a transcript originally created using the AI application otter.ai. It may not be 100 percent accurate, but should be pretty close. If you’d like to quote from it, please check the quoted segment in the recording.

Ian Fletcher  00:03

People’s mobility from job to job is not frictionless. It’s not frictionless for people to move where the new jobs are. People’s entire lives, friends, family, support systems are in one place. If they pick up and, you know, try to move someplace else just to get a job. There’s reasons why people don’t do that. When you have the economy collapse in some Midwestern factory town, the real estate market collapses with it. So anybody who lives there wants to move someone else is trying to sell a house that is now worth very little there’s not worth enough money to buy a house in the place they’d have to move to, where there are jobs, where real estate prices are high because people have money. There are all these factors, which, when you look in detail at what happened, you discover that the Ricardian free trade story is just full of holes in gene,

Gene Tunny  01:04

welcome to the economics explored podcast, a frank and fearless exploration of important economic issues. I’m your host. Gene, Tunny. I’m a professional economist and former Australian Treasury official. The aim of this show is to help you better understand the big economic issues affecting all our lives. We do this by considering the theory evidence and by hearing a wide range of views. I’m delighted that you can join me for this episode. Please check out the show notes for relevant information. Now on to the show. Hello and welcome to the show. This episode, I’m joined by Ian Fletcher an advisory board member for the Coalition for a prosperous America. Ian’s previously served as senior economist at the coalition and as a research fellow at the US Business and Industry Council. He holds credentials from Columbia University and the University of Chicago. In this episode, we talk about Ian’s latest book, industrial policy for the United States, published by Cambridge University Press, this book explores both the rationale and the practical steps for implementing industrial policy. Ian and his co author lay out their blueprint for developing high value industries, fostering innovation and boosting economic growth in the US. If you’ve listened to this podcast before, you’ll know that I’ve made some criticisms of industrial policy, criticisms that many economists share. There’s often a fear that governments, by trying to pick winners, might end up picking losers instead. That’s why I’m especially keen to hear Ian’s take, even if I disagree with him on certain points. His views come from a deep understanding of economic history and a careful examination of how policies have worked in the real world, whether you’re skeptical of industrial policy or all for it, I think you’ll find plenty of insights here before we dive in. I want to thank Lumo coffee for sponsoring this episode, economics explorer, listeners can enjoy a 10% discount on their premium organic coffee from the highlands of Peru. You’ll find the details in the show notes. Now let’s jump into the episode. I hope you enjoy it. Ian Fletcher, welcome to the program.

Ian Fletcher  03:18

Thanks for having me on your show gene, of course,

Gene Tunny  03:21

you’ve written or co authored a real weighty book on industrial policy, industrial policy for the United States, winning the competition for good jobs and high value industries, published by Cambridge University Press. Can we start off Ian by understanding your definition of industrial policy. When you talk about industrial policy, what do you mean, please. Well,

Ian Fletcher  03:51

industrial policy is about three basic facts. The first fact is, is some industries are better than others. They can pay higher wages, their output is worth more. They can provide higher profits, the more fruitful for producing growth in other parts of the economy and a bunch of other things. Anyway, some industries are better than others. All industries are not created equal. Second idea is the free market. Our beloved free market will not, on its own, give any particular country, the US, Australia, Taiwan, you name it, will not give any particular country the best industries that it could hypothetically acquire. Free markets are great, but they’re not the whole story. And the third idea is that judiciously chosen government policies have and can make a difference in terms of getting a country better industries than it otherwise would have, which means that the workers get. Paid more, your capitalists are happy. They make more profit and a bunch of other advantages. So that’s the basic idea of industrial policy, right there.

Gene Tunny  05:11

Got you. And in terms of the policy measures, we’re talking things that it may be grants for support for innovation, R and D. It could be tariffs, it could be concessional loans, a whole bunch of things, procurement policy, just, just so we just set out what, what’s involved. It’s a there’s a broad range of policies. Is that correct?

Ian Fletcher  05:33

For sure, some people who criticize industrial policy think it’s about nothing but tariffs, which are one part of it or one tool. Other people who criticize it think it’s nothing about subsidizing industries. You just shovel money out the government store. Industrial Policy is a package of about three dozen different tools, all sorts of things. You mentioned some of them, for example, most technologies are developed by the private sector, but there are some technologies that are too speculative, too risky, too long term, or they’re difficult to patent and keep to yourself. So they work a lot better when they’re developed by the government. The Internet is the most famous example. The internet was not invented by some company trying to make money. It was invented by government scientists to share data, and people figured out later that you could do all these wonderful things with it, and the private sector on its own is kind of unlikely to have developed it, yeah.

Gene Tunny  06:36

Okay, so there’s a I think we’ll I’d like to explore that later. What are the boundaries between science and innovation policy and industrial policy? I think that would be good to discuss so that, I think that’s a good introduction. But asking, How did you get interested in industrial policy in the first place?

Ian Fletcher  06:53

What happened was I wrote my first book, which is called free trade doesn’t work, because I got interested around 2007 in the fact that America was supposedly doing everything it was supposed to do economically, and yet we had all these problems. So I went looking on Amazon to see if I could find a book that could explain to me the critique of free trade, why this might not be the best idea, and I didn’t find it. There was no such book. So in order to read the book, I had to write it myself. So I had some help from a friend of mine who was working at a Washington think tank. At the time, he got me some sponsorship, and I had some philanthropic support. So that’s how I wrote the first book. And when I wrote free trade doesn’t work, it came out in 2010 and for the first month after it came out, I was terrified that I was going to get an email, what day suddenly, and someone’s going to say, hey, Fletcher, I read your book. Nice try, but you’re completely wrong. And free trade really is best because of x. And I didn’t know what X was going to be, but there’s a true story. I was afraid that somebody was going to come up with something, and it’s now 15 years since the book came out, and that isn’t what happened. Instead, an idea that was very much on the fringe when I wrote about it, has now become mainstream in in both political parties, in the US and in some other countries around the world. So you actually asked about industrial policy. Well, industrial policy, which is the current book, it’s the next step after you repudiate free trade. If you say, okay, free trade isn’t best, well, then you’ve also repudiated the whole globalist model of successful economics, because what they tell you is that free movement of goods, free movement of capital, privatization, fiscal austerity and a bunch of other deregulation. They tell you, that’s the way a country gets economic growth. Now, if you take free trade out of the picture, the rest of it, one you become skeptical of it, because if the free trade component is wrong, what else could be wrong? And the other thing is, the model starts to fall apart in practice. So the question then becomes, okay, smart guy, if you don’t want free trade, what do you want? What is your recipe for national economic success? And that’s really what industrial policy is. It consists in saying that a successful economy, a high wage economy, a wealthy country, it comes from having productive industries and. The market will do a lot to get you there, but it won’t do everything for some very deep seated reasons, so governments need to step in. Now, historically, this is what happened in all the countries that became rich, starting with Great Britain in the 19th century. And it goes back even earlier than there the United States, France, Germany, Japan, most recently, you’ve seen it in East Asia. But when you dig into the real economic history of these things, you discover that industrial policy has kind of a huge but largely ignored role in the success of lot of industries, and therefore of a lot of countries and the US is in a situation now with its own economic decline, particularly in manufacturing, and with the geopolitical threat posed by China of having to get its Economic act together again. And that, pretty much by definition, means you’re going to have to be doing industrial policy, but you want to be doing it right, because there are many, many ways to screw it up, and people who criticize it on grounds of, yes, this screws up all the time. They’re correct, and that’s part of why we wrote the book, is to avoid that happening here.

Gene Tunny  11:22

Yeah, yeah, okay, yep, yep, good point. Okay. Now there are lots of things I want to explore, but I want to go back to the when you defined industrial policy, you mentioned there some industries are better than others in your view. What are those better industries?

Ian Fletcher  11:41

Well, you’re talking about industries like in the US, manufacturing, cars, manufacturing, computers, manufacturing, aircraft, manufacturing pharmaceuticals. These are industries which have, above all, they have a high value added per man hour. Now how much can pay your workers depends on how much value they produce. Otherwise you’re going to lose money. You can’t pay somebody $10 an hour if they produce $9 an hour of value, but if you’re producing $20 an hour of value, maybe you can pay them $15 an hour and still make a profit. So that means you have to have certain industries in your country. If the only jobs out there are tiny number of people working on farms in every developed country, and then local service industries, which is the bulk of the jobs in any developed country. But those are, you know, things like working at McDonald’s or working in Walmart, those kind of jobs don’t have a potentially very high value added because the value of a cheeseburger is just not even remotely as high as the value of an automobile. So you want to get into these high value added industries now they’re difficult because you require technology that doesn’t grow on trees. You require supply chains, skilled labor, large corporate organizations that can administer these complex companies. So these industries are hard to get, and in the face of international rivalry, they’re hard to keep, but they’re very lucrative to have.

Gene Tunny  13:22

Is it the manufacturing per se, or the manufacturing itself, or is it the design of the products, actually developing the products, doing the R and D? I mean, think of Apple. I mean, it doesn’t do the manufacturing in the United States, does it? But yet it designs high value products. Do you have any thoughts on that? How do you how do you define manufacturing?

Ian Fletcher  13:45

Yeah, the first thing I want to tell you is that Apple and the iPhone, which people love to talk about, are just about the worst case study example for understanding how modern economies do and should work, because Apple is a very exceptional company, starting with the fact that they’ve managed to prevent the Chinese from just stealing all their intellectual property and flooding the market with copycat iPhones. It’s a mistake to think that an entire nation can specialize in simply design and just outsource the manufacturing elsewhere. That’s been a very popular idea in the United States, and that’s probably a recipe for having enough high value jobs to keep the San Francisco Bay area where I live, Silicon Valley, keep that going nice. But the United States has a population of over 300 million people. Most of those people are not going to be computer chip designers. They’re not going to be iPhone engineers. They don’t have the skills. They’re not going to acquire them. They also don’t live in places that have the headquarters of giant international computer companies. This is why the. So we have the problem in America, flyover country is the term Some people use to describe the vast interior between the two glamorous centers of power and money on the East Coast and the West Coast. You need manufacturing if you push high value added technologically rich jobs, down to the bulk of your population and across your national geography. The other problem is, when you outsource the manufacturing, you often end up outsourcing the production as well. There’s a long list of companies in the US that started by sending simple bits of fabrication to the Far East and more advanced bits, then they’re making the whole thing there. And then, lo and behold, they’re surprised to find that they now have competitors in that part of the world who are making a product similar to theirs and competing with them. And when you lose the manufacturing capability, you lose a lot of the innovation capability, because a lot of innovation doesn’t consist in scientists discovering things in a lab or even engineers drawing up a blueprint on computer aided design machine. It’s stuff that emerges from the factory floor. It merges from the experience of what’s called manufacturability. There are whole classes of expertise that really don’t exist in the US very much anymore, because nobody manufactures the product here. The US would love to have people here who can manufacture carbon fiber aircraft wings, which we currently get from the Japanese Boeing outsource something like 30% of the 787. Is foreign. And if you don’t have that manufacturing, you’re not going to have the expertise needed to develop the next better form of it. And you have to remember that manufacturing does not mean these images we have from 1950s black and white movies of you know, barely literate proletarian labor, hammering at metal objects going down an assembly line. I suggest anybody who’s listening to this and is skeptical. Find some modern manufacturing plant in your vicinity that occasionally lets people have a tour. Some of them do. I’ve visited some on this basis, and take a look at what’s going on you inside, you find these incredibly advanced precision operations, these computer controlled pieces of machinery, lasers, you You name it, and you have people milling around, keeping the machinery working and doing a few things that it can’t do. But modern factories have far more in common with the Starship Enterprise than they do with Dickensian mills. Yeah,

Gene Tunny  17:58

yeah. I agree with you on that one. I mean, I’ve visited various factories, the Coca Cola factory. Just go to any Coca Cola Bottling plant or manufacturing facility. Now, it’s just extraordinary. The level of automation. You hardly see anyone on the factory floor. You just see all these conveyor belts with all these cans whizzing by. It’s incredibly impressive. Okay, right? Just on free trade. I just want to go back to that. So I guess the traditional argument for free trade is that it does result in lower costs, lower prices for consumers, so consumers are better off, lower input costs for industries, and that should, yep, okay, look, I would understand your where you’re coming from, that what that that should result in, you know, improved, uh, improved output. Higher GDP is the argument, higher welfare for consumers. What are your arguments against free trade? Please. Ian, okay,

Ian Fletcher  18:59

the package of ideas you just presented forms a complex known as the theory of comparative advantage. And it goes back about 200 years to David Ricardo, who is a British economist who kind of first worked this out. And I’ll say straight up that a lot of these theories are in fact true, which is why neither I nor the organization whose advisory board I’m on, which is Coalition for prosperous America, which you can find at prosperous america.org none of us are in favor of abolishing Trade. We’re against free trade. We’re not against trade. Nobody here favors autarky, which is what completely crazy countries like North Korea try to achieve. But that theory of free trade is, I don’t know if it’s 75% true or what number. You want to put on it, because there are huge gaps in the theory, huge holes in the theory, huge exceptions that are big enough that taken together, it’s very expensive to ignore. For a start, you talked about low consumer prices. Low consumer prices are not the only good thing in an economy you want low prices, you also want high wages. Okay? And if you look into this theory, the problem with it is it depends intellectually on a lot of unstated assumptions that range from dubious to obviously false. One assumption. It assumes, and this is more aimed at the economists watching than most non economists, it assumes that there’s no international capital mobility. It assumes that what are called factors of production don’t migrate internationally. It assumes that there are no what are called externalities, that is social costs like pollution or the social damage due to job loss. The other interesting thing is this theory doesn’t even say, even if it is true, which it isn’t even if it were completely true. It doesn’t say a lot of the things that people who cite it think it says. For example, a lot of people think that Ricardo proved that a rising tide lifts all boats, as I say, that free trade is good for everyone. No, even Ricardo didn’t think it said that a lot of people think that free trade is a long term strategic answer for how to develop a country or keep it prosperous if it already is. Well, the theory doesn’t even say that. The theory only tells you what the right thing to do right now, you know, if you have coconuts and an island next to you has oranges, you exchange coconuts and oranges and you end up better off. It doesn’t say anything at all about economic growth. It doesn’t say anything at all about long term development trajectories of countries, but that’s what really counts. One of my favorite quotes on the subject, which is in both of my books, and I can’t remember where I saw it first, or I would claim originality, is that economic growth is about turning from Burkina Faso into South Korea. It is not about being the most efficient possible Burkina Faso forever that cuts through a lot of sophistry in the economic discipline, where people forget what a narrow concept efficiency is. I mean, efficiency is great. You don’t want to be inefficient, but it’s not the only thing that counts in economic life. It’s not the only thing that’s good for you.

Gene Tunny  23:05

Okay, can you talk about, or you know that this idea the rising tide lifts all boats? What? What’s the concern, what boats didn’t get lifted with? I mean, I presume you’re sort of talking about NAFTA China entering into the WTO what? What are the concerns that you’ve seen there? What boats weren’t lifted? Ian, is that part of your argument, one

Ian Fletcher  23:27

of the assumptions that was made when the United States entered NAFTA, when the United States led China into the World Trade Organization and opened up its markets, was that sure you’re going to lose certain jobs because you’re going to start importing things. But people lose their jobs all the time. People find new jobs all the time. It’s going to be okay if you have an economy that’s growing overall, people just go from one job to another job. Now it’s now being studied in detail. The key paper on this is called the China shock by a gentleman named David Autor at MIT. That’s a U, T, O R, for those of you want to look it up. And basically what was discovered is that’s not what happened to vast areas of the United States, secondary and tertiary urban centers where jobs were destroyed. People’s mobility from job to job is not frictionless. It’s not frictionless for people to move where the new jobs are. People’s entire lives, friends, family, support systems are in one place. If they pick up and, you know, try to move someplace else just to get a job. There’s reasons why people don’t do that. When you have the economy collapse in some Midwestern factory town, the real estate market collapses with it. So anybody who lives there wants to move someone else is trying to sell a house that is now worth very little. It is not worth enough money to buy a house in the place they’d have to move to where there are jobs, where real estate prices are high because people have money. There are all these factors, which, when you look in detail at what happened, you discover that the Ricardian free trade story, it’s just, it’s just full of holes. There are a number of things that are just wrong with it, even though, at some level, yeah, it’s an okay generalization about 75% of the time. Maybe,

Gene Tunny  25:37

yeah, I guess. What I’m wondering is, was there the potential for, I mean, there was there were gains from from NAFTA, or there were, well, I mean, China’s another story. When we chat about chat that a bit later. I mean, that’s a very controversial one, but I’m just wondering it was there the prospect for redistributing some of these gains, because I look at Australia and the story we tell ourselves in Australia, I used to be in the treasury here, and the story we we would tell ourselves, is that we had a high tariff wall up to the late 80s, and then we started bringing the tariffs down. We were trying to protect our car. Have a car industry. We protected it. We had a 57% tariff. At one time. We had high tariffs on textile, clothing and footwear, and we gradually reduced them. And then the story we tell ourselves is that that was good for consumers. We ended up with cheaper cars, cheaper clothes. In real terms, we had a period of strong productivity, strong economic growth in the from the like sort of second half of the 90s into the early 2000s and that allowed us to catch up. We went from the bottom third of the OECD to the top third of the OECD. We had job losses too, and I think because we had a Social Security system, we had a public health system, Medicare, then that sort of ameliorated or or meant that a lot of these problems you’re seeing in the United States. We didn’t see them as much here in Australia, and so we see the story as more of a positive story. Do you have any thoughts on that? Ian, yeah,

Ian Fletcher  27:11

for your international viewers, I just want to remark that it’s a myth that the United States doesn’t have a welfare state like other developed countries, it does, it’s just not quite as extensive. One of the things that’s different about the kind of economics that I and people who think as I do espouse and the consensus we’ve been living under, is the consensus generally gives the same answer for every industry, for every country, for every circumstance, it’s always the market. The market is always right, and we tend to come up with different answers based on different facts in an industry, in a country, a moment in historical time and so forth. So the problems that Australia has faced from free trade are quite different from those that the US has faced. For example, you talk about your car industry, by which I presume you mean Holden motors, the old Australian GM subsidiary, yeah,

Gene Tunny  28:13

we had Toyota and and also Mitsubishi. And I forget, sorry, a silly me, a toy Ida were here. Yep, for a while. Yep, yep, right.

Ian Fletcher  28:24

Well, the thing is that there’s a minimum efficient scale for a modern car plant, which means you need a minimum sales base if you’re going to be able to produce cars at the level of productivity comparable to the global standard, which is what you need to have pricing competitive with the rest of the world, and Australia is probably too small to support an auto industry on its own. So to go from having an autarkic auto industry to saying, okay, that’s not the right industry for us to be in, we’re going to let that go. Okay, that could have been a winner for you. But what I would point out is that Australia, throughout its modern history, is written on a succession of commodity booms, and your Australian listeners will know what the commodities involved were, as well as anyone right now, iron ore, coal, aluminum used to be, what did they say? Australia rides on a sheep’s back? Yeah, saying back in the day. Well, the problem with living off of commodity booms, a couple of problems. One is commodity booms come, they also go, I mean, coal, for example, given climate change concerns, eventually, either mankind is going to stop burning coal or it’s going to be so hot that nobody has to burn the stuff to stay warm. Okay, and I don’t know what’s going to happen with iron ore. I mean. Eventually China will finish building out its urban infrastructure and so forth. So commodity booms are not the best thing to stake your national prosperity on, from a global perspective, from an economic perspective, the other problem is, if you’re lucky to have commodities good for you if you don’t, well, you can’t create them the way you can create an auto industry. And what you basically got in Australia selling off non renewable commodities is you think you’re producing wealth. What you really have is an existing stock of wealth that was deposited under your country’s landscape by God, and you’re kind of extracting that and gradually selling it off bit by bit. It could work for as long as it works. Mean, you can look at the Petroleum Exporting Countries, they have a commodity that is in such huge demand that you can you can live off it, but there are problems with having a resource centered economy. What the better thing for Australia to do, I think, is to be a bit more like what Canada used to be, though Canada has kind of gone in that direction as well Canada, before NAFTA took the view that, yes, we have a huge quantity of natural resources as a large land mass country with a small population, but we don’t just want to end up a resource colony for the British Empire in the United States, so We are going to make the effort to develop manufacturing here. And for those of you who know Canada, Southern Ontario, which you can find on a map, used to be a very highly industrialized place, and still is, to some extent, and Canada was well integrated into the American automakers and and so forth. And the reason for that is it enables you to penetrate these high value industries with the high value added per man hour, among other things. If your best industries are going to be mining coal and iron ore, well, they don’t do that in suburban Sydney, they don’t do that in Brisbane or Melbourne. You can have manufacturing jobs in these other places. And I think the correct thing to do, if you face the fact that Australia is not big enough to have its own auto industry, say, is you specialize. That’s what a lot of successful countries have done. If you look at small countries like Singapore, they don’t have their own car industry either, but they specialize in, for example, electronics for automobiles. So you could be the people who make the computer chips that go into automobiles, the electrical harnesses for automobiles, and you ship them around the world to be assembled into cars or some other specialty, but that’s the way a country like Australia would get a desirably significant share of the really high value added industries.

Gene Tunny  33:20

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Gene Tunny  33:54

now back to the show. I think the point you make about the extraction of resources and well, yep, you’re depleting your wealth at the same time as you’re you’re selling them. That’s that’s a fair point. So the issue for the community is, how do we make sure that the community gets the right compensation for that? And so there’s a we’ve had a long standing debate about whether we’re doing that the right way royalties versus a resource rent tax. And then we look to you, look to Norway, and you see they’ve done something, you know, that looks pretty extraordinary in terms of what they’ve managed to do with with North Sea oil, and the wealth that they’ve managed to accumulate. So yeah, that they’ve really set a high standard there. So I think, yeah, that’s a I think so those points, I think they were, they were good to eject in the conversation. You know, I’d like to ask, what, what do you see as the tools of industrial policy that have the most merit, or the or, what are some case studies around the world that we should look to? I what I like about. Your book is, you’ve got some studies of different countries. You’ve got you look into the detail, the institutional detail, yep, the you know what’s happened? I like you talk about Taiwan. Well, I like the discussion of Taiwan and how that sort of, what are the agencies there that help foster some of some innovative businesses there? Can you tell us about what do you see as some of the successes? Yeah, we

Ian Fletcher  35:23

have a whole bunch of case studies in the book. We have success cases of Japan, Korea, China, Germany. We have France as a kind of half success case. Then we have failure cases of the UK, India and Argentina, partly to prove that we’re intellectually honest about the limitations of industrial policy, partly to show that when it does go wrong, it does not go wrong because the very idea is doomed. It does not go wrong because governments are too stupid or corrupt to do it right. It goes wrong because nations make what are upon examination fairly obviously elementary errors. Now getting back to your your actual question in terms of the policies that have the biggest impact, and this is going to vary from country to country, but for a country like the United States, you absolutely have to get your trade in balance, which means that your imports and your exports are approximately equal. Right now, the United States runs a trade deficit in goods that is physical stuff of over a trillion dollars a year, and only about a quarter of that is offset by services exports. So we have this gigantic trade deficit. So you want to have strong exports, creating jobs, if you’re going to have massive imports destroying jobs. So you want to get your trade in balance, which means tariffs, but it also means managing the price of your currency, because international currency rates are a gigantic sleeper issue that nobody is really talking about, but it’s incredibly important. The single biggest reason the US is running giant trade deficits is the US dollar is and has been significantly overvalued. I don’t know the status of the Australian dollar, so

Gene Tunny  37:21

not at the moment. Yeah, go ahead. You

Ian Fletcher  37:24

want to get that under control with policies like taxes or limits on international capital flows, because it’s foreign investment money flowing in the United States, buying existing assets and purchasing debt from Americans that pushes the dollar up too high. So when you get your trade in balance, I think the other thing you have to worry about is you need to have a good technology pipeline. That is to say, companies invent products, and sometimes companies invent technologies. But the most important, most fundamental technologies have a long history of coming from government, not just the internet, but jet passenger planes, for example, it all derives from military technology that was developed for reasons of the Cold War. Pharmaceuticals are almost entirely based on governmental research and then commercialized all sorts of humble things from a laser pointers, lactose free milk, I mean, all sorts of stuff derives from governmental technology research. So you need to push that hard. Or if you’re a small country, you need to figure out how to commercialize it early when it comes out of places like the US, Europe and China, which are doing it as large countries. And then you need a pipeline leading that to commercialize products. Because one thing that’s happened over and over in the United States is that we invent something, and then 20 years later, it turns out that all the jobs producing that something, all the corporations making profit producing that something, are in another country, for example, the flat panel displays that you’re probably watching this podcast on, that’s based on what’s ultimately American technology, but almost all of those displays Are Made in China, Japan, Korea, and part of why that happened is because the predecessor technology, the liquid crystal display, which you probably remember from digital watches, and you still see them around, that was also an American developed technology that ended up being produced abroad in. Yeah, and the reason for that is that these other countries have a much better pipeline between invention and production than the US does. There’s an assumption in the US, and as far as I know Australia too, that pure science just naturally turns into new products. And that’s not true. So there’s all sorts of institutions that you need in between. For example, in the US, under Barack Obama, they established a thing called a National Network for Manufacturing Innovation has since been renamed manufacturing USA, and this is a very small attempt at the US to solve this problem, because it’s a network of research and development institutions around the country, specialized according to different industries, where companies can go to work with government and also universities to develop new technologies. That it’s partly funded by the companies themselves to keep these institutions focused on things that are genuinely useful, but it’s also partly funded by the government in recognition of the fact that a lot of these ideas, when they are discovered, no one company is going to be able to keep that to itself. So why should they want to pay for something that everyone can use. This is an example of what you can do in the United States. And we do do these things. It’s just what we have is It’s a tense the size of the network the Germans have for an economy less than a quarter our size. I mentioned Germany before. They are European country that has, or has had, I mean, recently they did really stupid things, like becoming dependent on Russian natural gas and getting rid of their nuclear power stations. But Germany, and by extension, Germanic Europe, that is the countries that also follow the German example, which includes Austria, Switzerland, Poland and Scandinavia, they’ve had good industrial policies. The UK, for example, in Europe, has very much not had good policies.

Gene Tunny  42:12

Yeah, yeah. Exactly, exactly, yeah, okay, just on the UK. What? What went wrong in the 60s and 70s, with what the the UK was doing. I mean, we had some spectacular failures, like Concord, ultimately, which didn’t end up being commercial. What? What were the what was the problem in the UK? Well,

Ian Fletcher  42:31

I would actually trace the decay a little bit earlier than that. If you look at the Second World War when the American economy expanded 70% because the US was able to build plants at scale before entering the war, the British were fighting from the start, so their economy only expanded 17% and yet, because of wartime propaganda, people believed that they’d had a production miracle. They thought the British economy had done well during World War Two as a result, unlike in France, where, after the war was over, the country went through a very severe bout of frequently very honest self criticism, and they said, we just got defeated by Germany. Our economy wasn’t up to the military industrial complex we needed our wages weren’t high enough to keep the communists at bay. We’ve got to figure out what was wrong with our pre World War Two economy in this country and change it. And they did. The British thought after World War Two that their economy was fine, and the big thing they were worried about was, how do you transition to democratic socialism, which seemed like a nice idea to share the wealth of the workers without having some crazy communist revolution with storm troopers in concentration camps, etc, etc. So in the 1950s Great Britain had the opportunity to change fundamental things about its economy, but it didn’t. They thought they’d been doing well. And in fact, as late as 1950 with the rest of the world in ruins, it looked like Britain was doing well. I mean, exports had more than doubled since the end of the war. Britain, in 1950 was the world’s largest exporter of automobiles. They were pioneering new technologies like jet aircraft. I mean, they built jet passenger planes before, before the Americans, they had the world’s first nuclear power station. They thought they were doing well, but that meant that they never criticized their traditional ways of doing things. And in Britain, the traditional way of doing economics was very liberal in the old fashioned, 19th century sense of the government really doesn’t get involved. The government assumes that the private sector. Here can do everything. The government doesn’t see the need for a national economic strategy, so they just coasted on what they thought was a successful economy. And at the same time nations all around the world, because you got to remember the incredible shock of Japan being defeated, that caused them to think very hard about how to rebuild their own country from scratch, let alone Germany, which was, you know, utterly wiped out and politically discredited. So the Brits just kind of sat on their laurels and you asked specifically about Concorde? Well, Concorde was the result of building an aircraft based on simply the mindless extrapolation of one performance parameter, namely, speed. I actually used to work for an airline, so I can tell you that airlines are in the business to make money, which means that aircraft doesn’t just have to be fast, it has to be able to carry a large number of people and not be a horrendous gas guzzling so the Concord had a very narrow fuselage because it was supersonic, so It had to so it had low passenger capacity, and because it flew at twice the speed of sound, it had extremely fuel hungry engines, so it had terrible economics. It was only kept in service with British Airways and Air France for prestige reasons, and you could have thought that through at the beginning and realized this was a mistake. Interestingly enough, the United States actually made that call correctly. In the late 1960s the federal government was subsidizing Boeing to build a plane called the Boeing 2707 which was going to be a supersonic plane, kind of like the Concord. You can look up pictures of it on the internet. And at the outset of that project, somebody talked to the airlines, and they worked out what the parameters of range, payload, cost, passenger capacity, so on and so forth you would have to have for the thing to be commercially successful. I mean, they figured this out, and the project progressed for a few years, and got a certain amount of government money, but eventually Boeing wasn’t willing to go any further without a huge increase in the subsidy, and that’s when it was put to a vote. Was when Richard Nixon was president, and it was voted down in the Senate. They killed it. And the interesting thing is that none of the designs that Boeing had proposed for the plane that they said we could build this, we can build this. We can build this. None of those designs even promised in theory to meet the required parameters that have been set at the outset. So that’s one of the ways you make mistakes. That’s one of the ways you get things right in industrial policy, is you have to face the need for commercial viability, and you have to be disciplined about your objectives, rather than being distracted by the politics or distracted, which is equally as big a thing, by the difficulty in admitting you were wrong and you just spent a billion pounds doing something that’s better off abandoned before you spent 5 billion pounds on it.

Gene Tunny  48:35

Yeah, yeah. Okay. Can I ask before we go, what’s the role of tariffs in a modern industrial policy? In your view, Ian, are they a legitimate tool? Are they beneficial? In your view? Could you tell us, please,

Ian Fletcher  48:50

it depends what you’re doing, because tariffs can do a lot of different things. The tariffs that Trump imposed on China were about driving China to the bargaining table so that they would, for example, let our exports into the country. And if China is not going to do that, you want to reduce imports from China, which those tariffs have indeed done. The other thing that tariffs do, and the great virtue of tariffs is their industry specific, is, if you want to have a certain industry in your country, it’s got to sell product. And there’s only two ways to sell product. You either sell it domestically or you export it. And in order to export it, you need to have access to foreign markets, which is what we didn’t have in China, and that’s what I just mentioned. But you also don’t want to see your own domestic market taken away from your own producers by foreign imports, and that’s where tariffs come in. So in terms of whether President Biden would. Is right to impose a prohibitive tariff on imports of Chinese electric cars, which he did last year. Yeah, he’s absolutely right. Because if you don’t do that, there will not be an electric vehicle industry in the United States. There just

Gene Tunny  50:16

won’t right, yes, yes, yes. So the argument is that they were they’re subsidizing their their cars. Is that? That’s the argument? Is it what charge they’re

Ian Fletcher  50:27

subsidizing? But it doesn’t even really matter why their cars are cheaper than ours, whether it’s because of subsidies, whether it’s because they got there first, because of all the policies they used to push the country into electric vehicle adoption that were much more aggressive than the US and Europe, or the cheaper because they’re employing exploited labor, or whatever. Those are legitimate issues. But the bottom line is, if you have a massive flood of imports, you’re not going to be able to have this industry in the United States, and these are the kind of industries that you want. There are a limited number of industries that have the potentially high value added per man hour that you should be going after.

Gene Tunny  51:15

Yep. I mean, it’s look. I think these issues are certainly worth discussing. I mean, I just look at Chinese EVs. And I mean, they’re the popular EVs here at the moment the BYD, build your dreams. They’ve got a store down on Wickham Street and fortitude valley there. They’re incredibly popular. I think, you know people, people like the, the Chinese EVs, arguably, that, you know, probably because of the price that they’re cheaper, in a way, than a Tesla, I think, aren’t they? So, oh,

Ian Fletcher  51:45

sure, sure, yeah, I don’t take any position on what Australia should do. This is industrial policy United States, not for Australia. As I said, my way of thinking. Countries are different, industries are different, circumstances are different. I suppose I could look at Australia for a year and figure out what I think you should do, but as things stand, I have no opinion. Okay, that’s

Gene Tunny  52:13

fair enough. I mean, I think it’s, I think that’s a good point. I mean, every, every country is is different. So just before we go, I just want to go back to Taiwan, because I thought that was, that was something I found fascinating, because that’s a, that’s an success story. So they, I mean, I see industry policy as a bit of a or industrial policy as a bit of a gamble, right? I mean, sometimes you could have a success. I mean, economists tend to think most of the time, or there’s a, there’s a bias towards picking losers, but sometimes you do get some winners. And Taiwan is an example where they had an agency that helped out the major manufacturer of integrated circuits in the world. Is that correct? Yeah, you’re

Ian Fletcher  52:55

talking about it. Ri Yes, sure. They had, like all the East Asian countries have had very heavy handed, government centered policies that weren’t afraid to pick winners very explicitly, down to the corporate level, and do things that are relatively unlikely in any Western country. But you’ve also had strong industrial policies, as I mentioned, in Germanic Europe. So there are other ways of doing it. When I advocate industrial policy and I tell people what Japan did or Korea did, I’m not saying we should be like that. We don’t have to, you know, eat our food with sticks and eat cold fish for dinner. It’s about learning from what they did, which is more than just imitation. It’s about looking at the case study to see what underlying views of real economics. It reveals because the received laissez faire story that we were pretty much all brought up on is not true, and it’s becoming dangerously untrue, right? Okay.

Gene Tunny  54:01

Thanks for yeah, thanks for the conversation. Ian, I think this book, yeah, there’s a lot to think about. How many pages this is 700 or something, 700 and over 800 actually, yeah,

Ian Fletcher  54:13

it’s the reason it’s got reason it’s so big is because one, as I said, our way of thinking is very fact intensive. We view our opponents as just dishing off glib, ideological generalizations without bothering to get out of the classroom. The other thing is because what we’re saying is so controversial that every point we make is fastidiously footnoted, so that if economists want to argue with us about this stuff, we are prepared. And the third reason it’s so big is we don’t expect everyone to read all of it. It’s got a variety of content. So look at the table of contents and then pick out the bits that interest you. If you’re more interested in cars or you’re more interested. Interested in American history, or if you’re more interested in why economic theory is wrong, or so on and so forth, you pick out the bits. Maybe you’re familiar with the aircraft industry, I don’t know.

Gene Tunny  55:09

Yeah, yeah, exactly. I mean, I I agree with you. I mean, I think it’s you are you have been very fastidious. There are a lot of good references in there. And I mean, I’ve learned quite a bit from reading that you mentioned Danny Roderick. There was an interesting study that Danny Roderick did about how every his estimate was that every dollar gain from free trade for the US of GDP actually was associated with a $5 of redistribution or something of that magnitude. Yeah. What he’s talking

Ian Fletcher  55:43

about is that even if you assume that the conventional Ricardian theories of efficiency are true, the way that free trade makes your economy more efficient, it’s kind of like rearranging the furniture in your room to get more space, you have to move a lot of heavy stuff around to squeeze out a couple more square feet. So he’s absolutely right that well, he estimated that for every $1 in efficiency gain, free trade caused $5 of redistribution inside the economy that is changes in who gets wages, who gets profit, and so forth. I think that’s broadly true, though. I don’t have a quantification of my own to go up against his $5 figure. The highlight

Gene Tunny  56:35

of that in the book is I thought, Oh, that’s interesting. I’m going to look, look into that. Because, I mean, he’s a very if you want

Ian Fletcher  56:40

to, if you want to be in touch with him and ask him about that. I mean,

Gene Tunny  56:44

I’d be keen to, because he’s always been seen as someone who’s been very like as an economist. He’s someone who other economists look up to and think, okay, he’s saying some really interesting, clever things about industrial policy that really make us have to think about it. So I think, yeah, certainly be good to connect with him at some stage. But Ian Fletcher, I really appreciate the conversation. And again, learning to Yeah, talking about your new book, industrial policy for the United States. So I’ll put a link in the show notes. And yeah, certainly anyone interested in industrial policy, trade policy, with their innovation policy, they’re all related in a way I think would would get a lot out of it. So Ian, thanks so much for your time, and look forward to speaking with you in the future. Yes,

Ian Fletcher  57:30

thank you very much for having me on your show. Gene,

Gene Tunny  57:35

right? Oh, thanks for listening to this episode of economics explored. If you have any questions, comments or suggestions. Please get in touch. I’d love to hear from you. You can send me an email via contact at economics, explore.com or a voicemail via SpeakPipe. You can find the link in the show notes. If you’ve enjoyed the show, I’d be grateful if you could tell anyone you think would be interested about it. Word of mouth is one of the main ways that people learn about the show. Finally, if your podcasting app lets you, then please write a review and leave a rating. Thanks for listening. I hope you can join me again next week.

Obsidian  58:22

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Credits

Thanks to the show’s sponsor, Gene’s consultancy business, www.adepteconomics.com.au. Full transcripts are available a few days after the episode is first published at www.economicsexplored.com. Economics Explored is available via Apple Podcasts and other podcasting platforms.

Categories
Podcast episode

The Revival of Industrial Policy: Should Governments Pick Winners? – EP243

This episode explores the resurgence of industrial policy in the US and Australia. We critically analyze whether government interventions can truly shape industries or if they are doomed to repeat past mistakes, such as those experienced during the 1970s and with the Concorde project. The episode includes clips featuring Saxon Davidson from the Institute of Public Affairs and Eamonn Butler from the Adam Smith Institute. 

If you have any questions, comments, or suggestions, please email us at contact@economicsexplored.com  or send a voice message via https://www.speakpipe.com/economicsexplored.

You can listen to the episode via the embedded player below or via podcasting apps including Google PodcastsApple Podcast and Spotify.

What’s covered in EP243

  • Introduction to Industrial policy and its potential consequences. (0:00)
  • Budget, inflation, and economic policies in Australia. (8:34)
  • Climate change policy and government incentives for renewable energy. (13:59)
  • Australian economy, productivity, and government intervention. (19:44)
  • UK’s economic struggles in the 1970s, including strikes. (29:41)
  • The failure of the Concorde supersonic jet project. (35:59)
  • Failures of activist industrial policy – e.g. in Australia’s car industry. (49:16)

Takeaways

  1. Revival of Industrial Policy: Governments in the US and Australia are reintroducing industrial policies to shape their economies, sparking debate among economists.
  2. Historical Lessons: The economic turmoil of the 1970s and failures such as the Concorde serve as cautionary tales against heavy government intervention in industry.
  3. Climate Policy Challenges: The push for renewable energy in Australia raises concerns about the rapid transition and its impact on the economy and energy grid reliability.
  4. Productivity Focus: Effective economic policies should enhance productivity through structural reforms rather than picking winners.
  5. Government’s Role: While there is a place for government to address market failures, extensive intervention often leads to inefficiencies and unintended consequences. 

Links relevant to the conversation

Australian Taxpayers’ Alliance Budget Chat:

https://www.youtube.com/live/MYX35Lk_ZYA?si=0kJzBt47Yh_5sUnS

Gene’s CIS issues analysis paper on the Australian budget, co-authored with Robert Carling:

https://www.cis.org.au/publication/budget-fails-important-policy-tests/

Episode with Eamonn Butler on Thatcher:

https://economics-explained.simplecast.com/episodes/adam-smith-and-margaret-thatcher-with-dr-eamonn-butler-1oXNvQg_

Episode on Concorde:

https://economicsexplored.com/2022/03/20/concordes-economic-lessons-a-closer-look-ep131/

Previous episodes on Australia’s energy transition:

https://economicsexplored.com/2023/08/24/australias-net-zero-transition-successes-challenges-w-andrew-murdoch-arche-energy-ep202/

https://economicsexplored.com/2022/12/19/aussie-energy-crisis-net-zero-transition-w-josh-stabler-energy-edge-ep170/

Australia’s Hydrogen Production and Critical Minerals Tax Incentives:

https://www.ato.gov.au/about-ato/new-legislation/in-detail/businesses/hydrogen-production-and-critical-minerals-tax-incentives

Lumo Coffee promotion

10% of Lumo Coffee’s Seriously Healthy Organic Coffee until 30 June 2024.

Website: https://www.lumocoffee.com/10EXPLORED 

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Transcript: The Revival of Industrial Policy: Should Governments Pick Winners? – EP243

N.B. This is a lightly edited version of a transcript originally created using the AI application otter.ai. It may not be 100 percent accurate, but should be pretty close. If you’d like to quote from it, please check the quoted segment in the recording.

Eamonn Butler  00:04

Mrs Thatcher realised that we couldn’t go on like that. She knew it would be painful and but she was determined enough that the country would go through that pain and it will come out better the other side, which it did.

Gene Tunny  00:23

Welcome to the economics explored podcast, a frank and fearless exploration of important economic issues. I’m your host gene Tunny. I’m a professional economist and former Australian Treasury official. The aim of this show is to help you better understand the big economic issues affecting all our lives. We do this by considering the theory evidence and by hearing a wide range of views. I’m delighted that you can join me for this episode, please check out the show notes for relevant information. Now on to the show. Hello, and welcome to the show. Before we get started, I want to give a big shout out to our sponsor for this episode Lumo coffee Lumo is seriously healthy organic coffee that you don’t want to miss out on. You can use the promo code 10 explored in all caps to get 10% off. But hurry, it’s only for a limited time. Check out the details in the show notes. K. Now let’s get into the episode. Something I’ve been thinking a lot about lately is the revival of what’s called industrial policy. In the US, the Biden administration, it’s introduced the chips Act and the inflation Reduction Act. They’ve featured activist industrial policy measures designed to promote domestic microprocessor manufacturing and green industries. In Australia, the Federal Labour government has introduced a future made in Australia plan and that was highlighted in the latest federal budget which was handed down a few weeks ago by the Australian treasurer Jim Chalmers, as a former Treasury official, and indeed, as one who managed treasuries industry policy unit for a little while. I have some fairly strong views on industrial policy. So I thought it would be good to cover the rise of industrial policy or the revival of it on the show. So just to clarify industrial policy, that’s where the government tries to deliberately shape the structure, the industry mix of the economy. So forget about comparative advantage, the invisible hand, the government’s attitude is that the market is failing to give us the highly productive industries that we need. So that the government is going to pull the policy levers to change the industry mix. So that’s the idea and it’s going to use various tools at its disposal. It’s going to use tax policy, tax incentives, subsidies, regulations, etc, to bring about the industry mix that that it desires. Historically, I mean, one way of doing that was through protectionist measures, such as tariffs to, to protect domestic in industries, particularly so called infant industries, but tariffs have fallen out of favour. And increasingly, we’re seeing other types of measures used, so particularly tax incentives, they tend to be a feature of modern activist industrial policy. Now, all this sounds terrific in visionary speeches by politicians. But when you think about it a little, especially using economic logic, and when you consider the historical experience, you’ll realise that activist industrial policy isn’t a great idea, after all, which is that’s going to be the basic message of this episode. And to help demonstrate that, in this episode, I’m going to feature some clips from conversations that I’ve had on industrial policy. Some of the clips are from outside of the show. They’re, they’re from a conversation I had with my colleague, John Humphries, John is at the Australian taxpayers Alliance. And we occasionally do a live stream on YouTube and Facebook, where we talk about economic and budget issues. So I’ll feature some clips from that. And I’ll also feature a couple of clips from previous economic system explored episodes. And finally, I will wrap up with some of my thoughts on industrial policy. Okay, now, the first clip I want to play, it’s from that conversation that I had with John Humphries from Australian taxpayers Alliance. And we also had Saxon Davidson from the Institute of Public Affairs on the show. Now, the full conversation, we had the full budget chat, this was the day after the 2024 25 Australian federal budget. So it was around mid May 2024, the full conversation is on YouTube. And I’ll put a link in the show notes if you’d like to watch the whole thing. It’s, it’s a great conversation. Unfortunately, John’s audio was a bit a bit distorted at times because of internet connectivity issues. But it’s still a great, a great video to watch. And we had Senator Malcolm Roberts and also Senator Matt Canavan on as as guests for part of it. So definitely worth checking out. Now, because John’s audio was distorted, I couldn’t reply the bit that sets up this clip, that what John was saying in in it was that the Australian treasurer, Jim Chalmers, has adopted a Shi Jing ping model of the economy. So John being very provocative there. Now, at the same time, John says that the that’s the vision that the treasurer is setting out for the spending for that is largely going to occur in future budget year, so not the current budget year 2425. But beyond that, and so therefore, in John’s view, the current budget itself wasn’t particularly in this interesting. So with that context, let me play the clip.

John Humphreys  06:59

That’s me being a black pill. Maybe there’s a downer here. What am I missing?

Gene Tunny  07:07

Oh, look, I think you’re missing quite a lot. Yeah. I mean, I think this is quite a consequential budget. I mean, I wouldn’t be compare a job as to shooting pig or to whoever else you did, quite yet. I mean, maybe actly. I mean, I think we’re talking about the sort of post war, you know, semi socialist governments of that Li, et cetera, where they wanted to take over the commanding heights. And I think we’re going back towards that maybe not full on communist but, you know, certainly a greater role for government in the economy than we’ve seen. So I think this is where he’s really implementing it. And it’s also, you know, this is his big play. I mean, this is his big play for the leadership. If he pulls this off, he’s going to be seen as a political genius. I mean, he’s got this really clever way of are I so clever, I’m going to bring down CPI arithmetically. And, um, you know, hopefully that convinces Michelle Bullock to cut rates later in the year or just before the election. So look, he’s, he’s playing, he’s making a big play. This is his play for the leadership. I think he could be too clever by half for the reasons we’ve, you know, alluded to already. But yeah, I think this is a very consequential you know, it’s a stark break from the past from previous, even previous, you know, recent from the Rudd administration or from certainly from Paul Keating, it’s a big change.

John Humphreys  08:27

I just clarify that. Xi Jinping is a communist. I think he’s a different sort of non capitalist, but that’s a different issue. Sorry.

Saxon Davidson  08:34

I think I agree with Jane. I think this is a an outline, for the vision for the future of how Jim Chalmers or perhaps even Anthony Albanese views it, you know, where this is rethinking it. This was all in his essay that he wrote about 18 months ago. This is a rethinking capitalism and vision for the future. It’s no mistake, that when the future mate for Australia policy was announced that Albanese referenced the different models from overseas, you know, the IRA, the European Economic defence strategy. Same with the Japanese economic security idea, the SBR act, whereas the Japanese say it’s rethinking capitalism. It’s a new way of capitalism. And this is actually how Jim Chalmers views it as well. This is a vision for the future of budget. This is why it’s an interesting budget is I do have to leave soon, but I’ll leave it at that and say, it’s a instead of Wait, it’s a vision for the future. This is if you have to lose vision for the future.

John Humphreys  09:37

If you have to leave soon. I take that as not immediately. So one last question if you’ll indulge me his vision of the future, but why is it wrong? If we need all these investments, and the money is lack ing and we need to go in a direction? What’s wrong with this policy? The future made in Australia.

Saxon Davidson  09:53

Well, because we’ve seen it before. This is you know, the 1970s protectionist policies have gone back to the few Chuck, like, we’ve seen it before it entered the era of stagflation. And then that’s why that’s how the great economic free thinkers emerged. In the 1980s, we’ve seen this happen before, we’ve seen this movie before. And when productivity is such a such a low in productivity growth is so low and private investment is so low in the economy. You know, as I said, before, rising tide lifts all boats, there are going to be plenty of Australians left behind in this new capitalist netzero future. And we know this, because, you know, no matter how many how much more green energy is brought into the market, or into the energy grid, how I mean, electricity bills are still up, power bills are still up, people are still suffering, this new vision is not a vision that is sustainable. And what actually concerns me more is the is the idea that, you know, after this election, we might be in the, we might be experiencing a very unstable government, which could actually bring forward these policies further to the left if they are in cohorts with the teals and the greens.

Gene Tunny  11:06

Okay, that was that was good stuff from Saxon. I particularly liked his point about the problems in the 1970s. And we’ll return to that soon. One thing I should clarify, in that clip is this point, might the point I was making about how I think Jim Chalmers has been too clever by half now, one of the features of the budget was this $300 electricity bill rebate that was being offered across Australia, and this is on top of some assistance that’s been provided by Well, the Queensland Government and possibly another, or maybe some other state governments will provide assistance. So Queensland Government’s providing the $1,000 rebate. And the idea is that these, these rebates or these subsidies for electricity, that’s going to reduce the the electricity bills of consumers, and it’s because of that it’s going to reduce CPI inflation. And, you know, this is a bit of a hatch. This is what I call that in the note I wrote for the Centre for independent studies with, with Rob Carlin that I’ll, I’ll quote from later. And I mean, it’s a bit of a trick. It’s not really doing anything to address underlying inflationary pressures. And I mean, this, you know, no, no economists have any credibility actually backed? What, what the government was doing here? I mean, I think, I think most economists, I mean, it well, we’re all sceptical, I mean, how, how is spending more money, the solution to inflation, it just doesn’t make any sense. So that’s what I was. I was referring to there. So you can check out that cis issues analysis paper on the budget, I’ll put a link in the show notes for more on that. Another point, I should note regarding what Saxon was saying there, and he was, you know, he I think he was alluding to, or referring to a conversation or point that Senator Malcolm Robertson had previously made, there’s this concern that in Australia where, you know, arguably, we’re pushing too fast in the direction of renewable energy. And that’s been driven by a lot of the policy measures that are really, you know, heavily pushing us in that direction. And, you know, I’m not saying I wouldn’t want to say that we shouldn’t respond to climate change. I do think climate change is, is something that we do need to respond to. But I think there is a legitimate debate, however, about how quickly we do that and what the right policy response is. Now, the way economists think about it, and this was certainly the view in Treasury when I was there is that we shouldn’t be picking winners are picking in particular, or favouring particular types of technology or trying to direct it. The, you know, the response or micromanage the response. What governments should be doing is to the extent that there is this externality from greenhouse gas emissions, we should put a price on that externality which is the idea of a carbon price. And you can do that in various well. I’ll come to In ways you can have an emissions trading scheme, you can, you can create a market, and then you have a carbon price that falls out of that or you can have a carbon tax. And those are alternative ways of of putting a price on carbon dioxide emissions or co2 equivalent emissions. Now, you know that most economists would say that is the best way to do it, if you’re going to do something about it. And, you know, that’s sending the signal to the market, that there’s a cost to the environment of, of this pollution. And you leave it up to the industry to sort out the most cost effective way to reduce those emissions, you don’t go and, you know, actively promote particular solutions. And in in Australia, there’s a, there’s a growing concern that maybe we’ve been pushing too hard on renewables policy, measures and subsidies etc, have favoured renewables. And we’ve had, we’ve had to faster pace of development. And that’s creating issues for the reliability of the electricity grid. Now, I’ve talked about these issues with with previous guests. So I might put a link in the show notes, where I’ve I’ve covered that. So just just saying, I don’t want to be accused of being a denialist not caring about climate change, I recognise it is an issue. I’m just saying we need to think intelligently about how we respond to it. And in my view, we’re probably we’re probably not adopting the right measures. And certainly all of these new industrial policy or in measures, particularly some we’ve seen in this latest budget, where we’ve got these generous tax incentives for hydrogen production in critical minerals. Where the government is is, is saying, Well, we think these are the industries of the future. I mean, they may well be but hydrogen, renewable hydrogen, that certainly you could say it’s an unproven technology, or commercially unproven, we’re not sure whether we will be able to develop a commercially viable hydrogen industry. And does it make sense for the government to have this tax incentive just for that industry to try to promote the growth of that industry, the movement of resources into that into that industry and away from sectors which actually could be more productive and which aren’t receiving the subsidy? That’s what I’d be wondering. And there has been a bit of criticism of, of this measure the particularly the hydrogen production incentive, because there are some and critical minerals to because there are some well known billionaires who will likely benefit from those measures. And one name that comes up is Andrew Twiggy, Forrest. And there’s been accusations that these tax incentives are millions, for billionaires. So there’s a really interesting debate going on about that at the moment. Right. Oh, I mean, one thing I should note is that those incentives are worth a lot of money. And I’ll put some links in the show notes regarding that. I mean, they’re talking about billions of dollars of subsidies. So check out the show notes for all of the details. Okay, now, let’s hear some more from Saxon about the budget and what he thinks it should have done rather than pursuing these industrial policies. And as you’re listening, just note that the ringing that you can hear that was a bell ringing in Parliament House in Canberra, that was telling members of the House of Representatives to get back to the chamber. So it’s on the audio, we can hear it, because one of the people on the call was Queensland Senator Malcolm Roberts, he joins us from his office in Parliament House and the bell was ringing in the background. So it’s very loud. He’s in the Senate, but he could still hear the bell. Right. Oh, let’s, let’s see this other clip.

Saxon Davidson  19:43

This budget is interesting because it actually lays bare the lack of a productivity agenda that the current government have, you cannot deal with inflation and the anaemic economic growth that we are currently suffering unless you have a productivity agenda because our rising tide lifts all boats. That is actually how you deal with the cost of living, not with handout how to hand out inflationary spending after inflationary spending, and the lack of productivity agenda is really laid out with this future, this protectionist future made in Australia policy. It is shovelling money out of, well, essentially shovelling money out of our other industries, to put to pick winners and to put into the production of solar panels and other subsidised green energy policies. Senator Roberts was correct that a lot of our productivity issues can be solved by removing a policy of net zero emissions by 2050. You know, this government repeatedly over regulates and overburdens our most productive industries that being mining agriculture, gas, coal, iron ore, and then get them to basically create these previous two surpluses about but they’re not structural surpluses, they’re actually we have entrenched deficits, which the government is hiding behind the political euphemism, unavoidable spending. Besides servicing the debt and national defence, I don’t believe there is actually ever such a thing as unavoidable spending. But I’ll leave it there because I know we’re short for time, but we can sort of Yeah, go on from there. Sex.

Gene Tunny  21:19

And can I ask about your productivity agenda? So you identified you think energy is one of those areas, you’re you’d be against all of these net zero emission policies to get to that target? Is there anything else that your productivity agenda? Well,

Saxon Davidson  21:35

I’d reverse a lot of the industrial relation laws that have been passed in the past couple of years, particularly because we actually got a worker shortage, we don’t actually, it is actually counterintuitive to make our labour laws more rigid than they currently are, especially when they were already rigid before this current government entered power in May 2022. For example, there are bountiful of red tape and tax laws that apply to Australians who wish to work but cannot, such as Australian veterans pensioners and students on the Youth Allowance. people receiving those benefits face a tax rate as high as 66% Starting July one thanks to the stage three tax cuts. And that’s because their their benefits and combined their combined benefits and income is is automatically bound to the lowest tax threshold. But also, if a pensioner for example, if they work a day and a half or minimum wage, they’re all of a sudden caught by a 50% taper rate to their benefits, which means they pay a start in July won a 66% effective marginal tax rate for working. This is why only 3% of pensioners are currently in the workforce. And there was no plan to address this in this current budget. When I play research looked at New Zealand and their equivalent tax system where pensioners are not accountable under the same tax rate. They actually pay a minimum tax rate of about 10.5%. Should they choose to work on their combined pension and their income. And this IRS had found that this was the major reason why, why they haven’t suffered a worker shortage crisis. Since COVID. Our worker shortage and productivity sort of solution is actually mass migration. And it simply hasn’t worked. We still have a worker shortage. And as Senator Roberts alluded to, we’re in a per capita recession. The slice of the pie is getting larger, but the slice of the pie is getting small.

Gene Tunny  23:38

Right? Oh, that’s more great stuff there from Saxon so well done Saxon. Saxon is definitely an Australian economist to look out for in the future. And I what I thought was good about that is I think, Saxon highlighting an area where New Zealand is doing something better than Australia. I think that’s, that’s very effective in an argument because nothing is going to annoy Australians more than hearing that New Zealand is doing something better than us. So given our friendly rivalry, I should say with our Kiwi cousins. Okay, we’ll take a short break here for a word from our sponsor.

Female speaker  24:29

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Gene Tunny  24:58

Now back to the show. So what I also like there is Saxons talking about productivity. And he’s emphasising that, well, we shouldn’t be trying to pick winners and, and, you know, have the government favouring one sector over the other. I mean, we should be looking at these more fundamental what we should be looking at what economists would call framework policies or structural policies. And this was always the view we had in, in Treasury. I mean, yeah, sure, you can have policies that price externalities or policies that promote something that is generally beneficial, such as innovation where there might be a market failure, which means you don’t get enough of it. But these policies should be economy wide, you shouldn’t be favouring one industry over the other, what you should be doing is getting the right economic framework policies in place. And so those are policies that promote competition, those are policies that that you know, promote a efficient or flexible labour market. So I mean, we want you know, we need some basic protections in the labour market, I mean, we don’t want people exploited, but at the same time, the more you regulate the labour market, the more difficult you make it, the more expensive you can make labour, particularly low skilled labour, and the more difficult it becomes, and, and particularly if we have all of these rules around, unfair dismissal, etc, it can make employers reluctant to, to hire workers. And I think, I think sextons Making some, some fair points there about the tax system. And the welfare system, we’ve got to be careful how we design those policies. I think that’s good stuff from Saxon, he’s pointing us in the direction of what we should be looking at when we’re thinking about how do we make our economy more productive. So very good. Now, recall from the previous clip, not that one, the one before that Saxon mentioned how we’d seen this movie before. So this movie of heavy government intervention, and Saxon mentioned the economic turmoil of the 1970s, and how that was related to the interventionist policies of governments. Now, that brought to mind a conversation that I had on the show in late 2020, with Amon Butler, co founder of the Adam Smith Institute. We talked about how Margaret Thatcher so the UK Prime Minister, how she came to power after the post war, UK socialist economic model broke down in the 1970s. So let me play you a clip from that episode for you. After I watched the season four of the crown, so the Netflix series on the royal family, and Gillian Anderson plays, Margaret Thatcher, the pm the Iron Lady, and I think her performance is amazing. She really, I think she nails the mannerisms of Margaret Thatcher and the voice. But the depiction of fascia seems a bit slanted or bias to me. It focuses on a lot on the social dislocation that the series suggests were was caused by her policies. People are unemployed and struggling. And it contrast that with well, that Thatcher and also the Queen, and they, it suggests that they’re detached from it all. And there’s this episode where Fagan who was the the unemployed man, I think he was who broke into Buckingham Palace and ended up speaking with a queen for 10 minutes, it paints a very sympathetic portrait of him, in contrast to Thatcher. So I wanted to speak with someone in the UK about just what the situation was like in Britain in the in the 70s. Would you be able to describe that, please, amen. So we can understand how Facha got into power. What What was she trying to, to address?

Eamonn Butler  29:40

Well, I can I can describe that very easily because I wasn’t the only one. What am I? Well, two of my colleagues did exactly the same. In the mid 1970s, I joined the brain drain, because I went to America, because I thought there was no future in The UK that the trade unions were running country, people were seriously saying that it was going to end up nearer to an Eastern European country as they were there, rather than a Western European country. And a lot of us thought that there’s no point in sticking around here. And so a lot of us immigrated, large numbers of people simply left the country. And of course, large amounts of money left the country as well. But investors thought there’s no point in keeping your money in Britain. It’s a big world and your investments in Britain look dire. But I mean, in 1939, when Mrs. Thatcher took office, the state controlled everything. When you woke up in the morning, obviously, you wake up to or the BBC, which is a state organisation, of course, you still do. But you wake up to that on perhaps your alarm radio, which is powered by electricity, which was produced by the states, you go downstairs and you, you put your state produced egg into a state produce saucepan and you fill it with state produce water, and you will put it on your state produce gas oven, using state produced gas and so on, you would take your kids to the school in your state car or your state bus. And every part of your life was run by the state because they control all of the key industries, coal, shipbuilding, steel, transport, everything. And of course, the trouble is that when you give people monopolies, they abused them. And these were state monopolies and they were abused. And the the product was expensive, particularly for taxpayers who had to pay for all these things. And everything was run through the convenience of the workforce. And so the trade unions became exceedingly powerful. And of course, they had special legal privileges as well that had been granted them so they could, they could have wildcat strikes and secondary picketing, and nobody could do anything about it. If you pick it came around your your factory, there was nothing you could do, even if you weren’t involved in the dispute. So they they knew that they could bring the entire country to a halt. And, you know, they, during Mr. Sanchez time, they very nearly succeeded. But she realised that that had to be taken on that. People blame her for unemployment, particularly in the north of England where coal mines were closed down and steel mills close. But that wasn’t her fault. The problem was that we had wasted our time and energy and money on these industries decades before, that it was cheaper in 79, to load coal from take coal from Australia, and landed in Southampton than it was to pull it out of the mines in South Wales. It just made no economic sense at all. So Mrs. Thatcher realised that we couldn’t go on like that. And she knew it would be painful. And but she was determined enough that the country would go through that pain and it will come out better the other side, which it did, yes,

Gene Tunny  33:16

yes. So do you remember or were you in the States at the time the so called Winter of discontent, there’s a there’s a photo in this book, the commanding heights by Daniel Yergin, and a co author is a photo of Leicester Square. In the West End in London, it’s been used as a garbage tip, in this so called Winter of discontent. 1978 79. So before Margaret Thatcher was elected, was that because of the gobos, the garbageman were on strike, whether it just strikes across the country, before Thatcher got in.

Eamonn Butler  33:57

Everybody was on strike because the Labour government which lasted until the middle of 1979, realised that it had run out of money, and that it couldn’t keep on paying higher and higher wages to public sector workers, which was most of the workforce. And the Prime Minister James Callaghan famously said that at the Labour Party Conference, and there was an outrage that and so the trade unions, protesting that they weren’t getting pay rises, basically knew that they could bring the country to a halt so that they would put that pressure on the government in order to get higher wages and better conditions. And the government simply said, No, we can’t do that. There isn’t any money. So then, everybody went, I mean, that the whole public sector was was hit by strikes and it wasn’t just garbage in Leicester Square in the middle of London, which I remember very well. And in fact, I think we did a little report on, on how to get out of that crisis. And we use the same photograph of the garbage and rats running around in in the centre of the tourist centre of London, if you can believe that. And then went on Barrett. And there was a famous case where somebody was being transported to hospital over the Yorkshire Dales, in the snow. And the the ambulance drivers got a message that they were now on strike, they had to down tools. So this was he stopped out, make her way home. And it’s that sort of feeling. Business and so it was a winter of discontent. And it was it was a dire period. And I think that convinced the British public, we couldn’t go on like this, we actually had to, to do something else. And Mrs. Thatcher was clear in her vision that something needed to be done and, and so that’s why people voted for it.

Gene Tunny  36:07

Okay, so I think that’s a good reminder of why there was a change, of course, in in economic policy in the 1980s. In Britain, under Thatcher in the US under Reagan, and in Australia under Hawke and Keating, the old interventionist why that wasn’t working? Well, arguably, it never worked. We should remember that. We should remember that when we hear all of these growing calls for more government intervention for industrial policy in particular, which is the topic of this episode. Now, another clip, I want to play, it relates to one of the great failures of of industrial policies. I think there are many failures. There, there are too many to go through this episode. I mean, maybe I’ll come back. I mean, you know, I should probably mention, you could argue there are some successes, but I think the the failures are more numerous. And, and probably more likely, because if if something is commercial, if it’s economic to invest in, then the private sector is probably going to be undertaking it already. It’s going to be investing in it. So you have to argue that are there some market failure that’s preventing that and, I mean, you know, that can be that can be difficult to argue. So yeah, I mean, generally I’m very sceptical and I think the evidence is weighted toward the failures and one of the great failures of industrial policy was the Concorde. Supersonic aeroplane. So the Concorde supersonic aeroplane, as we know, it was an economic proposition. It, it flew for maybe, well, a few decades, it’s no longer flying. It just wasn’t commercial for either British Airways or, or Air France, I think it was. Now Concorde. It was developed in an era when there was a great belief that governments could shape the future of industry, particularly by encouraging r&d and the take up of technology. The UK Labour leader, later Prime Minister Harold Wilson, he gave what was by all accounts and electrifying speech in 1963, to the Labour Party Conference, about how his government would use the white heat of technology to transform Britain’s economy. It was a grand vision and Concord was an important part of that vision of that vision to transform Britain’s economy. So, you know, this was a vision that was you know, it started before Wilson, but, you know, there was almost a pre war Well, sorry, there was almost a post war consensus between the Conservatives and labour regarding the role of government, the role of government to steer the economy but Wilson really crystallised that, in that that famous speech of his and Concorde ends up being overseen by Wilson’s government for during the late the mid to late 60s. And and so I think it’s it really is an important part of that, of that vision of, of the white heat of technology, trends forming the economy. Okay, I spoke about Concord with my adept economics colleague Arturo Espinosa in a march 2022 episodes. So let’s take a listen to this clip. And if you want to learn more about Concord, then definitely check out this episode. But let’s hear the clip. We might chat about what Concorde is, I just want to make sure that if you’re listening, and you’re unfamiliar with Concorde, and I’m guessing you probably know a little bit about it, because it’s such an iconic aircraft, and it’s such a beautiful design really sleek and the delta wing. And that, that knows that. That it’s like a beak, isn’t it like the beak of a bird? I think they call it a droop nose, because it can, it can move around. So depending on what stage of the flight you are, it will either be in the rock than the standard position or it will drop down. So I think when they were coming into land, they would they would drop it down just to improve their visibility. So yeah, it’s got a it’s got an interesting nose there. And yes, it’s, as you mentioned, it’s supersonic. So it can travel faster than the speed of sound. And I think actually travel about two times the speed of sound. So at Mach two, so supersonic when I was chatting with Tim, I said, Oh, is it hypersonic? And now it’s not hypersonic. So Tim corrected me it was supersonic. So supersonic is faster than the speed of sound. And hypersonic is five times the speed of sound, at least I think there are some hypersonic missiles that have been developed that have that I’ve seen while I’ve seen in the news reports. Okay, so yeah, Concorde was it was a joint project, it was a joint venture in a way between the British and the French governments. And the name for it came from an agreement that they reached in the early 1960s, I think was a treaty was signed on 29th of November 1962. And so what you had was, this is something that came out of the 1950s. And you had both there were British and French companies that were investigating supersonic, air travel, and I think the Americans were looking at it too, but the British and French, they reached an agreement whereby there would be a joint project because there was a British company that was looking at it, the British Aircraft Corporation, and that was being funded by the British government. So they were providing funds for research and development by that British Aircraft Corporation. And there was also a French company, which was state owned sued aviation, which later became Aerospatiale. They were looking at it too. And so the two governments got together and decided to enter this joint venture for Concorde, whereby they would jointly develop this aircraft that shared the development costs. And they would also they would split the production of it across Britain and France, too, with a view to creating jobs and all that. So it was a British and French government project. And I mean, I would argue that this is a good example, that there’s there’s a few economic principles which come out of the whole Concorde experience. And we talked about the sunk cost fallacy. Well, the fact you should ignore sunk costs. One, one principle, or close to a principle, I would argue is that governments need to be very careful about going into business. I mean, governments really, governments really shouldn’t be picking winners or picking projects. They should be doing the core business of government, I mean, National Defence and the justice system and mean, arguably some assistance for health and education, rather than trying to develop a new supersonic aeroplane. I mean, when you’ve got governments making these decisions and funding r&d for this sort of thing. I mean, it’s, it’s probably more likely it’s not going to be a commercial proposition, and it’s going to be a waste of money. So that would be one thing. I would argue Do you have any, any thoughts on that tomorrow, of course,

Arturo Espinoza Bocangel  44:37

and that there is an interesting point. So in order to see what is the real scope of the government, right, definitely the government should focus on other issues that are more relevant for people instead of promoting this kind of embarrassment that as we We have seen is worth a failure in terms of economic business perspective, right. So, I think,

Gene Tunny  45:11

yeah, I mean, it’s the sort of thing I mean, it could have, who knows? I mean, maybe, maybe if things weren’t right, and the oil price didn’t increase three or four times over what it was previously, after 1973. Maybe the the economics of the whole project would have been better. And it could have been, it could have been more of a mass proposition. I think the mass market proposition, I think the problem that they ended up having was that it became a real niche product. It was really only wealthy people, pop stars and, you know, CEOs of Fortune 500 companies who could actually afford to fly on Concorde. As we can talk about LIDAR. I mean, I think tickets ended up being about in today’s dollars, I mean, I think over 10,000 US dollars, really, I mean, expensive tickets. Yeah. And so you really have to have a you really have to have deep pockets either don’t you have to be someone who really doesn’t care how much they’re spending, or it’s just absolutely time critical that you need to get from New York, New York to London or the other way or Paris to New York, you need to get there in three hours or so. It was a good fly incredibly quickly. Now, I think the figures I’ve seen is that, so this thing’s flying it basically two times the speed of sound, whereas a Boeing 747 flies at point eight four times the speed of sound, so it’s not supersonic. So it can fly about to the Boeing 747 can fly about 900 kilometres an hour, whereas the Concorde could fly at 2172 kilometres an hour. So just incredible. And it’s 60,000 feet too, so Wouldn’t that be amazing to have been to have been up that high? And so it really ended up just becoming a transport option for the rich and famous in a way. And I mean, one example of that, Have you have you heard the story about the Live Aid concert and Phil Collins, how he used Concorde to fly from the Live Aid concert in London at Wembley Stadium. And so he performed at Wembley, and then he hopped on the Concorde. He got a chopper from Wembley to Heathrow Airport, and helped on the Concorde and then got the Concorde. The JFK, and then he ended up getting it was. It’s pretty, it’s a huge logistical job. Where is it? Yeah. And he took a British Airways Concorde flight to New York City before taking another helicopter to Philadelphia, just so he could perform at at the stadium and in Philadelphia, which I think might have might have been JFK Stadium in Philadelphia. That was in 1985, July 1985. So the big Live Aid concert for I think it was to raise funds for to help address or alleviate the suffering of people in famine in Ethiopia, if I remember correctly. So yeah, that’s one of the famous examples of the use of the Concorde. Que so, yes. The Concorde. I mean, it was such a beautiful aeroplane, but just didn’t stack up. Unfortunately. I mean, maybe one day we will have commercial supersonic travel. That would be amazing. But it didn’t work out. For for the Concorde. Right. Oh, to wrap up, I would like to first quote from that issues analysis paper for the Centre for independent studies that I talked about before. This is a paper I wrote with Robert Carlin. And in that paper, we wrote that activist industrial policy has chalked up numerous failures in history, including a domestic car industry that ultimately was unviable despite decades of tariff protection and billions of assistance with his embrace of activist industry policy. chamas is ignoring history lessons, both here and overseas. So yep. I was referring to the car industry in Australia, which is was, you know, Australia was proud of its current history. And we produced some great cars at times, particularly in the 1970s. And there was, you know, there was a great rivalry between Ford and Holden, at that was featured in the famous race at Mount Panorama in Bathurst. But alas, we just the policy settings weren’t the right policy settings. And we didn’t get a sustainable car industry, we had a car industry that could only be viable with with government support, and ultimately, even the government support that was being provided was insufficient to keep the industry going. So we don’t have any of the major car manufacturers here in Australia anymore. So that’s, that’s a lesson about, you know, the challenges of industrial policy, just how well, if you’ve listened to this episode, you will understand that I don’t think it’s a good idea at all. I’ll end with another quote. And it’s from no less than authority, then Adam Smith, walk a lot of passages in Adam Smith’s writings, this one is still fresh. It’s one of my favourites. And it’s one that I think that everyone in political office, they should ponder it every time that they consider some new intervention in the economy. So this is what Adam Smith wrote over 250 years ago. Little else is required to carry a state to the highest degree of opulence from the lowest barbarism, but peace, easy taxes, and a tolerable administration of justice, all the rest being brought about by the natural course of things. All governments which thought this natural course which force things into another channel, or which endeavour to arrest the progress of society at a particular point, unnatural and to support themselves are obliged to be oppressive, and tyrannical. That’s brilliant, isn’t it? I imagine that economists will still be quoting Adam Smith in 250 years time, and will have accumulated many more examples of the failures of activist industrial policy. Although I should be hopeful that economists will eventually win the argument against politicians with their grand visions of transforming the economy. I live in hope rato thanks for listening to this episode of economics explored. If you have any questions, comments or suggestions, please get in touch. I’d love to hear from you. You can send me an email via contact at economics explore.com Or a voicemail via SpeakPipe. You can find the link in the show notes. If you’ve enjoyed the show, I’d be grateful if you could tell anyone you think would be interested about it. Word of mouth is one of the main ways that people learn about the show. Finally, if your podcasting app lets you then please write a review and later writing. Thanks for listening. I hope you can join me again next week.

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Credits

Thanks to Obsidian Productions for mixing the episode and to the show’s sponsor, Gene’s consultancy business, www.adepteconomics.com.au. Full transcripts are available a few days after the episode is first published at www.economicsexplored.com. Economics Explored is available via Apple PodcastsGoogle Podcast, and other podcasting platforms.

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