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Podcast episode

Is Uncle Sam Running a Ponzi Scheme with the National Debt? w/ Dr Dan Mitchell – EP235

In this episode, show host Gene Tunny engages with Dr Dan Mitchell in a frank discussion about the US’s looming debt crisis. The conversation covers Dan’s new book, co-authored with Les Rubin, The Greatest Ponzi Scheme on Earth: How the US Can Avoid Economic Collapse. In the episode, Dan talks about the unsustainable trajectory of federal debt, the consequences of government overspending, and the tough choices needed to avert economic disaster. Hear how Dan reacts to the Modern Monetary Theory view that debt and deficits aren’t a problem.

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About this episode’s guest: Dr Dan Mitchell

Daniel J. Mitchell is a top expert on fiscal policy issues such as tax reform, the economic impact of government spending, and supply-side tax policy. Mitchell is a former senior fellow with The Cato Institute and The Heritage Foundation and served as an economist for Senator Bob Packwood and the Senate Finance Committee. His articles can be found in such publications as the Wall Street Journal, New York Times, Investor’s Business Daily, and Washington Times. He is a frequent guest on radio and television and a popular speaker on the lecture circuit. Mitchell holds bachelor’s and master’s degrees in economics from the University of Georgia and a Ph.D. in economics from George Mason University. 

What’s covered in EP235

  • Introduction. (0:00)
  • US government debt and entitlement programs. (4:48)
  • Government spending and its impact on the economy. (9:05)
  • US government spending, Social Security, and fiscal policy. (14:06)
  • US retirement systems and entitlement programs. (18:32)
  • Medicare reform and the federal budget. (24:05)
  • US budget deficits and entitlement programs. (27:59)
  • Taxes, spending, and economic growth. (33:01)
  • Kyle Kulinksi clip. (38:11)
  • Dan responds to Monetary Monetary Theory (41:00).  
  • Entitlement programs and government spending. (44:40)

Takeaways

  1. The US federal debt is soaring, with projections showing a large increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio in the coming decades.
  2. Government spending, particularly on entitlement programs, is the primary driver of fiscal imbalance.
  3. Addressing the debt crisis requires significant policy changes, including reforming entitlement programs like Social Security and, to a lesser extent, Medicare and Medicaid.
  4. Reforming Social Security through personal retirement accounts could save trillions over the long run.  
  5. Lessons from other countries show that fiscal discipline and restructuring can improve economic stability.

Links relevant to the conversation

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Transcript: Is Uncle Sam Running a Ponzi Scheme with the National Debt? w/ Dr Dan Mitchell – EP235

N.B. This is a lightly edited version of a transcript originally created using the AI application otter.ai. It may not be 100 percent accurate, but should be pretty close. If you’d like to quote from it, please check the quoted segment in the recording.

Dan Mitchell  00:04

We had this wonderful opportunity back when we had a much stronger fiscal situation and we blew it. And it could very well be in 30 years. As you know, once we’ve hit that iceberg with our fiscal Titanic’s, you know, sort of the, on the tombstone of the American economy will be. It’s a shame that we had the Monica Lewinsky Bill Clinton scandal because it ruined our chance of saving the country.

Gene Tunny  00:37

Welcome to the economics explored podcast, a frank and fearless exploration of important economic issues. I’m your host gene Tunny. I’m a professional economist and former Australian Treasury official. The aim of this show is to help you better understand the big economic issues affecting all our lives. We do this by considering the theory evidence and by hearing a wide range of views. I’m delighted that you can join me for this episode, please check out the show notes for relevant information. Now on to the show. A lot of thanks for tuning into the show. In this episode, I’m delighted to speak once again with one of my favourite economics commentators Dr. Dan Mitchell, co founder and chairman of the Centre for freedom and prosperity. Dan was previously a senior fellow at the Cato Institute. And earlier in his career, he worked as an economist for a US senator and for the Senate Finance Committee. This episode I’m speaking with Dan about his new book, co authored with entrepreneurs Rubin titled The greatest Ponzi scheme on Earth, how the US can avoid economic collapse. It’s about a rapidly growing US federal debt. The US federal debt is over 120% of GDP currently, and according to the Congressional Budget Office, it will reach 181% of GDP in 2053. In this episode, Dan explains the difficult policy choices that will need to be made for the US to get its debt under control. This episode of economics explored is brought to you by Lumo coffee, which has three times the healthy antioxidants of regular coffee. It seriously healthy organic coffee Lumo offers a 20% discount for economics, explore listeners until the 30th of April 2024. Check out the show notes for details. As always, I’d be interested in what you think about what we discussed this episode. Are you concerned about the ever growing US federal debt? Also, please let me know any ideas you have for how I can improve the show. You can find my contact details in the show notes. Right? Oh, we’d better get into it. I hope you enjoy the episode. Dr. Dan Mitchell, welcome back on to the programme.

02:42

Glad to be with you, Jane.

Gene Tunny  02:44

Yes, it’s excellent. Dan, I’ve enjoyed reading your new book with your co author, Liz Rubin, the greatest Ponzi scheme on Earth,

02:55

how the US can avoid economic collapse. To start off with, could

Gene Tunny  03:02

you explain why do you compare the fiscal situation in the US to a Ponzi scheme, please? Well,

Dan Mitchell  03:09

a Ponzi scheme as your listeners and viewers may know or not know, is when you, in fact, get the sucker people into a game where they pay money. And they’re promised that they’ll get their money back because new people will always come into the game. So if you get the game early, you can wind up winning, but all Ponzi schemes ultimately fall apart. Because they’re your pyramid schemes where however you want to describe them, there just aren’t enough new suckers that join the game to keep it going. So the early people get out, and they make a profit. But the vast majority of people wind up losing their money. And when you look at the budgets, by the way, not just in the United States, but in many Western nations with demographics of ageing populations, and poorly designed entitlement programmes. When the US budget and the budget of a lot of other countries, we’re heading toward disaster because government is growing faster than the private sector. And when government grows faster than the private sector sooner or later, that’s going to lead to massive debt increases massive tax increases massive money printing to finance government spending is just a recipe in the long run for some sort of disaster, and then the United States. We’re like the Titanic sailing toward the iceberg. Except we can see the iceberg. We know what’s going to happen. We know it’s going to be bad news, but politicians, they don’t think past the next election cycle, or at least they don’t act like they do. And as a result, it gets worse every year because they keep adding more spending on top of all the spending already in the pipeline.

Gene Tunny  04:48

Yeah. Can we talk about that, please? Dan, is it true that the US it’s running it’s got a baked in budget deficit, hasn’t it? It’s got a structural budget deficit of several percentage points of GDP. And so that means your debt to GDP ratio is going up by several percentage points of GDP every year. And I’m not sure the exact figure, but are you at something like 100? And is it 130% of GDP or something of that order of magnitude at the moment in terms of debt to GDP, we

Dan Mitchell  05:18

have two measures. And this, this confuses a lot of people, we have gross debt as a share of GDP. And then we have public debt as a share of GDP. The public debt as a share of GDP, I think is the more relevant number, because that’s the calculation of how much money the government has borrowed from the private sector. The gross debt includes the money the government owes itself because we have with programmes like our social security system, which is our pension system in the US. When the government was collecting excess payroll tax revenues, the Social Security system would give those payroll tax revenues to the Treasury, the Treasury would issue government bonds, a special type of government bond and the Social Security system, but it was the government taking money out of one pocket and putting an IOU in the other pocket. It’s only a bookkeeping entry. So so a lot of people when they cite that higher number in the range of 130% of GDP, that’s the gross public debt, which is the real public debt, ie the debt held by the public, plus the the amount of money the government owes itself for these phoney trust funds.

Gene Tunny  06:29

Right, so So what is it roughly I mean, you have, I think, what’s good about your book as you you’re careful to you talk about the actual liabilities, there are some there are the ones that are owed to the bondholders. And then there are also these unfunded liabilities. So you talk about this broader range of liabilities as well, I like that, can you? Can you give us a picture of where the US is now and where it’s heading?

Dan Mitchell  06:55

Well, it’ll be a depressing story. As I already said, the most important thing to worry about is that government spending is growing faster than the private sector. And as long as those trend lines are upside down, where government is growing faster than private sector, that ultimately is a recipe, as I said, for massive tax increases, massive debt increases, and government printing money to finance its budget, Allah, Argentina, at least pre President Malay down there. Now, what accounts for our trouble? Why is government growing faster than their private sector? The main thing is the entitlements. And since we were just talking about public debt, government debt, let me try to explain three different calculations. That held by the public, as we already discussed, is the amount that governments borrowed from the private sector to gross public debt includes the money the government owes itself for the phoney trust funds and Social Security and things like that. But then the really scary number are the unfunded liabilities. And that’s just a measure of how much money the government has committed to pay for various entitlement programmes Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, and since those programmes are the ones growing the fastest, and says the revenues, even though revenues are growing over time, you know, not only a nominal dollar, not only in inflation adjusted dollars, but even as a percentage GDP, the tax take in the United States is scheduled and projected to increase over the next several decades. The problem is government is projected to grow at a much, much faster rate. And these unfunded liabilities. And as you probably know, Jean, you know, a lot depends on what your projections are interest rates, discount rates, all these other things. But we’re talking potentially several 100 trillion dollars, depending again, what what assumptions you have in your model. And what it really boils down to is massive, long run fiscal imbalance in the United States, because government is simply growing much too fast and, and reuse my metaphor, we are heading for that iceberg. We’re in the Titanic. And it’s very frustrating that we have such short sighted politicians in both parties, by the way, where they just say, Oh, who cares? That’s, that’s a problem for someone in the future. Yeah.

Gene Tunny  09:17

And you talk about this concept of a doom loop. Are we is the US in that doom loop already? Or is that something that could happen in the future? If you

Dan Mitchell  09:27

were to ask me to make a guess? I would be on the pessimistic side. I just don’t think that our current political class has enough responsibility. My former George Mason University professor, the Nobel Prize winner, James Buchanan, we came up with the whole public choice school of economics, analysing what are the incentives facing politicians and bureaucrats, things like that. He and other public choice scholars will sometimes talk about the unwritten constitution And for a long time in the United States, there was this sort of expectation, even among politicians, well, we can’t really mess things up too badly. We have to sort of keep government under control. We can’t let debt spiral out of control. We can have massive, massive money printing or excessive taxation. And so that sort of kept things within check. Unfortunately, I just don’t think those constraints exist anymore. In some cases, I think it’s just pure shallow politics. I don’t care about the future. I’m going to buy votes today, try to accumulate power, make my committee more important, whatever their the incentives are, the politicians have. And in some cases, I think you have genuinely deluded people, especially on the left, who think, Oh, well, bigger government is good for the economy. You know, maybe they’re Keynesians, maybe they’re hardcore socialists, but I’m sure some of them are, are sincere in their beliefs, however diluted they are. But I think the main problem is, is that the politicians simply are so short sighted. They care more about their political careers than they do about the best interests of the country. Yeah,

Gene Tunny  11:07

I think I think you’re right there. Unfortunately, it seems to me, my impression is, is that politicians were more, there was more of a bipartisan consensus. I mean, now you don’t have either party that seems to be concerned about it. But back in the 90s, it seemed to be that there was more of a concerted effort by Congress on both sides of the aisle to get things under control. And then that helped Bill Clinton run some budget surpluses in the 90s. So yeah, even Joe Biden’s as a senator was, was very much in involved in these efforts. Am I reading that correctly? Dan?

Dan Mitchell  11:44

I think you’re basically Correct. You had, especially once the Republicans took over Congress in 1994. You know what sometimes it was called the Gingrich revolution, after being in the minority in Congress for What deal 40 years, the Republicans took the house, they took the Senate, it was a massive landslide win. And to give Bill Clinton credit, he didn’t try to fight it, he gave that famous State of the Union address where he said the era of big government is over, there’s over. And it wasn’t just rhetoric, going for a four year period, following the Republican takeover of Congress, government grew by an average in nominal terms of only 2.9% a year. And that was when we went from these massive $200 billion plus deficits. Now, of course, that seems small when we’re talking about reading today. But back then everyone was worried that was some threshold and you’ve crossed over it, you were being very irresponsible. Well, those big deficits turned into budget surpluses within a very short period of time, why government road grew at an average of 2.9% a year. And nominal GDP, of course, was growing much faster than that. And since revenue tends to track nominal GDP, that meant revenue was growing faster. So we had a bigger and bigger private sector, and relatively speaking, a smaller and smaller burden of government spending. Now, we got the budget surplus, but you know, when I think mattered, even more government spending as a share of GDP declined, because as Milton Friedman informed us many decades ago, the burden of government is not how much in taxes, it’s how much it spends. Because whether you you finance that government spending with borrowing with printing money, or with taxing, you’re diverting resources from the productive sector of the economy, so a lot of people in the US are very fixated on reading deficits, and that, Oh, that’s terrible. Well, they are bad. But government spending is the real problem. That’s what we need to get under control. And if we get government under control, make sure that the private sector is growing faster than the government, you’re gonna get rid of reading, you’re maybe not in one year, maybe not two years. And given the magnitude of the problem we face today, it might even take five years or 10 years. But so long as government spending is constrained, you’re eventually going to solve your problems of reading. And but the key thing to understand is government spending is the underlying problem. Red ink is simply a symptom of the problem.

Gene Tunny  14:14

Yeah, one of the strong points you make in the book is that the US Treasury itself, it’s issued warnings about this, hasn’t it? That this current fiscal path is unsustainable. So is this Janet Yellen is treasury. Does that mean that Janet Yellen, the Treasury Secretary knows this problem? And presumably she’s, I mean, you hope she’s telling, you know, Biden, and you know, the people in the West Wing about this. So where does the what’s going wrong? Is it in Congress? Is it the fact that it’s all just politically too hard that you’ve got these entitlements baked into the system? Well, what’s going on? What’s going wrong?

Dan Mitchell  14:52

I don’t know what Janet Yellen, the Treasury Secretary tells Joe Biden or for that matter, the Director of the Office of Management Budget, theoretically in charge of the spending side of budget, but whatever they’re telling him, Joe Biden’s budgets are terrible. He does have massive tax increases. And some people say, Oh, look, he’s serious about the deficit. He wants to raise taxes. But he’s always proposing massive spending increases. And of course, what do we know about tax increases, they never generate as much revenue as the politicians think because people change their behaviour. But also, whenever there’s an expectation of higher revenue in Washington, politicians can’t resist increasing spending. So Biden’s budgets were ever enacted. I would bet dollars to donuts that we would have more brand A we would have higher deficits, for those two reasons. So I don’t think you and again, is it Biden’s fault? Is it is it his appointees fault? Who knows who cares? The the key thing to understand is, he has terrible fiscal policy. He seems to be captured by sort of the Bernie Sanders Elizabeth Warren wing of the Democratic Party. And frankly, there really isn’t a bill clinton wing of the Democratic Party anymore. That’s that’s the problem. So, you know, Joe Biden, when he was a senator went along with Bill Clinton’s more free market economic agenda in the 1990s. But now, Joe Biden is doing the Elizabeth Warren Bernie Sanders agenda. And unfortunately, you know, Republicans have sort of lost that that old Tea Party zeal for fiscal responsibility and spending restraint. And that makes it very depressing for people like me, who work on fiscal policy in Washington.

Gene Tunny  16:35

Yes, yes. In terms of what can be done about it. So I had a guest on a couple of weeks ago, Michael Johnston is a in the in the finance industry. And he’s and he’s had a look at it. And you know, he’s we talked about the retirement age, we talked about the contributions, changes to the payroll tax contributions. We talked about, you know, different options for reforming Social Security. And you cover those in your book, many, I think, similar ones, but you’ve got a transition plan, which I think is really interesting, because there’s this recognition that the trust fund is exhausted to the or what happens is that when they run out of those IOUs, that the Treasury put in there, I mean, the cash went a long time ago. But when you get to a certain point, and then they have to cut benefits, don’t they? There’s a there’s a point in 2033, or whatever it is, but you’ve got a plan for improving that or getting out of that situation fixing up social security over I think it’s a 20 year period. Can you explain that plan, please, Dan,

Dan Mitchell  17:46

the problem we have with Social Security is that the spending and the programme is growing much faster than the revenues going into the programme. And as a result, this mythical trust fund is being depleted, the IOUs are being cashed in, which simply means the Treasury’s borrowing more money. But the trust fund, you know, as funny as it is, it’s still an important bookkeeping entry. And that’s going to run out in the early half of the first half of next decade. And then, technically, under the law, there’ll be an automatic cut and benefits for senior citizens of more than 20%. Now, will politicians allow that to happen? Probably not, you know, they could pass a lot tomorrow and add five zeros to every IOU in the trust fund. And on paper, that would solve the problem. But of course, it would only solved the problems by having Uncle Sam just issue hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of billions of dollars, and eventually trillions and trillions of dollars of new debt. So given the ageing of our population, and given the fact that Social Security is so poorly designed, in the book, less Reuben and I proposed to, in effect, do something similar to what you guys have in Australia, have a system of personal retirement accounts based on real savings. Now, you guys sort of just adopted it out of nothing. We have this giant unfunded liability and poorly designed Social Security system. And so our challenge is going to be entirely different. Because if we allow younger workers to start, in effect, shifting their payroll taxes into personal retirement accounts, how are we going to pay the benefits to current retirees, or to workers who are too old to benefit from a new system? And that’s what’s called the transition cost. And the transition costs, frankly, will be enormous. You’re talking 10s of trillions of dollars over the next 20 years. And some people say, Oh, my God, we can’t do that. 10s of trillions of dollars when we already have this giant amount of government debt. Well, here’s the here’s the most important thing to understand the unfunded liability. The cash flow deficit of The Social Security system over the next 75 years, and inflation adjusted dollars is more than $60 trillion. So here’s the choice, we have in the US two choices, to keep the current system going with a giant $60 trillion plus cash flow deficit, or transition to a system of personal retirement accounts, which $20 trillion or more of transition costs. Now, I don’t like having to make that choice. But if I’m going to have to make a choice, I’d rather have a $20 trillion problem to deal with than a $60 trillion problem to deal with. And then at the end of the day, wouldn’t it be great to have a retirement system based on private savings, rather than a government retirement system that’s untrustworthy, that’s based on taxes and debt. So I think Australia, not just Australia, Switzerland, Netherlands, Sweden, Chile, you know, there are several dozen countries around the world that now have much stronger and retirement systems that are better for national economies, but retirement systems that also are better for individual workers. So that’s a giant challenge for the United States. We almost did it, by the way, during the Clinton years. And that’s what’s so tragic. rebill Clinton was on board, he understood the issue, Republicans and Congress understood the issue. But then we got that whole impeachment thing, and Bill Clinton had to move to the left to shore up the Democratic base. And as a result, we had this wonderful opportunity back when we had a much stronger fiscal situation, and we blew it. And it could very well be in 30 years. As you know, once we’ve hit that iceberg with our fiscal Titanic’s sort of the, the tombstone of the American economy will be it’s a shame that we had the Monica Lewinsky Bill Clinton scandal because it ruined our chance of saving the country. Right? Yeah, yeah. Yeah, that’s

Gene Tunny  22:02

a that’s a good political observation there. Dan. I think that a lot of the maybe a lot of the craziness does date from from that episode. That was an extraordinary of a so now, what about Medicare? I mean, one of the other issues is Medicare and Medicaid, do you have recommendations for those programmes to

Dan Mitchell  22:25

the good news about Medicare and Medicaid is that those problems are much easier to deal with and Social Security. With Medicaid. That’s the easiest one of all because, and that, by the way, for your your listeners and viewers outside of the United States, Medicaid is the federal government’s programme, to provide health care to poor people. And what we should do to that programme is what we did under Bill Clinton with welfare reform in the 1990s. Simply take the programme, block, grant it and turn it over to the states. And then the states would then have full flexibility to innovate and experiment, figure out the best way and most cost efficient way of providing health care to low income people, and that work fantastically with welfare reform. We reduce poverty, we reduce child poverty, we increase labour force participation among low income people. So let’s learn from that success and fix the Medicaid programme. Wonderful, simple choice. We actually almost did it during the Trump years. I mean, Trump was very irresponsible in many areas on government spending. But Congress came within one vote in the Senate from making that reform is another one of these tragic things of history, that, that we didn’t take that opportunity. But maybe it can happen in the next four years, because that’s an issue where we’re, I think Trump is open to doing the right thing. Now let’s shift to Medicare. Now, Joe Biden has said no changes to Medicare, that’s irresponsible. Donald Trump has said no changes to Medicare, that’s fiscally irresponsible. So it’s very hard for me to be optimistic about anything happening on this programme in the next few years. But let’s explain what should be done. And again, for your overseas listeners and viewers. Medicare is the federal government’s programme to provide health care for old people, Medicaid, health care for poor people, Medicare, health care for old people. I’m on Medicare, because I’m 65. So you have to sign up. So I know I’m part of the problem now. But the simple way to solve that, and by the way, Republicans back during the Tea Party era, in the early part of last decade, they had budgets, the Paul Ryan budgets that fix both Medicare and Medicaid and what they did with Medicare at the end of that they looked at the Health Care programme for federal government workers for the Federal Employees Health Benefits programme. And in effect, what it does is it tells federal bureaucrats, here are your choices and health plans. You pick the one that that best serves you the federal gov reds can provide a certain amount of support to premium support. So we subsidise the plans, but you pick the plan that you want. Well, let’s do the same thing with senior citizens. Give everyone this sort of voucher if you want to call it that, and then let them pick from from a range of approved plans. And then of course, if you limit how fast the premium support grows, you could wind up saving trillions and trillions of dollars over time. Just like with the Medicaid block grant, you can save trillions and trillions of dollars over time, so long as you keep the growth of either the block grant or the premium support from growing slower than the private sector. So fixing Medicare and Medicaid shouldn’t be that difficult, not nearly as big of a fiscal challenge as fixing Social Security. But of course, it will be a political challenge, because we saw back when Paul Ryan was trying to fix these programmes. last decade, you had you had folks on the left running campaign commercials of a Paul Ryan look like pushing a grandmother off a cliff. It gives you an idea of the kind of silly demagoguery we get in US elections. But the good news is Republicans several years in a row during the Tea Party era, they were passing budgets that presumed Medicaid and Medicare reform. Now, Bill Clinton was in the White House, obviously, these programmes died in Congress because they couldn’t get any farther than that. But if Republicans can sort of rediscovered that Ronald Reagan, Tea Party type spirit of fiscal responsibility, I think there is a chance maybe not with Trump in the White House. But at some point, you know, I think there’ll be a Reagan type conservative in the White House. And those programmes can and should and must be fixed. We discuss that in the book we explain, you know, we don’t go into great details, we don’t want to bore just the average reader. The whole purpose of the book is to explain and common sense language with lots of facts, but not bearing people with jargon and stuff like that. Here is our problem. Here’s the direction we’re going that direction is going to be a disaster. But if we make these reforms, we can we can make America much more prosperous.

Gene Tunny  27:19

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Gene Tunny  27:53

Now back to the show. Okay, and what about defence, Stan? So there’s a you know, reasonably widespread view that I mean, the Pentagon waste money? I mean, I think that’s undeniable. It’s failed six or seven audits. There are concerns about unnecessary, costly military adventures abroad. 7 trillion or whatever. There’s all of these astronomical estimates for what the, you know, Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria has cost the US and will continue to cost in the future. Is there anything that should be done about defence in your view?

Dan Mitchell  28:34

I’m sure there must be hundreds of billions of dollars of waste, and the Pentagon, but we focused in the book, what are the long term drivers of our fiscal problems, and it’s, it’s not the defence budget, the defence budget has, has keeps coming down as a percentage of the budget over time. Or if you measure the defence budget as a share of GDP, it’s come down. Obviously, we don’t want to waste money anywhere, even if it’s not the driving force and driving problem in the budget. But defence is not the issue. Now. That doesn’t mean we should do costly nation building exercises in the Middle East. But on the other hand, I’m not enough defence foreign policy expert. But given what Russia is doing, and given China’s sabre rattling in the South China Sea and stuff like that, I’m not sure I would want to radically slashed the defence budget, I would probably want to reorganise it. So we’re more focused on being able to protect America’s national interest. But but that’s separate from I guess, a fiscal debate. Again, fiscal fiscally speaking, the defence budget is is just a tiny fraction of our problem. And that’s even part of the problem at all.

Gene Tunny  29:47

Right? Because it’s these, these entitlement programmes where you’ve got that fundamental problem of the spending ghetto, getting away from any revenue that’s coming into town, you know, to fund them. So yeah. And take that point. Right, and why isn’t higher? I mean, I think you make a good a good case for why this is a spending problem. It’s not a just a low tax problem. Can you explain why you wouldn’t want? The government has to address this fiscal gap through higher taxes? Please, Dan?

Dan Mitchell  30:22

Well, I guess there are two things that are important to understand. The Congressional Budget Office every year publishes a long run forecast. And by long run, they’re looking out 30 years, they published his long run forecast of the US economy. And in that document, the most recent one came out just last month, I think it was maybe two months ago. But it showed that revenues are above their long run average. Spending is also above the long run average. And if you look at the forecast, 30 years out, the revenue burden is going to climb to record levels, because mostly because of real bracket creep. In other words, as you know, even in a sluggish growth economy, you know, people are going to sort of their incomes are going to increase, they’re gonna go into higher tax brackets. So the government winds up getting bonus tax payments, with even modest levels of economic growth. So the tax burden is heading to be at an all time high. But because government spending is projected to grow much faster than the private sector, it means that, that we’re falling farther and farther behind. So just as a matter of pure math, our problem is more than 100%. on the spending side of the budget. Again, revenue is climbing as a share of GDP. But because spending is climbing much, much faster. Why on earth would we want to increase taxes on the American people for a problem that is more than 100%? on the spending side of the budget. But that’s just the math argument. Now, let’s look at what I call the public choice slash economic issue, which is that if you put taxes on the table, what are politicians going to do, they’re going to increase spending. And not only that, if they get the taxes throw, the economy’s gonna suffer. Now, I’m never one to say, Oh, you raised this tax or that tax, there’s going to be a recession, I worry more about if you raise this texture, that tax, the long run growth rate will decline. And even if it only declines a small amount, maybe two tenths of 1%, a year that has massive long run implications because of the wedge effect over time. And then, and I think that even left wing economists, the honest ones are going to admit that higher marginal tax rates on work saving and investing are not good for growth. So as GDP gets smaller and smaller over time, at least in terms of compared to some baseline projection, that means foregone tax revenue, because there’s less national income to tax. So what’s the bottom line, politicians will spend more money because of the higher taxes and the higher taxes won’t generate as much revenue? And you don’t want to know what the most powerful evidence for this is? I think I get the data for the, for the 15 countries of the old European Union, in other words, the core Western European countries that would be most analogous to the United States or, for that matter, Australia, relatively rich by world standards, Western oriented nations. And what did I show in the European Union, you go back and I did a five year average. So nobody could accuse me of cherry picking just one year that was favourable to my analysis. I did a five year average for the last half of the 1960s. And I looked at government spending as a share of GDP, taxes of the share of GDP, and government debt as a share of GDP, and taxes between the end of the 1960s. And the most recent five years, the tax burden in Western Europe increased by 10 percentage points of GDP. Now, politicians in Western Europe and these various countries Germany, France, Belgium, Netherlands, etc, etc. They said, Well, we have to raise taxes, because we have red ink, we have deficits and debt. So I said, Okay, taxes went up by an enormous amount as a share of GDP between the late 60s and today. What happened to government debt, they use this massive increase in the tax burden to lower government debt, no government debt during that period, doubled as a share of GDP. In other words, politicians spend every single penny of that new revenue plus some. So when I debate some of my left wing friends, I tell them, show me an example. Anywhere in the world, where we’re giving politicians more money to spend has resulted in better long run fiscal performance. It just doesn’t happen. By contrast, I’ve gone through the IMS World Economic Outlook Database, and I found not a lot unfortunately, but I found many examples of countries that for multi year periods had government spending growing at 2%? a year or less? And what do you find, in those cases when they’re spending restraint. And we talked about this, by the way, we have an entire chapter in the book, where I cite some of these good examples. When you have spending restraint. Deficits go down the burden of government spending, as a share of GDP goes down, you have success. Yeah, I couldn’t, we could add some blank pages in the book, and lift and title that chapter success stories of higher taxes, because there wouldn’t be anything to write.

Gene Tunny  35:32

Very good. And you saw it studies by OECD and IMF, I think that do establish that empirical link between taxes and growth and negative link. If you have a higher tax to GDP, you have a lower economic growth rate. If I’m if I remember correctly, you cite some of those studies. So I can put links in there.

Dan Mitchell  35:53

It is remarkable that the OECD and then the IMF, by and large are sort of, I don’t know whether you’d call them left leaning bureaucracies, but drug pushers controlled by government bureaucrats who respond to their political paymasters in Washington and Berlin and Brussels and Paris. And so you get a lot of bad advice from the IMF and the OECD. But both of those international bureaucracies have economics departments that do working papers and studies. And even though these studies don’t get a lot of attention, I look at them. And it’s remarkable how often those studies point to the fact that spending restraint, and low tax rates are good for growth, while at the same time to political appointees at the IMF and the OECD. They go around the world saying government should raise taxes and increase spending. So I’m not a fan of international bureaucracies. He has the leadership of the International bureaucracies. They respond to pressure from national capitals around the world. And unfortunately, when you have Joe Biden, and the US and your Sunak, in the United Kingdom, might as well be a Labour Party, Prime Minister, and then of course, he macarons No, good. Schultz. I mean, we just have so many bad left wing governments and the major countries of the world that you wind up with the OECD and the IMF responding to their pressure to give bad advice, even though many of the economists that work at those bureaucracies, publish papers that have findings that that good economists would agree with.

Gene Tunny  37:22

Yeah, yeah. Yeah, they’re not motivated by the politics. They just want to do the the analysis, crunch the numbers and come up with credible findings. So absolutely. Dan, before we wrap up, I’d like to play you a clip, which I think is it’s representative of all the the opposite view to yours. And, and in a way, it’s almost like when I listened to it yesterday, I thought is this Kyle Kolinsky actually talking about Dan, but I think he’s just thinking generally about other, you know, economists and what economists are not and what I think mainstream economists think about the dead. I don’t think this is necessarily a libertarian economist view. So I want to play this and then get your reactions to it because it’s, it’s quite a quite a fascinating clip.

Kyle Kulinski  38:11

Your line of attack against both Trump and Biden is the debt. That’s the first thing you list the existential issue of the debt. Okay, let’s be clear, guys, that is simply a right wing argument. That’s like the libertarian economics types, the Austrian economics types. The idea that, you know, the nation’s debt is you should conceptualise it the same as household debt. Like if you have household debt, you only have a choice, you kind of have to pay it off. Like you have to. It appears like RFK has no idea how the national debt functions, especially when you have a sovereign currency. He should read up not only on Keynesianism, but on modern monetary theory, because all this debt and deficit fear mongering, I just need to understand this. It’s the dumbest shit of all time. It’s just the dumbest shit of all time. Just just to give one example, Japan has had a lot of debt for a long time. And even their debt to GDP ratio was kind of out of whack. And a lot of like, right wing wall street types have been predicting forever, a debt crisis that’s going to hit Japan. And it never comes. They’ve been saying it since like the 1990s. That that’s gonna happen. It never comes. Why? Because they fundamentally misunderstand what the national debt is, what it means to run a deficit, how that impacts the economy. Here’s a fact that a lot of people don’t know. Did you know that public debts lead to private growth? Right. So from that perspective, you might even say in many instances, public debt is a good it’s just a good thing. Not it’s a bad thing. We got to fear it. You know, this is bad and wrong, and we need to reverse it and we need to Make sure we cut it. No. In some instances, it’s a good thing. Like there are very positive outcomes that come from public debt. And again, I don’t, I don’t think he understands it, that public debt means private surpluses. That is like, that’s the lifeblood, certainly of a capitalist economic system.

Gene Tunny  40:21

Right. So that was Carl Kolinsky, who’s a very prominent progressive commentator in the, the US and he was responding to something RFK Jr. said, he told Erin Burnett on CNN, regarding how he sees the dead as an accident, an existential threat to the US. And he’s worried that neither Biden nor Trump are actually that concerned about it, or will will do anything about it. So Dan, do you have any thoughts on I mean, that particular viewpoint, I’d be interested in your reactions to that because it is it does seem to be a common view among, among many people out there.

Dan Mitchell  41:00

But I never thought I would agree with RFK, Jr. on something, but he is right about Trump and Biden. They don’t care about that. But I would change the focus. My concern with Trump and Biden is that they don’t care about the growth of government. And as we’ve already talked about, Jean, that growth of government is the problem. The growth of debt is a symptom of the problem. Now, there’s no question that, that a lot of people who do fixate on the debt, have pointed to Japan and said, Oh, this, this is not going to end well. And, and I think those people are right, but it’s always a danger to imply that crisis will happen overnight. Now, having said that, let’s Ruben and I, at the start of our book, we give a little story. We say imagine that you’re Greek, and that you’re living in Greece in the mid 2000s. And everything seems great. You’re now part of the euro, your interest rates have come down, your economy is growing 4% a year. And sure there are some people complaining, well, wait, our demographics aren’t friendly, and our government debt is too high and government’s growing too fast. But you don’t care as a great citizen, because the government’s giving you lots of benefits. And it seems like the economy is just fine. And you think, oh, this person is just, you know, crying wolf. Well, guess what, within five years, your economies and one of the most massive, severe economic downturns that we’ve seen in the modern history of the Western world, and then, you know, their living standards dropped by 25%. In Greece, it was a horrible wrenching experience, because they got to the point where what happened were investors didn’t trust the Greek government. Now, we’re used to that with third world countries or developing countries, I guess we don’t use third world anymore. Why? Why has Argentina defaulted so many times because at least before President Malay, they’ve had all these Coronas governments that would spend money, borrow money, print, print money to finance their budgets. And then they got to a point where international investors said, I’m not gonna buy any bonds from that, from that government. That’s when you have a fiscal crisis, when investors no longer trust your government to pay back the bonds when they borrow money. Now, is Japan going to hit that? That that that crisis point? I think at some point, they probably will, because their demographics are really challenging. They have the entitlement problems, and government debt is more than 20% of GDP. And now, yes, they got the Japanese government has certain regulations, that sort of forces, a lot of private savings into buying government bonds. But at some point, you have to wonder they’re gonna run out of time. And I think the same thing will happen to the United States if we don’t get control of government spending. So I disagree with the gentleman whose clip that you played. I think that government debt is a troubling symptom of a bigger problem of government growing too fast. And I think Greece isn’t is a real world. Not that far ago, example of how that won’t end well. And yes, the US is the world’s reserve currency. We can print a bunch of money. But the mere fact that that guy was citing modern, modern monetary theory, the biggest crank theory that you could possibly imagine that you can sum up print your way to prosperity if that was true. Why isn’t Venezuela the most prosperous country on the planet? So I don’t know what that guy was smoking but that must be really fun.

Gene Tunny  44:40

Yeah, but look, it is. It is actually a an increasingly common view among particularly younger younger people. So I think it’s it’s interesting, he’s very influential on in those progressive circles in the state so that I get your reaction from that. Okay to that Okay, Dan, this has been terrific go. Yeah, I really enjoyed your book, I’m really gonna recommend it. I’ll put a link in the show notes. I learned a lot I learned about, you know, exactly what’s happening with Social Security in this days for the trust fund. That’s fascinating how it’s full of IOUs, how there’s going to be this, this critical point in in 2032, or 33. And I chatted about that with Michael Johnston as well, that will, hopefully for some type of action is not just some sort of, you know, putting in a couple of zeros, as you suggest that they could do, they could just say, Oh, look, all is good. We’ll just give you some, you know, pretend you’ve got more money in that trust fund. Let’s say they actually do something about that. And also liked you cite Switzerland as an exemplar of a of a, of a country that appears to be doing things really well. And in federal, the federalism there, the Federation could help because there’s the cantons compete with each other. They don’t want to have high taxes, they want to attract people. So I think that’s a good example. So yeah, definitely learned a lot from the book. Is there anything you’d like to say before we wrap this up, please, Dan?

Dan Mitchell  46:09

Well, of course, I recommend that people buy the book. I suspect, given that it’s a wonky topic, we’ll never sell enough that we get any royalties to speak of. So I want people to buy the book, not to not to put money in my pockets. But to understand what our problem is. Government is growing too fast. We have so many real world examples of countries that have done good things and bad things in the book. We have very accessible, easy to understand explanations of what’s wrong with our entitlement programmes, to solutions to fix those problems. And all I know is that I don’t want to be that Greek citizen in 2005, who 10 years later, was suffering through a deep, deep economic downturn because my politicians never got spending under control.

Gene Tunny  46:58

Yeah, yeah. Very good point. Okay, Dan Mitchell. This has been great. Thanks so much for appearing on the show. I’ve really enjoyed it.

Dan Mitchell  47:05

Well, thanks, Lucky. Thanks for having me on.

Gene Tunny  47:09

rato, thanks for listening to this episode of economics explored. If you have any questions, comments or suggestions, please get in touch. I’d love to hear from you. You can send me an email via contact at economics explore.com, or a voicemail via SpeakPipe. You can find the link in the show notes. If you’ve enjoyed the show, I’d be grateful if you could tell anyone you think would be interested about it. Word of mouth is one of the main ways that people learn about the show. Finally, if your podcasting app lets you then please write a review and leave a rating. Thanks for listening. I hope you can join me again next week.

47:56

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Credits

Thanks to Obsidian Productions for mixing the episode and to the show’s sponsor, Gene’s consultancy business, www.adepteconomics.com.au. Full transcripts are available a few days after the episode is first published at www.economicsexplored.com. Economics Explored is available via Apple PodcastsGoogle Podcast, and other podcasting platforms.

Categories
Podcast episode

The Limits of Fiscal Policy: Insights from Tony Makin, Alex Robson & others – EP222

This episode on the limits of fiscal policy features highlights from host Gene Tunny’s past conversations with the late Australian economist Professor Tony Makin and former OECD Ambassador Alex Robson. In the discussions, Tony Makin provides a balanced and insightful analysis of Australia’s fiscal response to the COVID-19 pandemic, critiquing programs like JobKeeper while recognizing some justification. He and Alex Robson discuss the importance of considering the open economy impacts of fiscal stimulus and the long-term burdens of debt. The episode looks to validate Makin’s warnings about the limits of discretionary fiscal policy through subsequent evidence and events. Gene summarizes the JobKeeper evaluation results and what happened in the Australian housing market following the pandemic fiscal stimulus. 

Please contact us with any questions, comments and suggestions by emailing us at contact@economicsexplored.com or sending a voice message via https://www.speakpipe.com/economicsexplored.

You can listen to the episode via the embedded player below or via podcasting apps including Google PodcastsApple Podcast and Spotify.

What’s covered in EP222

  • Fiscal policy limits and its impacts: introduction (0:03)
  • Economic stimulus measures during the COVID-19 pandemic. (9:36)
  • JobKeeper program design and targeting. (15:44)
  • JobKeeper program’s effectiveness and infrastructure spending challenges. (21:31)
  • Keynesian economics and infrastructure spending. (27:50)
  • Fiscal policy and its impact on the economy. (33:13)
  • Fiscal policy and its unintended consequences. (40:12)
  • The economic impact of public debt with Tony Makin and Alex Robson. (48:31)
  • Fiscal policy and its impact on the economy: wrap up. (53:39)

Takeaways

  1. Fiscal stimulus packages must be carefully designed and limited in size to avoid unintended consequences.
  2. The nature of the workforce is important to consider when implementing fiscal policy, as not all workers can easily transfer to different industries.
  3. The burden of public debt, including interest payments, can have long-term impacts on national income and economic growth.
  4. The effectiveness of fiscal policy in an open economy is influenced by factors such as capital mobility and exchange rates.
  5. Tony Makin was a leading advocate for sensible fiscal policy in Australia, and his contributions to the field are greatly missed.

Episodes the highlights are clipped from

EP119: What Tony Makin taught us about macroeconomics – Economics Explored 
A Fiscal Vaccine for COVID-19 with Tony Makin – new podcast episode | Queensland Economy Watch

Links relevant to the conversation

Fiscal policy papers by Tony Makin:

The Effectiveness of Federal Fiscal Policy: A Review

(PDF) Australia’s Competitiveness: Reversing the Slide 

 A Fiscal Vaccine for COVID-19

Treasury analysis of JobKeeper:

Independent Evaluation of the JobKeeper Payment Final Report | Treasury.gov.au

The employment effects of JobKeeper receipt | Treasury.gov.au  

News regarding unintended consequences of fiscal stimulus:

Building company collapses into liquidation days before Christmas, impacting four Guzman Y Gomez sites

Transcript: The Limits of Fiscal Policy: Insights from Tony Makin, Alex Robson & others – EP222

N.B. This is a lightly edited version of a transcript originally created using the AI application otter.ai. It may not be 100 percent accurate, but should be pretty close. If you’d like to quote from it, please check the quoted segment in the recording.

Tony Makin  00:03

For instance, baristas who’ve lost their jobs are not necessarily going to be one want to be out there on the road as a construction worker, financial sector employees and not wanting to be perhaps putting paint bets and ceilings. So the the nature of the workforce is important. We can’t just treat the labour force as this homogenous entity where people can transfer across to any sort of industry at whim.

Gene Tunny  00:39

Welcome to the economics explored podcast, a frank and fearless exploration of important economic issues. I’m your host, Gene Tunny. I’m a professional economist and former Australian Treasury official. The aim of this show is to help you better understand the big economic issues affecting all our lives. We do this by considering the theory evidence and by hearing a wide range of views. I’m delighted that you can join me for this episode, please check out the show notes for relevant information. Now on to the show. Hello, in this episode, I’m going to talk about the limits of fiscal policy. So that’s the use of government spending and taxation to influence the economy. So to try to smooth out the business cycle or to respond to some big shock, like the pandemic or the financial crisis. During the pandemic, in particular, we saw heavy use of fiscal policy by governments around the world. While some stimulus may have been warranted, we’re starting to really see some of the adverse consequences of fiscal stimulus packages in different countries. So you could argue that are a good part of the inflation that we’ve seen in the last couple of years that was due to the, you know, these massive fiscal policy responses that occurred that, that injected all of this additional money into household and business bank accounts, and we ended up with too much money chasing too few goods, which is that that classic explanation of inflation. We’ve also seen high public debts. So big increase in debt worldwide. And then we’ve got the growing burden of interest payments on government budgets. We’ve also seen impacts like what you’d call crowding out, we’ve seen supply side impacts, or constraints really starting to, to bite, particularly in the building industry. So some of these, these unintended consequences, you could say, maybe they should have been foreseen, they’re really starting to have an impact, particularly here in Australia, we’ve seen an impact on the building industry on its costs, and that’s affecting firm viability. So there’s all this extra demand, and there’s only so much supply out there. And, you know, supply can only respond in, it can’t respond automatically or instantly, to to this additional demand. So we’ve seen a big increase in in costs in that sector, and then that’s having all sorts of adverse impacts and you know, builders are closing down and then the people who are getting their houses built, they’re badly impacted, too. So that’s, that’s one of the things we’re seeing here in Australia that I’m going to talk about. Early in the pandemic, Professor Tony Macon of Griffith University in Australia. So Tony was based on the Gold Coast, which is south of Brisbane, where I am so early in the pandemic tiny warned about the adverse consequences of fiscal stimulus in Episode 41 of the podcast. So in one of the earlier episodes of this show, in June 2020, I spoke with Tony about his analysis of Australia’s fiscal response to the pandemic. He prepared that for the Centre for independent studies, which is a think tank in Sydney. So the CIS it’s one that I’m an adjunct Fellow at and I’ve had a lot to do with over the years. I’m gonna play some clips from that conversation I had with Tony, in, you know what turned out to be one of the early Months of the pandemic. So, I mean, things started going, going crazy. And when was it March 2020. So that’s a, it’s just a few months after, after that. We had a big a major fiscal policy response by the end of March in Australia, if I remember. And so we’re starting to see some of the, you know, the less desirable features of that already in in June when I spoke with Tony. Okay, so I’m going to play some clips from that conversation to illustrate some really important points about the limits of fiscal policy. So I’m not saying that activist fiscal policy is everywhere and always bad. I think what I want to say is that you’ve really got to be careful with it, you’ve got to think about, well, what’s going to be the ongoing impact on your interest payments? Could could there be any crowding out? Could there be unintended consequences? Could you actually be destabilising the economy in the future? You may be trying to stabilise it now, but could you actually make things worse than they otherwise would be in in the future? So they’re the types of considerations I think are important with with fiscal policy? Okay, one thing I have to say is that tiny Macon is sadly, no longer with us. He died unexpectedly in November 2021. So, in addition to playing some highlights from my fiscal policy conversation with Tony, I’m also going to play some highlights from my conversation about Tony’s legacy that I had with Alex Robson in Episode 119, from December 2021. So I think they’re worth that’s worth sticking around. For. Alex is a you know, he’s a former collaborator with Tony, he wrote some papers with him. And he’s also Australia’s former ambassador to the OECD in Paris, which is really top job in economics. Yeah, so Alex, Alex is a great person to hear from and he has a lot of excellent observations about about Tony. Okay, let’s play the first clip, which it features Tony’s critique of the massive job keeper, payroll subsidy programme that we have in Australia. I think that much of Tony’s critique has been supported by the facts. So new evidence, or what we’ve learned about how Job keeper rolled out and, you know, the impacts that it had. And also, I think that the review of the programme that my old deputy secretary in the treasury, Nigel Ray, so Nigel did a review of it. Last year, I think that that review that brings out some of these, well, that’s supportive of some of the criticisms that that that Tony made, although, of course, it’s it’s going to be measured. And you know, Nigel, is not someone who’s going to come out and say, Look, this is, you know, this is terrible, you really stuff this up, he’s going to be very measured about it all. There’s also a treasury research paper that’s relevant here. And I’ll have more to say about them after I play the clip. Tony, I’d like to ask about the Australian response, I thought you made some really great observations about the different elements of the response. So there was the job keeper programme, the payroll subsidy programme. And then there were there were cash handouts. And there’s also some bringing forward of infrastructure spending. You made some really insightful remarks regarding the efficacy regarding the merits of the different elements of the Australian Government response. And I think there are lessons that can apply to responses across the world, would you be able to take us through what those those insights and lessons that you made workplace turning?

Tony Makin  09:36

Yeah, well, I made a distinction between fiscal responses that were targeting the aggregate supply side of the economy, and, in the paper, endorse those in principle and in particular, we’re talking about job Keeper which I think is a great innovation. We’ve not seen a scheme like like that, before, it’s not original to Australia, Australia copied what was happening in the UK and New Zealand and one or two other European economies. And the innovation was to see firms as a source of employment. Correct. And to alleviate the pressure on firms and their employees in particular, by providing a direct subsidy to the firm. So it was a supply side initiative, more than a demand side initiative, it was helping aggregate supply, it wasn’t an element that he was sought to increase CRI or it was increasing G, of course, but it was it was it was aimed at the firm’s production. So that was an innovation. And I think there’s a prototype there for future fiscal responses in heaven. Let’s hope we don’t have similar sorts of crises. But it’s it’s a preferred means as opposed to the aggregate demand side response. And a, we’re in the form of two cash transfers or cash handouts, as we saw in response to the GFC trying to in the Keynesian ways stimulate spending, and the purpose of stimulating the spending is to enhance employment. So it’s a roundabout way of trying to enhance employment. I think it has the features of a of a subsidy to retailers in effect, because they’re the ones that they’ve been at most. And in any case, if there is spending and evidence shows that such handouts tend to be largely saved, but if they are spent, they are spent on imports. And they’re funded by borrowing from overseas, which has to be paid in the future. So there were two responses there that were trying to sustain employment one was the direct one to Job keeper. Good marks for that one. And then there was another one on top of that, which was the cash handouts, which was a roundabout way of of sustaining employment when there was another policy in place for that purpose.

Gene Tunny  12:24

Yep. So this job keeper, it was originally costed at one 30 billion, it turns out all it it may only cost 70 billion, there was a forecasting error. But that’s that’s, that’s tangential to our discussion. You did know that while job keeper is more justifiable than other stimulus or emergency measures, there are still concerns with the design of job keeper. Could you take us through some of those please, Tony,

Tony Makin  12:57

our look, the key one is the industry is involved. The questions about casuals being paid more on job teper than they were otherwise earning. So they’re being paid more not to work than to work. I think that’s the key floor with the with the programme. And hopefully that will be fixed when the Treasury completes its review very soon. I guess it’s also questions about eligibility and the the the rule that was there for downturn in, in sales, some of those aspects of it could be possibly fine tuned, but I think it is a useful prototype that can be improved.

Gene Tunny  13:49

Yep. If they if they did it again, I’m sure they would better targeted, and they might target it to the industries that are most affected, such as hospitality, tourism, retail, possibly not professional services, which, you know, appear to be, well not as badly affected as some other sectors. So the the key lesson is that this needs to be better targeted. The problem was from what I can tell this was developed within a week, possibly under a week when at toward the end of March, when they realised that they needed something like this because all of the employer groups were coming to the the government ministers and telling them we need this or we’re going to have to sack millions of people. So I think that’s what drove it. It was done very quickly.

Tony Makin  14:43

Yes. And also the alternative was to put enormous pressure on the on the Employment Benefits Scheme. people queuing up for benefits that would have been a major headache as well. Absolutely.

Gene Tunny  14:56

I think one of the great points you made in the paper was Sir. Regarding the cash handouts, we want to get people out spending, but the public health advice is saying actually stay home, we don’t want you to go out. So I thought that was a really interesting point. And actually, yes, that’s right. So the goal of these emergency measures should be to sustain businesses to keep people in employment during this challenging time. It’s not necessarily, though, and the way to do that is not necessarily to give people money to go out and, and spend on new flat screen TVs, which are imported. So that’s, I think that’s a good point that you’ve made. Okay, so that was Tony on job keeper, which was the payroll subsidy programme we had in Australia. And yep, Tony was, Tony was right about the some of the problems with that programme. Um, overall, I mean, I think that was a very balanced assessment of Tony’s he did recognise that to an extent, it could have been justifiable if it was better targeted. So he wasn’t ruling it out completely. He just had the had some concerns about the design. So I think that was a very, you know, measured, balanced assessment of job keeper from tiny, and another measured and balanced assessment of job caper came from Nigel Ray, who, as I mentioned, was my boss in the treasury. So really, really great public servant, Nigel. And, yep, I think he’s written a great report on job keeper. In the independent evaluation of the job keeper payment final report, he prepared that for the Treasury, I’ll put a link in the show notes. It was broadly supportive of the programme. But Nigel, you know, he had to acknowledge there are some serious issues with it with the design of it. And so what did he conclude? Let’s, let’s go through it. So one of the major conclusions was that a more flexible policy designed during the first phase of job keeper. So I think that was the first six months. A lot of the detail is, it’s hard for me to remember at this stage, but I think that he’s talking about the first six months of the programme. They rolled it out for six months, and then they had another six months of it. A more flexible policy designed during the first phase of job keeper would have enabled an earlier move from prospective to retrospective eligibility thresholds. For example, After three months, this would have allowed better targeting of payments beyond the initial three months and lower the costs of the programme. Okay, so what he’s, what he’s talking about there is that when it was rolled out, basically, you know, accountants would apply for their clients that apply to the ATO, and the accountants would be asking their clients, okay, well, what do you think’s gonna happen to your turnover over the next six months, so when whatever the whatever it was, maybe was quarterly basis, and, you know, you’d think, Oh, well, we’re gonna have this major pandemic. So yeah, we think we’re gonna get smashed. And so there are a lot of, you know, firms that applied for job keeper and got this job keep it like this very generous, turned out wage subsidy, that, you know, they really didn’t end up needing and they didn’t have that turnover reduction that they were forecasting and that they, you know, they’re they advise the ATO that they would, they would have, but there was no way for the ATO to claw that, to claw that back. So, yeah, what Nigel’s getting out there is that you could have designed it in a way that limited the fiscal cost by actually seeing, you know, what happened to the businesses like after a few months and then adjusting the payments after that. So I think that’s what he’s getting out there. It relied a lot on what businesses and their accountants were forecasting would be the impact of the pandemic on their, their turnover. And for many businesses that didn’t actually they didn’t experience the big revenue reductions or the turnover reductions that that they were forecasting, you needed to forecast a particular percentage reduction in in your turnover. I can’t remember off the top my head if I can find it. I’ll put it in the show notes. Righto. So and the second major finding from Nigel regarding job keeper he noted that a tiered payment structure One that is proportionate to previous earnings is better targeted than a flat payment. And this is getting at that concern that Tony had that there were quite a few part time. People, part time employees who may have maybe they were working a couple of days a week in, in a business and they, you know, they were earning an award wage that wasn’t much more than the national minimum wage. Suddenly, because of this payment for a job keeper was that it was more gee, it must have been at sort of trying to approximate a might have been a full time wage for a person roughly on minimum wage or something like that. I can’t remember exactly. But it was much higher, then, you know, some it’ll be more money than someone be would be earning if they’re only working a couple of days a week, part time. And so the idea was, let’s make this simple. Let’s get this out to the people who need it. Let’s not worry too much about trying to make it more targeted, because we don’t have time to do that. And what it meant is that you had and this is the point time he’s making you had many part time people actually earning more with job keeper, then they would have learned otherwise. So yeah, that was a really poorly designed part of job keeper. Also relevant regarding job keeper is a recent Treasury research paper and this came out. So this came out late on Friday, the 22nd of December, okay, so the Friday before Christmas 2023. And Peter Tula, who’s my colleague at the CIS, so Peter is the chief economist at CIS. He tweeted on the Friday that the fact that Treasury releases it late on Friday 22nd December suggests that it embarrasses somebody. So Peter was suggesting that this paper from the Treasury by Natasha Bradshaw, Nathan Deutsche and Lachlan vos, or vas, it’s titled The employment effects of job paper receipt, Peter suggesting it must be embarrassing someone. So what does it what’s embarrassing about it? So the main findings from it. So I’ll put a link in the show notes, you can check out what they’ve done. They’ve done some clever things with a, you know, a data set on businesses that where they can try to infer what’s actually going on, it’s rather clever paper. So check that out. Our findings suggest that at its height in early 2020, job keep it directly preserved between 300,000 to 700,000. Jobs. Right. Okay. So that’s, that’s reasonable. I mean, that’s, you know, if that if it was 700,000. And, you know, that could have pushed the unemployment rate up to near 10% or something, they’ve got an estimate of what then what that would have been, and put that in the show notes. So, you know, that’s a, that’s a big deal. But then if it’s only 300,000, well, okay, is that, you know, how effective was that? So I guess, maybe that’s something you could, you could say, justifies the cost of the programme, which was in the order of $100 billion or so that’s, you know, that’s something you could argue about. So, you know, I’d say somewhere between 300,000 to 700,000 jobs, that compares with around three and a half million employees covered by the scheme at its peak. So I think when the government was rolling it out, initially, it it was suggesting it could save something around, you know, 700,000 jobs or so. If it actually is about 300,000, then well, that makes you wonder, you know, was that good value for money? So maybe that’s something that they’re embarrassed about? I’m not sure. I mean, you could say Oh, well, hundreds of 1000s of jobs, maybe it was worth it. That would be their their argument. What could be the potentially embarrassing bit about the paper is a finding that is in the footnote. It’s a one of the footnotes. And this finding is it’s on page two suggestive evidence. That job keeper receipt made casual workers less likely to be employed over a year later. So they found suggestive evidence that job keeper receipt made casual workers less likely to be employed over a year later. So the effects are far smaller and less statistically significant than the positive effects found during early 2020. But are not implausible they could reflect income effects on labour force participation given job keep a lead to some workers having substantially higher incomes than they otherwise would have. Okay. So this is that point about these, you know, these part time workers getting all of this additional, additional cash so many, many casual workers would only be working part time, they would be, you know, they could be working in a bar or at a cafe, and they’re getting much more money than they would have expected. So they’ve got all this extra money in their bank accounts. And so what they do a year later, is, you know, for many of them, they go, okay, but there’s extra cash, maybe I don’t need to work as many hours at the bar or the cafe, I’m going to spend more time on my studies or, or on a hobby, or I’m going to go overseas. So that’s what they’re, they’re driving out there. So this is really illustrative of how you can have these unintended consequences with fiscal policy. So maybe that’s what’s what’s embarrassing about the paper. So check it out. I think it’s a good paper, it illustrates a neat little econometric technique that I might talk about in a future episode. Okay, so that’s, that’s plenty on job keeper, the payroll subsidy programme and the the challenges or the problems you have when you don’t design a programme properly, of course, they had to do it very quickly. Next time, let’s hope they have a much better design, if there is a next time hope there isn’t a next time. If there is it needs to be better designed. The second clip that I want to play from my chat with Tony is about infrastructure spending. So with job keeping, we were talking about this payroll subsidy and you know, often, often the fiscal stimulus comes in the form of cash payments to households or businesses with the payroll subsidy programme, which then had to be paid to the employees. Some fiscal stimulus comes in the form of infrastructure spending, public works, that sort of thing. And I think Tony’s right there, that can also be problematic, you’ve really got to think about that. And that is the topic of this second clip from tiny, so I will play that now.

Tony Makin  27:50

infrastructure spending can be beneficial. And it has lasting benefits. And what it does not do is deteriorate the government balance sheet, as does the spending on cash handouts and other forms of consumption related government stimulus. What infrastructure does is it creates an asset there on the government’s balance sheet that matches the borrowing, it still has to be funded by borrowing, we started with a budget deficit. So all of his extra spending has to be funded by borrowing. And so there’s an asset there, so the balance sheet won’t deteriorate, to the extent otherwise. But again, it needs to be quality spending, it needs to pass certain tests, the crude Keynesian idea would be again, just to spend on anything. And being holes in the ground, as you mentioned earlier, is a form of crude Keynesianism, which, which could well be sort of portrayed as a form of infrastructure spending if it’s working on the road somewhere. But the point about infrastructure spending is it does have to pass the test where the benefits the present value of the benefits of the project, exceed the costs. And one other point to make about infrastructure spending. And this is one feature of government spending, the Keynes instanced in his work originally right back in the 1930s, but he talked about Public Works, which is effectively what we call infrastructure today. But the difference between then and now when they talk about boosting infrastructure spending is that the nature of the workforce has changed dramatically. I mean, people these days, have certain skills. It’s a highly variegated work workforce, people doing different things. And the assumption in Keynes’s theory was you increase spending on public works, then you have workers easily transferred from jobs that they’ve lost places of employment where they used to be in factories and other areas of unskilled work and they can easily be transferred to, you know, working on the road, so to speak. But these days, that seems far fetched, because for instance, baristas who’ve lost their jobs are not necessarily going to be one want to be out there on the road as a construction worker, financial sector employees, and not wanting to be perhaps putting pink bats in ceilings. So the the nature of the workforce is important. We can’t just treat the labour force as this homogenous entity where people can transfer across to any sort of industry at work. And there’s also I mean, there’s, there’s information costs there. There’s transactions costs, which which make the whole process a little bit trickier than than it sounds in terms of increasing employment.

Gene Tunny  31:08

Yeah, it’s not like it was in the 30s when you could get a whole bunch of unskilled or semi skilled workers, unemployed workers and have them carve out a walking track in the national park or something like that. Exactly. Right. Yeah, yeah. Okay, we’ll take a short break here for a word from our sponsor.

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Gene Tunny  32:06

Now back to the show. Okay, so another really balanced and insightful clip from tiny. And one of the things Tony was talking about in this clip is Keynesianism, so the ideas associated with John Maynard Keynes, the great British economist, and there’s a particular I guess, a school of thought or there’s a crude Keynesianism often in the way that you know, some, some economists or well, not not many economists, I think most economists recognise the the limits of fiscal policies, the problem with too much discretionary policy with Hey, you got to be careful with it. But there are there still are some we could say crude Keynesians and in in politics, too, there are some people with these these crude Keynesian ideas and they become quite popular during times of crises. And you know, Tony was someone in Australia who was always, always pushing back against that crude Keynesian view and trying to explain what are the what are the potential offsetting impacts, you know, how can interest rates respond, exchange rate, what’s the response to fiscal stimulus and particularly in an open economy like Australia’s Okay, so I’ll play the next highlight in which Tony covers that. So,

Tony Makin  33:42

in the open economy, where you introduce capital flows, exports imports, exchange rates, and emphasising in particular the exchange rate, then you can have a counter model to crude Keynesianism and the best known approach is the so called Mundell Fleming model, which is which features in intermediate macro economics textbooks. And it really just builds upon the IS LM model that Hicks invented by introducing capital flows and exchange rates and net exports. So, listeners may well be familiar with with that model, but simply says that if you increase government spending, you’re going to increase the budget deficit there’s going to be more spending in the economy, but that for a given money supply is going to tend to push up domestic interest rates relative to foreign interest rates and that will induce capital inflow foreigners will be flooding into buy these bonds that are paying a slightly higher interest rate than in their own countries, and that capital inflow will appreciate the currencies. And we’re talking about a floating exchange rate here. And that appreciation will worsen competitiveness because in the short run, price levels are fixed. So a nominal appreciation will translate to a real appreciation. And that loss of competitiveness will crowd out net exports. And this is exactly what we saw. Post GFC. And I’ve written written on this. It’s part of the Treasury external paper. But the exchange rate appreciated massively. As the fiscal stimulus was being rolled out and just look at the national accounts, and you’ll see that the swing variable, there was net exports that went down due due to the loss of competitiveness. That’s, that’s one open economy perspective. And I think that model has been borne out empirically, with reference to Australia’s previous experience, post GFC.

Gene Tunny  36:10

Yeah, so I’ll put a link to that paper of yours, which I think was in agenda. And you also wrote a paper for the minerals Council. One thing which was what one thing that’s really interesting, tiny is that your original minerals Council paper was criticised by the Treasury Secretary, Dr. Martin Parkinson, my old boss at the time. But then a couple of years later, you wrote a paper for the Treasury under the new secretary, John Fraser, essentially, almost refuting what Dr. Pockets and wrote in that rather extraordinary refutation of your minerals Council paper.

Tony Makin  36:58

Yes, yes. It’s quite curious and evidence that economists disagree, even heads of treasury disagree and their economic thinking. So yes, Martin Parkinson issued a press release criticising my minerals Council paper, which was mostly about Australia’s competitiveness. It was not focused, essentially on fiscal policy. That was a part of it. But that’s what caught the criticism from Treasury. And then subsequent to that, when John Fraser Parkinson, successor became Treasury head, he commissioned me to write a paper for Treasury, and that is available from their website, Treasury, external paper where I elaborated on the aspects in the minerals Council paper about fiscal policy and and raise some of these issues about accounting models to to crude Keynesianism. Yeah.

Gene Tunny  37:58

It’s interesting, because I mean, we both worked for Treasury it at different times, though. And I remember the traditional Treasury view is that we have to be careful about fiscal policy because it could end up being destabilising is the open economy impacts that you’ve mentioned, there’s also the problem that you don’t know whether you’re intervening at the right time. The problem that, you know, the stimulus might come on when the economy is recovering anyway. And then it’s, you know, it’s not really necessary. So there are these lags involved. What happened, I think, during the GFC, or the global financial crisis, was that the Treasury people thought, and you know, the, the politicians Kevin Rudd, the Prime Minister, Wayne Swan, the Treasurer, they thought, well, we’ve got this huge shock coming from overseas, we’ve got to do something. So we’re just going to throw as much money at the problem as we can to save the economy. That seems to be the logic and know all of those old concerns about discretionary fiscal policy, what we call discretionary fiscal policy, as distinct from automatic stabilisers such as unemployment benefits, which increase during recessions or the fact that your tax revenues fall during recessions. That all view that discretionary fiscal policy is insensible. That was just thrown out the window. And we’re seeing it again now. So what do you do you have any views on why treasury? The Treasury line on fiscal policy has changed, Tony?

Tony Makin  39:35

Well, I think it’s become crude, Keynesian. And there’s another example that you hadn’t mentioned, and it was the response to the Asian financial crisis, which was also a major, a cataclysmic event at the time in terms of what happened to asset prices and, and we by then had been heavily dependent on the Asia Pacific For our for our trade, not so with the GFC. Because our trade with North North America, the North Atlantic region was minimal compared to Asia. And yet the responses were completely different. In the first instance, there was virtually no fiscal response, there was a strong monetary response, which allowed the exchange rate to stay at a highly depreciated level, which, which soars through that crisis, we didn’t experience a recession that time. And that was what was happening with the global financial crisis, the exchange rate collapse, not as much as it did during the Asian financial crisis. But the government of the day then panicked, reflecting the panic in the US, and by that time, interestingly, the International Monetary Fund had a change course. And it’s thinking it has traditionally been influenced by Chicago economists and had always highlighted in my time working there highlighted problems with activist fiscal policy, including the lags problem that you’ve you’ve mentioned, but there had been this major reversal of thinking at those levels. And the Australian government here, panicked as a consequence of the crisis where we did not where it should not have given that the banking system here didn’t collapse in the same way as it did. In the United States. I fully endorse the the underwriting of the system or the banking system at the time, but the fiscal stimulus was, was completely over the top in my view.

Gene Tunny  41:46

Okay, I really loved that clip of my chat with Tony about fiscal stimulus, I think the comparison he makes or the contrast he makes between how Australia responded to the Asian financial crisis, which as he knows, was a huge deal. Particularly in in Southeast Asia. I mean, it had huge impacts on a major Well, an important economy to the north of us, Indonesia, which, you know, country I’ve had a little bit to do with, particularly with their finance ministry. And it led to effectively to the overthrow of the Suharto regime that they had there. So huge, huge impacts in that region. And yet, Australia responded differently, as Tony was explaining, but by the time of the financial crisis, the thinking in in Treasury, and and also it was a government of a different political persuasion, too. So that may have had something to do with the response. Right. Okay. So we’ve talked about crude Keynesianism. The other thing? Oh, yes, one. One thing I want to mention here is that I’ve been talking about how there are these unintended consequences of fiscal policy that that we can see. And I think that was particularly the case with, with one of the packages that was part of the pandemic response here, which was home builder, which was this home builder grant to two people who were, you know, building or renovating a home. So they had a home builder grant there was about, I think it was two and a half billion dollars. I’ve got that in my notes. And it’s ended up having these, you know, a really adverse impact on the building sector now. So there was a really crisp report from this was on news.com.au. This was on Christmas Eve, Kassar building group collapses into liquidation receivership owing $3.7 million, Guzman and Gomez. So jiwaji sites impacted. And so it’s a nice little as well, you know, it’s not nice, but it’s a good illustration of these unintended consequences. So I’ll just read some, I’ll put it in the show notes. And I’ll just read. I’ll just read some of the main points because I think it does illustrate, you know, what can go wrong if you’re not thinking through what the consequences of your policies can be. So ASIC is the Australian Securities and Investments Commission. So that regulates companies here in Australia. So ASIC insolvencies, statistics show 2213 building companies collapsed during the 20 to 23. financial year, there was a 72% increase on the previous 12 months. The alarming trend has been blamed on a perfect storm of factors including fixed price contracts, escalating costs, supply chain disruptions and tradie shortages. So tradie that’s the what we call tradespersons here in Australia. I’m not sure if you use that term in other countries, if you’re in the state So the UK, for example, the previous Morison government’s home builder grant, which was introduced in June 2020, handed out $2.52 billion to owner occupiers who wanted to build a substantially renovated home it turbocharged the sector, more than 130,000 Customers signed on to the programme with many trainees agreeing to the work under fixed price contracts, it soon became unsustainable as prices began to soar. Okay, so there was this crowding out. And you know, the, the builders or the tradies, they were relying on supply, you know, whether, you know, they may, they may have had to subcontract to other trainees, or they may have been, you know, they may need to purchase the supplies, so plumbing supplies or timber, and they may have been thinking, Oh, well, we’ll just quote based on the prices at the moment. And then suddenly, there’s this additional demand a huge amount of additional demand, and their prices increase for all those input costs. And they’ve signed these contracts to do the work at a particular rate. And these jobs are no longer viable for them. And so now what we’re seeing is we’re seeing these these building companies and collapsing, they’re just going into, into receivership liquidation administration. Yep. So bad results from that. So I’ll put a link in the show notes to that really important piece of information there. This is my final clip from Tony, from my conversation with Tony that had in June 2020. It relates to the ongoing burden of the debt. So those interest payments that, you know, that takes money out of your budget, that’s money that you can’t spend on health and education, for example, and this is something that I think it’s not sufficiently appreciated by decision makers during times of crisis. Okay, so I think, you know, there’s, there’s this need to respond, there’s this, there’s this panic, we think this is, this is the big issue we’re going to deal with. Okay. Sure. Except I accept that. But I think decision makers really have to think more about the long term implications. Okay, because, you know, this, this crisis will pass, presumably, I mean, you don’t want to be, too, you know, obviously, we need to be realistic. But generally, these things will pass, we’ll get to the the other side of it. And I suppose we, we probably should have expected that we would get over this pandemic. I mean, it has been, it has been dreadful, and you know, lots of people have died from it. So I’m not willing to downplay it. But we should have thought that yep, there will be life after the pandemic, and there will be this ongoing burden. Okay. So let’s play the next clip, the final clip from Tony on debt. What do you see as the the problem with this is this buildup of debt isn’t there, and there’s the problem, we have to pay for it, or we have to service that debt and a lot of that money is going to go overseas. You’ve also mentioned the impact on economic growth. What evidence is there regarding the impact on economic performance and growth of a buildup of public debt, which is in Australia is easily going to exceed $1 trillion within a few years?

Tony Makin  48:31

Yes, well, there’s certainly going to be the impact on national income because there’ll be a pure drain from national income of the public interest paid abroad, and we’re talking about 10s of billions there that will just be subtracted from national income to service to service the debt that we will have and that that drain will likely exceed. If it’s a trillion dollar debt, it’s likely to be about eight times the foreign aid budget and a multiple of, of what’s spent on the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme and, and a host of other other government programmes. So there’s going to be a direct impact there. But there’s been a number of elaborate econometric studies done. And you’ll find them in the literature. I won’t instance all the authors, but the IMF has done work on this. I’ve actually done had a paper published with a PhD student of mine, looking at Asian economies, and there seems to be a consensus empirically, that a 10% increase in public debt. Other things are saying well, contract, GDP growth, that’s conventionally defined GDP by point two of a percent. So that might not sound much but new compound that through it can be quite significant. After a few years.

Gene Tunny  49:55

What would be the mechanism there tiny would it be the fact that too due to service this debt, you might have to have taxes higher than otherwise. And these taxes, haven’t they lead to an efficiency loss. There’s an efficiency loss with taxation, because you’re discouraging people from working or investing. Could that be one of the mechanisms?

Tony Makin  50:15

Yeah, absolutely. The interest rate is going to play a play a role as well. But the there’s going to be a deadweight losses of the future taxes are going to harm future income. There’s no question about that. But also, there’s other studies have shown that the the the interest rate will will increase by seven basis points, or 1% increase in the public debt to GDP ratio tends to in these studies show that the interest rate tends to go up by about five basis points or up to five basis points. But the mechanism through tax is important, but also, through expectations, if you’ve got this big debt overhang, public debt overhang that’s going to affect expectations. And we can invoke Ricardo there in terms of what what he said for for households having to attend to to save more, but also firms and it’s not something that Ricardo instance, I think it’s important that investment investment is likely to be weak due to the uncertainty that business has about future tax liabilities in the face of an enormous public debt. And then lastly, there’s the impact on future generations that Thomas Jefferson, a founding father of the United States instance, and that the the future generations are going to have to pay for the repayment of the massive debt that’s that’s arisen due to the fiscal response. Yep.

Gene Tunny  52:02

Okay, so that was really interesting from tiny there. Now, some of that was the point he was making about expectations and what you call Ricardian equivalence, I think we’ll have to cover that in a future episode, because there’s a big controversy about that, and to what extent that actually, that actually happens. So, yeah, we’ll we’ll cover that in a future episode. The other stuff, you know, the, I think it’s the other points are really undeniable, really about the the interest burden of the debt and what that does the budget. So I think that’s, that’s well said, from tiny Okay, so that’s, that’s it from my conversation with Tony. What I’d like to do now is I like to play some clips from Alex Robson, who I mentioned before, Alex is out of the amazing Korea. He was an economic adviser to former Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull has been Australia’s ambassador to the OECD in Paris. And like me, he hails from Townsville in North Queensland. So yeah, I was really glad to catch up with Alex. Well, I wasn’t glad because it was a terrible event. But it was good that I could catch up with Alex after Tony’s passing to discuss Tony’s legacy. So here’s Alex on tinies legacy.

Alex Robson  53:38

I mean, in a closed economy, the assumption is you’ve got no capital inflows or outflows. And so the exchange rate then doesn’t really matter. So what Mondale and Fleming showed in the 60s Was that actually, if you just change that assumption, and then allow for the exchange rate to change, and capital inflows and outflows to occur, and that has been impacted by by imports and exports. And so with policy, say, for fiscal policy, you get this leakage into and out of exports and imports. And so if your sales are up, for example, boosting government spending or reducing taxes that will then have effects on interest rates, exchange rates and exports, so and then an open economy like Australia, that obviously matters quite a bit. And so the critical thing lever there that that changes, or you know, a lot of those predictions of the standard sort of pump priming model, we think about your government goes out and spends more money and has these multiplier effects and so on is this assumption of capital mobility and how it affects the exchange rate. And once you have that, you get a completely different predictions about the effectiveness of these different policy instruments. So and and Tony was always really good at just constantly reminding people of this and and I think it’s the tend to be something which was taught. It’s been taught, obviously, in universities for a long time, but it didn’t seem to quite make it into the, into the policymakers sort of calculus in in in Canberra. And so that was just one of Tony’s big things was just to remind people and of that. And I think, you know, I mean, we saw that during the GFC. With respect to exports, we saw it with respect to the exchange rate, there were big changes going on. And the point is that, you know, Australia is affected by everything else that’s going on in the world. And that’s why places like the OECD and IMF are always talking about coordinating fiscal policy, because, you know, otherwise, you get these leakages across across countries, and you may not get the impacts that you’re trying to achieve.

Gene Tunny  55:50

Okay, and here’s the second clip from Alex. So my conversation with Alex, I

Alex Robson  55:56

mean, thinking about, he had a good mix of very good technical economic skills. I mean, he wasn’t a heavily mathematical person, but he did use those tools when he needed them. And, but also very much an applied focus to policy questions of the day that that mattered. And it wasn’t something where he, you know, there’d be a policy issue. And so I’m now going to think about that. It was, you know, he’d been thinking about these things for a long time. And then when they tended to come up again, and again, he was ready with the arguments that he divided, quite a lot of thought to. So it was wasn’t like he was sort of chasing these different policies. She was, I think he just spent a career thinking about the big macro topics. And they just come back again and again, in Australia. And and it was we were fortunate, I think, to have him as a voice during these tumultuous times in the big macro debates of the 90s. And then during the GFC. And then more recently, as well, yeah, I think, yeah, thinking about his career, it was a good mix of contributions to the academic literature, technical skills, but then also translating that into policy commentary and advice that really stood him apart from a lot of economists today.

Gene Tunny  57:10

Okay, so we’ve come to the end of the episode. I think that the experience of many economies over the last couple of years has provided validation for the criticisms of fiscal policy of activist fiscal policy that came from economists such as the late Tony makin. The takeaway from this episode is that fiscal stimulus packages need to be very carefully designed and limited in their size, if you are going to implement them. There’s a legitimate argument that they’re best avoided altogether, but I would reserve the right to use them in some cases. And even Tony did suggest that there may have been justification was something like Job keeper, but a more targeted in better designed version of it. Okay, so, to wrap up, it’s really pleased me to be able to go back into the archives and to to find these great highlights from my conversation with tiny, tiny making. He was the leading advocate for sensible fiscal policy and Australia for for many years, and he is sorely missed. Thanks for listening. rato thanks for listening to this episode of economics explored. If you have any questions, comments or suggestions, please get in touch. I’d love to hear from you. You can send me an email via contact at economics explore.com Or a voicemail via SpeakPipe. You can find the link in the show notes. If you’ve enjoyed the show, I’d be grateful if you could tell anyone you think would be interested about it. Word of mouth is one of the main ways that people learn about the show. Finally, if your podcasting app lets you then please write a review and leave a rating. Thanks for listening. I hope you can join me again next week.

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Credits

Thanks to Obsidian Productions for mixing the episode and to the show’s sponsor, Gene’s consultancy business www.adepteconomics.com.au. Full transcripts are available a few days after the episode is first published at www.economicsexplored.com. Economics Explored is available via Apple PodcastsGoogle Podcast, and other podcasting platforms.

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