Categories
Podcast episode

Reagan’s Budget Boss David Stockman on Trump’s Economic Policies – EP224

Economics Explored host Gene Tunny speaks with David Stockman, who was President Reagan’s first director of the Office of Management and Budget. Stockman discusses his new book, “Trump’s War on Capitalism,” and shares his frank and fearless commentary on the former president’s economic policies. In his foreword to the book, Robert F. Kennedy Jr wrote, “Stockman has become one of the nation’s most steadfast and eloquent crusaders against the corrupt merger of state and corporate power.”

Please get in touch with us with any questions, comments and suggestions by emailing us at contact@economicsexplored.com or sending a voice message via https://www.speakpipe.com/economicsexplored

You can listen to the episode via the embedded player below or via podcasting apps including Google Podcasts, Apple Podcast and Spotify.

What’s covered in EP224

  • Trump and capitalism. (0:04)
  • Trump’s fiscal and monetary policies. (4:41)
  • Government spending and lockdowns during the Trump presidency. (10:04)
  • Trump’s handling of the COVID-19 pandemic and its economic impact. (15:06)
  • COVID-19 response and blame game. (20:05)
  • US economy under Trump, job growth, and performance. (25:51)
  • Economic growth and tax cuts during Trump’s administration. (30:10)
  • Monetary policy and inflation during Trump’s presidency. (36:26)
  • Corruption in US government and military spending. (41:56)
  • Alan Greenspan’s legacy and economic challenges. (49:54)

Takeaways

  1. David Stockman argues that while Trump portrayed himself as a capitalist, his fiscal and monetary policies like large tax cuts, increased spending and pressure on the Fed to keep rates low were reckless and a threat to capitalism.
  2. According to Stockman, the data shows the US economy was not in its strongest position ever pre-COVID, as Trump claimed, with key metrics like GDP growth, job growth and investment lower under Trump compared with some previous presidents.
  3. Stockman believes Trump bears responsibility for the unprecedented pandemic spending and deficits, as he could have resisted lockdowns but instead endorsed huge stimulus packages.
  4. Stockman views Trump as the worst president for sound money policy due to his pressure on the Fed to keep rates low.

Links relevant to the conversation

Amazon page for Trump’s War on Capitalism:

https://www.amazon.com/Trumps-War-Capitalism-David-Stockman/dp/1510779329

William Greider’s famous 1981 Atlantic article “The Education of David Stockman”:https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1981/12/the-education-of-david-stockman/305760/

Transcript: Reagan’s Budget Boss David Stockman on Trump’s Economic Policies – EP224

N.B. This is a lightly edited version of a transcript originally created using the AI application otter.ai. It may not be 100 percent accurate, but should be pretty close. If you’d like to quote from it, please check the quoted segment in the recording.

David Stockman  00:04

He’s campaigned against the Fed, but he wants an easier fed, okay, I want to read the Wall Street doesn’t like totally different I want a Fed that’s proven that pursues sound money policy Trump wants a fed that prints even more money than the flood we already have.

Gene Tunny  00:28

Welcome to the economics explored podcast, a frank and fearless exploration of important economic issues. I’m your host gene Tunny. I’m a professional economist and former Australian Treasury official. The aim of this show is to help you better understand the big economic issues affecting all our lives. We do this by considering the theory evidence and by hearing a wide range of views. I’m delighted that you can join me for this episode, please check out the show notes for relevant information. Now on to the show. Hello, thanks for tuning into the show. My guest this episode is David Stockman, who was President Reagan’s first director of the Office of Management and Budget. Prior to the Reagan administration, he had served as a congressman. And after he left the administration, he had a career in private equity in business. David has a new book out titled Trump’s war on capitalism, and I was delighted to speak with him about it. David is a frank and fearless commentator, and I was never left wondering what he really thought about the former President’s economic policies. Indeed, David has a long history of Frank commentary. He first became famous for some frank remarks he made in 1981, to journalist William Greider about the Reagan administration’s budget strategy is also tangled with Paul Krugman, among other prominent commentators in the US. I really enjoyed this conversation with David and I hope you do too. Regardless of whether you agree with him or not, I think you have to respect his ability to argue his points. And he will demonstrates that ability in this conversation. I get the sense he is incredibly resilient as he’s copped a lot of criticism over the years, he’s had to make a multimillion dollar legal settlement with the SEC. He’s even a defender of criminal charges, they did end up being dropped by the SEC, I should note, all of this is to say that he’s had a very interesting career and life experience. And he’s someone worth hearing from, in my view. Now, David expresses some very thought provoking views in this episode, and I expect you’ll have some thoughts on what he says and you may have some thoughts on some of the things I say. So please get in touch and let me know your own thoughts. My contact details are in the show notes as our links related to the book and about David Righto. We’d better go into the episode. I hope you enjoy my conversation with David Stockman about Trump’s war on capitalism. David Stockman thanks for joining me on the programme.

David Stockman  02:46

Very happy to be with you got a lot to talk about here, I think. Absolutely.

Gene Tunny  02:50

Well, you’ve written a very provocative book a very, very in depth book looking at the policies of the former President Donald Trump and prospects for a new term if the minute is looking very possible that Donald Trump could be in the White House again next year. So your book is called Trump’s war on capitalism. Now, this is, this is interesting because too many of us, Donald Trump is the exemplar of the American capitalist. And yet you argue that he is undertaking a war on capitalism. And even more strongly, well, strongly. You argue that is a clear and present danger to capitalist prosperity. Could you explain David, how do you how can we reconcile these things? I mean, Donald Trump does seem to be the exemplar of a capitalist, but yet he’s a threat to capitalism. How do we reconcile these facts?

David Stockman  03:58

Well, those are great questions. I don’t think really, he’s an exemplar of capitalism. And we can get into that. I think he’s an exemplar of getting lucky when the Fed created so much inflation and asset prices and made debt so cheap that if you were a speculator, in New York City, real estate or elsewhere, you possibly made a lot of book, wealth, but I don’t think it was capitalist genius behind it. That’s the first point. The second point is that his policies were really almost anti capitalist in some common sense notion of conservative economics. To have a healthy capitalist economy. You need three things. One, fiscal rectitude, you can’t be running up the public debt, spending like there’s no tomorrow and having the government grow and mushroom and impinge in every direction on the economy. You can’t have easy money and a central A bank that is flooding the system. With cheap credit and excess liquidity, you can’t have a government that is really anti free market, which is what, you know, trade protectionism is all about. And he’s the biggest protectionist in the White House. You know, since I don’t know Hoover set, and Smoot Hawley in 1931. So all of his policies were really in the wrong direction. Now, I do concede in the book, that the one abiding virtue that Donald Trump has is he’s got all the right enemies, okay. The establishment hates him, The New York Times The Washington Post, CNN, The Washington, what I call you, in a party establishment, the leadership and the long standing careerist of both parties can’t stand him. But basically, it’s because he’s an outsider is because he’s unwilling to conform, and he’s pretty obnoxious, and unpredictable. That’s why they’re against him. The point of the book, though, is none of his power. And his policies were wrong, even if he had the right enemies. And nothing that he did help the economy or addressed, the huge long term problems we have of a runaway public debt of a government is way too big and too costly and too intrusive. And especially at the heart of the matter, a central bank that is out, it’s a rogue Central Bank, it’s out of control. And yet Trump was constantly on their case, demanding even easier money, lower interest rates, even more, you know, of the same that got us into, you know, the huge bubbles and troubles that came from them. So, the point of my book was to say he had a chance he’s got her four year record we can look at it is terrible, it offers nothing in terms of remediation of our great problems and putting us in a different direction for the future. So, you know, don’t waste the opportunity. And you know, that’s about where I come out.

Gene Tunny  07:13

Right. Okay. So you write about what you call the Donald’s reckless fiscal and monetary policy. So we might talk about fiscal first. Now, among other things, you talk about the most grotesque act of fiscal malfeasance in American history. So that was something that Trump was associated with you argue? Are you talking about the the big tax cut the Trump tax cut in 2017? Is that Is that something you see as as reckless,

David Stockman  07:44

and that’s part of it, but I’m looking at the overall picture, and the data, the big top line data on spending and borrowing on the public debt. Now, let’s just take it down to the core metric, which is the public debt. I mean, if you’re running huge deficits and spending, far beyond your willingness or ability to tax, it comes out in the public debt. When Trump became president in round terms, that public debt was about 20 trillion. When he left it was 28. That’s 8 trillion of growth, a trillion of debt, public debt. In four years, you let me ask the question, when did when did we get the first 8 trillion of public debt? And how long did it take us to get there? The answer is in two or three, it took us 216 years 43 presidents to rack up a trillion in debt. He did it in four years. That’s kind of the bottom line. It puts it in perspective, in terms of how big the air was. If we look at other more conventional measures, you get the same picture, the average deficit to GDP and that’s another good ratio, you know, how big is the deficit or surplus relative to the national economy? It will the deficit average two and a half percent of GDP for all the presidents from the early 50s through 2016. The deficit under Trump’s four years average 9% of GDP, almost four times more than it had been the average going back for. If you look at spending, I think that’s important. And again, let’s take the inflation out of the picture and looked at it in inflation adjusted for real terms real spending. Trump average 7% per year during his tenure, for instance, big spending Obama right before him was 2% per year in real terms. Reagan when I was there was 3% per year. In real terms, the average was two and a half. So again, Trump was you know, three times, in some cases four times more In terms of the growth rate of spending then haven’t heard historically. So you know, if when you go through those kinds of measures, and then of course, it all culminated, I just want to put this last point. And in 2020, when he made the huge mistake of shutting down, locking down the economy based on very bad advice from some very bad doctors that worked for the federal government, if he had any principles about, you know, property rights and personal liberty and constitutional due process, he never would have ordered a lockdown to the economy. But in any event, he did that in 2020. And as a result of that, we had just an explosion of spending to bail out the economy that the government had ordered to close. And I’m talking about the 2 trillion worth of stimulus measures that were passed with his urging, you know, with his support in 11 days, I mean, this was an $800 800 page, I mean, Bill that contain 2.2 trillion, where the so called Cares Act, you know, banned unemployment insurance benefits, that checks 200 million households, massive amounts of money to education, health, other institutions. The point is, they passed 2.2 trillion in spending and 11 days, nobody read the 800 pages. And that was just the warm up. He then, you know, insisted on the second stimulus or COVID Relief bill in December that he signed right before he left, that was another 2 trillion. And it paved the way for the last 2 trillion that Biden put on top of it, when he came in, basically to implement an extension of all of the freebies and free stuff and giveaways that Trump had put into place during 2020. Well, the reason I’m dwelling on this is it added up to $6.5 trillion of spending, almost sight unseen in terms of legislative review, and scrutiny, it happened in 12 months, march 2020, to march 2021. And that in itself was equal to 150% of the pre existing budget. In other words, in 12 months, they passed the emergency spending that was 1.5 times bigger than the entire federal budget, defence, Social Security, interest payments, student aid and all the rest of it. This is how far it was out of control. And he was sitting in the Oval Office with a veto pen in his hand, theoretically, but obviously, his stubby little fingers never gotten here, the veto pen, he didn’t veto anywhere in either he waved it on. And so therefore, you have to blame him for the most outrageous edge Regis outbreak of fiscal madness that we’ve ever seen in peacetime or wartime in this country. And when you prove that’s where, you know, that’s where you come out that you know, as his record is undeniable, the facts are all there. Why in the world, the Magga fans and Republicans or the Republican rank and file, want him to have another chance is really beyond me. But I wrote this book test, just in case someone cares about, you know, the reality and about the facts, that if they do put him back in, they’re probably going to put him on the ticket. And if the country puts him back in the Oval Office, there is no, it should be no confusion about what you’re getting, you’re getting a worse, you’re getting a exacerbated case of all the problems that we have already today. Rod,

Gene Tunny  14:05

okay. In terms of that spending, I thought that was interesting. You compare the growth rate of spending under Trump versus other presidents, including Reagan. And I was surprised it was. Yeah, there was that stark difference that’s due to that, that pandemic stimulus is that that, you know, one and a half times the budget that was approved in whatever, 11 days or however many, there was an extraordinary fact you mentioned there. Now, one thing I’d like to ask you about because I’m in Australia, so I’m less familiar with exactly what happened in the States than I am here. I mean, I’ve seen it, you know, I saw all the commentary and but you said that you blame Trump for the lock downs or partly, you blame Trump for the lock downs. i The impression I got was he was king piny against the lock downs. Am I wrong on that? I thought it was done by the states.

David Stockman  15:06

No, but yeah, it’s a great question. But if you go back and look at the calendar, the Tick Tock day by day, week by week, it’s very evident that another reason why Trump is on Fit is that he doesn’t have any principles. He doesn’t have any guiding philosophy, he flies by the seat of his ample britches, and whatever seems to strike is fancy at any moment in time, he goes with me because he’s so damn arrogant, that he doesn’t even begin to understand what he doesn’t know. And basically, when it comes to economics in the world, and governing a $26 trillion economy, he knows very little that maybe he sees basically ignorant. So when when the COVID came along for a few days, he was saying, Well, you know, the flu every year to X number of people, 38,000 50,000 people succumb to the flu one way or another, we’re used to this very, what’s the crisis, six days later, as a result of a lot of pressure that came into the Oval Office led by, you know, his son in law, Jared Kushner, bringing in a couple of scientists who wanted a chance to really exercise some power, I convinced him that it was not only not the flu, but it was something like the Black Plague, and that every all stops had to be pulled out. And that’s on the 16th of March, he gave this speech, you know, two weeks to flatten the curve and turn Dr. Fauci and Dr. Burks and the rest of that crowd of Mal practising doctors loose on the country. And before we know it, the entire economy was on its knees and I got data in the book that lays out how severe this was. Two measures, I think, give you a dramatic a pretty dramatic indication of the hammer that Donald Trump brought down on the US economy and therefore the world economy at the end of the day, on March 16, when he authorised you know, two weeks to flatten the curve and turn the CDC loose on daily economic life. First in the second quarter, when it hit that was ground zero of the lockdown second quarter 2020 GDP in the United States declined at a 34% annualised rate, what does that mean? Well, in the worst recession that we’ve had in the post war period, which is the Great Recession, you know, in 208, the annualised the redonk, fall in GDP was 8% during the worst quarter, okay, the worst quarter was 8%. And in the second quarter of 2020, because of the government ordered lockdown, not some kind of cyclical, you know, tumble of the economy, the government ordered the Trumpler lockdown, GDP declined at a 32% rate just, you know, startling, you know, on precedent. Now, the other measure I use a lot in the book is if you look where it hit the hardest lockdowns, it was obviously in my I call the social interaction venues, restaurants, bars, sports, arenas, gyms, malls and the rest of it. in that arena, that area of the economy in the BLS statistics, Labour department’s statistics is called leisure and hospitality as you know, all those industries are in that grew in April 2020, which is ground zero, the heart of the lockdown hours worked in the leisure and hospitality sectors declined by 56%. Compared to the previous month, half of the employment half of the out and not just headcount answer people but actually hours worked, disappeared. Now how big is a 56% decline in employment in that core sector of the economy? Well, it’s so big that it reduced the actual working level. In other words, the hours work the number of people on the pay pay clock to a level not seen since the spring of 1979. In other words, it rolled back the clock 43 years in terms of the slow and steady and relentless growth that occurred in that sector. Are was wiped out in 30 days and it’s taken years to recover. And we’re still not back to where we were in February 2020. So the lock downs are fading, you know, because as time passes things that seemed pretty bad, right at the moment they were happening suddenly, you know, see maybe not so bad, but the lock downs were dramatic. Yeah, they were, you know, the biggest, you know, Thunderbolts to hit the economy. I think it ever at least in the United States, so, he that was the consequence of Trump. swivelling on a dime from nothing to worry about to the sky is falling. And then And here’s where I really put the pin the tale of the donkey, so to speak. He created this thing called the White House Coronavirus, Task Force. And it met day after day and they had a big press conference. At the end of the day. It was like a reality show from the White House Press Room day after day in which Fauci was up there. Burks was up there, and it Hance Vice President Pence and others. And they just scared the living daylights out of the country, even as all of these orders from the public health departments were being implemented at the urging of the CDC and the White House. So this, this whole lockdown catastrophe, was born, bred and perpetuated from the Oval Office, and I go by the famous aphorism you might not be as an Australian might not be aware of it. But Harry Truman, famous president, you know, at the end of World War after World War Two, and had this had this slogan on his desk that said, the buck stops here. In other words, I am going to take responsibility for what happens? Well, in this case, the buck stops with Trump on the whole disaster of the COVID response to pandemic response to lock downs, the damage that it did to the economy and the costs that were generated in terms of borrowing and deficits and the public debt, you know, all of it, you have to ultimately put on his doorstep. Because if he had stuck to his guns, listen to this, this is unbelievable. If he had stuck to his guns of March 11, when he said, you know, this will be handled in the normal way. We’re used to these, you know, viruses coming along, and we can handle it. If he had stayed with that position. None of this disaster would have happened, right? It wasn’t the virus that caused the economy to plunge into a black hole. It was the lockdowns.

Gene Tunny  23:08

Right, just on the what Trump could have done. I think this is an interesting perspective. And it’s Yeah, I think this is probably this might be the perspective that gets you the most pushback or reaction. I think it’s an interesting proposition. What I’m interested in is whether like, say Trump just said, Okay, we’ll ignore the we think there’s a minor virus. I’m not saying necessarily it is. Let’s say Trump says that. Could he have actually directed the states? Could he have directed? Who was at Andrew Cuomo and Gavin Newsom to open up? Could he have done anything? Did he have the levers to be able to do that? Yes.

David Stockman  23:50

Because they responded, I don’t think they were sitting there in Albany, New York, where Cuomo was where Sacramento and said, hey, you know, this, these reports, we’re getting sound like this is a pretty terrible virus. We’re gonna start systematically closing bars and restaurants and malls. And they were doing that in response to the guidelines, the recommendations, and the pressure from the CDC, which was the federal government, and it was controlled, obviously, by Trump, and the CDC and in turn was responding to the White House Coronavirus Task Force, which was being run by Fauci, which was being run by dance is as delegated by Trump. So it was all coming right out of the oval office there. They wouldn’t. I don’t think and I’ve been in politics since the 1960s in America. So I think maybe my judgement is not totally bad. But I’m absolutely certain that without the imprimatur without the urging without all the hysteria, coming from Fauci in that White House Task Force, these people would have not, they wouldn’t have stuck their neck out and closed down their economy, because every one of them was creating political problems for themselves. It wasn’t you know that this was like some great winning political opportunity. Let’s close down all the gyms and in the state, like they did New Jersey and New York, and let’s shut down the malls and let’s put the restaurants out of business. They’re sitting there saying, Yeah, this would be some real good politics for us and forced that the governors weren’t saying that. They were doing it all ultimately, because they were being pressured. They were being encouraged by the federal government and particularly by the Trump White House.

Gene Tunny  25:51

Okay, we’ll take a short break here for a word from our sponsor.

Female speaker  25:57

If you need to crunch the numbers, then get in touch with adept economics. We offer you Frank and fearless economic analysis and advice. We can help you with funding submissions, cost benefit analysis, studies, and economic modelling of all sorts. Our head office is in Brisbane, Australia, but we work all over the world. You can get in touch via our website, www dot adapt economics.com.au. We’d love to hear from you.

Gene Tunny  26:26

Now back to the show. crass now about one of the things that President Trump would claim was that he had the greatest economy ever the economy was in the strongest position ever. And then it was the virus that COVID that came along and, and wrecked everything. But you, you actually question that you don’t think that the US economy was the greatest economy ever pre COVID? What What’s your what is your analysis? Show you there? You haven’t What do you conclude there?

David Stockman  27:00

Yeah, good question. I don’t question it myself. The data proves it. In other words, I just did a lot of research and served up the data that comes out of the statistical mills of the US government. And you can measure it seven different ways. And you get the same answer. But let’s start with real growth. After all, that’s the big, you know, summary metric for economic performance and health. And real growth of the economy was grew at 1.5%. During Trump’s four years, the lowest rate of any presidential term, going back to Harry Truman, again, to 1950, the average over that entire period, no, nine presidents 11 business cycles during that period, recessions and recoveries, we had a couple of wars during that period, we had any number of crises. So in other words, what we’re talking about here is the long term trend performance of the US economy from 1954 to 2016. Right before Trump got in it averaged 3.04% Or double the growth that occurred during the Trump period. So you can on that on that summary, you can’t make that statistic go away. That’s that’s the major the whole ball of wax. And his growth rate was half of the norm. It was a third, basically, of the highest performance with Kennedy Johnson was 5%. It was maybe 40% of what I remember during the Reagan period, when the growth rate was 3.5%. So the idea that he kept Tweety and keeps to this very day complaint, you know, talking about the great Magga economy that he brought the greatest economy ever is totally refuted contradicted by the facts. Now that’s one of them. We can look at job growth. And of course, the answer there is pretty interesting. He’s the only president since Herbert Hoover, in which there was no job growth. You’d never know that from listening to Donald Trump’s boisterous speeches, but the fact is, when he took office in January 2017, there were 145 point 5 million jobs, non farm jobs in the US when he left office in January 2021. There were 142.5 in other words, the job shrunk by 3 million jobs during his term nothing like that ever had before every other president, there’s more jobs than when they start, not because of their virtue. Do necessary or are there policy is because a capitalist economy unless it’s really thwarted, tends to expand and grow and create more jobs. Trump was the exception. Now you can say, Well, again, it was the lock downs, and it was the spring of 1920 20 catastrophe. But even if you take that out of the picture, and you look at Trump and pretend his, his administration handed in February 2020, which is, you know, the month before the COVID, the pandemic hit, he averaged 145,000 new jobs a month, in that period, until the eve of the COVID, or pandemic hit to the economy. Obama had 215,000. So he was a third shorter than Obama. And Obama was considered pretty bad. If you look at overall employment growth, even taking the pandemic period out, the growth rate under Trump was about 1.4%. And it average two and a half percent in the decades and decades before. In finally, I think the, the, you know, the bottom line measure of economic health. And, you know, the this standard of living on Main Street, you know, for the broad middle class is really per capita, GDP, real GDP per capita, if it’s rising, that means the living standards are rising. And if it’s not, you have a problem. But the average again, during the 60 years post war was 2.5%. And during Trump’s period, it was 1%. In other words, the growth rate was, you know, barely two fifths of the normal rate on this basic metric, which is real GDP per capita. So when we can look at other things to the savings rate collapsed during his administration, despite the big tax cut, we haven’t gone into in detail yet. But despite that, investment growth was lower during the Trump period, than in any other administration going back again to 1950. So, you know, when you ask the question, Where’s the proof? Is it in the pudding? The answer is no. There’s there’s no proof whatsoever of his boast. You know, about the greatest economy ever. So what I say in the book, is it wasn’t the greatest economy ever. It was really the greatest con job ever. Right.

Gene Tunny  32:47

Okay. So on the tax cut, you mentioned the tax cut before you mentioned that this didn’t. In your view, it didn’t lead to, you know, a, an economic surge or surge in investment. And can you explain what happened with that tax cut? And where did you where did the money go? You talk about that in the book?

David Stockman  33:10

Sure. Well, if you want to look at the tax cut, you have it was clearly skewed to encouraging reinvestment by business, both corporations and, you know, individual proprietors. That’s why the corporate rate went down from 28 and 21. Why they put in the equivalent 20% deduction for unincorporated businesses. Now in Aw that cost 1.7 trillion over the first 10 years in revenue loss. And that was supposed to then, you know, cause a surge of investment. But if I look at the investment rate, by that I mean, real investment in the business sector, in the five years before the tax cut became effective in 2018. It was actually well higher than the growth rate in the next five years after the tax cut took effect. So if you spend $1.7 trillion that you don’t have, because it was all deficit, finance, they didn’t cut spending to pay for the revenue loss, and you get not no gain at all, but actually a worse trend performance in real terms, inflation adjusted terms, then you have to ask, how could you possibly justify that if you were borrowing money for a huge rate of return? You might argue, well, let’s let’s try that. But if the rate of return is even smaller than what was already built in, it’s dubious now where the money went them because clearly, corporations and individual proprietors paid a lot less in taxes. The answer is into a record surge in stock buybacks, and in corporate m&a deals and in other forms of, you know, leverage recaps and so forth other forms of financial engineering that basically flow money to Wall Street and to the top of the economic ladder, because that’s where all the stock is owned. In other words, 93% of the stock in the United States is probably true in Australia as well, I’m not sure. But 93% is owned by the top 10% of households, and bout 48% is owned by the top 1%. So if you have a huge corporate tax cut 1.7 trillion, that produces no gains in investment and therefore, future growth and job creation, but instead ends up being flushed back into Wall Street, you know, in the form of stock buybacks and other financial engineering, which then flows to the very top of the income scale. You know, you’ve got a double bad, okay, you added to the debt that the whole public is going to be paying service charges interest on forever, and you put the money, you took the money out of the economy and Senate, to the top of to the very wealthy and to the most affluent people next. Oh, sense. Raw.

Gene Tunny  36:27

Okay. I’d like to ask you about a go back to this point you made in the book about the Donald’s reckless fiscal and monetary policies being doubly bad. We’ve talked about the fiscal policies, what were his monetary policy? So monetary policy is handled by the Federal Reserve, isn’t it? What’s what’s, what was Trump’s role there?

David Stockman  36:49

Okay, though, that’s, again, another important topic. As far as I’m concerned, the number one, number two, and number three policy problems in the United States today, and the world is the Fed and the other central banks, they’re out of control, they’re printing presses have been running red hot. For decades and decades, one measure that I think is startling, if you take all the central banks of the world and add their balance sheets together, in 20, in the year 2000, it was 3 trillion. Now, why is it important to take the balance sheets, look, because that’s just a measure of how much money they printed? Okay, you know, when they print money, they buy assets and put it on the balance sheet. That’s a good simple metric to measure how much money they’re printing, it was 3 trillion at the turn of the century is 44 trillion today. All right. So in barely two decades, they have, you know, they’ve just flooded the world financial system, you know, with freshly minted credit, that, you know, ultimately created bubbles and inflation of every time. So the question then is, what about Fed policy? Now, given that backdrop, and my point is yes, in nominally, the Fed is independent, and they make their own decisions. But my quarrel with Trump is twofold. One, he made enormous put enormous public pressure on them, you know, practically week after week, to lower interest rates, and to make money even easier than it already was. So he was making the wrong advice. And secondly, he was doing it at a time in the business cycle, when it was desperately important for monetary policy to be normalised. I never agreed with all the huge money printing that Bernanke undertook in 208209 to 10. But you know, people argued it was an emergency, it was a one time thing, and even Bernanke himself, said in 2011, we’re out of the woods now. And we’re going to normalise the balance sheet, and we’re going to shrink it back to something reasonable, because it was 900 billion when the, you know, great financial crisis started struck the Wall Street meltdown in September 208. And by the peak it was 4.4 trillion. And, you know, everybody agreed that it needed to be normalised and interest rates were being held practically to zero for years and years and years, and I document a lot of this in the book, and that they needed to normalise as well, because when you make money dirt cheap, you’re just inviting speculation on Wall Street and you’re inviting Congress to spend money it doesn’t have because it’s so cheap to borrow down in Washington. So it was time for normalisation the Fed was trying to To do that by slowly raising rates, and by getting out of the Qt business and actually our QE business and actually shrinking its balance sheet they had initiated before Trump got through something called Qt quantitative tightening, and they were slowly trying to shrink the balance sheet back, just like Bernanke had promised they would. And Trump was constantly on their case, not to do either. And as a result of that the Fed just kept interest rates at zero. It kept the balance sheet, massively, bloated, still around $4 trillion. And that paved the way for the huge inflationary mourning after that we had in 2020 2021 and up into the present. So it the timing of the cycles screamed out because we were well into the recovery, the longest recovery in history. It was it screamed out for normalisation get back to something that was sustainable. And Trump was pounding the table, you know, day after day, don’t you dare do it. And even you know, leaking to the press that he was investigating whether he could fire Powell or whether he could, you know, clean house at the Fed and so forth. So therefore, when it comes to something as fundamentally important as sound money, Trump is the worst president and I say this advisedly, that we ever had the very worst, you know, far worse than Jimmy Carter far worse than Lyndon Johnson. Far worse, as far as I’ve studied it, than FDR, he may be even William Jennings Bryan if he had been elected president. So you, that’s another big black mark on the record.

Gene Tunny  41:56

Okay. You don’t blame Richard Nixon for taking us out of Bretton Woods. off the gold standard? Yeah,

David Stockman  42:04

no, I do. Yeah. And I’m I don’t know how I missed that one. But he was he was he was even worse than Richard Nixon and Tim was bad enough. Right.

Gene Tunny  42:14

Okay. Okay. That’s a it’s a Yeah, that’s a lot. I think your discussion of the Fed and fed policies, it’s definitely worth reading. So thanks for that. David. One last thing. In the foreword to the book by you’ve got Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. He says that you’re a crusader against the corrupt merger of state and corporate power in the US. Is that? Is that? Is that how you see yourself? And like, How bad is it in the States? I mean, you’ll see here the talk about the swamp and you hear about the power of lobbyists and all of that, and, and the corruption. I mean, how bad is it, in your view in the US at the moment?

David Stockman  42:59

I think it’s, I think is terrible, because the two worst things we have going are the military industrial complex, this massively bloated defence budget, and the pretentions of Washington that were the hegemony of the world with bases all over, will forever wars all over it interventions everywhere. That is due to the capture of policy by the military industrial complex, that’s corporate power, merging with government power, that’s the first one. The second one is the Fed is a rogue institution that is basically captive of Wall Street. That’s why they keep you know, printing money like they have been doing for decades now. And, you know, that’s exactly what Robert Kennedy is talking about there as well. Total capture of government institutions, in one case, the national security apparatus, in the second case, the basic Central Bank, by private interests, and it leads to some very, very bad outcomes, both domestically and internationally.

Gene Tunny  44:11

Gotcha. These are things that these are things that Trump himself has been campaigning against, hasn’t he or he made he these are things that he uses in his

David Stockman  44:22

arguments. Yes. And no, that is a good point. He’s not campaigning against the Fed. He’s campaigned against the Fed, but he wants an easier fit, okay. I want to send a Wall Street doesn’t like it’s totally different. I want a Fed that’s proven that pursues sound money, but obviously Trump wants a fed that prints even more money than the flood we already have. When it comes to defence is weird. He talks about America First he talks about, you know, NATO should pay its fair share of the tab and all that. But when he got in, he inherited a defence budget of 600 billion which was already way too big bloated, beyond anywhere. Rational need, and he took it up date other than 50 billion. In other words, he never saw a request from the defence department from, from the generals for money that he didn’t like that he wasn’t ready to embrace lock, stock and barrel. Now, why was that? Well, because Trump fancies himself as the greatest negotiator to ever come down the pike. I guess he learned that in the Queen’s as a real estate developer in his early life. And if he hasn’t, you know, an $850 billion defence budget behind him, even if it’s a big waste unnecessary. He thinks he’s accomplished something. But he’s so wrong. Because when you give the defence department and national security apparatus and all those agencies, all that money, they use it to buy political support. That’s right. You know, they use it, basically to perpetuate their missions, their manpower, their budget levels, and so forth. So, you know, Trump isn’t very smart. To tell you the truth, when it comes to how the world works. You know, he may have been a street smart gambler from Queens and got lucky in the real estate business. But he’s never studied. He’s lazy. He’s uninformed. He’s impetuous. He’s fairly dangerous.

Gene Tunny  46:27

Okay. Brought up Wow, man, this is, yeah, it’s been a real. A really great conversation, David, and very, very forthright. And I expect you’ll get a lot of reactions to your book for sure. I suppose one thing I’d like to ask before I leave. So you’re someone that you’ve, you’ve worked, you’ve been in Congress, you’ve been a representative, and you’ve also you’re a director of the Office of Management and Budget, management and budget in the Reagan administration. Correct. What was what was that? Like? I mean, what I mean, that’s, that’s a celebrated administration. I mean, obviously, one of your most distinguished or famous presidents and, you know, lots of really good people in that administration. What was it like on the ground working in it? Well,

David Stockman  47:18

it was a pretty exciting time, at least an effort was made to try to contain the behemoth that it build up on the banks of the Potomac. And it’s interesting to note that when Reagan was sworn in, in January 1981, I became budget director, the first thing we had to do, because we inherited this mess from Jimmy Carter, was to raise the national debt limit above a trillion dollars for the first time, we didn’t have any choice. But where are we today? Go public debt is 34 trillion. And we were struggling with one and we thought, you know, it was a world was going to come to an end. That’s how far things have drifted. Now, of course, the economy is three times bigger, but the public debt is 34 times bigger. So you know, it’s. And then during that period, we had our ups and downs. But at the end of the day, only some minor progress was made in shrinking the size of the federal budget, we cut taxes deeply. We were going to cut spending to match the tax cuts, the spending cuts didn’t happen, because the Republicans really, were not willing to walk the plank in Congress. And because defence spending, got totally out of control and ate up all the savings that we were getting domestically. So essentially, the fiscal calamity that the country is struggling with still today, and the Trump made infinitely worse, originated in the early 1980s, not by purpose, not by intention. But, you know, by the result of the political and policy battles that occurred in the Reagan era, but the one thing that was different is we had Volcker as chairman of the Fed. Volker was the last of the sound money Fed chairman. And he said, You know, I’m not going to finance the federal deficit. You guys want to run up the ready, then you’re going to fund it honestly, in the bond pits, interest rates are going to go up and it’ll be on your watch. And so he did bring inflation to heal, but he was the last of them and in fact, he was so unpopular with the Republican politicians who ran Reagan You know, by the end Reagan wasn’t with it that much of the last two years. They convinced him to not reappoint Volcker and put it Alan Greenspan instead. And, you know, the rest is history. Greenspan was a disaster.

Gene Tunny  49:53

Yes, I mean, he he certainly is his legacy initially After he retired he was seen as the the maestro, but then the financial crisis and there’s been a big reassessment of Greenspan’s legacy since then for sure, absolutely. I might have to cover that on a future show because it’s Yeah, it is a it’s a you know, there’s a lot of history a lot of to go over there. But then Stockman has been terrific. I really enjoyed talking about your new book. I think it’s an important book. It’s, it’s thought provoking. I expect it will be controversial and will should there should be prominent in the the upcoming debate over the rest of this year. So thanks so much for for participating. I’ll put a link in the show notes to your book. Is there anything you’d like to say to wrap up?

David Stockman  50:47

Well, I think we’ve covered a lot of good ground. But I think the answer is, you know, people really need to look beyond the headlines and what the mainstream media is telling you or what the politicians are boasting about, and get a grasp on the facts because we’ve got some pretty difficult economic times to grapple with as we go forward.

Gene Tunny  51:10

So David Stockman thanks so much for your time, really enjoyed it.

David Stockman  51:14

Very good. Thank you.

Gene Tunny  51:18

rato thanks for listening to this episode of economics explored. If you have any questions, comments or suggestions, please get in touch. I’d love to hear from you. You can send me an email via contact at economics explore.com Or a voicemail via SpeakPipe. You can find the link in the show notes. If you’ve enjoyed the show, I’d be grateful if you could tell anyone you think would be interested about it. Word of mouth is one of the main ways that people learn about the show. Finally, if your podcasting outlets you then please write a review and leave a rating. Thanks for listening. I hope you can join me again next week.

52:05

Thank you for listening. We hope you enjoyed the episode. For more content like this or to begin your own podcasting journey head on over to obsidian-productions.com

Credits

Thanks to Obsidian Productions for mixing the episode and to the show’s sponsor, Gene’s consultancy business www.adepteconomics.com.au. Full transcripts are available a few days after the episode is first published at www.economicsexplored.com. Economics Explored is available via Apple PodcastsGoogle Podcast, and other podcasting platforms.

Categories
Podcast episode

The Limits of Fiscal Policy: Insights from Tony Makin, Alex Robson & others – EP222

This episode on the limits of fiscal policy features highlights from host Gene Tunny’s past conversations with the late Australian economist Professor Tony Makin and former OECD Ambassador Alex Robson. In the discussions, Tony Makin provides a balanced and insightful analysis of Australia’s fiscal response to the COVID-19 pandemic, critiquing programs like JobKeeper while recognizing some justification. He and Alex Robson discuss the importance of considering the open economy impacts of fiscal stimulus and the long-term burdens of debt. The episode looks to validate Makin’s warnings about the limits of discretionary fiscal policy through subsequent evidence and events. Gene summarizes the JobKeeper evaluation results and what happened in the Australian housing market following the pandemic fiscal stimulus. 

Please contact us with any questions, comments and suggestions by emailing us at contact@economicsexplored.com or sending a voice message via https://www.speakpipe.com/economicsexplored.

You can listen to the episode via the embedded player below or via podcasting apps including Google PodcastsApple Podcast and Spotify.

What’s covered in EP222

  • Fiscal policy limits and its impacts: introduction (0:03)
  • Economic stimulus measures during the COVID-19 pandemic. (9:36)
  • JobKeeper program design and targeting. (15:44)
  • JobKeeper program’s effectiveness and infrastructure spending challenges. (21:31)
  • Keynesian economics and infrastructure spending. (27:50)
  • Fiscal policy and its impact on the economy. (33:13)
  • Fiscal policy and its unintended consequences. (40:12)
  • The economic impact of public debt with Tony Makin and Alex Robson. (48:31)
  • Fiscal policy and its impact on the economy: wrap up. (53:39)

Takeaways

  1. Fiscal stimulus packages must be carefully designed and limited in size to avoid unintended consequences.
  2. The nature of the workforce is important to consider when implementing fiscal policy, as not all workers can easily transfer to different industries.
  3. The burden of public debt, including interest payments, can have long-term impacts on national income and economic growth.
  4. The effectiveness of fiscal policy in an open economy is influenced by factors such as capital mobility and exchange rates.
  5. Tony Makin was a leading advocate for sensible fiscal policy in Australia, and his contributions to the field are greatly missed.

Episodes the highlights are clipped from

EP119: What Tony Makin taught us about macroeconomics – Economics Explored 
A Fiscal Vaccine for COVID-19 with Tony Makin – new podcast episode | Queensland Economy Watch

Links relevant to the conversation

Fiscal policy papers by Tony Makin:

The Effectiveness of Federal Fiscal Policy: A Review

(PDF) Australia’s Competitiveness: Reversing the Slide 

 A Fiscal Vaccine for COVID-19

Treasury analysis of JobKeeper:

Independent Evaluation of the JobKeeper Payment Final Report | Treasury.gov.au

The employment effects of JobKeeper receipt | Treasury.gov.au  

News regarding unintended consequences of fiscal stimulus:

Building company collapses into liquidation days before Christmas, impacting four Guzman Y Gomez sites

Transcript: The Limits of Fiscal Policy: Insights from Tony Makin, Alex Robson & others – EP222

N.B. This is a lightly edited version of a transcript originally created using the AI application otter.ai. It may not be 100 percent accurate, but should be pretty close. If you’d like to quote from it, please check the quoted segment in the recording.

Tony Makin  00:03

For instance, baristas who’ve lost their jobs are not necessarily going to be one want to be out there on the road as a construction worker, financial sector employees and not wanting to be perhaps putting paint bets and ceilings. So the the nature of the workforce is important. We can’t just treat the labour force as this homogenous entity where people can transfer across to any sort of industry at whim.

Gene Tunny  00:39

Welcome to the economics explored podcast, a frank and fearless exploration of important economic issues. I’m your host, Gene Tunny. I’m a professional economist and former Australian Treasury official. The aim of this show is to help you better understand the big economic issues affecting all our lives. We do this by considering the theory evidence and by hearing a wide range of views. I’m delighted that you can join me for this episode, please check out the show notes for relevant information. Now on to the show. Hello, in this episode, I’m going to talk about the limits of fiscal policy. So that’s the use of government spending and taxation to influence the economy. So to try to smooth out the business cycle or to respond to some big shock, like the pandemic or the financial crisis. During the pandemic, in particular, we saw heavy use of fiscal policy by governments around the world. While some stimulus may have been warranted, we’re starting to really see some of the adverse consequences of fiscal stimulus packages in different countries. So you could argue that are a good part of the inflation that we’ve seen in the last couple of years that was due to the, you know, these massive fiscal policy responses that occurred that, that injected all of this additional money into household and business bank accounts, and we ended up with too much money chasing too few goods, which is that that classic explanation of inflation. We’ve also seen high public debts. So big increase in debt worldwide. And then we’ve got the growing burden of interest payments on government budgets. We’ve also seen impacts like what you’d call crowding out, we’ve seen supply side impacts, or constraints really starting to, to bite, particularly in the building industry. So some of these, these unintended consequences, you could say, maybe they should have been foreseen, they’re really starting to have an impact, particularly here in Australia, we’ve seen an impact on the building industry on its costs, and that’s affecting firm viability. So there’s all this extra demand, and there’s only so much supply out there. And, you know, supply can only respond in, it can’t respond automatically or instantly, to to this additional demand. So we’ve seen a big increase in in costs in that sector, and then that’s having all sorts of adverse impacts and you know, builders are closing down and then the people who are getting their houses built, they’re badly impacted, too. So that’s, that’s one of the things we’re seeing here in Australia that I’m going to talk about. Early in the pandemic, Professor Tony Macon of Griffith University in Australia. So Tony was based on the Gold Coast, which is south of Brisbane, where I am so early in the pandemic tiny warned about the adverse consequences of fiscal stimulus in Episode 41 of the podcast. So in one of the earlier episodes of this show, in June 2020, I spoke with Tony about his analysis of Australia’s fiscal response to the pandemic. He prepared that for the Centre for independent studies, which is a think tank in Sydney. So the CIS it’s one that I’m an adjunct Fellow at and I’ve had a lot to do with over the years. I’m gonna play some clips from that conversation I had with Tony, in, you know what turned out to be one of the early Months of the pandemic. So, I mean, things started going, going crazy. And when was it March 2020. So that’s a, it’s just a few months after, after that. We had a big a major fiscal policy response by the end of March in Australia, if I remember. And so we’re starting to see some of the, you know, the less desirable features of that already in in June when I spoke with Tony. Okay, so I’m going to play some clips from that conversation to illustrate some really important points about the limits of fiscal policy. So I’m not saying that activist fiscal policy is everywhere and always bad. I think what I want to say is that you’ve really got to be careful with it, you’ve got to think about, well, what’s going to be the ongoing impact on your interest payments? Could could there be any crowding out? Could there be unintended consequences? Could you actually be destabilising the economy in the future? You may be trying to stabilise it now, but could you actually make things worse than they otherwise would be in in the future? So they’re the types of considerations I think are important with with fiscal policy? Okay, one thing I have to say is that tiny Macon is sadly, no longer with us. He died unexpectedly in November 2021. So, in addition to playing some highlights from my fiscal policy conversation with Tony, I’m also going to play some highlights from my conversation about Tony’s legacy that I had with Alex Robson in Episode 119, from December 2021. So I think they’re worth that’s worth sticking around. For. Alex is a you know, he’s a former collaborator with Tony, he wrote some papers with him. And he’s also Australia’s former ambassador to the OECD in Paris, which is really top job in economics. Yeah, so Alex, Alex is a great person to hear from and he has a lot of excellent observations about about Tony. Okay, let’s play the first clip, which it features Tony’s critique of the massive job keeper, payroll subsidy programme that we have in Australia. I think that much of Tony’s critique has been supported by the facts. So new evidence, or what we’ve learned about how Job keeper rolled out and, you know, the impacts that it had. And also, I think that the review of the programme that my old deputy secretary in the treasury, Nigel Ray, so Nigel did a review of it. Last year, I think that that review that brings out some of these, well, that’s supportive of some of the criticisms that that that Tony made, although, of course, it’s it’s going to be measured. And you know, Nigel, is not someone who’s going to come out and say, Look, this is, you know, this is terrible, you really stuff this up, he’s going to be very measured about it all. There’s also a treasury research paper that’s relevant here. And I’ll have more to say about them after I play the clip. Tony, I’d like to ask about the Australian response, I thought you made some really great observations about the different elements of the response. So there was the job keeper programme, the payroll subsidy programme. And then there were there were cash handouts. And there’s also some bringing forward of infrastructure spending. You made some really insightful remarks regarding the efficacy regarding the merits of the different elements of the Australian Government response. And I think there are lessons that can apply to responses across the world, would you be able to take us through what those those insights and lessons that you made workplace turning?

Tony Makin  09:36

Yeah, well, I made a distinction between fiscal responses that were targeting the aggregate supply side of the economy, and, in the paper, endorse those in principle and in particular, we’re talking about job Keeper which I think is a great innovation. We’ve not seen a scheme like like that, before, it’s not original to Australia, Australia copied what was happening in the UK and New Zealand and one or two other European economies. And the innovation was to see firms as a source of employment. Correct. And to alleviate the pressure on firms and their employees in particular, by providing a direct subsidy to the firm. So it was a supply side initiative, more than a demand side initiative, it was helping aggregate supply, it wasn’t an element that he was sought to increase CRI or it was increasing G, of course, but it was it was it was aimed at the firm’s production. So that was an innovation. And I think there’s a prototype there for future fiscal responses in heaven. Let’s hope we don’t have similar sorts of crises. But it’s it’s a preferred means as opposed to the aggregate demand side response. And a, we’re in the form of two cash transfers or cash handouts, as we saw in response to the GFC trying to in the Keynesian ways stimulate spending, and the purpose of stimulating the spending is to enhance employment. So it’s a roundabout way of trying to enhance employment. I think it has the features of a of a subsidy to retailers in effect, because they’re the ones that they’ve been at most. And in any case, if there is spending and evidence shows that such handouts tend to be largely saved, but if they are spent, they are spent on imports. And they’re funded by borrowing from overseas, which has to be paid in the future. So there were two responses there that were trying to sustain employment one was the direct one to Job keeper. Good marks for that one. And then there was another one on top of that, which was the cash handouts, which was a roundabout way of of sustaining employment when there was another policy in place for that purpose.

Gene Tunny  12:24

Yep. So this job keeper, it was originally costed at one 30 billion, it turns out all it it may only cost 70 billion, there was a forecasting error. But that’s that’s, that’s tangential to our discussion. You did know that while job keeper is more justifiable than other stimulus or emergency measures, there are still concerns with the design of job keeper. Could you take us through some of those please, Tony,

Tony Makin  12:57

our look, the key one is the industry is involved. The questions about casuals being paid more on job teper than they were otherwise earning. So they’re being paid more not to work than to work. I think that’s the key floor with the with the programme. And hopefully that will be fixed when the Treasury completes its review very soon. I guess it’s also questions about eligibility and the the the rule that was there for downturn in, in sales, some of those aspects of it could be possibly fine tuned, but I think it is a useful prototype that can be improved.

Gene Tunny  13:49

Yep. If they if they did it again, I’m sure they would better targeted, and they might target it to the industries that are most affected, such as hospitality, tourism, retail, possibly not professional services, which, you know, appear to be, well not as badly affected as some other sectors. So the the key lesson is that this needs to be better targeted. The problem was from what I can tell this was developed within a week, possibly under a week when at toward the end of March, when they realised that they needed something like this because all of the employer groups were coming to the the government ministers and telling them we need this or we’re going to have to sack millions of people. So I think that’s what drove it. It was done very quickly.

Tony Makin  14:43

Yes. And also the alternative was to put enormous pressure on the on the Employment Benefits Scheme. people queuing up for benefits that would have been a major headache as well. Absolutely.

Gene Tunny  14:56

I think one of the great points you made in the paper was Sir. Regarding the cash handouts, we want to get people out spending, but the public health advice is saying actually stay home, we don’t want you to go out. So I thought that was a really interesting point. And actually, yes, that’s right. So the goal of these emergency measures should be to sustain businesses to keep people in employment during this challenging time. It’s not necessarily, though, and the way to do that is not necessarily to give people money to go out and, and spend on new flat screen TVs, which are imported. So that’s, I think that’s a good point that you’ve made. Okay, so that was Tony on job keeper, which was the payroll subsidy programme we had in Australia. And yep, Tony was, Tony was right about the some of the problems with that programme. Um, overall, I mean, I think that was a very balanced assessment of Tony’s he did recognise that to an extent, it could have been justifiable if it was better targeted. So he wasn’t ruling it out completely. He just had the had some concerns about the design. So I think that was a very, you know, measured, balanced assessment of job keeper from tiny, and another measured and balanced assessment of job caper came from Nigel Ray, who, as I mentioned, was my boss in the treasury. So really, really great public servant, Nigel. And, yep, I think he’s written a great report on job keeper. In the independent evaluation of the job keeper payment final report, he prepared that for the Treasury, I’ll put a link in the show notes. It was broadly supportive of the programme. But Nigel, you know, he had to acknowledge there are some serious issues with it with the design of it. And so what did he conclude? Let’s, let’s go through it. So one of the major conclusions was that a more flexible policy designed during the first phase of job keeper. So I think that was the first six months. A lot of the detail is, it’s hard for me to remember at this stage, but I think that he’s talking about the first six months of the programme. They rolled it out for six months, and then they had another six months of it. A more flexible policy designed during the first phase of job keeper would have enabled an earlier move from prospective to retrospective eligibility thresholds. For example, After three months, this would have allowed better targeting of payments beyond the initial three months and lower the costs of the programme. Okay, so what he’s, what he’s talking about there is that when it was rolled out, basically, you know, accountants would apply for their clients that apply to the ATO, and the accountants would be asking their clients, okay, well, what do you think’s gonna happen to your turnover over the next six months, so when whatever the whatever it was, maybe was quarterly basis, and, you know, you’d think, Oh, well, we’re gonna have this major pandemic. So yeah, we think we’re gonna get smashed. And so there are a lot of, you know, firms that applied for job keeper and got this job keep it like this very generous, turned out wage subsidy, that, you know, they really didn’t end up needing and they didn’t have that turnover reduction that they were forecasting and that they, you know, they’re they advise the ATO that they would, they would have, but there was no way for the ATO to claw that, to claw that back. So, yeah, what Nigel’s getting out there is that you could have designed it in a way that limited the fiscal cost by actually seeing, you know, what happened to the businesses like after a few months and then adjusting the payments after that. So I think that’s what he’s getting out there. It relied a lot on what businesses and their accountants were forecasting would be the impact of the pandemic on their, their turnover. And for many businesses that didn’t actually they didn’t experience the big revenue reductions or the turnover reductions that that they were forecasting, you needed to forecast a particular percentage reduction in in your turnover. I can’t remember off the top my head if I can find it. I’ll put it in the show notes. Righto. So and the second major finding from Nigel regarding job keeper he noted that a tiered payment structure One that is proportionate to previous earnings is better targeted than a flat payment. And this is getting at that concern that Tony had that there were quite a few part time. People, part time employees who may have maybe they were working a couple of days a week in, in a business and they, you know, they were earning an award wage that wasn’t much more than the national minimum wage. Suddenly, because of this payment for a job keeper was that it was more gee, it must have been at sort of trying to approximate a might have been a full time wage for a person roughly on minimum wage or something like that. I can’t remember exactly. But it was much higher, then, you know, some it’ll be more money than someone be would be earning if they’re only working a couple of days a week, part time. And so the idea was, let’s make this simple. Let’s get this out to the people who need it. Let’s not worry too much about trying to make it more targeted, because we don’t have time to do that. And what it meant is that you had and this is the point time he’s making you had many part time people actually earning more with job keeper, then they would have learned otherwise. So yeah, that was a really poorly designed part of job keeper. Also relevant regarding job keeper is a recent Treasury research paper and this came out. So this came out late on Friday, the 22nd of December, okay, so the Friday before Christmas 2023. And Peter Tula, who’s my colleague at the CIS, so Peter is the chief economist at CIS. He tweeted on the Friday that the fact that Treasury releases it late on Friday 22nd December suggests that it embarrasses somebody. So Peter was suggesting that this paper from the Treasury by Natasha Bradshaw, Nathan Deutsche and Lachlan vos, or vas, it’s titled The employment effects of job paper receipt, Peter suggesting it must be embarrassing someone. So what does it what’s embarrassing about it? So the main findings from it. So I’ll put a link in the show notes, you can check out what they’ve done. They’ve done some clever things with a, you know, a data set on businesses that where they can try to infer what’s actually going on, it’s rather clever paper. So check that out. Our findings suggest that at its height in early 2020, job keep it directly preserved between 300,000 to 700,000. Jobs. Right. Okay. So that’s, that’s reasonable. I mean, that’s, you know, if that if it was 700,000. And, you know, that could have pushed the unemployment rate up to near 10% or something, they’ve got an estimate of what then what that would have been, and put that in the show notes. So, you know, that’s a, that’s a big deal. But then if it’s only 300,000, well, okay, is that, you know, how effective was that? So I guess, maybe that’s something you could, you could say, justifies the cost of the programme, which was in the order of $100 billion or so that’s, you know, that’s something you could argue about. So, you know, I’d say somewhere between 300,000 to 700,000 jobs, that compares with around three and a half million employees covered by the scheme at its peak. So I think when the government was rolling it out, initially, it it was suggesting it could save something around, you know, 700,000 jobs or so. If it actually is about 300,000, then well, that makes you wonder, you know, was that good value for money? So maybe that’s something that they’re embarrassed about? I’m not sure. I mean, you could say Oh, well, hundreds of 1000s of jobs, maybe it was worth it. That would be their their argument. What could be the potentially embarrassing bit about the paper is a finding that is in the footnote. It’s a one of the footnotes. And this finding is it’s on page two suggestive evidence. That job keeper receipt made casual workers less likely to be employed over a year later. So they found suggestive evidence that job keeper receipt made casual workers less likely to be employed over a year later. So the effects are far smaller and less statistically significant than the positive effects found during early 2020. But are not implausible they could reflect income effects on labour force participation given job keep a lead to some workers having substantially higher incomes than they otherwise would have. Okay. So this is that point about these, you know, these part time workers getting all of this additional, additional cash so many, many casual workers would only be working part time, they would be, you know, they could be working in a bar or at a cafe, and they’re getting much more money than they would have expected. So they’ve got all this extra money in their bank accounts. And so what they do a year later, is, you know, for many of them, they go, okay, but there’s extra cash, maybe I don’t need to work as many hours at the bar or the cafe, I’m going to spend more time on my studies or, or on a hobby, or I’m going to go overseas. So that’s what they’re, they’re driving out there. So this is really illustrative of how you can have these unintended consequences with fiscal policy. So maybe that’s what’s what’s embarrassing about the paper. So check it out. I think it’s a good paper, it illustrates a neat little econometric technique that I might talk about in a future episode. Okay, so that’s, that’s plenty on job keeper, the payroll subsidy programme and the the challenges or the problems you have when you don’t design a programme properly, of course, they had to do it very quickly. Next time, let’s hope they have a much better design, if there is a next time hope there isn’t a next time. If there is it needs to be better designed. The second clip that I want to play from my chat with Tony is about infrastructure spending. So with job keeping, we were talking about this payroll subsidy and you know, often, often the fiscal stimulus comes in the form of cash payments to households or businesses with the payroll subsidy programme, which then had to be paid to the employees. Some fiscal stimulus comes in the form of infrastructure spending, public works, that sort of thing. And I think Tony’s right there, that can also be problematic, you’ve really got to think about that. And that is the topic of this second clip from tiny, so I will play that now.

Tony Makin  27:50

infrastructure spending can be beneficial. And it has lasting benefits. And what it does not do is deteriorate the government balance sheet, as does the spending on cash handouts and other forms of consumption related government stimulus. What infrastructure does is it creates an asset there on the government’s balance sheet that matches the borrowing, it still has to be funded by borrowing, we started with a budget deficit. So all of his extra spending has to be funded by borrowing. And so there’s an asset there, so the balance sheet won’t deteriorate, to the extent otherwise. But again, it needs to be quality spending, it needs to pass certain tests, the crude Keynesian idea would be again, just to spend on anything. And being holes in the ground, as you mentioned earlier, is a form of crude Keynesianism, which, which could well be sort of portrayed as a form of infrastructure spending if it’s working on the road somewhere. But the point about infrastructure spending is it does have to pass the test where the benefits the present value of the benefits of the project, exceed the costs. And one other point to make about infrastructure spending. And this is one feature of government spending, the Keynes instanced in his work originally right back in the 1930s, but he talked about Public Works, which is effectively what we call infrastructure today. But the difference between then and now when they talk about boosting infrastructure spending is that the nature of the workforce has changed dramatically. I mean, people these days, have certain skills. It’s a highly variegated work workforce, people doing different things. And the assumption in Keynes’s theory was you increase spending on public works, then you have workers easily transferred from jobs that they’ve lost places of employment where they used to be in factories and other areas of unskilled work and they can easily be transferred to, you know, working on the road, so to speak. But these days, that seems far fetched, because for instance, baristas who’ve lost their jobs are not necessarily going to be one want to be out there on the road as a construction worker, financial sector employees, and not wanting to be perhaps putting pink bats in ceilings. So the the nature of the workforce is important. We can’t just treat the labour force as this homogenous entity where people can transfer across to any sort of industry at work. And there’s also I mean, there’s, there’s information costs there. There’s transactions costs, which which make the whole process a little bit trickier than than it sounds in terms of increasing employment.

Gene Tunny  31:08

Yeah, it’s not like it was in the 30s when you could get a whole bunch of unskilled or semi skilled workers, unemployed workers and have them carve out a walking track in the national park or something like that. Exactly. Right. Yeah, yeah. Okay, we’ll take a short break here for a word from our sponsor.

Female speaker  31:37

If you need to crunch the numbers, then get in touch with adept economics. We offer you Frank and fearless economic analysis and advice. We can help you with funding submissions, cost benefit analysis, studies, and economic modelling of all sorts. Our head office is in Brisbane, Australia, but we work all over the world. You can get in touch via our website, www dot adapt economics.com.au. We’d love to hear from you.

Gene Tunny  32:06

Now back to the show. Okay, so another really balanced and insightful clip from tiny. And one of the things Tony was talking about in this clip is Keynesianism, so the ideas associated with John Maynard Keynes, the great British economist, and there’s a particular I guess, a school of thought or there’s a crude Keynesianism often in the way that you know, some, some economists or well, not not many economists, I think most economists recognise the the limits of fiscal policies, the problem with too much discretionary policy with Hey, you got to be careful with it. But there are there still are some we could say crude Keynesians and in in politics, too, there are some people with these these crude Keynesian ideas and they become quite popular during times of crises. And you know, Tony was someone in Australia who was always, always pushing back against that crude Keynesian view and trying to explain what are the what are the potential offsetting impacts, you know, how can interest rates respond, exchange rate, what’s the response to fiscal stimulus and particularly in an open economy like Australia’s Okay, so I’ll play the next highlight in which Tony covers that. So,

Tony Makin  33:42

in the open economy, where you introduce capital flows, exports imports, exchange rates, and emphasising in particular the exchange rate, then you can have a counter model to crude Keynesianism and the best known approach is the so called Mundell Fleming model, which is which features in intermediate macro economics textbooks. And it really just builds upon the IS LM model that Hicks invented by introducing capital flows and exchange rates and net exports. So, listeners may well be familiar with with that model, but simply says that if you increase government spending, you’re going to increase the budget deficit there’s going to be more spending in the economy, but that for a given money supply is going to tend to push up domestic interest rates relative to foreign interest rates and that will induce capital inflow foreigners will be flooding into buy these bonds that are paying a slightly higher interest rate than in their own countries, and that capital inflow will appreciate the currencies. And we’re talking about a floating exchange rate here. And that appreciation will worsen competitiveness because in the short run, price levels are fixed. So a nominal appreciation will translate to a real appreciation. And that loss of competitiveness will crowd out net exports. And this is exactly what we saw. Post GFC. And I’ve written written on this. It’s part of the Treasury external paper. But the exchange rate appreciated massively. As the fiscal stimulus was being rolled out and just look at the national accounts, and you’ll see that the swing variable, there was net exports that went down due due to the loss of competitiveness. That’s, that’s one open economy perspective. And I think that model has been borne out empirically, with reference to Australia’s previous experience, post GFC.

Gene Tunny  36:10

Yeah, so I’ll put a link to that paper of yours, which I think was in agenda. And you also wrote a paper for the minerals Council. One thing which was what one thing that’s really interesting, tiny is that your original minerals Council paper was criticised by the Treasury Secretary, Dr. Martin Parkinson, my old boss at the time. But then a couple of years later, you wrote a paper for the Treasury under the new secretary, John Fraser, essentially, almost refuting what Dr. Pockets and wrote in that rather extraordinary refutation of your minerals Council paper.

Tony Makin  36:58

Yes, yes. It’s quite curious and evidence that economists disagree, even heads of treasury disagree and their economic thinking. So yes, Martin Parkinson issued a press release criticising my minerals Council paper, which was mostly about Australia’s competitiveness. It was not focused, essentially on fiscal policy. That was a part of it. But that’s what caught the criticism from Treasury. And then subsequent to that, when John Fraser Parkinson, successor became Treasury head, he commissioned me to write a paper for Treasury, and that is available from their website, Treasury, external paper where I elaborated on the aspects in the minerals Council paper about fiscal policy and and raise some of these issues about accounting models to to crude Keynesianism. Yeah.

Gene Tunny  37:58

It’s interesting, because I mean, we both worked for Treasury it at different times, though. And I remember the traditional Treasury view is that we have to be careful about fiscal policy because it could end up being destabilising is the open economy impacts that you’ve mentioned, there’s also the problem that you don’t know whether you’re intervening at the right time. The problem that, you know, the stimulus might come on when the economy is recovering anyway. And then it’s, you know, it’s not really necessary. So there are these lags involved. What happened, I think, during the GFC, or the global financial crisis, was that the Treasury people thought, and you know, the, the politicians Kevin Rudd, the Prime Minister, Wayne Swan, the Treasurer, they thought, well, we’ve got this huge shock coming from overseas, we’ve got to do something. So we’re just going to throw as much money at the problem as we can to save the economy. That seems to be the logic and know all of those old concerns about discretionary fiscal policy, what we call discretionary fiscal policy, as distinct from automatic stabilisers such as unemployment benefits, which increase during recessions or the fact that your tax revenues fall during recessions. That all view that discretionary fiscal policy is insensible. That was just thrown out the window. And we’re seeing it again now. So what do you do you have any views on why treasury? The Treasury line on fiscal policy has changed, Tony?

Tony Makin  39:35

Well, I think it’s become crude, Keynesian. And there’s another example that you hadn’t mentioned, and it was the response to the Asian financial crisis, which was also a major, a cataclysmic event at the time in terms of what happened to asset prices and, and we by then had been heavily dependent on the Asia Pacific For our for our trade, not so with the GFC. Because our trade with North North America, the North Atlantic region was minimal compared to Asia. And yet the responses were completely different. In the first instance, there was virtually no fiscal response, there was a strong monetary response, which allowed the exchange rate to stay at a highly depreciated level, which, which soars through that crisis, we didn’t experience a recession that time. And that was what was happening with the global financial crisis, the exchange rate collapse, not as much as it did during the Asian financial crisis. But the government of the day then panicked, reflecting the panic in the US, and by that time, interestingly, the International Monetary Fund had a change course. And it’s thinking it has traditionally been influenced by Chicago economists and had always highlighted in my time working there highlighted problems with activist fiscal policy, including the lags problem that you’ve you’ve mentioned, but there had been this major reversal of thinking at those levels. And the Australian government here, panicked as a consequence of the crisis where we did not where it should not have given that the banking system here didn’t collapse in the same way as it did. In the United States. I fully endorse the the underwriting of the system or the banking system at the time, but the fiscal stimulus was, was completely over the top in my view.

Gene Tunny  41:46

Okay, I really loved that clip of my chat with Tony about fiscal stimulus, I think the comparison he makes or the contrast he makes between how Australia responded to the Asian financial crisis, which as he knows, was a huge deal. Particularly in in Southeast Asia. I mean, it had huge impacts on a major Well, an important economy to the north of us, Indonesia, which, you know, country I’ve had a little bit to do with, particularly with their finance ministry. And it led to effectively to the overthrow of the Suharto regime that they had there. So huge, huge impacts in that region. And yet, Australia responded differently, as Tony was explaining, but by the time of the financial crisis, the thinking in in Treasury, and and also it was a government of a different political persuasion, too. So that may have had something to do with the response. Right. Okay. So we’ve talked about crude Keynesianism. The other thing? Oh, yes, one. One thing I want to mention here is that I’ve been talking about how there are these unintended consequences of fiscal policy that that we can see. And I think that was particularly the case with, with one of the packages that was part of the pandemic response here, which was home builder, which was this home builder grant to two people who were, you know, building or renovating a home. So they had a home builder grant there was about, I think it was two and a half billion dollars. I’ve got that in my notes. And it’s ended up having these, you know, a really adverse impact on the building sector now. So there was a really crisp report from this was on news.com.au. This was on Christmas Eve, Kassar building group collapses into liquidation receivership owing $3.7 million, Guzman and Gomez. So jiwaji sites impacted. And so it’s a nice little as well, you know, it’s not nice, but it’s a good illustration of these unintended consequences. So I’ll just read some, I’ll put it in the show notes. And I’ll just read. I’ll just read some of the main points because I think it does illustrate, you know, what can go wrong if you’re not thinking through what the consequences of your policies can be. So ASIC is the Australian Securities and Investments Commission. So that regulates companies here in Australia. So ASIC insolvencies, statistics show 2213 building companies collapsed during the 20 to 23. financial year, there was a 72% increase on the previous 12 months. The alarming trend has been blamed on a perfect storm of factors including fixed price contracts, escalating costs, supply chain disruptions and tradie shortages. So tradie that’s the what we call tradespersons here in Australia. I’m not sure if you use that term in other countries, if you’re in the state So the UK, for example, the previous Morison government’s home builder grant, which was introduced in June 2020, handed out $2.52 billion to owner occupiers who wanted to build a substantially renovated home it turbocharged the sector, more than 130,000 Customers signed on to the programme with many trainees agreeing to the work under fixed price contracts, it soon became unsustainable as prices began to soar. Okay, so there was this crowding out. And you know, the, the builders or the tradies, they were relying on supply, you know, whether, you know, they may, they may have had to subcontract to other trainees, or they may have been, you know, they may need to purchase the supplies, so plumbing supplies or timber, and they may have been thinking, Oh, well, we’ll just quote based on the prices at the moment. And then suddenly, there’s this additional demand a huge amount of additional demand, and their prices increase for all those input costs. And they’ve signed these contracts to do the work at a particular rate. And these jobs are no longer viable for them. And so now what we’re seeing is we’re seeing these these building companies and collapsing, they’re just going into, into receivership liquidation administration. Yep. So bad results from that. So I’ll put a link in the show notes to that really important piece of information there. This is my final clip from Tony, from my conversation with Tony that had in June 2020. It relates to the ongoing burden of the debt. So those interest payments that, you know, that takes money out of your budget, that’s money that you can’t spend on health and education, for example, and this is something that I think it’s not sufficiently appreciated by decision makers during times of crisis. Okay, so I think, you know, there’s, there’s this need to respond, there’s this, there’s this panic, we think this is, this is the big issue we’re going to deal with. Okay. Sure. Except I accept that. But I think decision makers really have to think more about the long term implications. Okay, because, you know, this, this crisis will pass, presumably, I mean, you don’t want to be, too, you know, obviously, we need to be realistic. But generally, these things will pass, we’ll get to the the other side of it. And I suppose we, we probably should have expected that we would get over this pandemic. I mean, it has been, it has been dreadful, and you know, lots of people have died from it. So I’m not willing to downplay it. But we should have thought that yep, there will be life after the pandemic, and there will be this ongoing burden. Okay. So let’s play the next clip, the final clip from Tony on debt. What do you see as the the problem with this is this buildup of debt isn’t there, and there’s the problem, we have to pay for it, or we have to service that debt and a lot of that money is going to go overseas. You’ve also mentioned the impact on economic growth. What evidence is there regarding the impact on economic performance and growth of a buildup of public debt, which is in Australia is easily going to exceed $1 trillion within a few years?

Tony Makin  48:31

Yes, well, there’s certainly going to be the impact on national income because there’ll be a pure drain from national income of the public interest paid abroad, and we’re talking about 10s of billions there that will just be subtracted from national income to service to service the debt that we will have and that that drain will likely exceed. If it’s a trillion dollar debt, it’s likely to be about eight times the foreign aid budget and a multiple of, of what’s spent on the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme and, and a host of other other government programmes. So there’s going to be a direct impact there. But there’s been a number of elaborate econometric studies done. And you’ll find them in the literature. I won’t instance all the authors, but the IMF has done work on this. I’ve actually done had a paper published with a PhD student of mine, looking at Asian economies, and there seems to be a consensus empirically, that a 10% increase in public debt. Other things are saying well, contract, GDP growth, that’s conventionally defined GDP by point two of a percent. So that might not sound much but new compound that through it can be quite significant. After a few years.

Gene Tunny  49:55

What would be the mechanism there tiny would it be the fact that too due to service this debt, you might have to have taxes higher than otherwise. And these taxes, haven’t they lead to an efficiency loss. There’s an efficiency loss with taxation, because you’re discouraging people from working or investing. Could that be one of the mechanisms?

Tony Makin  50:15

Yeah, absolutely. The interest rate is going to play a play a role as well. But the there’s going to be a deadweight losses of the future taxes are going to harm future income. There’s no question about that. But also, there’s other studies have shown that the the the interest rate will will increase by seven basis points, or 1% increase in the public debt to GDP ratio tends to in these studies show that the interest rate tends to go up by about five basis points or up to five basis points. But the mechanism through tax is important, but also, through expectations, if you’ve got this big debt overhang, public debt overhang that’s going to affect expectations. And we can invoke Ricardo there in terms of what what he said for for households having to attend to to save more, but also firms and it’s not something that Ricardo instance, I think it’s important that investment investment is likely to be weak due to the uncertainty that business has about future tax liabilities in the face of an enormous public debt. And then lastly, there’s the impact on future generations that Thomas Jefferson, a founding father of the United States instance, and that the the future generations are going to have to pay for the repayment of the massive debt that’s that’s arisen due to the fiscal response. Yep.

Gene Tunny  52:02

Okay, so that was really interesting from tiny there. Now, some of that was the point he was making about expectations and what you call Ricardian equivalence, I think we’ll have to cover that in a future episode, because there’s a big controversy about that, and to what extent that actually, that actually happens. So, yeah, we’ll we’ll cover that in a future episode. The other stuff, you know, the, I think it’s the other points are really undeniable, really about the the interest burden of the debt and what that does the budget. So I think that’s, that’s well said, from tiny Okay, so that’s, that’s it from my conversation with Tony. What I’d like to do now is I like to play some clips from Alex Robson, who I mentioned before, Alex is out of the amazing Korea. He was an economic adviser to former Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull has been Australia’s ambassador to the OECD in Paris. And like me, he hails from Townsville in North Queensland. So yeah, I was really glad to catch up with Alex. Well, I wasn’t glad because it was a terrible event. But it was good that I could catch up with Alex after Tony’s passing to discuss Tony’s legacy. So here’s Alex on tinies legacy.

Alex Robson  53:38

I mean, in a closed economy, the assumption is you’ve got no capital inflows or outflows. And so the exchange rate then doesn’t really matter. So what Mondale and Fleming showed in the 60s Was that actually, if you just change that assumption, and then allow for the exchange rate to change, and capital inflows and outflows to occur, and that has been impacted by by imports and exports. And so with policy, say, for fiscal policy, you get this leakage into and out of exports and imports. And so if your sales are up, for example, boosting government spending or reducing taxes that will then have effects on interest rates, exchange rates and exports, so and then an open economy like Australia, that obviously matters quite a bit. And so the critical thing lever there that that changes, or you know, a lot of those predictions of the standard sort of pump priming model, we think about your government goes out and spends more money and has these multiplier effects and so on is this assumption of capital mobility and how it affects the exchange rate. And once you have that, you get a completely different predictions about the effectiveness of these different policy instruments. So and and Tony was always really good at just constantly reminding people of this and and I think it’s the tend to be something which was taught. It’s been taught, obviously, in universities for a long time, but it didn’t seem to quite make it into the, into the policymakers sort of calculus in in in Canberra. And so that was just one of Tony’s big things was just to remind people and of that. And I think, you know, I mean, we saw that during the GFC. With respect to exports, we saw it with respect to the exchange rate, there were big changes going on. And the point is that, you know, Australia is affected by everything else that’s going on in the world. And that’s why places like the OECD and IMF are always talking about coordinating fiscal policy, because, you know, otherwise, you get these leakages across across countries, and you may not get the impacts that you’re trying to achieve.

Gene Tunny  55:50

Okay, and here’s the second clip from Alex. So my conversation with Alex, I

Alex Robson  55:56

mean, thinking about, he had a good mix of very good technical economic skills. I mean, he wasn’t a heavily mathematical person, but he did use those tools when he needed them. And, but also very much an applied focus to policy questions of the day that that mattered. And it wasn’t something where he, you know, there’d be a policy issue. And so I’m now going to think about that. It was, you know, he’d been thinking about these things for a long time. And then when they tended to come up again, and again, he was ready with the arguments that he divided, quite a lot of thought to. So it was wasn’t like he was sort of chasing these different policies. She was, I think he just spent a career thinking about the big macro topics. And they just come back again and again, in Australia. And and it was we were fortunate, I think, to have him as a voice during these tumultuous times in the big macro debates of the 90s. And then during the GFC. And then more recently, as well, yeah, I think, yeah, thinking about his career, it was a good mix of contributions to the academic literature, technical skills, but then also translating that into policy commentary and advice that really stood him apart from a lot of economists today.

Gene Tunny  57:10

Okay, so we’ve come to the end of the episode. I think that the experience of many economies over the last couple of years has provided validation for the criticisms of fiscal policy of activist fiscal policy that came from economists such as the late Tony makin. The takeaway from this episode is that fiscal stimulus packages need to be very carefully designed and limited in their size, if you are going to implement them. There’s a legitimate argument that they’re best avoided altogether, but I would reserve the right to use them in some cases. And even Tony did suggest that there may have been justification was something like Job keeper, but a more targeted in better designed version of it. Okay, so, to wrap up, it’s really pleased me to be able to go back into the archives and to to find these great highlights from my conversation with tiny, tiny making. He was the leading advocate for sensible fiscal policy and Australia for for many years, and he is sorely missed. Thanks for listening. rato thanks for listening to this episode of economics explored. If you have any questions, comments or suggestions, please get in touch. I’d love to hear from you. You can send me an email via contact at economics explore.com Or a voicemail via SpeakPipe. You can find the link in the show notes. If you’ve enjoyed the show, I’d be grateful if you could tell anyone you think would be interested about it. Word of mouth is one of the main ways that people learn about the show. Finally, if your podcasting app lets you then please write a review and leave a rating. Thanks for listening. I hope you can join me again next week.

59:20

Thank you for listening. We hope you enjoyed the episode. For more content like this where to begin your own podcasting journey head on over to obsidian-productions.com

Credits

Thanks to Obsidian Productions for mixing the episode and to the show’s sponsor, Gene’s consultancy business www.adepteconomics.com.au. Full transcripts are available a few days after the episode is first published at www.economicsexplored.com. Economics Explored is available via Apple PodcastsGoogle Podcast, and other podcasting platforms.

Categories
Podcast episode

The Power of Economics: A Look Back at the Past 20 Episodes – EP221

This episode features highlights from the past 20 episodes. Economics Explored host Gene Tunny plays clips that illustrate key themes like using economics as a scientific framework, considering different perspectives, and remembering the limitations of models. The clips feature discussions on COVID policies, the role of experts, projections of resource depletion, nuclear energy, and the challenges of development economics. Gene hopes listeners find the highlights thought-provoking and looks forward to feedback on improving the podcast in the new year.

Please contact us with any questions, comments and suggestions by emailing us at contact@economicsexplored.com or sending a voice message via https://www.speakpipe.com/economicsexplored.

You can listen to the episode via the embedded player below or via podcasting apps including Google PodcastsApple Podcast and Spotify.

What’s covered in EP221

  • Economics and decision-making with a focus on open-mindedness. (0:03)
  • Using experts in decision-making and tolerating dissent. (3:12)
  • COVID-19 modelling and its limitations. (9:34)
  • Economic development, critical thinking, and foreign aid. (12:41)
  • The limitations of economics and the need for interdisciplinary approaches. (19:25)

Takeaways

1. Economics is a powerful framework, but we should remember its limitations and consider insights from other disciplines like psychology.

2. We must be open-minded and tolerant of dissenting views when relying on experts to inform policy decisions.

3. Numerical models and projections should be viewed cautiously as they can exaggerate outcomes, given the complexity of real-world systems.

4. It’s important to think critically about all options when analyzing issues and not come to them with preconceived notions or biases.

5. Effective policymaking requires understanding incentives, weighing tradeoffs, and considering how people may respond differently based on cultural and social factors.

Episodes the highlights are clipped from

https://economicsexplored.com/2023/11/09/is-the-american-dream-a-broken-promise-for-latinos-w-dr-paul-rivera-ep213/

https://economicsexplored.com/2023/10/13/private-vs-public-sector-jobs-consulting-scandals-economics-as-an-imperialist-discipline-w-uqppes-ep209/

https://economicsexplored.com/2023/10/06/growth-or-degrowth-w-oliver-hartwich-nz-initiative-ep208/

https://economicsexplored.com/2023/09/14/gigi-foster-estimates-covid-lockdowns-cost-young-people-116x-any-benefits-ep205/

https://economicsexplored.com/2023/08/24/australias-net-zero-transition-successes-challenges-w-andrew-murdoch-arche-energy-ep202/

https://economicsexplored.com/2023/08/19/the-role-of-experts-in-a-democracy-pandemics-monetary-policy-ai-w-peter-kurti-cis-ep201/

Transcript: The Power of Economics: A Look Back at the Past 20 Episodes – EP221

N.B. This is a lightly edited version of a transcript originally created using the AI application otter.ai. It may not be 100 percent accurate, but should be pretty close. If you’d like to quote from it, please check the quoted segment in the recording.

Gigi Foster  00:03

Even if you think that I’m under balling that low balling that, in fact, even if you think the Prime Minister’s estimate of 40,000 people who would have died is correct. If you look at the costs of lockdowns, they still weren’t worth it. Right. So even if I’m totally wrong as Prime Minister’s right, the lockdown still shouldn’t have been pursued.

Gene Tunny  00:25

Welcome to the economics explored podcast, a frank and fearless exploration of important economic issues. I’m your host, Gene Tunny. I’m a professional economist and former Australian Treasury official. The aim of this show is to help you better understand the big economic issues affecting all our lives. We do this by considering the theory evidence and by hearing a wide range of views. I’m delighted that you can join me for this episode, please check out the show notes for relevant information. Now on to the show. Hello, Happy New Year. It’s the first episode of 2024. In this episode, I’m going to play some highlights from the last 20 episodes. I’ve chosen these highlights. So they’re consistent with the theme of using economics in a scientific way to better understand our world and to make better decisions. Take to simple principles that people respond to incentives and that things must add up and you end up with powerful insights. You start to see constrained optimization problems everywhere. You start with a presumption that people are trying to make the best decisions for themselves based on the incentives and constraints that they face. And you think about the trade offs involved in decision making. It’s not a perfect framework, but it gets you a long way in analysing important issues. And I hope I’ve demonstrated that on this show through various conversations that I’ve had over the last four years. One of the other points I make on the show a fair bit. And this has guided my choice of highlights is the importance of being open minded, which I’d argue is consistent with the scientific approach. One quote I think a lot about us from Richard Feynman who said that the first principle is that you must not fool yourself, and you are the easiest person to fool. We should be open to a wide variety of views, and be open to vigorous debate on important issues. Okay, please let me know if you have any reactions to the clip, I play into this episode or anything that I say or my guests have said, I’d love to hear what you think. Also, please let me know any ways that I can improve the show in 2024, you’ll find my contact details in the show notes. Right. So let’s get into it. I hope you enjoy these highlights from our last 20 episodes. The first clip I’ve chosen as a highlight is from Episode 201. On the role of experts in a democracy, it’s with Peter Kirti, from the Centre for independent studies. So I’m an adjunct Fellow at CIS. And Peter’s one of my colleagues there and he’s, he’s always a great person to chat with about these big philosophical issues. I really like are Peter reminds us about the importance of being open minded, and tolerating dissenting views. Here’s the clip.

Peter Kurti  03:11

What I’m saying is that if we’re going to use experts, as we are bound to do, we, as citizens of a liberal democracy in Australia, need to be thoughtful about the way in which we engage them in ways in which we hold them to account. And we also need to be stronger about defending freedom of speech in the sense that I think we need to be more willing to tolerate dissent, we need to be able to say, well, this group of scientists over here says, you know, there is a climate catastrophe, for example, whereas this group of scientists over here saying, well, warming, and cooling is just part of a trend. These are parts of trek, these are trends that that take place in on on the earth over a period of years. We need to be able to tolerate dissenting views. I’m not saying we are necessarily able to determine which view is correct. But we are increasingly reluctant I feel to tolerate it today. We’re reluctant to tolerate dissenting views, because we want to have the right answer and we want to know what the right position is the right solution is. We saw that during COVID, of course, debates about the efficacy of vaccine mandates or mask mandates or social distancing, dissent was not tolerated. And I think that if we are going to make an intelligent use of experts, we do need to be willing to tolerate dissent and to live with perhaps the discomfort that comes from having dissenting views.

Gene Tunny  04:41

Yes, yes, exactly. Yeah. It makes it difficult for politicians, though, if, if the experts don’t agree so how, how do we think about that or what’s the relationship mean? You mentioned tolerating dissent. That’s one of your rules or your tips for getting experts like using them effectively. I mean, there’s obviously a role for expertise and people who understand the issues and they provide the advice to the government of the day. How do you think about how those experts should be used? And I mean, what the decision makers do when there is a situation of of that have that dissent to mean? Is it up to them to judge where the weight of evidence is? I mean, because the politicians will say, Well, look, the bulk of evidence is in favour of this hypothesis. It could be climate change, for instance. So yeah, how do you think about that, Peter, how should politicians use experts?

Peter Kurti  05:38

Well, I think it really adjust the way that you have outlined by examining what it is the experts are saying, By assessing the evidence by determining where the bulk of opinion lies, and then using judgement and skill to make a decision. We can apply that sort of framework to any policy area, we might think about. Migration levels of migration, there are people experts who say Australia, we can’t have a big Australia, others say we can have a big Australia, and each side will mount will present evidence to bolster their own arguments. And I’m sure believe quite passionately, the evidence that the cogency of the evidence they present, but somebody then has to make a decision about how we do that, and an elected government has to take a position, we can see it in terms of going to war, or whether we supply arms, for example, to Ukraine, we went into Iraq 20 years ago, very controversially, but we did so on the bait, I mean, at the Howard Government did so on the basis of evidence that was presented. And as we remember, because we know those around at the time, there was a huge amount of dissent in this country about that. At the end of the day, it’s elected representatives who have to make the call and are then held accountable. So I think it’s a it’s a difficult role. And I’ve never been an elected politician. So I’ve never been in the position of having to implement this. I’m simply really someone on the sidelines who’s advocating for a certain, as it were a certain style, of style of living, if you like. But I think it’s bias by weighing and assessing, carefully, evidence that is presented. And I think not allowing fear, I talked about the importance of political courage, not allowing fear of adverse consequences to deter somebody to do to take you from making the right decision, for example, when I mean, how many years ago was it now it’s, it’s must be nearly 30 years, since the Port Arthur tragedy. And the Howard Government decided that they were going to take a stand on on firearms. And there’s a lot of controversy about that at the time. I remember not being in Australia very long. And the view was that people living in the country or people who are really attached to their weaponry wouldn’t be happy with this. And there were arguments on both sides. But I think the weight of public opinion, or rather, I should say this put it this way. I think the Howard Government made it made a decision based on on the evidence and the politics, and also having to judge which way public opinion whether public opinion would accept this. And it was a controversial decision. But I think, given the horror of what happened at Port Arthur, the Australian public did accept it. But there was no telling which was the right what was the right decision or not. I think it’s in a sense, you only know whether you’ve made the right decision with hindsight.

Gene Tunny  08:52

This next clip features the one and only JG foster professor of economics at the University of New South Wales, in Sydney. Tim Hughes and I spoke with Gigi and Episode 205, which was on the costs of COVID policies to young people. I really liked this clip, because it reminds me why we should be careful when we’re relying on the results of numerical models, particularly projections, which show that something is going to get really bad, or, you know, we’re going to end up in a doomsday scenario. So these type of models were heavily relied on during the pandemic. I think that models have their place of course, but we need to remember their limitations and what their underlying assumptions are. Okay, let’s see the clip.

Gigi Foster  09:34

In mid March, you may even recall Neil Ferguson’s ICL modelling came out saying that, you know, 60 million people around the world were going to die or something. And of course, as we know, the COVID death count even now is you know, an order of magnitude less than that. And by the way, Niall Ferguson had been wrong in the past. These epidemiological models that are run in a simulated environment in a computer that necessarily do not include all of the real World variables that are actually relevant to whether people die or suffer from diseases are notoriously exaggerative of the bad outcomes that may occur from the new disease threat. Right that has happened again and again. And again. We’ve had SARS and the swine flu and the you know, all these different fluids that have been modelled and they’ve basically always there has been some coterie of doomsaying epidemiology, people who have said, based on my model, everybody’s gonna die, right? That’s just a common thing it happens, right? And you know why? Because the, you know, the media loves that stuff. It’s, you know, they get ahold of a guy like that, who will be, you know, put on a bleeding headline, that will get eyeballs, right, and they get status, and they get to be the person who really cares about people, because if you care about people, then you know, don’t you care that they’re all gonna die, or I mean, that becomes this whole narrative. And it really crowds out actual science, actual science is based, at best on real data, real data, right? Of course, we have theories about what happens, and we need to use those to structure our understanding of our world. But our world is so incredibly complex and dynamic. And there are endogenous factors that are happening and shocks that we can’t predict. There’s just so much going on, that all models are wrong, as somebody said in my discipline, but some are useful. That’s how you should see a model. So what I did in order to produce that estimate of how many people in a counterfactual non lockdown Australia would have succumbs to COVID is I looked with Sanjeev we looked at the countries in the world that had low restriction levels. So obviously, Sweden is one. Yeah, but it also used another counterfactual, which was about six I think other countries with populations over a million that had low restrictions, mostly in Europe, I think Taiwan might have been in there as well. And we basically took, you know, the average deaths from COVID. This is real data, real data, what they actually experience not something that comes out of a computer generated simulation, but actual data, because we just believe that much more. And then we of course, adjusted for population and then applied it to Australia. And we say, well, this is our best guess right now. Even if you think that I’m under balling that low balling that, in fact, even if you think the Prime Minister’s estimate of 40,000, people who would have died is correct. If you look at the cost of lockdowns, they still weren’t worth it. Right. So even if I’m totally wrong, if my minister is right, the lockdown still shouldn’t have been pursued. Right. But I also think that the Prime Minister is using these simulation models, these SR models or something like this, or you know from the Doherty Institute, or some other kind of, you know, institute that was supporting the narrative and coming out with these doomsday scenarios, to come up with that figure and make himself look like a saviour.

Gene Tunny  12:41

This next clip, which is a short one is from Episode 208 on degrowth, with Oliver Hartwich from the New Zealand initiative. Again, it’s on the theme of the limitations of modelling and making forecasts and projections. It reminds us that we should be sceptical regarding any predictions of impending doom. Let’s hear from Oliver.

Oliver Hartwich  13:02

The other idea of course, in all of us resource depletion seems to be one of these ideas that you simply cannot ever refute, keeps coming back. Going back to amorphous Of course as the starting point, but William Stanley Jevons in the 1860s actually predicted the world would run out of coal. But it’s this general tendency to linear thinking where everything is always continuing on a certain path. I mean, there was a letter writer, I believe, in the London Times in the early 20th century, predicting that London at some stage would be under six feet of horse manure from all the offices in the city, it has this tendency to always think we’re just continuing on the same path and it will never change.

Gene Tunny  13:44

The next clip is from Episode 202. On the net zero transition with Andrew Murdock from RK energy. It reminds us of the importance of thinking through all available options, and not coming to an issue with biases and preconceptions. Let’s play the clip.

Andrew Murdoch  14:01

We certainly should be considering nuclear as one of the options. The engineering me likes to consider things with a sceptical and inquiring mind. So what are all of the options? What are the ones that will work? What are the ones that won’t work? What will they cost? What are the probability that we will achieve the outcomes that we’re trying to achieve? So in the context of assessing any type of technology, we should be looking at? What is it going to cost? What are the consequences? How does it impact our society? How does it impact our landscape? My personal view is that that advanced small modular reactors have a role to play, particularly when we’re getting into the very deep baseload. So the power that has to run 24/7 at very high levels of reliability, that’s going to be very difficult and expensive to do with intermittent renewables and it is possible to do it with independent renewables. It’s possible to deal with intermittent renewables and storage and gas topping, but another arrow in the quiver of decarbonisation tools that we could use is small modular reactors.

Gene Tunny  15:11

This next clip is from Episode 209, which was a recording of a seminar that I spoke out with the University of Queensland students that were students in the politics, philosophy, and economics degree. It illustrates the importance of thinking critically of really thinking through the implications of a course of action. I talked about a notorious incident that occurred in the history of convict transportation to Australia. It was the second fleet and 7090 rather than the Third Fleet, I should note, I mentioned the Third Fleet in the conversation with the UQ students. So I must remember that I’ve linked to an article in the show notes, which explains all the relevant facts, so you can check that out. Around two out of every five convicts in the second fleet died either at sea or shortly after landing. The contract is transporting the convicts were paid based on the number who bought the ships in England, rather than the number who disembarked in Australia. And they had the right to sell whatever provisions were left over from the voyage. The results were tragic. Let’s hear what I had to say.

Joe  16:16

As someone who’s working in the consultancy industry at the moment, what’s your take on the ongoing scandals that have been happening involving PWC and other consulting firms at the moment? Do you think this may be raises questions or concerns about the efficacy of outsourcing public policy?

Gene Tunny  16:36

Oh, look, I think there’s always been concerns about the efficacy of outsourcing. And if you look at the history of contracting out, I forget which fleet it was, but was it the Third Fleet, there was one some of the convicts ships are all put out to tender right by the by HM Treasury, or the Admiralty in the UK. And the Admiralty or the the Treasury they want. They want the most people to get out. They want people to come to Australia, they don’t want people to die on the ship. Right? They actually want people to survive the voyage. But the ship owners, the ones who are who win the contract, they want to fulfil the contract to just to the letter so they can get the payment from the Treasury. But they don’t really care much about the people who were the people survive unless you make that explicit in the contract. So and there was a scandal with one of the convict ships, if I remember correctly, I can look it up and we can put it in the show notes. So yeah, there’s always been issues with government contracting, there’s always been concerns. And so I’m a great believer in outsourcing because I think it does save money. But you’ve got to do it for specific things for specific jobs that you can keep a close eye on and where you trust the people to deliver those jobs. Okay, we’ll take a short break here for a word from our sponsor.

Female speaker  18:03

If you need to crunch the numbers, then get in touch with adept economics. We offer you Frank and fearless economic analysis and advice. We can help you with funding submissions, cost benefit analysis, studies, and economic modelling of all sorts. Our head office is in Brisbane, Australia, but we work all over the world. You can get in touch via our website, www dot adapt economics.com.au. We’d love to hear from you.

Gene Tunny  18:32

Now back to the show. Rado, this is an ultimate clip is from my conversation with Dr. Paul Rivera, from Episode 213 Regarding the American dream. At the beginning of our conversation, we talked briefly about Paul’s work and economic development for USA ID. He told me a story that well illustrates one of the fundamental challenges in providing foreign aid, again, is on the theme of being open minded this clip about thinking critically and not having preconceptions. Here, the preconception came from a standard model of economic development. So this clip is a good reminder to economists that we shouldn’t fall too much in love with our own models. We need to think about whether any psychological or cultural issues may be relevant to the situation that we’re analysing. Okay, let’s listen to the clip.

Paul Rivera  19:25

One of my first consulting jobs that I ever that I ever took was with one of these large international financial institutions, which shall remain nameless, but they had a they had been working in Western Africa somewhere with these with these fishery fisherman communities. Somebody had the idea that, you know, in my last situation, they said they had worked somewhere in East Asia, I think, I believe it was in Thailand, and they had worked with Fisher communities and they had created this project through which they purchased sort of these laws. on boats with motor but with motors that would help the fishermen they said basically, that the problem in that situation was that there was a sort of a low level capital investment. And so they just infused this capital. And that’s what was needed to bring our productivity. And so they said, copy paste, it worked in East Asia, so it’s going to work in West Africa. And they they did absolutely no consultation. Okay, so I came in actually, as an ex post evaluator, about three years after the project had been completed. And so I go in to this community where I know they had worked. And I started asking about the boats and the fishermen and how things are going and people are looking at me with blank stares, like what are you talking? I’m like, I’m like, a few years ago, there was this project and this organisation came, and they’re like, Oh, you have to talk to the chief. And so this particular country still had sort of a chief says chief type chiefdoms society organisation, right? So they take me to the chief, and the chief walks me down to the beach, and I see 10 of these boats upside down, sitting on the beach completely rotted out, and there’s no motors. Okay. And so what they, when I started asking about it, he said, Well, what is what essentially they didn’t understand was that their society is a very highly structured society. And the fishermen, they were considered to be sort of not high loss, high status, folks. And so this organisation had come in, and given a very high status gift, in effect, to a relatively not high status person. And so the natural thing for them to do was to say, I can’t accept this gift. So they gifted all of the boats to the chief, the chief is the chief. So the chief doesn’t fish. He doesn’t, he’s not a fisherman. So the chief basically sold the boats, sold all the motors, he used the income to buy himself a new house in Switzerland. And that was it. Right? So what happened, right, and I can, I can give you five other similar examples. There was there was basically they external parties came in, they gave some sort of analysis of what they perceive to be the problem, they copy pasted a solution. And they put in millions of dollars for it. And at the end of the day, there was no real impact from that, because they failed to secure the buy in from the community, they failed to do the basic consultation that would show you know what it is that was actually needed in those communities. So you know, that’s our, that’s our big thing is really, really engaging in listening. You know, before, you know, when we talk about wasting taxpayer dollars, and that sort of thing, it’s our responsibility to make sure that that’s that that’s going to be used in a proper fashion, you know.

Gene Tunny  22:44

Now it’s time for our final highlight. It’s another clip from my wide ranging talk with UQ students. And it’s another reminder of how regardless of the power of economics as a way of thinking, economists do need to consider insights from other disciplines. The clip begins with a question from the event MC Joe Christiansen, let’s hear it. Russ Roberts, who is the host of econ talk a podcast, he refers to economics as an imperialistic discipline, this idea that, you know, being like, you know, economists often try to apply economics and economic thinking too broadly, to domains where the assumptions may no longer hold, and its utility is questionable, I guess, someone that might come to mind is someone like Gary Becker, you know, bringing the idea of economics and supply and demand to the family and areas that typically it hadn’t been applied to before. And for you personally, what do you think the limits are of economics as a discipline, and other things that economics can’t explain? And we might need other sort of perspectives to understand? I think, certainly, I mean, even economics requires other perspectives. So I mean, I think economics is an incredibly powerful tool. And I mean, you know, it’s a science of the economy and studying the economy there. There’s some core economics, you need to know, where it gets difficult is trying to predict behaviour and, and in in cases where people don’t act fully rationally. And that’s what you need to bring the psychology. Right. So I think any idea that economics is the imperialist discipline, and we’ve got all the answer is I think, that was destroyed by the financial crisis. I mean, maybe up until 2008 People could have believed that, but after 2008, I think there was a recognition that okay, we haven’t really solved the business cycle. We thought we’ve solved the business cycle is this Great Moderation. markets aren’t always rational. You can’t. There are periods of irrationality and economics is not going to help you there. That’s where you need psychology to bring Psychology and that’s why behavioural economics is trying to bring in psychology with economics. So, yeah, I think there are clearly limits to economics and one of the one of the important limits or considerations, is that economics to the extent Well, if it’s, you could say it’s a science or it’s a study a field of study, it can answer questions of fact, or we can make predictions. Or we could argue, analyse what might be the most efficient course of action from the perspective of consumers consumer welfare, or from economic welfare, broadly construed. What we can’t necessarily answer is what’s the best thing to do for society? Because then you’ve got ethical issues, value judgments, how do we okay, if something is affecting the environment, for example, and that affects future generations? How do we, how do we analyse that that those can be difficult issues? Or how do we make choices regarding health policy measures? So it’s not always they’re not always issues where economic considerations are the final determinant, you may need to bring in value judgments? The whole distinction that thing was David Hume between isn’t bored. Yeah,

Joe  26:14

yeah. Yeah. Yeah, good. All.

Gene Tunny  26:19

Right. Oh, those are all the highlights that I have for now. If you’re a regular listener, I’d like to thank you for tuning in over the last 12 months. In 2024, I’m aiming to dive deep into some critical issues, and to really explore all the relevant theory and evidence on them. Next week, I will talk about some recent things that we’ve learned or relearned about the limits of fiscal policy based on our experience during the pandemic. If you’re a new listener, I hope that you continue listening to the show. Whether you’re a new listener, a regular listener, or an occasional listener, please let me know how I can improve the podcast. Over the years I’ve been grateful for all the feedback on what’s been said on the show, about the types of guests you like and the topics that you’d like me to cover. I want this podcast to be as informative and as objective as possible. So please get in touch with any ideas on how I can improve it. My contact details are in the show notes. That’s it for this episode. And all I have to say now is Happy New Year rato thanks for listening to this episode of economics explored. If you have any questions, comments or suggestions, please get in touch. I’d love to hear from you. You can send me an email via contact at economics explore.com Or a voicemail via SpeakPipe. You can find the link in the show notes. If you’ve enjoyed the show, I’d be grateful if you could tell anyone you think would be interested about it. Word of mouth is one of the main ways that people learn about the show. Finally, if your podcasting app lets you then please write a review and leave a rating. Thanks for listening. I hope you can join me again next week.

28:06

Thank you for listening. We hope you enjoyed the episode. For more content like this or to begin your own podcasting journey. Head on over to obsidian-productions.com

Credits

Thanks to Obsidian Productions for mixing the episode and to the show’s sponsor, Gene’s consultancy business www.adepteconomics.com.au. Full transcripts are available a few days after the episode is first published at www.economicsexplored.com. Economics Explored is available via Apple PodcastsGoogle Podcast, and other podcasting platforms.

Categories
Podcast episode

Nuclear Power, COVID Policies, & Outsourcing: Thoughts on recent episodes w/ John August – EP220

John August, a Sydney radio host and Pirate Party of Australia official, returns to provide feedback on recent episodes about nuclear power, COVID policies, and government outsourcing and consulting. John discusses his generally positive view of nuclear energy with some qualifications and provides his thoughts on the analysis of COVID restrictions presented in a recent episode by Prof. Gigi Foster. John also weighs in on the challenges of government service delivery, noting potential upsides and downsides to outsourcing and cautioning against contractors dominating policy development.

Please contact us with any questions, comments and suggestions by emailing us at contact@economicsexplored.com or sending a voice message via https://www.speakpipe.com/economicsexplored.

You can listen to the episode via the embedded player below or via podcasting apps including Google PodcastsApple Podcast and Spotify.

About this episode’s guest: John August

John August is the Treasurer of the Pirate Party Australia. John does computer support work in retail and shareholder communication. He is passionate about justice and ethics in our world, particularly as it plays out in law generally and intellectual property in particular. He has stood on behalf of the Pirate Party in the Federal seat of Bennelong and also as a Councillor for Ryde City Council.

Along with technology and law John is also interested in spoken word and poetry. He broadcasts on community radio and hosts the program “Roving Spotlight” on Tuesdays from noon-2pm on Radio Skid Row Marrickville Sydney, and writes about his ideas on the website www.johnaugust.com.au. You can keep up to date with what John is up to via his Facebook page

What’s covered in EP220

  • 00:04:08 – Discussion on Nuclear Energy
  • 00:13:37 – Gigi Foster’s COVID Analysis
  • 00:25:58 – Economic Impact of COVID Restrictions
  • 00:35:57 – Outsourcing and Consulting in Government
  • 00:44:20 – Final Thoughts and Wrap-up

Takeaways

  • Nuclear power holds promise as an energy source, but challenges around risk management, technology development, and public perception still need to be addressed.
  • In John’s view, there are reasonable arguments on both sides of the debate around COVID restrictions, with disagreement centring around difficult-to-determine counterfactual scenarios.
  • Outsourcing can benefit the government, like additional capacity and fresh perspectives, but oversight is needed to avoid issues like mission creep or perverse incentives.  

Links relevant to the conversation

Recent news about nuclear energy:

First new U.S. nuclear reactor since 2016 is now in operation

NuScale ends Utah project, in blow to US nuclear power ambitions | Reuters  

John talking about nuclear energy on his radio show:

https://www.mixcloud.com/Johnorg/roving-spotlight-26-sept-23-nuclear-nuclear-more-nuclear/

Pirate Party position statement on bureaucracy and rent-seeking:

https://pirateparty.org.au/wiki/Position_Statements/Government_Bureaucracy_Rent-Seeking

Video mentioned by John: “The consulting industry has infantilised government” – Mariana Mazzucato on taking back control

https://youtu.be/ycVBoWsGLJs?si=r7f5qIJds0dENPtI

Review of Jobkeeper payment by Nigel Ray: 

https://treasury.gov.au/consultation/c2023-407908

Previous Economics Explored episodes mentioned this episode:

https://economicsexplored.com/2023/07/27/sir-david-hendry-on-economic-forecasting-the-net-zero-transition-ep198/

https://economicsexplored.com/2023/09/14/gigi-foster-estimates-covid-lockdowns-cost-young-people-116x-any-benefits-ep205/

https://economicsexplored.com/2023/10/13/private-vs-public-sector-jobs-consulting-scandals-economics-as-an-imperialist-discipline-w-uqppes-ep209/

Transcript: Nuclear Power, COVID Policies, & Outsourcing: Thoughts on recent episodes w/ John August – EP220

N.B. This is a lightly edited version of a transcript originally created using the AI application otter.ai. It may not be 100 percent accurate, but should be pretty close. If you’d like to quote from it, please check the quoted segment in the recording.

John August  00:03

Over time, the Public Service changed from this institution that was giving Frank and fearless advice to one that was basically mindlessly implementing government policy without challenge or question.

Gene Tunny  00:20

Welcome to the economics explored podcast, a frank and fearless exploration of important economic issues. I’m your host gene Tunny. I’m a professional economist and former Australian Treasury official. The aim of this show is to help you better understand the big economic issues affecting all our lives. We do this by considering the theory evidence and by hearing a wide range of views. I’m delighted that you can join me for this episode, please check out the show notes for relevant information. Now on to the show. Hello, it’s the last episode of 2023. And I thought I’d take the opportunity to share some feedback on recent episodes from listeners. I caught up with previous guests and regular listener John August recently for some of his reactions to some episodes. If you’ve listened to my previous conversations with John, you’ll know he’s a radio show host in Sydney. He’s a member of the Pirate Party of Australia. And he always has interesting things to say. So I’m glad I caught up with him for his reflections. We talked about nuclear power, about COVID policies about consulting and outsourcing. So these reflections of John were inspired by recent conversations that Tim and I had with David Hendry, and with GG Foster, and about a conversation I had with university students. I’ll put links to those episodes in the show notes so you can check them out if you haven’t listened to them yet. If you have any thoughts on what genre I have to say in this episode, or ideas about how I can improve the show in 2020 for them, please get in touch in find my contact details in the show notes. One really great bit of feedback I’ve had recently came from radio it was in a shale. He had some kind words to say about recent episodes with John Cochran and John danced. So thanks for that shale. One of the really good points he makes regards health insurance, so quoting shale, regarding health care and social security. Those are both sticky wickets because of the adverse selection problem. Any medical system whether entirely socialised entirely private or some mixture of the two suffers from the fact that people in their working prime have little incentive to contribute to pooled insurance or annuities, which benefit older strangers more than themselves. Privatisation risk spiralling costs socialisation risks long wait times and rationing of services. I think this is a really good point about the trade offs involved. And one I’ll have to explore in a future episode. So if you think this is a topic I should do early next year, then please let me know. Right. Okay, let’s get into it. I hope you enjoy my conversation with John August. John Agus, good to be catching up with you again. Yes.

John August  03:02

Good to be talking. Again, Jean, you’ve got a lot of interesting discussion on your podcast. And I’ve obviously stuck my order in and a lot of ways on a lot of topics along the way on my own show. But yes, good to be here again.

Gene Tunny  03:14

Excellent, John. So some of the issues I’d like to chat with you about based on the conversations we’ve been having in response to some of those podcast episodes, keen to chat with you about nuclear energy, you’ve got some views on nuclear, and also the episode that I did with Gigi Foster on COVID. And then consulting and outsourcing and possibly we might get on to crypto if, if we have time to start off with on nuclear energy? What’s your position on nuclear? So we’ve had a lot of discussion in Australia about possibly, you know, opening up or allowing these small nuclear reactors? Do you think that’s actually feasible? So one, there’s a question of feasibility. And two, there’s a question of desirability. What are your thoughts on that, John?

John August  04:07

Well, I think it’s desirable, it may not be feasible. But to try it as well, I’d say there’s a lot of ideas I have swirling around and I will get started on them. Like, one of my favourite ideas is to take our existing power stations and retrofit them with a nuclear boiler. And that, you know, people talk about just how long it takes to make a whole new nuclear reactor. And that is true, it is quite an amount of time. But you know, if we had that technology knocked that out, then you know, I guess retrofitting existing new power stations with nuclear actors would be a good thing. And then you also have your small modular nuclear reactors and one of the things you’ve got to say about those reactors as much as I am feeling so positive about their promises In a potential, the technology isn’t there yet. Now, my more contingent statement is, you know, let’s have a list of things once the technology does five or six things in will officially say it’s a goer, and then run with it. Now, one of the things that I sort of straddle the fence between nuclear and renewables. And if you go back, you know, 10 or 20 years ago, there all these people promoting renewable saying, you know, one day we’ll have good solar panels, one day, we’ll have this one day, we’ll have that. And if you look at the last 10 or 20 years, I think we have made considerable progress on those fronts. But the point is just like I was willing to give renewable power a bit of slack back then, in the same way, I’m willing to give nuclear power a bit of a Slack now and say, Look, some of these things aren’t quite nutted out at the moment, but maybe they will be in the future. And you know, that’s a reasonable position to say, let’s wait till these things are sort of working. But in broad terms, going back to nuclear power itself, you know, regardless where we’re talking about new technology or whatnot, there’s like, so many, so much criticism of nuclear power that I think is ill founded. And one of the things that people claim is that, oh, there’s no new nuclear power stations coming online. And I believe there’s one coming online just reasonably soon, or in the next six months or whatever, in the US. Admittedly, it’s been stalled for about 10 years, but it’s finally coming online. And, you know, one of the things is that, like, you’ve got, I think, nuclear reactors elsewhere in the world, I think India, some countries in, in and around Saudi Arabia, are building them. And, you know, you can wonder why are these other nations thinking that this is a reasonable thing to do? The cynical comment would be, you know, they don’t value human lives that much. Or you could just say, Look, they are a sovereign nation, which is making their own calculations and their own decisions, and they think it’s a reasonable thing to do. So in broad terms, I’m actually quite positive about nuclear power. Because even with Shinobu, in Fukushima, and so on, you grind through the numbers. And basically, conventional coal fired power stations built kill a lot more people on a per kilowatt hour basis than nuclear. Because your nuclear accidents, look, they are quite spectacular. Let’s not deny that. But there is some details underneath that, that with a coal fired power station, every bit of coal has to be mined in the mind and transported to the power station with nuclear power, that you have a certain amount of mining and each step down the track, it becomes more and more concentrated till it’s this lump of uranium, you’ve just got to get to the nuclear power station, you don’t need to do it very often. So there’s, there’s basically less fatalities overall. And also, this is one of the things that even though I’m an atheist, I suppose sometimes I tap into concepts like original sin, and so on. And look, with Shinobu, I think we can legitimately say, that was an artefact of the way they did things in the Soviet Union. And like, the reactor had its own faults Built in, the people running it weren’t properly trained. And they did some stupid things, and so on. So so that’s one thing you say there. And with Fukushima, there was a problem with the fault analysis of it. There’s something in engineering called failure mode and Criticality Analysis. And it’s my view that if they properly assessed the Fukushima reactor, they might have actually uncovered this floor in this design, the possibility that tsunamis would not get out, and basically take an action for that maybe elevated their backup reactors to the point where, you know, they were not in a basement that would get flooded, or whatever. But having said that, this is where I talk about original sin, because I don’t blame that nuclear technology. But I do wonder about our human ability to properly manage this risk. And maybe that’s an inherent problem, but the other side of it and who knows, maybe we’ll get into bureaucracy, later on. But I was speaking to a administrator of a nuclear reactor in the US. This was probably a good 10 or 20 years ago, and he was telling me a story that he felt he was being paid by this the signature not by the hour, because in a given day, he signed 500 different bits of paper. Right now, the point is, look, this is a dangerous technology, it needs to be regulated by the government in an appropriate way. Okay, so I think we have to acknowledge that but when they say nuclear power in the US is really expensive. You wonder if it really is expensive. If, or it’s expensive because of the excessive bureaucratic overheads that are piled on it. So, you know, that’s sort of one of the things that I think about. And the other thing is that people say, while nuclear power can actually be very cheap, once you get the reactor running, it’s such an investment to get going, that like the financial markets, you know, they struggle to deal with that. So you might say, you know, sometimes it is interesting that, you know, with, with some people who are critical of nuclear actors, how a lot of the time they’re critical of the market, and maybe that’s a legitimate thing. But then when it comes to nuclear power, they suddenly think that the insurance market is absolutely perfect, while at other times they think the market is totally dysfunctional. And so I sort of say, well, how do we deal with this risk? How do we insure it? And you know, if you look at the deeper picture that basically more people get killed in coal fired power stations, and I don’t know, it was 10 years or more, I think I was checking out an eclipse in China. And I checked out in the newspaper, and they said, you know, some sort of headline like, last year, we had an amazingly good year, only 40,000 people died in coal mines. Right. Right. So so they have a different way of looking at things. Obviously, we’re pretty good with power mines in Australia. But if you look at the global picture, you know, there, there’s more going on there. So what some of the stories that the idea that nuclear waste, is that obnoxious, I tend to think there’s a fundamental trade off here, either you have a lot of pollution in the atmosphere all around you, or it’s all located in one place, and you can point a finger at it. And I have to say, I am much more comfortable with it being located in one place where you can point a finger at it, then it sort of being everywhere. So I’m actually comfortable with nuclear waste. Okay.

Gene Tunny  11:57

And John, is that the Pirate Party position? Are you are you still with the Pirate Party and the I

John August  12:03

am still with the Pirate Party? And I suppose look, we mostly, let’s say there’s a diversity of views on within the Pirate Party. I think our main position, though, is we shouldn’t let we shouldn’t lift the ban on nuclear power, and let things unfold and progress and develop. And, you know, that’s, I think that would be a fair assessment of the position of the Pirate Party on nuclear power. You know, that we don’t put Well, the official position is not to particularly favour it, but let me know, let’s set up a situation where if it’s good, it can show itself to be good.

Gene Tunny  12:43

Yeah, yeah, I think that’s, that’s fair enough. Okay. We might move on to the COVID discussion I had with Gigi Foster. So you had some reactions to the conversation with Gigi, would you be able to take us through First, what were your reactions to Jay Jay’s thoughts on COVID? And the big? I mean, Gigi has analysed, you know, she’s run some numbers. And she’s concluded that, you know, the COVID restrictions, lock downs. In particular, school closures ended up costing young people so much more than any benefits they gained. And I mean, her conclusion is that from a societal perspective, it didn’t make sense, either. So could you take us through what your reactions to that episode? Were please, John?

John August  13:37

Oak? Okay. Well, the point is, I can think of lots of concerns I would have with her analysis. But let me also say at the same time, I haven’t actually sat down and cranked out the numbers. But still at a conceptual level, I could see so many problems with the way she had done her analysis. Now, let me first off say that, you know, I think it’s a healthy thing to do these styles of economic analysis. I think that Jodie Foster was, I guess, you know, basically people were having a personal galette are harassing her and, and I don’t condone that I’m very sympathetic to her in that situation. I think it’s very sad that that happened, because part of me says, I think she’s wrong, but she should be allowed to speak that wrong and we shouldn’t try to censor her. So, but at the same time, there was a certain amount of emotion in her argument where she was presuming that she was correct straying that she was engaging with people, and they were just talking past each other. And there was no, there was no accommodation, no engagement. But I also know that it did seem to me that on the one hand, she was claiming to be this objective economist that was just going through the numbers, but you could also see some definite, I guess, emotional leakage. In the argument that she made, but to try to sort of talk about, I guess the problems I saw with her analysis was where she wasn’t working through what I consider to be some illegitimate costs of COVID. And basically, looking at Rip, because there were the things that we saw in Italy, in the US of, you know, basically funeral homes being overwhelmed with hospitals being overwhelmed. And, you know, I will look, I’ll listen to a detailed argument, if you want to say that those pictures were misleading and not representing the underlying statistics. But, you know, I would be very surprised for me, you know, they let it rip in the US, and Italy, and things got quite bad. Another thing is to sort of say, look, Gigi was saying, oh, you know, the people were asking for, for lock downs, and clamp downs, and so on. And if you look at what was going on in the US was just so many people saying, on our COVID is not a problem, we’ll sort of just, yeah, people are talking nonsense. It’s just a little flu. And, you know, there are a number of tragic cases of people who just thought, Oh, this isn’t going to be a problem, and they caught it, they died, or they got very seriously ill. And then they suddenly thought, oh, cripes. COVID really is a thing. So I challenge that narrative in terms of what did actually happen in the US. But look, you know, I now have a doctor in Melbourne, who was saying, Look, guys, this is a respiratory disease fundamentally, and people are overreacting sort of worrying about surfaces and so on. And but, you know, he was actually saying, Look, you know, breathing on each other is an issue, but surfaces really isn’t an issue. And you know, there was sort of an overreaction there. And I do remember, I think I spoke to an epidemiologist on my own show. And he was willing to say, look, in the latest stages, maybe we should have lifted the lock down sooner than we did. But certainly, he was going to say, look at the early stages, lockdown was worthwhile. Now there was this whole story of flattening the curve, and the hospitals being overwhelmed. And you might remember that concern. And I think that was a legitimate concern. And you know, some of the stories about Sweden, you know, a lot more old people died than they expected, their health services were overwhelmed. You know, the story about rounds wound Sweden was not as rosy as is made out from the outside, though, certainly they took a different approach. And that’s worth paying attention to. But you know, the other thing is, as far as young people is concerned now, you know, sure, it’s good, that they’re educated, it’s good that they have a job. But in a sense, it’s also good that there’s an economy to provide services for us all. And if that economy is disrupted, then that’s a bad thing. And you can say, look, how much is it going to be disrupted when the health services are overwhelmed? You know, when there’s so many people having COVID, so many people going off work, they’re not off work, because it’s locked down. They’re off work, because they’re ill. You know, that is what I guess you call the counterfactual of a situation in Australia being somewhat like that in Italy, or the US. And you know, your GI, we’re talking about qualities. And I would still say that there is the whole thing of like, Sure, it’s, maybe some people just get COVID Very lightly. I remember I had, you know, two decent nights of fever. It was a bit strange, but no, I have actually had worse, I guess, infections or flus and COVID had had a different trajectory. But equally, I think I’d had two in two backs vaccinations at that stage, so maybe it could have been a lot worse if I hadn’t been vaccinated. But the point is, you can actually get long COVID. And if you have long COVID, that means you have a health impact, where you’re knocked around for for quite some time. And I remember a woman I know, she got COVID. And I think a month later, you know, she had, she was struggling to walk upstairs. You know, that’s how badly off it affected her. And I think there’s that sort of effect, ongoing effect on the hill. So you don’t just say, look, either you’re alive or you’re dead. And there’s no grey area in between, I think the grey area in between is quite significant. And once we had vaccinations, alright, you deal with it differently, but before you have vaccinations, then it is appropriate to say, let’s contain the outbreak. And I do remember there was a time I think before, before Delta That’s right. And you know, we Australia had been cleared of COVID and you know, I was sitting at the beach looking at the looking at the beach and thinking this is part of the shoreline of Australia and We’re here and we’re protected by ocean and were safe. And that was truly an uplifting feeling. And keep in mind politically in Western Australia, they had what you might call a pro COVID reaction, because we in the, in the eastern states, were looking at the US and Italy and shaking our heads, and Western Australia, they were looking at the eastern states of Australia and shaking the head and thinking, thank God, we’ve gotten away with COVID. And yes, they wanted their lock downs, and they got their lock downs. And then you know, that government was returned with an astounding majority, because partially because of its behaviour around COVID. So, so I guess that’s going off on quite a tangent. But the point is, you know, you’ve got to contrast against Western Australia to the to the eastern states and their experience of it. But what’s the other thing is sort of like, during the lockdown, some businesses would have reviewed their processes done all the maintenance that have been putting off. So, you know, you want to have a productivity boost when you came back. But the other thing that Judy also mentioned was, look, we got our put ourselves into debt. And I will actually have to say that some of that money may not being targeted, as well as it could have been, you can wonder, was that an honest mistake? Should they have known better? Okay, that’s a more complicated issue. But I’ll certainly say that. But you know, the Liberal Party finally figured out what it was like to be a government and you had to spend some money from the government coffers, I suppose. So then they finally finally got to find out what it felt like. But, but the thing is, in going into debt like that, you’re hopefully giving the economy a soft landing, it’s not crashing into a wall. Now, the problem is, Gigi might well say, Well, I avoided any sort of soft landing hard landing, you would have the consequences, you know, would have been like Sweden, that would not have been that bad. But I believe we manage COVID, we went into debt, we went into debt so that our economy didn’t hit a wall. And in fact, you know, some people were surprised at how the economy bounced back. After like the COVID Depression, the economy just came back. And, you know, one metaphor was that, you know, we had the embers that were still warm in the fire, and were able to come back, you know, we had all the cycle couriers keeping things going during lockdown. And so the economy was able to recover. But I guess what I’m trying to say is, look, my argument is yes, we went into debt, some of that money was ill spent, but broadly speaking, we got the benefits for going into debt. And, okay, and a few things that I will say about that I agree a teensy bit, or think about the possibilities with her argument. Look, okay, SARS, various other I think it was swine flu. Maybe some people were saying, Oh, this is gonna be bad. And it wasn’t as bad as it was. But keep in mind go back at 20 or even 30 years, the smart people were saying, the next pandemic epidemic was spread across the world, through the airline system. And that’s what they said, what happened? And that’s what happened. So, you know, I think so I engaged with both the fact that God legitimately says, Look, some people were overstating the story. And she’s talking about people voluntarily catching COVID To, to sort of give themselves immunity. And this is where I sort of have this engagement of like, you know, an honest volunteer response that makes a conscientious reaction to the situation, I would have thought engaging. Well, Judy says, maybe you get a whole bunch of young people who are willing to catch COVID, take them out to the country, put a campsite there, bring a few people with COVID, everyone gets COVID. And then once everyone has got COVID, and everyone’s got cured of it, then you bring them back into society. And you’re as it were isolating the group of people that do that. And I personally think we could have been a bit more flexible with COVID, where if you wanted to attend a funeral, or some event, you define, let’s say, 20 or 30 people ahead of time, and two weeks out from the event, you isolate yourself at home, and people just drop off eskies of food at your door. And then you all go to that event and then for two weeks after people drop off excuse of food at your door. So you’re still allowing people to attend funerals, but there’s also this this hybrid of sort of quarantining you more stringently than would have otherwise been the case. So notice, and I do engage a little bit with some of Judy’s ideas about we could have gotten immunity and deliberately caught COVID to help things along. So admittedly, okay, there’s my reply to what she said. I don’t know how structured that was, but yes, I thought I blurted it all out anyway. Yeah,

Gene Tunny  24:59

yeah. minutes no doubt that GGS GGS views are I suppose you’d say controversial. I mean, I think there’s a, it’s a good work she’s done. And I think it’s great that she has tried to put it in a framework where we might be able to come up with a rational answer to this. Although, you know, it is challenging because there are, as you said, the challenge is, understanding what that counterfactual is what would have happened. I think my idea

John August  25:29

of what we avoid now is very different to what Gigi, we avoided. I think that’s that’s a fundamental point of disagreement. And as I say, I’m just reacting as best I can. I let me be honest, and say, Look, I’m interested, I’m passionate, but I can’t afford to spend the sort of time on this that Gigi has. So you know, she’s, she’s got one up on me there.

Gene Tunny  25:52

Okay, we’ll take a short break here for a word from our sponsor.

Female speaker  25:58

If you need to crunch the numbers, then get in touch with adept economics. We offer you Frank and fearless economic analysis and advice. We can help you with funding submissions, cost benefit analysis, studies, and economic modelling of all sorts. Our head office is in Brisbane, Australia, but we work all over the world. You can get in touch via our website, www dot adapt economics.com.au. We’d love to hear from you.

Gene Tunny  26:28

Now back to the show. So a couple other points, Mike. So you talked about, you know, all of the debt now. And we came roaring back. And I mean, partly that was because of all the additional money that people had in their bank accounts that was that was financed by all that borrowing. And so, yeah, we just had this extraordinary recovery. And then we had the inflation because of, you know, too much money chasing too few goods, so to speak. So look, I think, yeah, the stimulus was definitely over done. I think they we recognise that, in hindsight, having worked in Treasury, and having, you know, worked on a stimulus package, the one in 2000, and 809, I know that at the time you don’t have, you just don’t have a lot of time to be able to develop these things as rigorously or as well targeted as you might like. And I think they did the best in the circumstances. And yeah, and I was just thinking about job keeper. I mean, that was at a time when we thought the world economy was just, it was just collapsing, right. And I mean, there was so much pessimism in late March, and they just had to come up with something in a few days or a week or however long they had to design it and announced it. And it was as simple as that.

John August  27:51

I suppose the different layers are, do you want to say it was a mistake or not? And then do you want to say it was an honest mistake or not? You know, do you want to say really, they don’t want to say, well, they maybe they made a mistake, but Well, fair enough, you know, that that’s, I guess the range of ways you can relate to it.

Gene Tunny  28:12

I think they did the best they could in this in the circumstances. But you know, looking at it, you know, some of the design features. In hindsight, were pretty bad.

John August  28:22

I’ve actually spoken to someone in business. And he thought that the way that you would prove that either there was a loss related to COVID, or you would or wouldn’t shed shed staff or whatever, he thought it was very easy to put up your hand, even if you weren’t going to be affected by COVID. And he said that, and I won’t mention the guy’s name, obviously, look, he thought he put up his hand just like everybody else did. But you know, he was actually thinking about what hoops do I have to do to prove that COVID is affected my business and he even he felt you know, the the the the hoops yet to jump jumps through weren’t that stringent? You just put up your hand and I will give you some money sort of thing. That was that was his view of it? And I mean, admittedly, it’s good, good, good one two years since I had that discussion with him. But that was a story that he told me at the time and and then there is a whole thing of these businesses that claimed all this COVID help. And then, you know, however down the track, their their profit margins went up considerably. And you thought I thinking well, hang on, maybe you should pay some of that extra profit back to the government. Isn’t that the reasonable thing to do? And, you know, but that okay, but that’s perhaps going off on a bit of a tangent, I have to say,

Gene Tunny  29:32

yeah, there’s a, there was a good review of job keeper, which I’ll put in the show notes. I thought it was well done. And it did raise a lot of these issues and, you know, issues with the design of it, and okay, if we did it again, we’d probably do it differently. We’ve learned from this experience was done by Nigel Wray who was my old boss in Treasury. So I’ll put a link to that in the show notes.

John August  29:56

I suppose tomorrow. I think it’s the counterfactual. Oh, yes, we got into debt. Yes, we got inflation but the economy didn’t hit a brick wall. Now how valuable is it that their economy didn’t hit a brick wall? You know, that’s that’s to my way of thinking. That’s that, that those are the things you got to balance. Yeah.

Gene Tunny  30:15

Yeah, yeah. Yeah. I agree with you there. Okay. And the other. Oh, yes. The point about lock downs and the all of the restrictions. I think there is a consensus emerging that we probably did go too far isn’t there. I mean, maybe early on, there was a need for a reaction, but there was an independent review by Peter shergold and some other academics and public policy and public health experts, which I thought came to the conclusion that we were imposing them lockdowns when we shouldn’t have or interstate border restrictions. I think they came out against those. So we just went we went too far in our, in our restrictions. And I think that, you know, that possibly, you know, lends some support to what Judy’s been arguing. I mean, we probably we should have listened more.

John August  31:14

Talk to the Western Australians and see what they think about that. Not the Western Australians. Yeah, yeah. Yeah,

Gene Tunny  31:21

I mean, Queensland is too. I mean, we loved it in a while. I didn’t but other Queenslanders seem to love it. And, you know, Anastasia, Paula, che was reelected resoundingly. So yeah, look, people did did love it. But gee, gees argument is that it was, you know, her argument is that it was driven by fear. It was irrational. Now, I mean, that’s, that’s a difficult thing to figure out.

John August  31:44

All I can say is, I haven’t spoken to a bit if I had discussed it, whether I would like to think I would have had an objective and moderately dispassionate discussion whether or not been one of the people whose brains were totally blanked as well. I’m not, I’m not sure. Well, but that’s not the exact words, but the sort of sentiment that she was driving it.

Gene Tunny  32:06

Right. Okay. Well, I think it’s, uh, I mean, I think you make some, make some good points there, John, and ask them good questions. And I’ll, I’ll put a link in the show notes to the episode with Gigi, because I think it’s really worth listening to, I think Gigi is, you know, she’s thought a lot of thought a lot about these issues and done some really provocative, really thought provoking analysis that I think is definitely worthwhile. Okay, one thing I wanted to get back to John, I just remembered about nuclear. You mentioned there was one reactor being built in the states that you’re talking about this one, you’re not talking about this utar project idea that was abandoned because it was news last month, maybe? I don’t know if you saw it about new scale, new scale NS utar project in blow to US nuclear power ambitions. Was that the one you? You thought you were thinking of?

John August  32:56

So yeah, but that that story you have there is, is not to do with a regular nuclear reactor, that that sort of installed for 10 years, and finally came online just recently. And the reason why I was talking about that, who knows, maybe you want to actually link to my own show where I had this discussion, but there was someone involved in brains. And they were saying, look, there’s no nuclear reactors being built anywhere around. I did my research. And I found, you know, there, there were a few in the Arab nations, there was this one in the US that had just come online recently. And I guess I was pushing back saying, you know, maybe they may not be building that arrayed or not. But you know, I think, particularly South Korea is is cranking them out. You know, there’s basically a decent number of them being built around the world, which is contrary to what this gentleman was saying. And I do think you got to say, look, if now if the Indians are making their assessment of the South Koreans are making their assessment, the French are making the assessment. Do we want to say that they’re all stupid? And really, that’s sort of the thinking I was saying, and what the CSIRO have said that, you know, small modular nuclear reactors are not a mature technology, while and maybe they’re onto something there. That’s why I say I’m contingent. I say once you tick enough boxes, then we’ll say this is a goer.

Gene Tunny  34:16

Yeah, yeah. I think you’re right about one coming online recently. I’ve just found on the Energy Information Administration, that’s a federal government US agency. Newest reactive anti Commercial Services Unit three at the Elven W. votable. probably mispronounced that VAG TL E electric generating plant in Georgia.

John August  34:38

That sounds that sounds like it, look, I mean, it’s gonna take me you know, a good three to four, three to four minutes to check through my notes, so I could actually try to find out what these references are. Who knows I can even email them to you after the show.

Gene Tunny  34:55

Yeah, that’d be good. But that’s 31 July 2023. So that sounds like The one you were you were thinking of?

John August  35:01

Yeah. And this was sort of like some International Nuclear Energy Agency, which had, you know, we’ll have all the ones in the US and South Korea, and here and here and here and here and all across the world. And as I say, it’s not a bucket load, but there’s a moderate, moderate number of new nuclear reactors coming online of the conventional variety, not the Small Modular variety. Okay. That yeah, okay. I’ll track that down and send you the notes of that. And obviously, I think you may have listened to some of the show where I had that discussion. So very

Gene Tunny  35:33

good. Okay. Well, that’s so chat about nuclear and COVID. Finally, good. Just so we keep this to a manageable length, we might just cover the outsourcing and consulting issue. So you, you listen to that conversation I had with the university students, the UQ PP. E. S. Society, that that’s correct. Yes. Yes. Yeah. And you had some thoughts on, you know, the use of consulting and outsourcing that’s been quite controversial in in Australia, recently. And now there’s some, you know, I guess, worldwide. There’s the LSE, economist. whose name I won’t try and pronounce it was Mariana

John August  36:18

Mazur. carto. Right. But, yeah, she’s been talking about the experience with outsourcing. But this happened in the UK Government. And there was one time where she mentioned some stuff happening in Australia. And, you know, basically, they’ve had a similar experience over there. And she’s got some perspectives there. But, but, okay, look, I will actually rip in and sort of say that, you know, part of me part of the Pirate Party, we do actually say, look, it’s very easy for there to be excessive bureaucracy. And we do have a more general feeling that there are too many people calculating numbers, but you know, statistics or universities or schools or whatever, and too few people actually doing stuff. So that’s the broad brush thing will actually say about bureaucracy. And also, I think in Queensland, it was Dr. Patel, if you remember him, and our cynical remark was look at how much the Queensland Health bureaucracy Brut grew over the time leading up to Dr. Patel. And it seemed to be mostly concerned with trying to stop the minister from getting embarrassed rather than actually doing good. And you would think if that grind bureaucracy realised its promise, it would have been able to figure out there was an issue with Dr. Patel, as it were, as a result of the regular workings of its own processes. And it was actually as I understand it, some courageous nurses who stood up and said, Hey, there’s a problem here. It wasn’t the regular workings of the bureaucracy. So you know, whether it be me or the Pirate Party, we certainly have a lot of criticisms to make bureaucracy, you know, but we will also say that sometimes the government has got it correct. We do actually think that the CAS did a good job. And it’s been replaced with numerous private providers with twisted incentives, and the whole thing’s quite a mess. But let so so there are those things there. But I guess there’s a whole lot of other things that add to the mix that basically Mariana Meza, Carter has actually said, look, we’ve infantilize the public service to the point where the public service isn’t actually smart enough to properly scrutinise the contracts that they are feeding into the private private service. Because let’s just say, Look, if you’re in a government department, you’ve got some report that needs to be done in three months time, you’ve got a bit of a squeeze on your resources, let’s get this outside firm just to square this on you. That’s probably a very reasonable thing to do. But what he’s saying is that, you know, the private companies, the contractors have taken over, like the comprehensive policy development thing, and sort of taking the lead. And she’s sort of like saying, look, so often, why do we think that the contractors or the will actually have expertise? Now if we want to know what’s going on with health, we ask that the you know, the health bureaucrats if we want to know what’s going on with science, we asked to CSIRO and Marianas political story was looked, you know, the government could have got the CSIRO to make an assessment of climate risks, but they actually got a private contractor to do that. And her suspicion is that they wanted a political answer rather than the objective scientific one that the CSIRO would have would have given. So, so there’s a lot of sort of abuse of that. And to some degree, there’s this like laziness. have sort of like starting to push more and more of your policy development notes, as I say, Sure, a contractor to fix a particular issue, you know, perhaps reasonable, but to take the lead on policy development, and to also think that these these contractors will have good expertise in health in science, like to my way of thinking if you’ve got an issue, you talk to the CSIRO, some academics in a university or an engineering firm or something like that, you know, that’s that if you need to reach outside of government, you know, that’s what you do. Now, one of the things that contracting firm might just have, they might have the outsider’s perspective. And maybe that’s a useful thing to bring in. But you shouldn’t let the outsider’s perspective, you know, stop the insiders, from actually figuring out what’s going on as well. You know, okay, a fresh out pints perspective, maybe that’s the one legitimate justification you might have. But the idea that this ad hoc bunch of consultants would know their science better than the CSIRO seems a bit strange to me. But what’s some other things going on with bureaucracy? I know that if you go to that, I think it’s the cyber the programme, you actually have Malcolm Crompton, who was once a Privacy Commissioner. And he’s actually talking about how I think evil was Whitlam was starting to sort of change the way department heads were hired and fired and allocated. And that this was to try to give the public service more flexibility. But is also saying that over time, the Public Service changed from this institution that was giving Frank and fearless advice to one that was basically mindlessly implementing government policy without challenge or question. And he does say that the right sort of started with Gough Whitlam. But you know, to actually try to be politically neutral. You know, it was John Howard that took it even further. And the original sentiment was good, let’s give people flexibility to prove themselves to demonstrate themselves that free up the public service. But you know, John Howard started to take it away from, you know, the tradition of Frank and fearless advice to, to mindlessly implementing government policy without challenge or question. And you could say that it ended up in the whole Robo debt fiasco. So notice my, my more complicated thing, where I have actually acknowledged that you can have too much bureaucracy going in the very wrong direction. And I’ve sort of introduced that at the start of my talk. But I’ve also said, Look at what’s happened, and I suppose this controversy with those contracting bodies, and just how they’ve basically, you know, basically, you know, had confidential information from government that they have abused and then sold to other corporate clients. And that’s been a betrayal of trust. And yet, you know, on paper, these firms will say, you know, oh, there’s a wall between these different sections of the firm, and that wouldn’t happen. And, you know, well look at you, well, we I can see you’re sort of smiling or shaking your head. But let’s just say, Look, I’m here, I don’t want to mention any names, but it’s amazing how tangled and convoluted any firm can get over time. And, you know, there’s just so many things that are boiling over and you’re, you’re you’re putting out fires all over the place. It’s, it’s amazing how chaotic things can end up. And this is an affirm that I won’t mention names, but it was a good firm, it made a damn good quality product, but by golly, under under the surface, just how, just how, yeah, you’re putting out fires all the time. And I can imagine a similar thing happening in the public service. So or are these private organisations were on paper, you know, you’ve got these rigorous processes and procedures that everyone follows to the letter and you’re sort of going oh, yeah, right. But anyway, so that’s me blabbing about those sorts of things. So that’s my hybrid thing, and unlike the Pirate Party does have their position about bureaucracy and rent seeking. And we do recognise that as a real and substantial problem that by golly, there’s a lot of problems to think about, if you want to think about them.

Gene Tunny  44:20

Yeah. You know, obviously, I’m, it’s a challenging issue for me, because I’m someone who has done some contracting for government and I have, but it’s more along the lines of, you know, occasionally coming in helping out on a report or doing an independent analysis of a specific issue. Now, yeah, there are challenges with this infantilization of the public servants. That’s an interesting way of putting it and I do wonder myself about whether the capacity of the public service has been reduced because of so much outsourcing I think that is a legitimate concern, something that that’s worth thinking about. And you just see it with NDIS. At the moment, like we’ve contracting out so much of that. I mean, that’s just a big, you know, this huge social welfare programme, the National Disability Insurance Scheme in Australia, and there’s, you know, big reliance on delivery by the private sector, and yet it’s overseen by this National Disability Insurance Agency. And it’s not clear to me whether the we’ve got those I mean, I guess we don’t know the rules, right. There’s all of the there are all these inquiries into NDIS. And we’re trying to tighten it up. So it just doesn’t become this huge, cost blowout. But it looks like there’s a lot of women, there’s problems with definition, who’s in and who’s out. But there’s also problems with just blight and rotting by both of these in firms that are NDIS providers. And the government just says, the regulatory agency just seems to lack the capability to to stop this.

John August  46:01

Well, that that is a strange thing. That note, notice earlier on in my narrative, I was saying, Oh, look at these bloated bureaucracies that, that don’t actually deliver on their promise. But at the same time, it’s a strange sort of thing that I will also say, it does feel like a lot of guff government, regulatory agencies just are not sufficiently resourced to do their job properly. And, you know, you end up in this this strange sort of thing where, you know, there’s a mistake made, you get some sort of inquiry, and they point out all these things, and the inquiry probably says, Oh, look, they could do with some more money, and then they don’t end up getting more money. So notice, I’m saying that in some cases, the bureaucracy seems to get bloated. And at some stage, other cases where you really do need some resources, it stopped. So yeah, it gets hard. You know, I

Gene Tunny  46:51

guess if you’re handing out $50 billion a year in, in contracts, or, you know, in funding, which the NDIS is, I don’t know if that’s the right amount, but it’s, you know, it’s 10s of billions of dollars, then you need some you need enough oversight to make sure that that’s not been recorded, and I’m not sure we’ve got that right at the moment. Well, I would

John August  47:11

broadly say I suppose. Yeah. Dealing with these these contracts is not easy. Yeah. That’s that’s, that’s, that’s the generalisation. I’ll make and

Gene Tunny  47:22

a couple other things. You mentioned Patel. So this was Jaden or Patel. I think Jaden Patel, he was a doctor at Bundaberg hospital. And it turns out he wasn’t very competent, and all of these patients died. Really just terrible situation. And I’m trying to remember the circumstances now. Partly is because I mean, there was a shortage of doctors. I mean, we so we were letting I think he was a he was an immigrant, if I remember, and so that I think there’s some question about his exact qualifications, and whether they were actually legitimate or not, or whether they were comparable with with qualifications here. And yeah, part of the problem, I guess, was just poor, administration, poor oversight by Queensland Health. And also we we just weren’t training enough people in, in medicine here in Australia, we just weren’t training enough doctors?

John August  48:22

Well, who knows? Maybe we’ll see common cause here. I mean, admittedly, look, they are obviously we’re trying to be flexible in letting this particular doctor in but I do have the feeling that, you know, our, you know, our medical profession are really don’t want to have sort of people coming in from overseas because it dilutes the amount that they’re able to sort of secure for their services. So having said that, it does get very complicated, where, you know, my my own position, I think it’s reflected in the Pirate Party is like, if we are importing skilled people from nations that are less well off than we are, we should really be making a virtual subtraction of those training costs to our foreign aid budget. And, you know, there is the whole thing of you know, do we want skilled people coming in now, how they’re going to contribute to the economy and so on. And, you know, and sort of like leaning on all those students coming into Australia as a source of foreign revenue, and, you know, oh, my gosh, should get get get sort of complicated. And then people say, Oh, yes, yes, we want to have skilled immigration, I’m thinking, well, if we’ve got skilled people coming in from nations less well than ourselves, aren’t we abusing those nations, you know, and, you know, that’s where the whole thing gets complicated. But let’s say if we quarantine that issue, I think it’s it’s fair to say that doctors in Australia are are protective of their monopoly,

Gene Tunny  49:51

I guess you would say, Yeah, I think that’s that’s correct. Yeah. So that is a that is a an issue. And you know, there’s a there’s a supply side restrict Near and dear. That’s partly the reason yeah, we’re not. We aren’t training enough doctors, arguably and so in because Queensland had a real big growth spurt in the 90s, lots of more, lots more people. Lots of people coming here, big growth in population and therefore, more demands on the health system. And so we maybe our standards did drop in. And it was, it’s quite scandalous. I was just looking at the details. And it turns out there were complaints about that doctor, so giant Patel, in other places who work before Queensland, so in in Buffalo in New York, and hang on, it looks like there was some issues in Portland, Oregon. And so these are things that, arguably our Well, I’d say they should have picked this up, they should have done their, their due diligence. So yeah, that was a that was a huge scandal. That one. The other thing I thought I mentioned is you talked about the CIA is now I mean, we have another CIA, I mean, that brought me, you know, took me back to the 90s. I think they abolished that 96. Didn’t know and how it got and that was a Commonwealth employment service. And yes, yeah, look, I mean, I, I wasn’t sure about how effective the CES was. But I do take your point. I mean, what we’ve replaced it with, there have been all sorts of problems with with that, and concerns about the level of service being provided by many of these. Well,

John August  51:28

one anecdote from an okay, unfortunately, it’s going to be hard for me to map this out and flesh out the details. But, you know, he was telling me a story of, you know, he saw 30 people in a day and place 15 of them in a job. And you go to one of these private agencies, you got to place an appointment, like three days in advance and your front up, and they might well see three or four people that morning, you know, and there’s sort of saying that there’s such a contrast between the effectiveness of the CS versus and, and, you know, I guess you perverse incentives, that there, there are stories of basically people being dragged along to buy become long term unemployed, and then then the agency is finally taken seriously, because there’s extra incentives replacing long term unemployed as compared to short term unemployed, but the CIS had no such distinction, you know,

Gene Tunny  52:18

you get those details of the specifics of the contracts. Right. So you got the incentives, right, or you can have all sorts of problems. So, yeah, yes. So definitely, there’s, there’s issues with outsourcing. I mean, I’m, I think, you know, we shouldn’t be doing looking for efficiencies, and in many cases, it makes sense to outsource but then in other cases, it doesn’t particularly well. And when you do outsource, you got to be extremely careful about how you do it, then you got to make oversee those contracts and make sure that there isn’t any rotting.

John August  52:54

And I’m very pleased and more by accident than design, but I didn’t bite the hand that sees me notice. I was saying that the worth in you know, hiring a contractor to fill in this particular report or this particular issue, but that’s quite different to basically taking over policy development. holdest Bowlus? Yes,

Gene Tunny  53:12

yes. Well, I guess what the some of the big four firms and also BCG, Boston Consulting and McKinsey seem to do very well is really get they get really into the government and or they get their people embedded in some of these agencies to and they’re very closely associated with the policy development and then delivery of of policy, I

John August  53:35

can only suggest let’s listen to some of the videos by Mariana. Cassie, when she sort of goes into that. Yes.

Gene Tunny  53:42

Yeah, I’ll I’ll definitely definitely have a listen. Okay. John Agus, this has been great. Thanks for all your your feedback on and thoughts on those recent episodes we covered? Is there anything else before we wrap up? Oh,

John August  53:58

my gosh. Okay, well, let’s say just say that there’s so many things that I can talk about. There’s a few different guys that you had you had a guy talking about, you know, productivity being a crisis, but he did say some interesting things about intellectual property or junk. I found that that quite Yeah, I found it found, found some of the stuff he was saying quite interesting. And I think you had a guy talking about valuation of businesses. And he was saying, you know, let’s sort of give banks equity in the property for when it gets sold rather than just, you know, to turfing, the turfing, the people who were paying the interest out, but I know you also had someone talking about crypto and some of the I don’t know the details of that show. Let’s say I’ve listened to quite a few shows but maybe not that one. But I would you know, I’m still saying before that the problem with crypto is a whole lot of amateurs are in the field. You can sort of say Oh, I’m in crypto and then you’re on some exchange and my my glib state would be, unless you have some sort of code on your phone that you can write down and transfer to another another phone that is actually engaging with a crypto network beggar theory, or Bitcoin or whatever. If you’re just plugging into an exchange and you’re playing with Lego blocks, you’re not actually doing crypto. Yeah, that that’s my and you know, it is the old cliche that you know, you should only invest in what you’re familiar with. But all the who worry about crypto is to try to get people who know nothing about crypto to be involved in crypto. I think that’s sort of a bit of an issue there. And what am I also thinking about crypto, gosh, that thought is slipping through my fingers? Oh, yes, the thing about crypto is at the moment. The discussion space, if you like, is dominated by snake oil merge. Now, that’s not to say there are some general genuine crypto people out there, you know, hidden behind all the all the all the all the noise, who genuinely want an alternative system of currency because they have problems with the way the central banks and the regular banks relate to our mainstream system of currency. And they are genuinely interested in an alternative. And there may well be people there who are the true believers. But the scene if you like the scene, sad to say, is dominated by the snake oil merchants. And until somehow the genuine players can achieve greater prominence and it not being just all this hooey. You know that the sad thing is that crypto has it has betrayed its promise. It’s gone down this path with all with with the conceptual space, the thoughts face, whatever want to call it being dominated by the snake oil merchants and the true believers being suppressed. You know that the way I’ve described the scene, and in a sense, it said, because I’ve heard the crypto advocates, I’ve heard the passion with which they talk about wanting to go down this alternative path. And while I’m not into crypto, it’s said that their passion hasn’t been realised, you know? Yeah, yeah, fair point.

Gene Tunny  57:25

I agree with you about, yeah, the snake oil, snake oil cycle merchants, I

John August  57:32

suppose. Or if you want to say as I call it, if you want to, say snake oil salesmen, yes, but there’s the old pump and dump thing about talking about some particular crypto. And, you know, basically, some, some prominent people might basically buy a little crypto, and then one week later, they go off and buy it back. Because they managed to suppress the value. You know, those sorts of games, you know, so that that’s getting a bit sad. And Sad to say, look, I’ve listened to a few other episodes. There’s so many thoughts that I have, but it’s hard for me to bring them bring them to mind at the moment. I have to say.

Gene Tunny  58:07

That’s, that’s fine, John. We’ve we’ve covered some, some important issues. So yeah, Happy. Happy to finish up there. So again, thanks for thanks for listening through the and thanks for all the great conversations. Yep. And yeah, I really, really enjoy hearing your thoughts and having having those chats so

John August  58:29

well. I do appreciate it. I know you had some some sort of sentiment that you didn’t want to interview people too often but I hope this is not too often. I know you’re you’re recycling guests to some degree anyway. So

Gene Tunny  58:40

Oh, yes. No happy this. Definitely not too often. I think we we caught up in June, didn’t we? That was when you visited Brisbane.

John August  58:48

Yeah. I think that was that was passing through Brisbane and, and yes, that was lovely. And I guess you had the dare I say you’ve obviously had better sound equipment there. But nevermind. It’s still good to have a chat regardless. Yeah, absolutely.

Gene Tunny  58:59

Okay, John, Olga’s thanks for your time.

John August  59:02

No worries. I’ll leave you to it

Gene Tunny  59:05

rato thanks for listening to this episode of economics explored. If you have any questions, comments or suggestions, please get in touch. I’d love to hear from you. You can send me an email via contact at economics explore.com Or a voicemail via SpeakPipe. You can find the link in the show notes. If you’ve enjoyed the show, I’d be grateful if you could tell anyone you think would be interested about it. Word of mouth is one of the main ways that people learn about the show. Finally, if you’re podcasting outlets you then please write a review and leave a rating. Thanks for listening. I hope you can join me again next week.

59:52

Thank you for listening. We hope you enjoyed the episode. For more content like this. To begin your own podcasting journey head on over to obsidian-productions.com

Credits

Thanks to Obsidian Productions for mixing the episode and to the show’s sponsor, Gene’s consultancy business www.adepteconomics.com.au. Full transcripts are available a few days after the episode is first published at www.economicsexplored.com. Economics Explored is available via Apple PodcastsGoogle Podcast, and other podcasting platforms.

Categories
Podcast episode

Gigi Foster estimates COVID lockdowns cost young people 116x any benefits – EP205

Professor Gigi Foster talks about her paper “COVID’s Cohort of Losers” which argues that COVID lockdowns and other restrictions disproportionately imposed costs on young people with few offsetting benefits. Gigi is a Professor of Economics at the University of New South Wales, Sydney and was named the 2019 Young Economist of the Year by the Economic Society of Australia.
Please get in touch with any questions, comments and suggestions by emailing us at contact@economicsexplored.com or sending a voice message via https://www.speakpipe.com/economicsexplored.

You can listen to the episode via the embedded player below or via podcasting apps including Google PodcastsApple Podcasts and Spotify.

About this episode’s guest: Gigi Foster

Gigi Foster is a Professor with the School of Economics at the University of New South Wales, having joined UNSW in 2009 after six years at the University of South Australia.  Formally educated at Yale University (BA in Ethics, Politics, and Economics) and the University of Maryland (PhD in Economics), she works in diverse fields including education, social influence, corruption, lab experiments, time use, behavioural economics, and Australian policy.  

Gigi’s research contributions regularly inform public debates and appear in both specialised and cross-disciplinary outlets (e.g., Quantitative Economics, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Journal of Population Economics, Journal of Economic Psychology, Human Relations).  Her teaching, featuring strategic innovation and integration with research, was awarded a 2017 Australian Awards for University Teaching (AAUT) Citation for Outstanding Contributions to Student Learning.  

Named 2019 Young Economist of the Year by the Economic Society of Australia, Gigi has filled numerous roles of service to the profession and engages heavily on economic matters with the Australian community.  As one of Australia’s leading economics communicators, her regular media appearances include co-hosting The Economists, a national economics talk-radio program and podcast series premiered in 2018, with Peter Martin AM on ABC Radio National.

What’s covered in EP205

  • Intro to the cost and benefits of lockdowns. (3:22)
  • Quality adjusted life year (QALY) and WELLBY. (8:07)
  • Fear and the crowd. (13:47)
  • The history of the cordon sanitaire. (16:58)
  • How many lives were saved? (22:14)
  • The cost and benefits of lock-downs. (27:25)
  • The economics of the lockdown. (34:24)
  • How do we determine the severity of pandemics? (36:25)
  • The difference between the 1918 flu and COVID-19. (41:18)
  • Citizen juries. (46:35)
  • New laws about misinformation and disinformation. (49:45)
  • Health and good nutrition. (56:01)

Links relevant to the conversation

Gigi’s paper for CIS:

https://www.cis.org.au/publication/covids-cohort-of-losers-the-intergenerational-burden-of-the-governments-coronavirus-response/

Information on WELLBYs:

HM Treasury’s Wellbeing Guidance for Appraisal: Supplementary Green Book Guidance

Transcript: Gigi Foster estimates COVID lockdowns cost young people 116x any benefits – EP205

N.B. This is a lightly edited version of a transcript originally created using the AI application otter.ai. It was then looked over by a human, Tim Hughes from Adept Economics, to pick up any clangers that otters sometimes miss in their rush to catch fish. It may not be 100 percent accurate, but should be pretty close. If you’d like to quote from it, please check the quoted segment in the recording.

Gene Tunny  00:06

Welcome to the Economics Explored podcast, a frank and fearless exploration of important economic issues. I’m your host Gene Tunny. I’m a professional economist and former Australian Treasury official. The aim of this show is to help you better understand the big economic issues affecting all our lives. We do this by considering the theory, evidence and by hearing a wide range of views. I’m delighted that you can join me for this episode, please check out the show notes for relevant information. Now on to the show.

Hello, thanks for tuning into the show. In this episode, I catch up with Gigi Foster to talk about her thought-provoking new paper “COVID’s Cohort of Losers”, in which she argues that COVID policies massively disadvantaged young people with few offsetting benefits. My occasional co-host, Tim Hughes, took part in the conversation too. Gigi is Professor of Economics at the University of New South Wales. She was named 2019 Young Economist of the Year by the Economic Society of Australia. She has an undergraduate degree from Yale, and a PhD from the University of Maryland. Okay, let’s get into it. I hope you enjoy our conversation with Gigi Foster.

Professor Gigi Foster, welcome to the programme.

Gigi Foster  01:30

Thanks so much for having me, guys. It’s a real pleasure to be here.

Gene Tunny  01:33

It’s terrific. Gigi. I’ve got Tim Hughes with me, Tim, good to have you in this conversation, too.

Tim Hughes 01:43

Yeah. Good to be here. Nice to meet you Gigi again.

Gene Tunny  01:47

Yeah. So I mean, both Tim and I saw Gigi at a event in Brisbane on First Tuesday Club when we, you presented on your book, The Great COVID Panic, Gigi so after that you’ve, well, among other things, you’ve produced a paper for a Centre for Independent Studies. So that’s an organisation I’ve got a connection with. I’m an adjunct fellow there. And you’ve written this great paper “COVID’s Cohort of Losers, the intergenerational burden of the government’s Coronavirus response”. So to start off with Gigi, I’d like to ask you about this estimate, you’ve got in your paper, you estimate that the COVID policies Australia pursued. So we’re talking about lockdowns, keeping kids home, keeping them away from school, those COVID policies have cost the nation’s youth at least 116 times the value of any benefit that they could have received from these policies. And you’re, you say that this is a conservative estimate? Could you tell us please? I mean, how do you broadly just broadly to begin with, how do you come up with a number like that 116 times the value of any benefit.

Gigi Foster  02:50

So basically, the approach I take in that CIS report, which came out a few months ago, is very similar to the approach I take in my cost benefit analysis of Australia’s Covid lockdowns, generally for the entire country, which was published by Connor Court in late 2022. That’s a book now that is co-authored with Sanjeev Sabhlok, who you may also know of through his anti-lockdown statements during the past few years, he used to be a Victorian Treasury economist. And then he parted ways with the Treasury in I think, September 2020. And fortunately, he was between jobs. So I was able to partner with him and producing this larger cost benefit analysis. And then CIS, well Matt Taylor at CIS asked me to produce a kind of focused report specifically on the cost to youth. So the mechanisms that caused damage during the COVID period, that were really the, the main ones I was worried about when we started with the lockdowns are the fact that when you lock people down you’re making them stressed and unhappy, right? So there’s that one immediate negative effect. And then also the fact that because we followed up lock downs with these large fiscal stimuli, the Jobkeeper programme in particular, that we were going to be racking up debt, we’re also creating inflationary conditions, which I mentioned at the time, but that seemed to be something nobody wanted to hear. But certainly the debt is basically signing us up to not be able to spend as much on other things in the future. And so for children or young people who are going to be around in the future, of course, that means that they’re going to have a less good life in the future, because we have accumulated this debt during this period, that three years ago, the COVID period were the two years really, which is what I’m analysing in the report and in the cost benefit analysis. So 2020 and 2021. And those two types of damage, those two mechanisms of damage are the major ones that are that are making up the large amount of costs, which is $116 billion. I believe that I estimate that the youth will have paid because of our COVID response. Now, of course, doing a cost benefit analysis, as the name suggests means that you also need to enumerate the benefits and so, of course the benefits that were touted when the lockdowns came in or that we would save people from COVID. Right? And as it turns out, and this was true in March 2020, if you actually looked at the data COVID is mostly dangerous to the elderly or people who are comorbid. So in fact, the average age of COVID death or death with COVID is basically the life expectancy in Australia right? And so, you know, really, if you’re thinking about the benefits to use of lockdowns, they’re not in the form of saving people from COVID deaths. They are actually more in the form of a few people not dying in traffic accidents or homicides who otherwise might have if we hadn’t had the lockdowns, those are benefits that were not sold as part of the marketing package for the lockdowns initially, but they are benefits. So there are fewer people go into pubs. And of course, the young people who go to pubs and sometimes get drunk and accidentally off each other. And then there were also fewer people driving cars. And so there were a few fewer deaths from that. So you know, those, those were the kinds of benefits that if you were looking for benefits to the young, it would count. Now, of course, the question then is, well, how do you compare these costs and benefits? Right? Because it sounds like you’re being more stressed when you’re sitting at home because of lockdowns is not really in the same category. It’s not in the same currency as a benefit. That means no, okay, I’m not gonna die from a homicide in a pub, right? So in order to do this, we have to choose and this is true for any cost benefit analysis that anyone has ever conducted, you have to choose a currency in which you are able to basically express or quantify the costs and the benefits of the policy or policies that you’re evaluating. And so for my cost benefit analysis of Australia, for Australia as a whole, and for the CIS report, what I choose to use is something we call the WELLBY or the well being year. And this is a new currency, reasonably new, we came on the scene in about 2018 or so it was the production of a bunch of researchers at the London School of Economics. And it’s built from a question that asks directly about life satisfaction. So there’s a there’s a question that appears on many life satisfaction surveys around the world across time that says overall, how satisfied are you with your life nowadays? Now, you know, you can argue about whether that actually captures everything that is important, right. But I think in terms of the immediate effects of the lock downs, it’s not bad, it’s probably better than alternative statistics that we have access to, like, you know, how many people were thrown out of work? Or how much is GDP expected to decline because it is really directly about human welfare, human wellbeing. And that to me, certainly as an economist, that is the most defensible maximand of government policy. It’s the maximand that I try to go for when I’m when I’m making policy recommendations. I want to recommend policy that has that is going to maximise human wellbeing, human thriving from the scarce resources that we’ve got, right? So I like the currency for particularly for that purpose for figuring out how much people suffered during lockdowns directly. And so the WELLBY is built from this question, the question’s answered on a zero to 10 scale. So zero is not at all satisfied and 10 is, you know, completely satisfied. The average answer to that question of somebody in a place like Australia when they’re feeling pretty good and healthy is about an eight. And the average answer of somebody who is kind of indifferent between life and death, because their life is so difficult and painful, is around a two, though there is some disagreement about this, some people say one I use two, which means that eight minus two being six, WELLBYs, so each increment there on that scale is one WELLBY, so six WELLBYs enjoyed for one person for one year, is equivalent to basically enjoying one year of healthy life. And one year of healthy life enjoyed by one person is also expressible, as what many of your listeners may already know, as the quality adjusted life year, the QALY, this is a currency that’s used a lot in health policy research, right? And health economics and decisions about what drugs to buy and this kind of thing. So the TGA, our drugs administrator, they use this QALY measure in order to bargain with the drug companies, when drug companies have new things to offer. The TGA says, Well, how many QALYs will I get from this drug? And if the number of QALYs is you know, let’s say 10. Then the TGA says, Okay, well, we’ll buy that drug if the cost is no more than 10 times some threshold value that they’ll pay per QALY. And that threshold value tends to be somewhere between 50 and $100,000 per QALY. So that shows you right there what the sort of social willingness to pay for a healthy life year is in Australia. And that value, by the way is higher in higher GDP per capita countries of course, then in lower GDP per capita countries. So as we increase our GDP per capita, so too, does our willingness to pay for a socially for an additional life year increase. That’s why GDP per capita is something we sometimes target in economics, right? We want to be able to afford better and more and you know, we want to be able to pay more for the good things in life including more healthy life years for our citizens. So what that means is that you can basically translate from WELBYs to QALYs to dollars that enables me then to capture other costs, like the debt, for example, in its native currency like dollars and translate back to WELBYs if I want to translate forward, and you know, there are some caveats around that translation which of course, you know, I discussed but, but that’s basically the method and that’s the method that I use in both the report and the CBA for lockdowns and I find that lockdowns were, as everybody else who has done a serious cost benefit analysis around the world is bound lockdowns were enormously more expensive than they could possibly have delivered in benefits, particularly for our youth who really had nothing to gain from them.

Gene Tunny  10:43

Yeah, I mean, certainly, during some of the lockdowns we had, if I was asked zero to 10, yeah, it wouldn’t have been eight for sure. So, yeah, yeah. So yeah, I can understand how the logic. Tim, do you have any questions for Gigi at this stage?

Tim Hughes  10:58

A lot of my interests and I find fascinating using WELBYs and QALYs and referring those to dollar value. I think that’s really interesting and a good way of quantifying responses and how we might have a better response. My main interest Gigi is in using whatever we went through to sort of determine what might be the best way to respond to something like this, if and when it happens again, because so much has been said about the response. And everyone’s got an opinion, which I fully understand. I’ve got my own opinions as well. I think the best thing that can come out of it is well what should we be doing the next time this happens, like what protocol can we put in place? And also, for instance, like to compare it to bushfire protocol, most people are quite familiar with what we would do in a bushfire, it’s going to come around more regularly than a pandemic, but is there something that we can learn from all of this that we can put into place to put in a better response, especially in the early stages?

Gigi Foster  11:58

Well, I think that’s a very, very important question. And I certainly like to think that the answer is yes, we can learn. But I would say that the the lesson is not as much in the space of quantification of benefits and costs and the technical side, it’s much more in the space of politics and psychology. Because if I were going to put the finger on what were the aspects of the, of the crisis that really drove this destructive response, they were very much in the areas of politics and psychology. And I and you know, some people will say, Well, you’re an economist so don’t talk about that, right? Well, fair enough. I mean, I studied ethics, politics and economics in university, actually. So I have a bit of a broader perspective, I suppose on the discipline and on social science, generally, than a lot of my fellow economists and my mother was a psychologist, you know, I kind of know a little bit about psych, I took psych in school, too. So for me as a broad-minded social scientist, the COVID era has been the most amazing lesson, the most amazing time to live it through, right, because I have not only sort of honed my existing theories of human behaviour and group influence, which has basically been the driving curiosity of my life, but also learned new things like for example, the power of crowd psychology in a moment of crisis to drive destruction. And we saw that, of course, we’ve seen this, you know, in the history books, right. I mean, we saw it in the witch hunts in the US, for example. We’ve seen it in 1930s, Germany, but I had never lived through something like this the creation of a cult and creation of crowd thinking, such that you literally had people whose minds had been hijacked by the crowd narrative, which in this case, you know, it’s an obsession, a crowd obsesses. That’s kind of the defining feature, it obsesses about one thing, right, and you’d have a conversation with these people who had basically had their minds taken away. And their minds were simply then in service to the defence of the crowd logic. And you would try to tell them logical things, you know, sensible things about real facts and things, you know, and they were just, they just couldn’t hear it literally couldn’t hear it. It was like talking at complete cross purposes. This is why early in the crisis, all of us who thought we saw what was really going on what the data really showed, which was certainly not that this was the black death or the Spanish flu. And, you know, we should probably protect the old people and try to figure out ways to minimise their likelihood of catching it. But basically, let everybody else keep going and develop natural immunity so that we could more quickly get to a point where we could protect the older people through natural immunity. That’s what we were all thinking, or at least many of us. But, you know, we were looking at the rest of the world and you know, these other people in our lives and thinking, wow, I just don’t seem to be able to reach this person anymore. I mean, am I going crazy? Or is this person going crazy? So that was a really interesting lesson. So all of that is to say that the answers to how do we prevent this from happening again, are really about how to control that fear so that the crowd is less likely to form, so that you don’t have that kind of obsession that drowns out out everything else that matters in normal times, right, which is why we were able to do this destruction blindly. Because we literally were blind to the destruction that we were doing. And and also how can we make the people in authority at such times more accountable to what is actually good for the people as a whole. Now, that’s a, that’s a difficult area because of course, the people were clamouring for lockdowns. In fact, that’s why they were delivered. Right. I when I gave the seminar about this yesterday in Macquarie that was, that was one of the points raised and it’s a very valid point, it’s not that the politicians came up with this whole lockdown shenanigans on their own, you know, and then we’re like, oh, you’re you have to have this everybody we’re gonna have to, you know, sorry, it’s, it’s a tough pill to swallow. No, no, no, the populations of the West became incredibly frightened. And they were demanding protection from COVID. And the politicians who were in charge at the time, read the writing on the wall, and basically thought to themselves, well, if I don’t do something big, I’m gonna lose my seat. And I’m going to potentially be blamed for, you know, not saving the country from what is perceived to be a mortal threat. And, you know, in such times that the character of a person really comes out, you know, and, and there is, it’s not like, there’s an easy way to tether actions back to the true interest of the people in that time, because so many people are caught up in this fear, right, but job one should be to reduce the fear. That should job one. And that actually happened in some countries, right. Sweden did that. So they tried to tamp down the fear. And then another thing that’s very important, of course, and then I’ll be quiet, is to try to make sure you’ve got independent voices, voices that are alternative, dissident voices about what’s going on. So you actually have kind of a, you know, some kind of a check on this mono vision that’s that’s barreling through the policy fields, which is what was happening in March and April, everybody thought the same way. And anybody who would say anything different was pilloried or or denigrated. I mean, I was called a neoliberal Trump cannot death cult warrior and Granny killer and a piece of human excrement. I mean, so many, I have a whole jar full of these epithets. And, you know, it’s like, why, all I was saying, was that what we’re doing has costs. You know, that’s all I was saying. So it’s, it’s a complicated question, what to do next. And, and I think we need to really think about that as a society, but not just in the area of technical costs and benefits.

Gene Tunny  17:25

Yeah, Gigi, what I’m wondering is if you thought, I agree with you, by the way on lockdowns, and now I see that it was, the cost far exceeded the benefits for COVID. But could it be the case that for another virus or another, say if we had, you know, if we had the plague again, I mean thankfully we don’t, that’s not really a prospect, but if it was something worse than COVID could lockdowns make sense then?

Gigi Foster  17:50

So that’s also a really great question. I’m actually at the moment writing a paper together with Sanjeev Sabhlok and Paul Frijters who I’ve both written with before as you know, about the history of quarantines. The history of quarantine policy whether quarantines, lockdowns, basically, or you know, cordon sanitaire, as they’re called in French, whether they actually have a track record of working in response to other disease threats over the ages, including the Black Death, and many other diseases as well. Now, what we are discovering, and this is really down to Sanjeev’s amazing historical work is that, in fact, in the 1800s, there was a movement that developed based on the the scant evidence that quarantines did anything positive and a huge amount of evidence that they were very destructive, there was a movement of the developed called the sanitarians movement, which aimed to basically beat quarantine as an idea out of the public health system and replace it with the idea that what we need to aim for in public health is clean water, clean streets, clean air, sanitary living conditions, basically, because in such conditions, of course, as we now know, germs are less likely to thrive, you have lower viral loads, you’d have more health for you know, individual people, it’s just more immune-supportive, if you can breathe free, you know, freely and fresh air and all this and drink clean water. So it’s really about supporting the immunity of the people and reducing the load of the infectious agents, rather than separating people according to whether you think they’ve, you know, been exposed or not, or certainly in the case of COVID, even people you don’t think have necessarily been exposed just whole healthy populations, locking them down, that that just you know that that’s not nearly as effective as the as sanitary measures. So there was a figure called Charles McLean, who was an advocate of the, in the sanitarian movement, and basically did a lot of the research showing that quarantines basically fail, and that really what they are. And this was the interesting, particularly interesting part of his work, that what they are is a tool for control that is often pressed upon populations by public health bureaucracies. So it’s much more about, here is something we can do. And we can justify our jobs by having this thing in place. Because I mean, my goodness, the bureaucracy and you know, COVIDeaucracy, that grew up during the COVID era was pretty large, you know, you had to hire more people and, you know, get them to help you enforce these various policies on the population. But in terms of actual effect on disease is pretty minimal. In my cost benefit analysis, I estimate that maybe we extended the lives of maybe 10,000, mostly elderly and comorbid people for a few years. That’s what we got out of lockdowns. And what we paid for that was way more than the roughly 6 million sorry, $6 billion, that in normal times we’d be willing to pay for that amount of of benefit, that is to save a few live years of about 10,000 people. So you know, so basically, the quarantine, so lockdowns, do not have a good track record. And that was already embodied in the pre 2020 pandemic management plans in place, not only in Australia, but around the world in the West, that said, look, locking down whole populations is just very, very costly, unlikely to be beneficial. And so we should avoid it. And we should target protection measures instead. So So basically, I like to tell people who say, Well, you know, what else were we supposed to do? You know? Well, the question is, you know that lockdowns don’t work. So what are you going to do? Right? Everybody’s scared. You need to find something to do, so that you don’t run headlong into a into a speeding truck, which is what lockdowns are. That’s what you don’t do. But of course, you have to take some action. Now, if you ask me, Is there any disease that one could potentially create or imagine in one’s head for which lockdowns might have more benefit than cost? I mean, even for the Black Death it’s questionable, compared to the other things that could be done, sanitary measures, right, compared to everything else we could do. It’s not like we have to let it rip versus lockdown. There’s a whole spectrum of possible response. And we really didn’t investigate that spectrum at all during COVID. So I think the answer is really usually it’s nuanced. It’s customised to the disease in play, it should be updated as we learn more information about that disease, and it should be targeted to the people who are truly vulnerable.

Gene Tunny  22:13

Yeah. Gigi. Can I ask you about that? Those numbers you cited regarding how many lives? Or how many years of life were potentially saved? Did you do that modelling? Or did you rely on modelling by epidemiologists? And how did you do that? Because I mean, you’re an economist rather than an epidemiologist, I don’t mean to be critical at all. But have you had pushback on that? Have people said, Oh, well, you have a model that why should we believe those estimates? I mean, because you you’re criticising this estimate from the Prime Minister, the Prime Minister Scott Morrison claimed, while campaigning before the May 2022 election, his regime of COVID policies had saved 40,000 lives, you’re, in my analysis, so your analysis shows this figure to be a significant overestimate, even being generous to lockdowns, potential deliver benefits, how confident are you in that assessment, Gigi?

Gigi Foster  23:08

I mean, I’m as confident as one could be based on the data that we used, I very expressly did not use model simulations. And by the way, that was one of the big errors of this time. In mid March, you may even recall Neil Ferguson’s ICL modelling came out saying that, you know, 60 million people around the world were going to die or something. And of course, as we know, the COVID death count, even now is, you know, an order of magnitude less than that. And, and by the way, Neil Ferguson had been wrong in the past, right? These epidemiological models that are run in a simulated environment in a computer that necessarily do not include all the real world variables that are actually relevant to whether people die or suffer from diseases are notoriously exaggerative of the bad outcomes that may occur from the new disease threat. Right, that has happened again and again and again. We’ve had SARS and the swine flu and the you know, all these different flus that have been modelled and they’ve basically always, there has been some coterie of doomsaying epidemiology people who have said “based on my model, everybody’s gonna die.” Right? That’s just a common thing it happens, right? And you know why? Because the, you know, the media loves that stuff. It’s, you know, if they get ahold of a guy like that, who will, you know, put on a bleeding headline, that’ll get eyeballs, right, and they get status, and they get to be the person who really cares about people, because if you care about people, then you know, don’t you care that they’re all going to die, or I mean, that becomes this whole narrative. And it really crowds out actual science. Actual science is based, at best on real data, real data, right? Of course, we have theories about what happens and we need to use those to structure our understanding of our world but our world is so incredibly complex and dynamic and there are endogenous factors that are happening and shocks that we can’t predict. There’s just so much going on, that all models are wrong, as somebody said in my discipline, but some are useful, that’s how you should see a model. So what I did in order to produce that estimate of how many people in a counterfactual non lockdown Australia would have succumbed to COVID is I looked with Sanjeev, we looked at the countries in the world that had low restriction levels. So obviously Sweden is one. But we also used another counterfactual, which was about six I think other countries, with populations over a million that had low restrictions, mostly in Europe, I think that oh, Taiwan might have been in there as well. And we basically took, you know, the average deaths from COVID. This is real data, real data, what they actually experienced, not something that comes out of a computer generated simulation, but actual data, because we just believe that much more. And then we of course, adjusted for population and then applied it to Australia. And we say, well, this is our best guess right? Now, even if you think that I’m under balling that low balling that, in fact, even if you think the Prime Minister’s estimate of 40,000, people who would have died is correct. If you look at the cost of lockdowns, they still weren’t worth it. Right. So even if I’m totally wrong, the Prime Minister’s right, the lockdown still shouldn’t have been pursued. Right? But I also think that the Prime Minister is using these simulation models, these SIR models or something like this, you know, from the Doherty Institute, or some other kind of, you know, institute that was supporting the narrative and coming out with these doomsday scenarios, to come up with that figure and make himself look like a saviour.

Gene Tunny  26:26

That’s fair enough. I was just just wondering what you did that seems to make sense to me. What did you find about the deaths of young people? So if we go back to the study “COVID’s cohort of losers”. How are we defining young people? And how do you recall how many young people did end up dying of COVID in Australia,

Gigi Foster  26:46

So young people are 25 and under, that’s the estimate. And look, there will have been a few that were 25 and under who died of COVID, but it’s going to be very, very small. And they they may have died of something else anyway, because these people almost to a man or to a woman or child will have been already sick with something else, you know, diabetes or a bad illness of some sort. So I think it’s very debatable whether there was any direct COVID related benefit to these younger people, from the lockdowns as I say they, you know, people in their young 20s and late teens are exactly the ones who may get into car crashes, and they get into bar fights. So really, if I’m looking for benefits from lockdowns, that’s where I’m gonna look for the on not not in terms of COVID deaths,

Gene Tunny  27:31

Right, and just wanting to just check this Gigi, you’ve got these figures in your paper somewhere, have you where, because the calculation you’ve done is this, you’ve got this 116 times the value of any benefits. So you’ve got an estimate in wellbeing of what the cost was to young people. And then you divide that by the benefits to young people to get that 116 times and that’s also in WELLBYs. So is, that’s in one of these tables is it?

Gigi Foster  28:03

So I mean, I don’t have the report up at the moment. But yeah, there’s a table of all of the costs. And then we also tabulate the benefits and then you simply take the ratio of one to the other, obviously, you want to make sure you’re using the same currency. So whether you’re using WELLBYs or dollars to get that ratio in the cost benefit analysis for Australia as a whole, I know the ratio was 68 times, as I recall, it was a bit higher. I, as I say don’t have the report open, but I think it was a bit higher for the young. But basically, the benefit just wasn’t as high. But there was some benefit. So you know that this as I say I keep saying that the traffic accidents was (inaudible)….

Gene Tunny  28:39

Okay, we’ll take a short break here for a word from our sponsor.

Female speaker  28:45

If you need to crunch the numbers, then get in touch with Adept Economics. We offer you frank and fearless economic analysis and advice. We can help you with funding submissions, cost benefit analysis studies, and economic modelling of all sorts. Our head office is in Brisbane, Australia, but we work all over the world. You can get in touch via our website, http://www.adepteconomics.com.au We’d love to hear from you.

Gene Tunny  29:14

Now back to the show.

Yeah, so you’ve got estimated cost to the Australian Young of the 2020/21 COVID lockdowns and you end up with an estimate in WELLBYs of looks like it’s over 7 million, over 7 million WELLBYs so that’s saying that the costs imposed on the young, so there are 7 million years of poor wellbeing for young people.

Gigi Foster  29:45

Not exactly so a WELLBY is one increment on that satisfaction scale, right? So your probably thinking of a QALY, so if you divide that number of WELLBYs by six, then you get to the QALYs and that’s the the currency you’re thinking of, which is the number of healthy years. Okay? And but you’re right in terms of that, that is that does roughly the, you know, the way to think about it is that this is the amount that was deducted from the well being of the young, okay? And that’s in terms of number of years but also the health of those years. And again as I mentioned at the start, the two main components of that are one, the direct life satisfaction damage done during lockdowns because people reported less satisfaction. And by the way, we see that in the data for Australia. So these this question about life satisfaction was asked during lockdowns by the ANUPoll survey people. So we literally use that, their findings to calibrate how much we think there was as a detriment to life satisfaction during the COVID period. And then the second big element of that cost is the debt, which will crowd out future expenditure which would have otherwise made the lives of our young people much better in the future. Now, you may ask, you know, what about the school closures? You know, wouldn’t you think that would be a big thing? And, and it is a thing, but it’s interesting, a bit of a complication here. So I was seriously disturbed at the the degree to which school closures were just immediately adopted. And everybody thought, oh, yeah, this will be fine, we’ll just have everybody working from home, you know, doing the, you know, classes from home and all this. I mean, it obviously was not the same. And it put our teachers under an enormous amount of pressure, by the way, as well. And, of course, I mean, I would have naturally expected that, in that situation, those kids who are already initially before COVID, in a disadvantaged or stress situation are going to be seriously left behind, right? Now the more advantaged kids, you know, kids of mine, for example, if I had had small kids at the time, they would have been fine. And I had young, young adult kids at the time, and they were fine. Because, you know, we have the resources to be able to support them and help to mitigate the damage that otherwise would have happened. But it’s the people already at the bottom of the food chain who suffer the most right? Which, which really makes me angry, because that’s, you know, that’s the last thing we need. Inequality is so unhelpful. And and it’s just a horrible thing, when you know, these, these people in cushy government jobs and bureaucracies, who don’t have any problem with job security are pushing this on people who then suffer and they’re, you know, they’re already suffering. So it’s just really heartless. Anyway, so you might think, well, that’s going to, of course, limit the degree to which these kids are going to be able to learn whatever it is that they’re learning, whether they’re what we call in economics, their human capital, you know, what’s in their brains from their years and years of schooling and experience will be necessarily less and that is true. But what we have to do then to figure out the the sort of cost that has been eventually imposed upon them in terms of their WELLBYs or their QALYs is work out, well, how much is that productivity loss going to be reflected in lower wages when they get to be adults, and of those wages, how much is actually likely to then be spent on things that would have otherwise made them healthier, better off, you know, more satisfied, et cetera, but that we are not going to be able to spend now because of the fact that they don’t have as high wages? Well, it’s, you know, it’s not just the full wage of those kids that you want to count. Because as it happens, when we spend privately, we’re often spending on things like status goods, you know, we’re not always but particularly in a country like Australia, we’re spending to keep up with other people. So it’s not that every extra dollar that these kids would have earned would have actually led to increases in life satisfaction, you know, you you spend in order to keep up with the Joneses that doesn’t make you more satisfied, it just keeps you at the same level sort of thing. So what really you want to count is the fraction of those extra wages, counterfactual wages that would have been accumulated by the society as a whole and spent on public goods, like more health, better education, better infrastructure, and that sort of thing. So that’s basically the tax take. So that’s what we do to estimate the negative, the damage from the loss of schooling, the disruption to schooling, in terms of WELLBYs in the future for these kids. And as it turns out, that amount tends to be you know, it turns out to be much less than it would be if we counted that whole forgone wage. And so you know, that that’s a bit of a surprise, perhaps, to some people, but it’s just because of this interesting feature of the way in which our private spending is or isn’t related to creating more life satisfaction for us.

Gene Tunny  34:24

Yeah, yeah, absolutely.

Tim Hughes 34:26

With the whole economics of it, which, of course, is what you two are trained in and experienced in. And so yeah, the figures are pretty damning for any of the responses around the world, apart from those who took a lighter, a view of it like Sweden, for instance. And I think it was really good that different responses were taken around the world so that they could be compared and whatever would come from that, like I said at the beginning, my main interest in all of these conversations, really is to see what could we do better next time, in view of what happened? And that’s still largely the case because clearly, I mean, I’m a lay person, that’s my role in this scenario, you guys are economists. Clearly, we would all listen to epidemiologists, medical people who would have their views on this too, because, for instance, in the early days of COVID-19, from the pictures that were being seen from North Italy, for instance, the, you know, the scenes from the hospitals there, it seemed extremely dire. And I didn’t feel for instance, everyone’s got a unique perspective of the lockdown and what happened. I didn’t see or feel any great fear in Australia, we were a long way from it. So geographically, we’re a long way from that kind of action. But (cough) sorry, long COVID, bad joke. So, yeah, my feeling would be that one of the first things with this, because I saw not panic or fear, especially over here in Australia, but people just complying and sort of concerned but just going along with what appeared to be the best decisions at the time. You know what can we do to protect the hospitals and the doctors, nurses from being overwhelmed was one of the driving forces, and some of the logic that a layperson, like myself might see in a lockdown. So for instance, and if that turns out to be not the best response, then I’m really open to see what would be the best response because everything done and said, What are we going to do next time when this comes around? And there seems to be at an early stage of any of these pandemics? We mentioned SARS and MERS, Ebola, for instance, they all have different CFRs, so the case fatality rate, and how likely to die are you if you contract this? And they have different R naught scores, which is something I learned about as we did some background for this, the transmissibility of it how easily transmissible is it? And so there must be at some point, an area in early days of any of these viruses where we’re not sure, we don’t know. And so the first thing would be, I would have thought to say, Okay, well, how soon can we have any kind of certainty as to what we’re dealing with? How? What was the case fatality rate? How easily transmissible is it? That would be, I would imagine one of the first things we can do, and then let it unfold from there. Like I mentioned before, like if some sort of protocol that we can have in place that we’re not, I mean, everyone, all of us now have some experience with this, from what we’ve gone through for good or bad or whatever. And I don’t think, I think it was a one trick pony, for the amount of lockdowns that happened. Even the most patient person would be less compliant if this was to happen fairly soon. And so the next one will be different straightaway, you know, so what is it we can put in place that everyone can be generally okay with, that would be a good response? But like I said, sorry, going back to an initial point, how do we determine, you know, what would be that, that first response of like, just how bad is this? What are we dealing with?

Gigi Foster  37:56

Yeah, so I mean, it’s, it’s interesting to hear you talk about and having in place protocol, you know, so that we know what the steps are, everybody can agree to them. That is kind of what the pandemic management policies that we already had before COVID, which…

Tim Hughes  38:09

Which nobody had known about. And like, that didn’t seem to be any, it seemed to catch everyone by surprise.

Gigi Foster  38:14

Well, I mean, I think that people who, whose job it was to know about them knew about them, you know, the department’s of health in the various different states and the Commonwealth, I mean, that they would, of course, know about their own pandemic management policies, right? People, as all might not have known about them. But that’s because, you know, we don’t know a lot about a lot of things that go on in the back rooms of government that are just handling stuff, like, you know, do we know, how many steam rollers are purchased every year for the infrastructure projects? No, you know, I mean, there’s a lot of stuff we don’t know. And they’ve came to the fore that these pandemic management policies existed really, quite a long time after the lock downs were implemented, right? Nobody was talking at the time about, Hey, why are we doing this? Look, it says in the plan, we’re not supposed to. Nobody was saying that, right. So your your desire for a protocol, which everyone can agree, I mean, we had that and it failed. Unfortunately, that’s from my perspective. That’s why I say the key things here are politics and psychology. Those are the two things that we need to focus on if we want to get a better solution going forward. And, you know, on the point of the overcrowded hospitals and overworked nursing and Doctor staffs, I mean, yes, it is true that in times of great disease, and you know, the the influx of a new bug, hospitals sometimes become very crowded, and the workers in health care systems sometimes become very overworked. This is something that they deal with on a semi regular basis. There’s surge, capacity protocols that these hospitals have and that the staff have as well. And you know, that you can bring in more people. It’s like, if it’s like, if you have a war, you know, and you and you have to mobilise, right. There are ways we do this. And as an economist, I might make a dry observation that if you never have your hospitals overcrowded then you’ve got too many hospitals. Right? If you always have a spare bed and some spare hands hanging around, then you should redeploy the money that you’ve spent to hire those beds and that those workers to some other area that can support human wellbeing and thriving, right, because we only have so many dollars, right. And so you don’t want to have spare capacity underutilised. So there is just this natural ebb and flow of sickness and illness that and you know, and injury as well that hospitals have to manage they manage this in maternity wards, for example, right? A lot of women give birth, when it’s raining outside, you know, I’d have particular pressure or whatever causes people to go into labour. And that means that you sometimes have to, you know, basically employ a lot more people, doctors and nursing staff or whatever, at a particular moment. And then there’s less demand later. I mean, hospitals know how to handle this. So that’s, that’s point one about the hospital overcrowding. Point two, we’ve been through this exact kind of problem before the 1957 flu was very similar. We didn’t lock down whole healthy populations for that thing, right? We didn’t have the media that we have today, we didn’t have the global media spreading all of these scary stories about Italy, as you mentioned, or China, you know, people falling over in the streets or in New York City with the mass graves and all that. So we didn’t have the fear generation mechanism that we have today. But we did have a virus that was pretty similar in terms of its virulence.

Tim Hughes  41:22

I hadn’t heard of that one actually, the 1957 one, yeah okay…

Gigi Foster  41:24

Just another flu. Yeah, no another flu. And the thing about COVID, that really was different than some of the analogues that were being used was not only that it was less lethal, but it was also just not killing kids. Right? 1918 flu was scary, because it was killing everybody. Alright, kids as well, that’s really scary, right? Like, one of the worst things gonna happen to you as a human being is you lose your child, right? So that’s very bad. That was just not really happening during COVID. Except for children who are already seriously ill. And even then, you know, less likely. And even for some people, I mean, people were the exact risk baskets, they were still surviving with more than, you know, 50% likelihood but it wasn’t like it was a complete death sentence. So. So anyway, the second point on the hospitals thing is just that you’re presuming that going to the hospital is the thing that you have to do when you have COVID. That’s the only way we can treat it or the best way we can treat it. As it turned out, going to hospital was kind of a mixed bag, in a lot of cases with COVID, right. And if you put people on ventilators, Mechanical ventilators, they often have worse outcomes. Not always but frequently enough, it wasn’t a panacea by going to hospital didn’t mean that you’d be cured. In fact, it was, you know, kind of much of a muchness in a lot of cases. And sometimes so as the, as the panic wore on, and the protocols became more entrenched about, you know, how are we going to count COVID, and how much money goes to hospitals that have COVID cases, it became financially advantageous for hospitals to label somebody a COVID case, and then follow a particular protocol to treat that person which really might not have the best outcome for him or her. Right, so hospitals were a real mixed bag. And what we weren’t told was all of the other myriad things that one can do if one wants to: A, avoid getting ill, and B, if one is ill, to limit the the probability that you’re going to progress to a disease stage where you really will need to go to hospital. So there were plenty of things we could have done, you know, including all the stuff we already knew before COVID, about how to fight respiratory illnesses, you know, take lots of vitamin C, go outside, get your Vitamin D, have, you know, fresh drinking water and have lots of sleep and eat fruits and vegetables. And as it turned out, over time, we were learning about more things, the important role of zinc, and the important role of, you know, sort of other prophylactic measures, which were just suppressed. And in fact, you know, the crowning achievement of that suppression was the TGA, blocking ivermectin, which has been proven to be a useful prophylactic, and very useful in the early stages. But why did we block it? I ask you, that’s not public health. That’s not protocols. That’s politics, right there, that’s power politics. And so if we want to fix this, if you want a plan going forward, I think what we need to do is work on our political system, we need to revive the accountability of the people making decisions at times of crisis to the people as a whole and a representative bunch of people that need to be sort of responsible in some way for those who are in authority or the decisions or overseeing those decisions. So I’ve suggested a number of different avenues forward in both “The Great COVID Panic” and on some blogs that have come afterwards on Brownstone Institute sites, Brownstone is my publisher for The Great COVID Panic. So brownstone.org, you can see those blogs. One of them I’ll mention here is the citizen juries idea. So at the time of COVID, we saw a lot of bureaucrats who were unelected and completely unaccountable, who were basically driving policy. So you know, health health ministers, for example, around the around the country, right? Remember, Brett Sutton, who basically became a sex symbol. Yeah. And Brad Hazzard and a few other ones. And you know, these people were doing things and advocating for policies that never went through Parliament. They never they never got the tick expressly from the people, now the politicians will say, well, but the people were clamouring for more and more protection. And you know, that is true to a certain extent. But these guys were appointed by politicians. So there was also this element to which they were all kind of playing into each other’s game, right? Everybody was following a playbook, rather than really having anyone looking out for what was really in the long term interests of the people. So I, with my co authors, Paul Frijters and Michael Baker, we’ve proposed that instead of having those positions, like the head of the Ministry of Health, be political appointments, we have them instead be appointments by citizen juries. So we already use the jury system in the criminal justice system, right? The idea would be that everybody in Australia, every citizen gets put on a jury role and an expectation once in your life, you have to spend two to three months working with 20 to 30 of your peers. And your sole job is to appoint the next Minister of Health or Minister of the Environment, or Minister of Immigration or whatever it is right on top of the public service. And if we did this over a few years, and you know, kept replacing all of the various heads who needed to be replaced at the state level and the Commonwealth level, with people appointed by the people as a whole rather than politicians, we’d end up with a burgeoning cadre of people making, you know, in positions of authority, able to make decisions, and hopefully more responsive to what is actually good for the people, because it’s the people who would have appointed them, right, rather than the politicians. So that’s one suggestion to try to hack away at the bad politics of this whole situation. So that maybe the next time those people would feel a bit more of a duty to be responsive to what was actually good for Australia.

Gene Tunny  46:35

Yeah, very good. Gigi. I’ve had Nicholas Gruen on the show and we’ve talked about citizens juries in the past. So yeah, absolutely. Think I think they’re a great idea. Did you have a follow up Tim?

Tim Hughes  46:46

I heard that episode, that conversation you had with Nick, Nick Gruen, and yeah, the idea of citizens juries I find really interesting. It’s along the lines of what Warren Hatch, from Good Judgement is talking about with super forecasters to have skilled generalists, as opposed to experts. I mean, obviously, we need to listen to everybody. I think listening to different perspectives and different opinions is really important with all of this. And that that feeds in with the citizens juries is to have that diversity of opinion in these areas of selection. So I think that’s a really, really interesting point.

Gene Tunny  47:19

Just one more Gigi, Yeah, this is great. I’ve really enjoyed this and learning a bit, there’s, learning a lot. So particularly about your methodology, I find this whole WELLBY methodology fascinating, because it’s not something I’ve used myself. And it’s something that’s different from standard cost benefit analysis. So I’d just like to ask, I mean how has it been received worldwide, this WELLBY methodology, is it being applied for, what policy issues is it been applied to?

Gigi Foster  47:47

Yeah, it’s a really good question. And the one of the reasons I use it is because it is actually getting some traction. So right now in the UK Green Book, which is the kind of , I don’t know, guide for how to judge, how to evaluate policies or you know, what we should be going for, as a government. They talk about WELLBYs, they talk about how to produce WELLBYs through government spending. Government programmes have been evaluated against the metric of how many WELLBYs on net are we getting from this programme, and that programme can be something like, you know, mental health provision, mental health service provision, which by the way, has a very, in, at least in the UK studies I’ve seen, has a very high benefit to cost ratio. So you should do that, if you’re a government mental health support is very important thing. And you can also evaluate anything else that the government might do, like, bussing old people up to Stonehenge to have a look, you know, or taking people out, you know, disabled people out to lunch every week, or whatever the thing is that you’re hoping that that might help people. And you kind of want a measure of that, you know, are we really delivering higher quality of life to our people with this policy? So it’s being accepted, I think, more broadly as a reasonable and defensible metric, to which governments can be tethered there, they can be held accountable. There have been a number of cost benefit analyses, actually of COVID policy that have been conducted in WELLBY terms. So not only in Australia, but I think in about six other countries around the world, there have been these CBAs that have used WELLBYs, but of course, there have also been a lot of other CBAs that have US Dollars or QALYs, and we all come to the same conclusion, you know, broadly qualitatively, but it’s really lovely to see that diversity you know, as you’re saying before, you know, diversity is an incredibly important strength of our, of our modern societies, if we could only harness it, right? And what we did in COVID, of course, was we suppressed it you know, we kind of killed that that golden goose whereas another thing we really need to focus on is how to not move in the direction of suppression and censorship. So for example, these new laws about misinformation and disinformation I think these things are toxic. That’s awful, you know, because who is going to decide what is disinformation and misinformation? I mean, my gosh, it’s puerile right, and just the idea the conceit you know, the hubris, that somehow the government knows what the truth is. I mean, when has that ever been true? Right? Like nobody has has a monopoly on the truth. I don’t have a monopoly on the truth. You know, I, I would love to be proven wrong on some of these things during lockdowns, I was thinking to myself, My God, I hope I’m wrong, like God, I hope I’m wrong, right? Because if I’m not, we’re killing people, you know, these policies are killing 1000s of people. And and it’s just it’s too too horrific to imagine. So, you know, I, I would like to have more discussion of these if these issues are crossed aisles of belief and perspective and experience. So we need to relearn how to have tolerance for that, you know, this, this cancel culture dynamic we’ve got going on today, is extremely toxic. It suppresses one of the greatest strengths of our civilised post enlightenment societies. And, and it basically just means that you have a lack of innovation, right? Innovation comes from somebody in a minority, at that time, having a new idea, right? And saying, Hey, guys, why don’t we try this? That’s That’s what innovation is. And if you if you quash alternative voices, you’re quashing innovation and innovation as a source as you know, of all growth. So, right, that’s the wrong direction to go. If we want to build healthy, vibrant societies with gains in human life quality, which is what I’m going for,

Tim Hughes  51:22

Completely agree, I think, you know, healthy debate and having those guidelines around what healthy debate is, and the ability to listen to different perspectives, and avoiding the echo chambers, which I agree, I think that’s what the cancel culture encourages, is to people to go to their little sort of support groups and say their things amongst each other without any serious sort of challenges to their ideas or hearing new ideas. So I fully, I fully agree with that Gigi.

Gene Tunny  51:50

And I think, I think certainly young people, if you look at the cost versus any benefit that they obtained, yeah, it’s going to far exceed that, that benefit, I agree with that. You’ve come up with seven new, over 7 million WELLBYs as a cost, and around 60,000 WELLBYs as a benefit. Now, it’s going to be some multiple, large multiple of, of any benefits I agree with that? Have you thought about whether, you know, young people may have been willing to pay that? Because they thought they were protecting their grandparents or elderly people? Have you thought about that Gigi and how you might incorporate that in your analysis?

Gigi Foster  52:27

Yeah. So I mean, the the question there is, would the government in a counterfactual world have been able to take policies that would have readjusted people’s expectations towards the truth in the moment of crisis, because the truth was that it was not going to be protective of their grandparents to do all of this stuff. In fact, it would be more protective, if they went out, licked a lot of lamppost tried to get COVID got immunity, and then we’re on, you know, not dangerous to their grandparents anymore, right. That’s what we were doing. I mean, in my family, we were trying to get COVID every which way. And we didn’t manage to until finally last year, I got it. But you know, it was sort of the young, healthy people, you know, on paper, they just wanted to get immunity as quickly as possible. That’s what that’s what would have best protected their grandparents. So the reason why people believed that was the misinformation promulgated by the government. Right. So if you ask me, Well, you know, should we just have gone along with that? Well, no, you know, I like to think that we can have a society where the government isn’t pushing propaganda. You know, that’s, that’s, that’s not what in a democratic society, I look to the government to do, the government is our servant. It’s our servant. And it should not be stuffing our throats with, you know, wrong think., and calling it right think and calling everybody else who disagrees the people who are the wrong thinkers, right? I mean, it’s 1984. So, you know, you get no, it’s ugly, I think. And now, now, the issue of however, is that because we have now lived through this, many people have become psychologically tethered to the narrative, they have been themselves in part of the agent of a lot of this destruction, right. And in their own mind, their identity is swept up with this. And they took actions against their own family, often, that they thought at the time were protective, because of course, most people act, you know, in a way that that upholds their self image as being a good person, of course, right. But now that that’s being revealed not to have been true, we have got a massive psychological problem on our hands, massive. People are unable to talk about this in an unemotive way. They’re scarred psychologically, they are, the the actual realities are so shocking, that if they were to face them, I think many people would would just fall into a really deep hole, psychologically, and so that is, in my mind, one of the big problems that we have to deal with now, in the post COVID, you know, period, is to reconcile across the aisles. And it’s not the people like me, who were pilloried at the time, who took the most psychological damage. Like I can handle it, it’s fine, right? Whatever. I knew I was doing the right thing I sleep well at night, no problem. But for the people who were part of the damaging structure, including those who were, you know, calling each other out about the masking, you know, you don’t have enough mask on or, you know, dobbing people in for going to school when they had a sneeze and or whatever it was, you know, they were being the agents of this distruction. You know, they’ve now learned Oh, okay, the 1930s, I would have been part of the regime, right? That’s the scary realisation, and for them to really face that is just going to cause a huge psychological shock. So that, for me is is one of the big things we have to work out. How are we going to help those people going forward? And because history will eventually put this period down as one of the most tragic in history because of the mismanagement of the crisis by the government, and all the people who went right along with it, will have to, you know, read that in the history books. And that’s going to be really difficult for them. So yeah, I have a lot of compassion for those people.

Gene Tunny  55:55

Very good. Tim, your, well, we might end on your intelligent observation, assuming it is intelligent.

Tim Hughes  56:01

Well, thanks. I shouldn’t talk it up too much. It was more of along the lines, actually of a couple of things you said earlier, Gigi, about health and good nutrition, being able to go out in the sunlight and everything which of course, was restricted at times with some of the lockdowns of course. And something that we can do straightaway, to help us through any future pandemics is to become healthier, improve our immune systems naturally, which has all these multiple benefits as well. So going along with any psychological issues that we may be facing as a result of the pandemic, then to eat well, and exercise well and sleep well would go along with that fabulously and what I was going to put forward do you guys being economists, see what you think about subsidising the cost of vegetables and whole foods, so fruit, veg and meat in their natural state, so without being processed, and put a tax on ultra processed food to be able to pay for that subsidy. So instead of Pringles being whatever they are double the price of that and use that money to subsidise. So people can be encouraged to eat more healthily.

Gigi Foster  57:12

Yeah, I mean, this is a typical kind of economist response. Right. So it’s a sin tax basically, you know, we have at the moment as you know, a GST which applies to you know, a lot of goods and services but not the food’s you know, foodstuffs of various sorts, you could you could have, you could have exclusions for you know, fresh fruit and fresh vegetables, whatever, and then have a GST in place for anything processed. There’s all sorts of things you could do, if you wished. My reading of the closest thing to that, that I’ve seen elsewhere, which is the tax on sugary drinks experiments, right, that’s been run elsewhere, is that it does collect money. Yeah, you do collect money and it does reduce the purchasing of those beverages, those sugary drinks, but it usually doesn’t actually change the underlying issue, which in those cases is obesity. Right? It doesn’t really have a measurable impact on the amount of people who are obese the fraction of people who are obese, how obese they are or whatever because what happens is people switch to other things. They may not buy the coke but they instead buy the muffins and then you know they’re getting just as bad so in the case of the the taxation on you know, different goods, I just don’t know really. Partly it’s because I think that some of the reason if not the bulk of the reason why some people are not as healthy don’t choose as healthy habits as others is psychological. Okay, it’s not just about the resources that are literally available to you like do you have enough money to buy the fruits and vegetables? It’s a bit of that perhaps and certainly in some food desert areas it will be that and there’s a cultural element of course which is you know, if your family doesn’t eat this way how can you do that but then that’s is that really going to be that affected by you know, taxes? Probably not. So my my sense I mean, obesity is a mental health problem from my perspective. And I think that low immunity is also to an extent that as well. If I think about myself for example, I have this incredible luxury of you know, being able to have a nice good job, well paying job I, mean they haven’t fired me yet thank goodness, knock on wood, for saying all the things I’ve said during this period, I love my job. I love teaching, I love doing research, I love doing these conversations. I have the luxury of being able to afford kitchen appliances which let me make beautiful smoothies every day from fresh fruits and vegetables I buy from the store. I have great sleep every night, I you know I can run, I can exercise, I got sex every day I want and all these things that are obviously promotive of immunity. But I also have something that people don’t mention a lot which is huge amount of mental resources. Why? Because I am loved. I am supported. I was, I feel accepted. I feel I’m making a contribution to my world. I’m also healthy, naturally. So you know, because I’ve been investing in my health I can use that health surfeit to put more effort into being healthier right? A lot of people who are in places of disadvantage or not looking after their health do not have those kinds of advantages. They’re in dysfunctional families. So we’ve got multiple overlapping problems, you know, substance abuse and domestic violence. They’ve got unclean, you know, living environments that you know, hail the sanitation people again. So you know, those people, are they really going to respond to having to pay 10 cents less for a, you know, a carrot, or something? I don’t know, I think the problems are bigger than that. So I’m not saying don’t try it. But I think that the problems are, again, wider than just, here’s a protocol, you know, in terms of the COVID stuff. Similarly, with being healthy, it’s not just the costs, it’s also other entrenched problems, which have to do with psychology and culture.

Tim Hughes  1:00:39

No, fair enough and, and yeah like anything, it’s not straightforward. But for most of us, it is something within our control that we can sort of focus on and do better on. So it’s certainly something I think can be emphasised by governments and whoever is looking to improve responses and everything. It’s the foundation of our natural immune systems, which isn’t impervious to all of these viruses, of course, but certainly gives us a fighting chance.

Gigi Foster  1:01:00

Yeah. Totally agree

Gene Tunny  1:01:04

Absolutely. Okay, Professor Gigi Foster. It’s been terrific. Thanks so much for your time. I really enjoyed chatting with you. And yeah, it was great and thanks for answering our questions. And yeah, I really look forward to your future work. So thanks so much, Gigi.

Gigi Foster  1:01:20

Thanks so much for having me on. It’s a, it’s a great pleasure to speak with you.

Tim Hughes  1:00:23

Thanks Gigi.

Gene Tunny  1:01:24

Righto, thanks for listening to this episode of Economics Explored. If you have any questions, comments or suggestions, please get in touch. I’d love to hear from you. You can send me an email via contact@economicsexplored.com Or a voicemail via SpeakPipe. You can find the link in the show notes. If you’ve enjoyed the show, I’d be grateful if you could tell anyone you think would be interested about it. Word of mouth is one of the main ways that people learn about the show. Finally, if your podcasting app lets you then please write a review and leave a rating. Thanks for listening. I hope you can join me again next week.

1:02:11

Thank you for listening. We hope you enjoyed the episode. For more content like this or to begin your own podcasting journey. Head on over to obsidian-productions.com

Credits

Thanks to Obsidian Productions for mixing the episode and to the show’s sponsor, Gene’s consultancy business www.adepteconomics.com.au. Full transcripts are available a few days after the episode is first published at www.economicsexplored.com. Economics Explored is available via Apple PodcastsGoogle Podcast, and other podcasting platforms.

Categories
Podcast episode

The role of experts in a democracy: pandemics, monetary policy & AI w/ Peter Kurti, CIS – EP201

The Centre for Independent Studies’ Peter Kurti asks “ Should those who know best rule the rest of us?” In this episode, host Gene Tunny chats with Peter about his new paper “Authority, Expertise and Democracy,” which explores the role of experts in government and how society should best utilize their knowledge in public policy making. They delve into the question of when it makes sense to delegate power to experts and the relevant considerations. The role of experts in decision making around the pandemic, monetary policy, and AI are discussed. 


Please get in touch with any questions, comments and suggestions by emailing us at contact@economicsexplored.com or sending a voice message via https://www.speakpipe.com/economicsexplored.

You can listen to the episode via the embedded player below or via podcasting apps including Google PodcastsApple PodcastsSpotify, and Stitcher.

About this episode’s guest: Peter Kurti

Peter Kurti is Director of the Culture, Prosperity & Civil Society program at the CIS. He is also Adjunct Associate Professor in the School of Law at the University of Notre Dame Australia, and Adjunct Research Fellow at the Australian Centre for Christianity and Culture at Charles Sturt University. He has written extensively about issues of religion, liberty, and civil society in Australia, and appears frequently as a commentator on television and radio. In addition to having written many newspaper articles, he is also the author of The Tyranny of Tolerance: Threats to Religious Liberty in Australia; Euthanasia: Putting the Culture to Death?; and Sacred & Profane: Faith and Belief in a Secular Society, published by Connor Court. Peter is a Fellow of the Royal Society of Arts, and an ordained minister in the Anglican Church of Australia.

What’s covered in EP201

[00:02:30] Authority and experts in government.

[00:04:07] Impact of experts during COVID. 

[00:09:29] Discrimination and lockdown restrictions. 

[00:13:29] Delegating power to experts. 

[00:18:12] Politicians’ difficult role in decision-making. 

[00:21:11] Trade-offs in decision making. 

[00:27:23] Vaccine mandates. 

[00:34:27] AI and expert advice. 

[00:37:35] Expert advice and self-interest. 

[00:37:59] The importance of delegation of monetary policy decisions. 

[00:40:19] Expert Failure book by Roger Koppl. 

[00:43:33] Experts and human failings. 

[00:50:32] The length of the leash. 

[00:52:12] The role of experts in policy making.

Links relevant to the conversation

Peter Kurti’s new paper for the Centre for Independent Studies:

Authority, Expertise And Democracy. Should those who know best rule the rest of us?

Episode on Public Choice theory mentioned by Gene:

EP93 – Public Choice theory with Dr Brendan Markey-Towler – Economics Explored 

Transcript:
The role of experts in a democracy: pandemics, monetary policy & AI w/ Peter Kurti, CIS – EP201

N.B. This is a lightly edited version of a transcript originally created using the AI application otter.ai. It was then checked over by a real human, Tim Hughes from Adept Economics, to pick out any howlers that otters might have missed. It may not be 100 percent accurate, but should be pretty close. If you’d like to quote from it, please check the quoted segment in the recording.

Gene Tunny  00:06

Welcome to the Economics Explored podcast, a frank and fearless exploration of important economic issues. I’m your host Gene Tunny. I’m a professional economist and former Australian Treasury official. The aim of this show is to help you better understand the big economic issues affecting all our lives. We do this by considering the theory, evidence and by hearing a wide range of views. I’m delighted that you can join me for this episode, please check out the show notes for relevant information. Now on to the show.

Hello, thanks for tuning in to the show. In this episode, I chat with one of my colleagues at the Centre for Independent Studies, Peter Kurti. Peter is director of the Culture Prosperity and Civil Society programme at CIS. He is also Adjunct Associate Professor of Law at the University of Notre Dame Australia. Peter has written a great paper for CIS on the role of experts in government. The paper is titled “Authority, Expertise and Democracy – Should Those Who Know Best Rule The Rest of Us?” In the paper, Peter asked how society should best use experts in public policymaking and he provides some very useful tips. This is a really important issue given how much we rely on experts. At different times, experts have wielded a lot of power. Dr. Anthony Fauci in public health and Jay Powell in monetary policy come to mind. When does it make sense to delegate power to experts? What are the relevant considerations? Peter Kurti provides some great advice in his latest paper, which we talk about in this episode. Okay, let’s get into it. I hope you enjoy my conversation with Peter Kurti.

Peter Kurti, thanks for joining me on the programme.


Peter Kurti  01:59

Thanks, Gene. Great to be with you.


Gene Tunny  02:02

Very good Peter. You’ve recently had a new paper published by the Centre for Independent Studies, “Authority, Expertise and Democracy – Should Those Who Know Best Rule The Rest of Us?” I’d like to ask to begin with what got you interested in this issue of expertise? Why did you think this was a good topic to write a paper on?


Peter Kurti  02:24

This all started really during the period of COVID and the lock downs. And I felt that here in New South Wales, and I know in other parts of the country in Queensland and Western Australia, and certainly Victoria, Premiers, it seemed to me ceded a great deal of authority to unelected chief medical officers, who determined what a government could and couldn’t do, and should and shouldn’t do, and certainly what the population should and should not do. And I felt that it in the course of managing an understandably complex public health situation. Nonetheless, politicians were ceding too much authority to experts, and that when politicians do this, they pose a threat to the liberal democratic society in in which we live, because we elect politicians to do a job, we elect politicians on the basis of policies they undertake to implement. And we look to politicians to regulate the kind of society in which we live. But they are accountable, because if we don’t like what they do, we can we can turf them out at the next election. And we can turf out individual members of parliament at by-elections. But when we have unelected unaccountable experts, such as chief medical officers dictating what can happen in any society, I think that it poses a great danger to us. And we saw the impact of this because there were social consequences. There were economic consequences. And there were cultural consequences as well. And I’m thinking when I talk about that I’m thinking about the impact on families of not being able to travel for funerals, not being able to visit people who are sick or terminally ill. And I think that the standard that chief medical officers set which was you know, keep everybody safe, and that there must be no risk of any contamination or, or contagion whatsoever, meant that the additional costs, the consequences that are borne or have to be borne from those decisions, were not taken into account. And that was really what made me start to think about the problem of experts. I mean, we need experts. They are an integral part of a, of a technologically complex society. I don’t say we don’t need them, but we need to hold them to account and we need to make sure that elected representatives, politicians who are appointed by us to do a job actually do do their job.


Gene Tunny  05:09

So would you say that the, to an extent these experts were ruling over the rest of us during that COVID period, is that, that’s the argument you’re making there Peter?


Peter Kurti  05:18

In Covid yes, I think they were. And I think that there are a number of reasons why that happened. One was that it was a once in a century, once in 100 year, public health emergency, and no politician really knew what to do. Nobody really knew what was coming. And there was a lot of anxiety and a lot of fear amongst the population at large. And politicians clearly had a responsibility to not just to set an example, I think, but to reassure uneasy populations, and one of the ways to do that is to cite medical advice, scientific advice. And the it to an extent, we all looked to chief medical officers to tell us, first of all, what is happening, and then tell us what’s going to happen next. And so as I said, a moment ago, it was a very understandable set of circumstances, but I don’t think it justifies or excuse, it justifies but it doesn’t excuse what happened. And I think that we must always be sure, should such a pandemic ever occur again, that public health advice is just one part of the body of information, one part of the body of opinion that is taken into account.


Gene Tunny  06:38

Yeah, yeah, I agree. Yeah. This is something I’ve covered on this show before and I had concerns about is there’s a point you’re making the paper about how there are, there are trade offs involved, and you need politicians to make those judgments. And there’s no real technocratic answer or no real. I mean, is that one of the arguments you’re making is I mean, the the idea of having an expert in charge or, or their view, almost prevailing all the time, the problem there is that that’s a technocratic answer. It assumes that there’s always a technocratic answer. Is that a fair reading?


Peter Kurti  07:17

I think that’s right. So Gene, and one of the reasons I think we got ourselves into this situation during the pandemic was the politicians didn’t really know what to do, because it was such an unexpected and unanticipated set of circumstances. And I think that they were, you know I’m speaking about in very general terms about a large group of people with different political affiliations. But on the whole, I think, political leaders did not want to be caught out, they did not want to be sort of caught out by the media, who might then say, if if things get worse that to say, well, you know, if you’d taken that advice, this wouldn’t have happened. How do you account for that? And so I think we have an increasingly risk-averse group of politicians who will just as it were hide behind or rely upon or depend upon that sort of expertise in order to, in a sense, make life easier for them. But we need that sort of, I mean, in a sense, we can’t, we cannot avoid engaging with experts. And we cannot avoid engaging with people who have expertise in public health when it comes to managing health issues such as the pandemic. But if we don’t hold people to account, if we just allow experts to make decisions for us, without regard for the broader set of consequences, those trade offs that you mentioned, then I think we’re in trouble. And we saw that we saw that in every state, and territory. But we certainly saw that here in New South Wales, where areas were locked down. So that there was an area in in in Sydney, from which a lot of tradies needed to travel in order to work, when they can’t travel, they can’t work when they can’t work, they can’t earn money. And well, I mean, we know what the economic consequences of and the social consequences of that are. And I think simply to say, you must stay home and stay safe is not enough, because everyday life is full of risks. And we take risks and assume risks and make calculations about risk every day.


Gene Tunny  09:26

Yeah. What area was that? Peter? Was that from Western Sydney? Fairfield? Fairfield. Gotcha. Okay. Was there also a an issue of the composition or the demographic makeup of that area that that suggested that I mean, this was almost discriminatory in a way because I know that some areas which had higher ethnic populations, they ended up being suffering worse restrictions, didn’t they? And that can lead to social tension.


Peter Kurti  09:54

That’s right. And that is exactly what happened because they found, I mean, the police were very, in my view, were very heavy-handed during a lot of this time, and then the police or others found that in communities with large, the large ethnic component, people were not being as observant about the restrictions because, for example, in, in Muslim communities, there are larger families and getting together and mixing with one another is is very important. And they attracted, I think, the particular attention of the authorities because of this. And so the lockdowns and restrictions were more stringent. Again, you know, judging everybody by one standard, everybody must stay safe. Everyone must stay home, regardless of whether or not that’s something that’s practical or even necessary.


Gene Tunny  10:51

Hmm, yeah, exactly. You talk about this concept of double delegation. So I’d be grateful if you could explain that and also reflect on is this something that we’re increasingly seeing these chief medical officers, they’ve been introduced in the last couple of decades? I mean, we didn’t have a Chief Health Officer in Queensland, I don’t think until the early 2000s, we had a public health act in 2005 that came in, and this this new position they’ve created, and they delegate some powers to that position. And presumably there are other examples of this, is this something that’s becoming more common. Is this something you’re concerned about the trend? Could you talk about that, please, Peter?


Peter Kurti  11:36

It is part of a larger trend. It was COVID that alerted me to the problem and brought it into focus. And I suppose maybe I have simply been complacent before because we are used to experts, advising government and all kinds of things. We just think, Oh, well, that’s the way the world works. But not in my lifetime have I seen what kind of impact this expert advice had? But I think it is part of a broader trend. And we see it in other areas. I’ll say something just about double delegation before I come back to that to that manifestations of that broader trend. It’s a phrase I picked up from the English political scientist, Adrian Pabst who talks about the the fact that he describes this problem that arises when we as it were delegate to elected politicians, we delegate to them, we say we appoint you to do a certain job for a certain amount of time, we will assess you. I know this is not necessarily what we actually think. But we say we will assess you at the next election and decide whether you’re going to keep the job. Those to whom we delegate, delegate in turn to, to this body of experts, and Pabst describes it like this. He says, double delegation arises when representatives elected by citizens delegate power to unelected officials, who are part of a professional political class. So it’s not just a matter of delegation, but delegation to a professionalised group of people who, who are then use their professionalised status to further entrench their position. And to argue that what they say not only is right but needs to be observed. Now, we’ve seen in public health that was the most obvious example but I think we also see it when, when there are discussions, for example, about energy, about climate and changes in in the climate. We do see it a lot in economics, although I think that’s to an extent a rather specialised example, because economics is so is so technical. Certainly monetary theory is very technical. But we hear these phrases that are put about when there are discussions about climate change, like the science is settled, for example, which I think is a contradiction in terms because I don’t think science is settled. But a group of professionalised climate scientists decided that this is this is the position we need to adopt. And they’re backed up by the media, who emphasise their opinions and so consolidate their position. So it’s part of a broader trend. And I think we’re going to see more of this, I think with when areas that really, so few of us actually do understand such as AI and the emergence of AI and development of AI. We need to be really vigilant about the way in which we use expert advice. The paper is not I’m not anti experts. I’m not saying we don’t need experts, we can we can make our own decisions any more than I’d say we don’t need we don’t need surgeons. I’ll do my own surgery. Thank you very much. Well, I’m not saying that. What I’m saying is that if we are going to use experts as we are bound to do, we as citizens of a liberal democracy in Australia, need to be thoughtful about the way in which we engage them in ways in which we hold them to account. And we also need to be stronger about defending freedom of speech in the sense that I think we need to be more willing to tolerate dissent, we need to be able to say, well, this group of scientists over here says, you know, there is a climate catastrophe, for example, whereas this group of scientists over here is saying, well, warming and cooling is just part of a trend. These are parts of tre.., these are trends that that take place in on the earth over a period of years. We need to be able to tolerate dissenting views. I’m not saying we are necessarily able to determine which view is correct. But we are increasingly reluctant I feel to tolerate it today. We’re reluctant to tolerate dissenting views, because we want to have the right answer. We want to know what the right position is the right solution is. We saw that during COVID. Of course, when debates about the efficacy of vaccine mandates or mask mandates, or social distancing, dissent was not tolerated. And I think that if we are going to make an intelligent use of experts, we do need to be willing to tolerate dissent and to live with perhaps the discomfort that comes from having dissenting views.


Gene Tunny  16:24

Yes, yes, exactly. Yeah. It makes it difficult for politicians, though, if, if the experts don’t agree, so how, how do we think about that? Or what’s the relationship I mean you mentioned tolerating dissent, that’s one of your rules or your tips for getting experts, like using them effectively? I mean, there’s obviously a role for expertise and people who understand the issues, and they provide the advice to the government of the day. How do you think about how those experts should be used? And I mean, what do decision-makers do when there is a situation of of that of that dissent I mean, is it up to them to judge where the weight of evidence is? I mean, because the politicians will say, Well, look, the bulk of evidence is in favour of this hypothesis. It could be climate change, for instance. So yeah, how do you think about that, Peter, how should politicians use experts?


Peter Kurti  17:21

Well, I think it really just the way that you have outlined by examining what it is the experts are saying, By assessing the evidence, by determining where the bulk of opinion lies, and then using judgement and skill to make a decision. We can apply that sort of framework to any policy area where might think about migration, levels of migration, there are people experts who say Australia, we can’t have a big Australia, others say we can have a big Australia, and each side will mount will present evidence to bolster their own arguments. And I’m sure believe, quite passionately, the evidence that the cogency of the evidence they present, but somebody then has to make a decision about how we do that, and an elected government has to take a position, we can see it in terms of going to war, or whether we supply arms, for example, to Ukraine, we went into Iraq 20 years ago, very controversially, but we did so on the bai., I mean, at the Howard Government did so on the basis of evidence that was presented. And as we remember, because we know those around at the time, there was a huge amount of dissent in this country about that. At the end of the day, it’s elected representatives who have to make the call and are then held accountable. So I think it’s it’s a difficult role. And I’ve never been an elected politician. So I’ve never been in the position of having to implement this. I’m simply really someone on the sidelines who’s advocating for a certain as it were, a certain style of, of a certain style of living, if you like. But I think it’s by by weighing and assessing, carefully, evidence that is presented. And I think not allowing fear, I talked about the importance of political courage, not allowing fear of adverse consequences to deter somebody to deter you from making the right decision, for example. When I mean, how many years ago was it now it’s it’s must be nearly 30 years since the Port Arthur tragedy. And the Howard Government decided that they were going to take a stand on on firearms. And there’s a lot of controversy about that at the time. I remember not being in Australia very long. And the view was that people living in the country or people who are really attached to their weaponry wouldn’t be happy with this. And there were arguments on both sides, but I think the weight of public opinion, or rather, I should say this put it this way. I think the Howard Government made it made a decision based on on the evidence and the politics, and also having to judge which way public opinion whether public opinion would accept this. And it was a controversial decision. But I think, given the horror of what happened at Port Arthur, the Australian public did accept it. But there was no telling, which was the right what was the right decision or not? I think it’s in a sense, you only know whether you’ve made the right decision with hindsight.


Gene Tunny  20:33

Yeah. What really annoyed me during that COVID period was the politicians making decisions and saying, the science tells us this, we have to do this, this is the only the only thing we can do and, and not going into what the decision making process was or they didn’t show that they were weighing up pros and cons, whereas they really should have because there are going to be pros and cons of any decision. There are the trade offs we talk about, there was no right answer in necessarily, in my view, it’s always a judgement call to an extent when we’re we’re dealing with those trade offs. And what made that clear to me and to others, and this is something I was chatting with one of my colleagues, Joe Brannigan about on this, this show when it happened, we had a Chief Health Officer who I don’t know if you remember, they let Tom Hanks in, you know, if you’re a movie star, you’re a footballer, you you had no problem getting into Queensland. But if you were just some regular, you know, person and yeah, bad luck, you got to do two weeks quarantine. And then we had a constraint on the number of hotels for quarantine. So that meant people were camping on the border. It was just disgraceful. So that that’s one thing that annoyed me that I think there was too much relying on the experts saying this is what the experts have told us that it’s based on science. And there’s no acknowledgement that they’ve actually, you know, there’s really a call that’s been made there, or there should be a call, there should be a judgement that the politician should be involved in. I think that makes sense. Does that make sense? What I was just saying?


Peter Kurti  22:16

Yes it does! And the trouble is that the politicians just caved in. I think there was a I mean, there were these sorts of stories all around the country. But there was that famous incident where a mother I think living in Tweed Heads needed to get her very sick child or children to a hospital. The nearest was in Queensland, but it’s qui… You can edit this bit out Tweed Heads, Tweed Heads in New South Wales isn’t it?. Yeah. She needed to get across the border. And Palaszczuk said famously, or notoriously that Queensland hospitals are for Queenslanders? Well, I thought, you know, I mean, it was a disgraceful thing to say, because I felt what was also happening in this time of panic was that our national identity was fragmenting and we were becoming a sort of a collection of fragmented colonies, and I would d.., former colonies, and I thought that even our sense of national cohesiveness has, has has gone. All kinds of stories, like I’ve had people who weren’t able to visit sick, sick relatives in hospital, because there was this fear of contagion. And I think, and politicians just seem to be happy to let that happen. In New South Wales, interestingly enough, when Berejiklian left, left the job of Premier and Dominic Perrottet came into office, the first thing he did was reduce the period of isolation that you had to have if you tested positive from seven days to five days. And there was the usual concern expressed by public health experts that actually this you know, you could still be contagious after five days and, and, you know, this is really not a good decision to make, but Perrottet had the wisdom to see that, in fact, people needed to get back to work and they need to get on with our lives. And that five days was enough. And that you just had then have to assume a degree of risk and in in what you do next, and we all of us, you know, we exposed to the flu virus every year. We know that if we’re sick, we stay home if we’re not if we if we feel really unwell we go to bed, and I think for the state to say and saying to people who are actually very well but happened to have tested positive on a on a on a rat rapid antigen test, which in itself was not 100% reliable, meant that people were exposed or subjected to all kinds of inconvenience. So I think there were lots of examples such as such as the ones that you cite, and and the ones that I’ve cited,


Gene Tunny  24:55

And just on Tweed Heads, so just to provide some context. So it’s part the same urban area as the Gold Coast effectively. I mean, if you if you drove through there, you wouldn’t, unless you saw the sign, you wouldn’t realise you were crossing from Queensland to New South Wales. So it’s, and that was the that was part of the problem. And then they had to put the barricades up and have the police there. It was just just awful situation. So I should ask Peter about the those tips for dealing with experts. You mentioned them before, I just want to go over them again. Because I think this is really good I think this is one of the best things you do in this paper, you’ve got these three cultural contours. There are three of them that if cultivated and emphasised can underpin the approach to engage in experts and help encourage an efficient and responsible contribution to democratic decision making and one tolerance of dissent. Absolutely. Political courage. So the elected representatives need to be less anxious about upsetting public and political opinion in determining the policy trade offs. I think that’s great. I think what would have worked, now it sounds like I’m picking on the politicians or politicians during the pandemic, but of course, it’s it’s one of those, you know, it’s an example. It’s one of the, you know, it’s one of those crisis periods where you really, these issues come to the fore. So, look, I understand the human, I don’t want to be super negative about them. But they really did provide this, this example for us to talk about. So I will talk about it again that say, you know, what would have been better is if say, our Premier had said, okay, look, yeah, this is what the Chief Health Officer advised. I’ve weighed this up, I’ve recognised the fact that this is going to cost the economy, but this is the judgement I make, which you should the politicians should have be more honest about that is that that’s what you’re getting at there?


Peter Kurti  26:45

Well, yes. And I think, not being frightened of making a decision. Lest it turn out to be the wrong one. I felt they played it safe all, all the time. And so I think that’s right. We saw it with the vaccine mandates that I mean, we were, for example, we knew that the vaccine wouldn’t stop you necessarily stop you getting COVID. But it would alleviate the symptoms, you would have it less badly. But it didn’t, if I’m vaccinated, it doesn’t stop me from infecting you. It just something that affects me and yet we had in New South Wales and around the country, these vaccine mandates, and it got ridiculous, you couldn’t go in, you couldn’t go into shops, you couldn’t go into these unless you prove that you’ve been vaccinated, whereas vaccination really did not affect, my vaccine status did not affect you or any other of my neighbours. And yet nonetheless, we were required to do this, and the hurriedly developed vaccines were presented to the Australian population as being safe. And we know that they were not entirely safe as I mean, no vaccine is because science, to an extent, is an art. I mean, it’s a science, but it’s also it’s an art and we don’t, we can’t always be sure of an outcome. And certainly, I think with things like vaccination, especially when they’re rapidly developed, there will be there will be difficult, and there’ll be problems. But anyone who raised those sorts of problems would announced those who expressed concern about about the safety of vaccines, vaccines were, were denounced as being irresponsible. And it seemed to me that no politician was prepared to say, we don’t need to do. We don’t need to do things in exactly this way. We need to be calmer, we need to be more realistic about about the nature of disease, we panicked. I mean, Western Australia shut down the entire state, when there was one case, yet we seem to be blithely indifferent to the 1000s of people who die every year of flu. And I felt there again, you know, the politicians were just caught up in this pandemic panic. And I think that a degree of political courage, would’ve allowed them to say, It’s okay, you know, we have sickness we have people do get sick, but life has to go on. And we need to make we need to be responsible and take decisions in a way that minimises the harm that we expose others to, but that allows us to continue with the lives that we’re living. And the the incomes that we’re earning. So yes, I think it’s, it’s that sort of response that I would like to see cultivated by when that I’m really scribing in terms of political courage.


Gene Tunny  29:45

Okay, we’ll take a short break here for a word from our sponsor.


Female speaker  29:51

If you need to crunch the numbers, then get in touch with Adept Economics. We offer you frank and fearless economic analysis and advice. We can help you with funding submissions, cost benefit analysis studies and economic modelling of all sorts. Our head office is in Brisbane, Australia, but we work all over the world. You can get in touch via our website, http://www.adepteconomics.com.au. We’d love to hear from you.


Gene Tunny  30:20

Now back to the show.

Okay, very good. So we talked about tolerance of dissent, political courage, and the final cultural contour is institutional integrity. Yes, exactly. Yes. So, “No democracy today can dispense with experts, but institutional mechanisms of accountability can ensure that experts exercise autonomy, responsibly” Could, what, what mechanisms do you mean there Peter?


Peter Kurti  30:49

I think? Well, I cite a number of examples. One is the oversight of budgets that are available to experts, the appointment of experts to advisory panels and boards, the codes of conduct that guide the behaviour of of experts, codes of ethics, just, you know, various sort of social and institutional frameworks that we put in place to ensure that people know, experts know that they have to be accountable and cannot simply claim their expertise as a warrant for doing whatever it is they want. You know, it’s a slightly nebulous idea, because it’s not it’s not something it’s not like a switch that can be can be flicked. And suddenly we have institutional integrity. I think that is a that’s why I call them these three points I call cultural contours, because cultural culture evolves and a cultural contour is something that has to be cultivated. And in a sense, practised as well. Another form of institutional integrity might be the very fact that we can question experts and say, but, you know, you’re wrong. Going back to the pandemic, it was simply not acceptable to say that Sweden had got it right and Australia got it wrong. I remember doctor as a doctor friend saying to me that ivermectin was, which, which in his medical experience was something that had that had the capacity to alleviate COVID symptoms, could now no longer be prescribed off label. And he was very indignant about that, because he felt doctors always have a discretion about prescribing medicines. And that whilst the medication can be prescribed for a specific condition, that it states on label, it might also have an effect on conditions not specified hence the description off label but they were actually prevented from prescribing off label. Well, I think we need to also why is this why but even to utter the word, ivermectin would get you disconnected from, you know, various groups and various fora. So that’s another form of another manifestation of institutional integrity that we can actually, we can have systems in place that are robust enough to ensure that people are held to account and are not free to make those sorts of decisions without without regard for the wider consequences.


Gene Tunny  33:18

Yeah, exactly. I mean, to me, so they’re getting some scrutiny. I mean, there is some media scrutiny, arguably not enough, there was not enough probing, there weren’t enough probing questions during the pandemic of the politicians and the officials and the chief health officers, they should subject themselves to more media interviews. And part of the problem is the normal processes of government were suspended, weren’t they during the COVID period, because we had these public health acts that gave them these emergency powers. So there wasn’t the usual debate in the parliament or the you know, the committee processes where there’s something serious, you know, something of such magnitude or such, such great impact on the economy and society would be debated for, I don’t know I mean should be extensively debated in parliament in committees, and it just wasn’t. So that’s that was what I see as one of the problems too.

Peter Kurti  34:18

I agree, I agree.

Gene Tunny  34:20

Yeah. Okay. Very good. So that’s one thing I really liked about that paper. And I’m going to put a link in the show notes because I think it’s Yeah, I think that’s great. Okay, AI, you mentioned AI, what are you concerned about there? Exactly. If the experts are formulating the response, what are you actually concerned about there?


Peter Kurti  34:37

Oh, no, I think we need we will need to be very attentive to expert advice when it comes to AI because it’s, it seems to me from my layman’s perspective as a non computer expert, that it seems to me that experts themselves are debating about the capacity of AI and these large language models and generative AI to assume increasingly demanding roles. And this is a long standing issue in, in areas like philosophy of mind, and certainly in cognitive science about what consciousness is and whether a machine can be conscious. And we don’t know. And I don’t think the experts know. And there are some AI some some experts who are calling for us to slow down and take things more steadily, others who are quite happy to let the horse out of the stable, well it’s out of the stable but let the horse gallop at whatever speed it wants. So I think that that’s an example of an area where we clearly are going to have to depend upon experts. And it will be foolish not to, but at the same time, we need to, we need to accept that there will be dissent within expert groups. And we need to be comfortable with that dissent, with that dissent, and we need to, in a sense, not abdicate responsibility for my for making our own decisions about these things to experts, and to to attend as best we can, to what experts are saying and to think critically, about how we ourselves respond to what they’re saying. I think AI is very exciting. And I think it’s it’s whether it’s in, in in medicine, or space exploration or, or defence, AI is rapidly changing the way we we interact with technology, but we don’t quite know how it’s going to go. And I think we need to be, as I said, we need to be attentive to what experts are actually saying and to follow the debate, you know, not to give all the authority and all the power away.


Gene Tunny  36:47

Yeah, gotcha. One of the conclusions you reach, you note that this report has argued that any economic account of experts, which takes into consideration the tenants of public choice theory. So that’s something I’ve covered on the show before, I’ll put a link in the show notes to that episode. So any economic account must always allow for the influence of personal interest, opinions and prejudices of those providing expert advice. So do you see that that has been? That has been a serious problem? Do you have any examples of that Peter, are there any examples that come to mind?


Peter Kurti  37:26

I know we’ve talked a lot about COVID in our conversation, but I think COVID provides a good example of that. This notion of information choice theory is an idea I discovered with the writings of Roger Koppl, who of course, develops as you’ve mentioned, public choice theory, but really, information choice theory. Koppl is arguing that perverse outcomes can occur when expert advice is is tended that experts themselves will be motivated by self interest. And he would say that what we have to do is abandon the idea that experts seek only the truth without regard to motives such as fame and fortune. And that sounds a bit cynical in some ways, but I think Koppl is is right that we can’t, we must imagine that experts themselves have got are devoid of human motivation or ambition or desire, and accepting that that’s just the case that is human nature, that Koppl argues that information choice theory suggests that what we need to do is have is to avoid situations where one body of experts has a monopoly over opinion, but they must be able to compete with one another, an example that he cites, and I’m not sure it applies in quite the same way in Australia, but one of the examples he cites is forensic medicine. And he argues that, that when there is no competition about forensic scientists, amongst forensic scientists, and forensic medicine is devoid of those the competing voices of experts, there’s a danger of, of scientific error, which of course, being forensic medicine can in turn lead to instances of injustice, and that where there is more than one forensic medical point of view, the there is a greater chance that error will be avoided and therefore injustice avoided. Now it does happen to an extent here we know in each state and territory of this country, forensic medicine has led to injust, miscarriages of justice, which are then which are then corrected. The problem in the United States is that the death penalty is is reasonably widespread, and that although that can take many years, faulty forensic medicine, forensic research can lead to, you know, very draconian punishments. We don’t have that quite that problem here. But it’s an example that Koppl cites and I think it’s a it’s an interesting one that we would do well to attend to.


Gene Tunny  40:02

Okay, I’ll have to look up his work. I wasn’t, I’m not familiar with Koppl. Did you, was he in the public choice school?


Peter Kurti  40:09

No, he is, it’s Roger Koppl he’s actually it’s finance and financial management. He teaches, he teaches, I’ve not got the book right beside me.


Gene Tunny  40:21

That’s okay. I’ll put it in the show notes. Is he at Syracuse in, in the States?


Peter Kurti  40:26

Yes I think he is, I think he is. And the book that he wrote a really interesting book was Expert Failure, a book published in 2018.


Gene Tunny  40:35

Yeah, I’ll definitely look into that sounds. Sounds interesting. Okay. Before we wrap up, I just want to ask you again about? Well, I want to ask about monetary policy, because you mentioned this is one area where and this is a case study you give in your paper, this is one area where delegation can be justified. Now, could you explain why that is? Peter, why we would delegate the monetary policy decision. So changing the cash rate in Australia, changing the federal funds rate, why we would delegate that to either the Reserve Bank of Australia board or the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Bank?


Peter Kurti  41:13

Well, it’s an interesting example. And I think, in a way, it’s a timely example, because the, and again this really flowed out of the way in which the Reserve Bank was considered to have performed in the wake of COVID, not raising interest rates fast enough, not getting on top of the not, not, tapping, trapping that inflationary genie in the bottle promptly enough. And so there was a review. And there was a feeling one of the recommendations in the review was that there should be this, this monetary check, what’s it called a monetary? That’s right, the Monetary Policy Committee, Monetary Policy Board that’s it, that there should be a separate board that will advise the Reserve Bank board about what to do. And there’s this view that, in fact, a view put forward by Peter here, that the the Reserve Bank, governors are well, meaning amateurs, and that’s possibly true. Not all of them are, but they’re engaged in business and corporate and economic life in the country, given that the Reserve Bank has a target band of inflation, and there are ways of meeting that target. And the board has to make a decision about interest rates in order to try to meet that inflationary target. It involves some very difficult some very technical decisions that are really beyond the capacity of ordinary members of the public. So I think I use as that as an example of an instance where we do need experts. But we mustn’t abdicate all responsibility, and that they need to be held to account in in some ways, and I think some it or the way the monetary policy board was promoted in the review. And the way it’s been greeted in the press, by some people, is that this body of experts will now correct and avoid all the failings of the Reserve Bank. And I think that’s a problem. I think that we need that sort of advice. But there were commentators like John Edwards was one of them, who wrote in the Australian saying that actually, the Reserve Bank didn’t do such a bad job when you consider other central banks around the world in western democracies, that the Reserve Bank board didn’t do such a bad job. And I think there’s this idea that now we’ve got the experts, everything will just be fine. And we won’t have those mistakes again. And I cite it as an example, because I think it’s an area where we do need experts, we do need people who are proficient in the complex technicality of monetary monetary policy. But in the sense it’s an instance of that might be an example of information choice theory where you need to account for the fact that even these experts with these technocratic experts, even these people have, have human failings, desires, ambitions, and goals. We cannot think that somehow there is this pure, disinterested advice. That’s been that’s been tendered. And I cite the Reserve Bank. And the other example I cite is ICAC The Independent Commission Against Corruption, because it shows actually how in a sense how complex modern life in a country like Australia is, and that there’s no rule. You can’t say, well, we need experts in these situations but not in those situations. We need experts in in different ways for differing rules, but we have to think about how we use them. So if we have a monetary policy board, is this board a board that is going to be accountable? To who? The treasurer, perhaps, the board? Probably not, it’s independent, who appoints them, and how, for how long are they appointed? and how they removed? Those are the sorts of questions that I think we need to ask about such a board. And that’ll be an example of the kind of institutional integrity that I’m talking about. Where we think about, what are the parameters of control? What are the terms of office? How are the people appointed, how they removed? What are the criteria that are used to make those appointments? And you may feel at the end? Well, that’s all a bit fuzzy. And I suppose in a sense, it is fuzzy. We these are, there is nothing, there are no hard and fast rules about how we approach these questions. I don’t think that means the questions are unimportant, nor do I think it means we should avoid asking them.


Gene Tunny  45:40

Yeah. So that Peter, the other Peter, you mentioned is Peter Tulip, Chief Economist at Centre for Independent Studies, and Peter’s argued that there should be a separate monetary policy board separate from the the bank board with that could run the Reserve Bank. And yeah, look, there are some there are arguments in favour of it. I don’t know whether it’ll actually mean we get better decisions. It might. Because the the current board does have the, it’s got some RBA members on it. It’s got the Treasury Secretary, and then it’s got, you know, it’s getting all the advice from the Reserve Bank. So maybe we could get better decisions. I don’t know. I’d be willing to have the experiment, it’s possibly worth doing the experiment. But one of the things I would point out too or one thing I should note is that, you know, there is a delegation already to the board from the government. I mean, the government, the Treasurer doesn’t make the interest rate decision that is delegated to the Reserve Bank board and economists have generally, you know, most they all sort of agree that that’s a great thing, because, well, monetary policy is a technical decision, we want to keep the politicians as far away as that away from it as possible, because their political interests could be in favour of inflation, getting some short term, you know, giving the economy a short term boost prior to the election, accepting some inflation that comes later, because they want to get elected so that there’s a risk there. So that’s why that’s been delegated. And then what Peter’s arguing for as well, we should then go even further than that, and have a or have a special Monetary Policy Committee with expert economists on it. So you know, really increase the expertise of the body that’s making that interest rate decision here in Australia. Yeah.


Peter Kurti  47:37

And I should say that Peter was kind enough to read that section of the report and gave some helpful feedback. And it was I incorporated a number of his comments in that section. So that I, he corrected any sort of that I was drifting at one point. I mean, I’m not an economist, and I was grateful to Peter for so he’s read this. And he knows what I’m, what I’m saying.


Gene Tunny  48:00

Very good. Okay. And, yeah, I guess the point is that we’re delegating the the technocratic decision on the exact interest rate at a particular in a particular month. But the government does still decide what the target is it decides what the it reaches an agreement with the Reserve Bank on the conduct of monetary policy. So they’re not, they’re not completely abrogating or dodging responsibility for it. They are, they are still accountable. The government is involved in it, but they’re not making the technocratic decision on the interest rate, which could be problematic if they were involved in that. Because for that reason that I mentioned that the you could end up with really bad policy and evidence from the 80s. From before the 80s. It was, the evidence came, I think it was Alesina or in the 90s, late 80s, who showed that central banks that are more independent, that don’t have that the government telling them what they should be doing with monetary policy. Those countries ended up with better inflation outcomes, so lower inflation. So that’s, that’s why it’s good to delegate that decision too.


Peter Kurti  49:17

And I agree with you, I remember when the the the Blair government was elected in 97. Very soon after the tre.., the chancellor, the Treasurer, Gordon Brown, declared the independence of the Bank of England, that had needed to happen long ago. And I mean, Australia had got an independent bank had already got an independent central bank. And I think that that’s very important because we can imagine that for example, if the Anthony Albanese decides to go for a double dissolution, we’re talking now on the last day of July, but if he decides to go for a double dissolution, he’s not going to want to run on on on on his economic policy at the moment because Australians are very cheesed off with the way things are going and so it’d be very tempting for a government to tweak interest rates with if they’ve got their eye on an election. So I think having, it depends it’s very important. And why I cite the example is because I think it’s an it shows the complexity of the relationship between experts and their elected overseers and how that relationship, how is managed, how they are held accountable, and how we decide to what extent they are, they enjoy autonomy and to what extent they need to be to be reined in. There’s a phrase that is used by one of the writers that I quote on this, because there’s a lot of literature about expertise, which was, so it’s a very interesting paper to research and write. He talks, Michael Schudson talks about, we need to work out the length of the leash on which we keep experts, it can’t be too short, otherwise they won’t be able to do their job, but it can’t be too long, otherwise, we won’t, you know, they’ll they’ll just make decisions without any kind of accountability at all. They have to be autonomous, but not too autonomous. How do we calculate the length of that lease? It’s a very difficult thing to do. But I think that I am completely in favour of an independent central bank. And I certainly wouldn’t want this paper to be interpreted by some as advocating for a return to government control.


Gene Tunny  51:20

Oh, no, no, no, not at all. I read that section, I thought Oh, yep. That’s That’s right. And the one thing I would have added into it was that point about how having that delegation of the actual choice of the policy rate that’s, that’s good from the point of view that that independence does lead to better or lower inflation outcomes. So that’s something that’s been widely researched and, and proven so very good. Okay. Peter Kurti. Thanks so much. It’s been great. And I agree, we need to think more about the role of experts and how they’re used in policymaking. It’s important if we have another pandemic, let’s hope not, but also in decision making and all the other great challenges that we face, challenges relating to climate change challenges related to AI. So it’s important to think about the role of experts in advising government and we want we want to avoid the experts taking over, we need governments to be weighing up the the advice thinking about it, you had that the great, the trilogy of of tips, which was good, the, you know, being courageous and tolerating dissent and what was it, thinking about, was it accountability?

Peter Kurti  52:37

Institutional integrity I’ve called it.

Gene Tunny  52:40

Institutional integrity. Very good. That’s great. Peter Kurti thanks so much for your time. I’ve really enjoyed it.


Peter Kurti  52:47

Thank you, Gene. It’s been a real pleasure. I’ve really enjoyed our conversation


Gene Tunny  52:53

Righto, thanks for listening to this episode of Economics Explored. If you have any questions, comments or suggestions, please get in touch. I’d love to hear from you. You can send me an email via contact@economicsexplored.com or a voicemail via SpeakPipe. You can find the link in the show notes. If you’ve enjoyed the show, I’d be grateful if you could tell anyone you think would be interested about it. Word of mouth is one of the main ways that people learn about the show. Finally, if your podcasting app lets you then please write a review and leave a rating. Thanks for listening. I hope you can join me again next week.


53:40

Thank you for listening. We hope you enjoyed the episode. For more content like this or to begin your own podcasting journey. Head on over to obsidian-productions.com

Credits

Thanks to Obsidian Productions for mixing the episode and to the show’s sponsor, Gene’s consultancy business www.adepteconomics.com.au. Full transcripts are available a few days after the episode is first published at www.economicsexplored.com. Economics Explored is available via Apple PodcastsGoogle Podcast, and other podcasting platforms.

Categories
Podcast episode

The ESG puppet show & taking Liberty seriously w/ Nicholas Gruen – EP199

Nicholas Gruen, CEO of Lateral Economics, and host Gene Tunny discuss the topics of ESG (Environmental, Social, and Governance) mandates and Liberty. They explore how ESG mandates can create confusion among executives and investors, and delve into Nicholas’ perspective on Liberty, how to take it seriously and the best way to think about it. Nicholas tells a story from the early 1980s about how he tried to change Australia’s laws which allow Parliament to lock people up for contempt of Parliament. The conversation also touches on Nicholas’ concept of citizens’ juries, which is gaining support internationally, including from Martin Wolf at the Financial Times.
Please get in touch with any questions, comments and suggestions by emailing us at contact@economicsexplored.com or sending a voice message via https://www.speakpipe.com/economicsexplored.

You can listen to the episode via the embedded player below or via podcasting apps including Google PodcastsApple PodcastsSpotify, and Stitcher.

What’s covered in EP199

[00:01:32] Citizens’ juries and economic policy. 

[00:02:41] Does divestment from emissions intensive firms reduce emissions?

[00:06:47] Investing in fossil fuel companies to help them transition.[00:11:58] Carbon pricing.

[00:17:54] Australian consumers and carbon pricing.

[00:23:26] A different mode of governance.

[00:26:14] Liberty during the COVID pandemic.

[00:30:46] House of Commons Privileges Committee.

[00:34:32] Safeguards and legitimacy in governance.

[00:40:25] Rushed legislation during a pandemic.

[00:43:33] High level political discussion.

[00:50:06] Managing a crisis.

Links relevant to the conversation

Nicholas’s YouTube channel:

https://www.youtube.com/@NicholasGruen
Videos of conversations featured this episode:
Why ESG is a puppet show and what to do about it
Liberty: Safety from tyranny or doing what you like?
Club Troppo posts:
https://clubtroppo.com.au/2023/07/11/why-esg-is-a-puppet-show-and-what-to-do-about-it/
https://clubtroppo.com.au/2021/08/22/lockdowns-and-liberty/
Regarding the journalists locked up the Australian Parliament in the 1950s:
https://clubtroppo.com.au/2021/08/22/lockdowns-and-liberty/
Freakonomics episode on ESG that Nicholas mentions:

https://freakonomics.com/podcast/are-e-s-g-investors-actually-helping-the-environment/

Transcript:
The ESG puppet show & taking Liberty seriously w/ Nicholas Gruen – EP199

N.B. This is a lightly edited version of a transcript originally created using the AI application otter.ai. It has also been looked over by a human, Tim Hughes from Adept Economics, to pick out the bits that otters might miss due to their tiny ears and loud splashing. It may not be 100 percent accurate, but should be pretty close. If you’d like to quote from it, please check the quoted segment in the recording.

Gene Tunny  00:06

Welcome to the Economics Explored podcast, a frank and fearless exploration of important economic issues. I’m your host Gene Tunny. I’m a professional economist and former Australian Treasury official. The aim of this show is to help you better understand the big economic issues affecting all our lives. We do this by considering the theory, evidence and by hearing a wide range of views. I’m delighted that you can join me for this episode, please check out the show notes for relevant information. Now on to the show.

Hello, thanks for tuning into the show. This episode features some recent conversations on ESG and liberty that I’ve had with my colleague Nicholas Gruen from Lateral Economics. They’re from our occasional joint podcast Policy Provocations, which is available via Nicholas’s YouTube Channel. In the first part of this episode, we talk about how ESG mandates can be a puppet show, and can create confusion among executives and investors. In the second part, we talk about liberty, and what Nicholas means by taking liberty seriously, and what he thinks is the best way to think about liberty. The title of the YouTube video of the conversation is Liberty, safety from tyranny, or doing what you like. Nicholas is one of the best lateral thinkers in economic policy out there for sure. One of the things I enjoyed about this conversation was the discussion of how his big idea of citizen’s juries can be applied in a variety of different applications. This concept of a citizen’s jury, which Nicholas didn’t invent, but which he’s been the biggest advocate of, in recent years, it was picked up by Financial Times columnist Martin Wolf in Martin Wolf’s latest book, The Crisis of Democratic Capitalism, which quotes Nicholas approvingly it’s great that Nicholas’s ideas are getting greater exposure internationally, and I’m very glad to have the occasional podcast chat with him and to feature them here on Economics Explored. Okay, let’s get into the episode. I hope you enjoy my conversation with Nicholas Gruen.

Hello, Nicholas, and hello if you’re watching, good to be doing back doing Policy Provocations. Nicholas, you’ve recently given a talk to some investors haven’t you on ESG. And you had some thoughts on this whole concept of ESG and how it’s applied. Would you be able to take us through that please?


Nicholas Gruen  02:40

Sure. So if you listen to one of the most recent episodes of Freakonomics, you will find a an episode which follows the work of two US academics, and they ask the question, Does divestment from emissions-intensive firms reduce emissions? Now, you might think it would. But their analysis leads you to believe that it doesn’t. Now, I think both you and I, Gene would have been pretty quick to say that just passing the parcel so that we don’t fund that thing, but the next capitalist to come along to invest in it will fund it. It doesn’t give us as economists a lot of faith that we’re achieving very much. It looks according to their work that it’s worse than that. Because if you starve in the, to the extent that you’re successful at all, you’re successful by raising the cost of capital to highly emissions-intensive firms and emissions-intensive firms are 282 times as emissions-intensive, as the bottom quintile the most emissions-intensive emit 292 times as much carbon as the top quintile into whom we’re going to invest. And if you ask the question, you know, how are we going to get those emissions down if they’re making aluminium or steel or something like that, then one of the obvious things we need them to do is we need them to invest in new technology in inventing it or in applying it. And if we raise the cost of capital to those firms, they won’t invest in new technology. And so these authors find that that is in fact the case and that raising the cost of capital to these firms actually increases their emissions. Now, I was giving a talk to the Centre for Institutional Investors and these are and it was on the subject of ESG. ESG stands for environment, social, and governance, a kind of an institutionalisation of of an old concept like the triple bottom line that firms should think about their environmental impact, their social impact, and the and the way they are governed. So these people, and this is on behalf of super funds, now what we know is that about half of investors in super funds, say that they do want the super funds to be ethical. Of course, it’s easy, that’s an easy thing to say, in their investments, and another 25%, sort of kind of agree, but they’re a little that they feel a little less strongly. So they feel this as a need. They feel this is something they want to provide their, their members. So they try to ask themselves, Well, how could we invest, to be simpatico with what most people think is a good idea, which is to lower emissions. And many of them end up in these positions where they run what’s called a negative filter. And they say, Well, if you’re emitting a large amount of money, sorry a large amount of emissions, we won’t invest in you. Now, another problem with that is you end up investing in banks and companies and consultants and companies that aren’t necessarily doing great things. They’re just doing them with white collars on. So they’re caught in a dilemma because one of the most plausible things you can say to your members is we’re not investing in high emissions firms. And yet, maybe if we want to lower emissions, that’s what we should be doing. And we should be another strategy, for instance, is the strategy of an organisation called Engine Number One, which invested in Exxon Mobil with a view to raiding basically to turning up their annual general meeting and replacing board members for Exxon Mobil. And they managed to do this and really not because of their own shareholding, but because their own quite measly $15 million shareholding in Exxon Mobil, gave them a stake and then going to talk to BlackRock and some really big institutional investors. And they made a big difference to Exxon Mobil, and Exxon Mobil is now less of a climate denier than it was and more interested in trying to make money out of the climate transition. Now, the ESG managers, the easiest thing for them to do is to just say, we’re not investing in emissions-intensive firms and that in fact, it you know, if you think about the divestment campaigns, for university endowments, and things like investments in university endowments, they’re all based on this kind of logic. So I put to them that they’re caught in a kind of a cascade of, of accountability, if you like, or pretend accountability. They’re trying to persuade their members that they’re doing the right thing. And what I said to these ESG people is, I think you should get a sample of your members and pay them to, so, so you might have 100,000 members, you randomly select 25 of them, you pay them to give you a day a month on the weekend, to get briefed on this stuff to talk among themselves, and to tell you how they would handle these dilemmas. And that means that you escaped from this theatricality, that you escaped from this way in which plausible ideas get embraced, and then we pretend that they then you become part of the propaganda effort to tell people that this is all working out well. And it’s not working out well, you’re actually papering over the problems. So I it’s a long explanation. But that’s, that’s the presentation. That’s what I was saying.


Gene Tunny  09:12

That study you mentioned, that’s fascinating. So it could actually be worse. I mean, I was thinking, well, it might not achieve anything, because there are going to be other people who will invest in these mining companies, the ones that are mining coal or whatever. And, and look, the reality is, if you weren’t invested in energy and commodities in coal, or oil and gas last year, you missed a huge amount of gains. Right. So you did your members a disservice. Right? So if you’re a super fund…


Nicholas Gruen  09:40

That’s right. Yeah. And then your members, I guess, are supposed to say yes, we know it did us a disservice. But that was what we were signing up for when we wanted you to be ethical. And the real kicker is that you weren’t being ethical. You were pretending.


Gene Tunny  09:55

So you’re talking about funds where it’s got an explicit investment mandate that they have to…


Nicholas Gruen  10:03

I’m also Yeah, I’m talking about them. But it turns out I sort of this was a bit new to me. You know, this is a much bigger craze than just the ethical investment folks, it’s pretty much taken over the world. Now, exactly how they apply their those mandates is, is not that they’re not applying the mandates as strongly as a fund that markets itself as in as ethical investment. But, but most mainstream funds, take this ESG business seriously. There are standards for reporting on ESG. And in a way, you know, as I thought more about this, one of the things, one of my friends said a bit of an I told you so moment, we there are many problems in the world for which we don’t have near perfect policy solutions. But greenhouse isn’t one of them. Because greenhouse we have carbon taxes, we have carbon pricing, and carbon pricing solves these problems, because it basically says, If you want to emit, it’s going to cost you more, and then you see the colour of people’s money, then ExxonMobil has you don’t have to, then the normal incentives of minimising cost drive this whole thing. Now what’s happened is that because it is so easy to weaponize carbon pricing politically, again, this is all about how easy it is to bamboozle the public in many ways. Because it’s so easy to run a negative campaign against carbon pricing, partly because it’s makes the costs transparent. The world has now built its entire strategy for reducing carbon emissions on guess what? Nice sounding statements and statements that are made by people holding offices who will not hold those offices when those statements are not, don’t come true. You couldn’t kind of make this up.
Gene Tunny  12:18

Yeah, who are you talking about specifically there because you’re talking? Are you talking about people in corporations or in super funds or are we talking about politicians, because one of them,
Nicholas Gruen  12:28

All of them. And they all have a different, they all have a different set of behavioural characteristics. But none of them are perfect. The relationship between what people say and what they do? Well, gee, that’s a bit of a problem for human beings all around. That’s one of the arguments for saying, let’s price things because you know that the people who save on emissions will also save money and people will admire them for it, and they will want to do more of it. And the whole thing is, as economists say, incentive compatible, but to take you, so firstly you’ve got the politicians. Now politicians say one thing and do the opposite. Within weeks, if they want to make it more respectable within a few years. Paul Keating tells us that the GST and I’m not being moralistic about this, Paul Keating tells us that the GST is necessary if we’re to escape being a banana republic. And then he describes it as a giant new tax that will come and monster everyone in Australia. Tony Abbott tells us that if he was getting if he was trying to reduce carbon emissions, he wouldn’t be pussyfooting around with silly regulation and, and renewable subsidies. He’d be introducing carbon pricing until he’s opposing carbon pricing, and so on it goes and Donald Trump will say different things in the morning in the afternoon. So that’s the politicians, the managers will, managers are a kind of politician or they’re, you know, they’re in a bureaucracy. There are lots you’ve worked in a public bureaucracy and managers are, you know, private or a public bureaucracy and they put a large amount of store in reassuring people having the fear you know, giving people are feeling that the adults are in the room, everything’s under control. Nothing could be further from the truth, the the transition to zero carbon, even the transition to about less than 40% of what we’re emitting now has got lots of gets more and more magic asterisks. As you go on magic bits of technology. We’re going to invest we’re going to invent. Well, I’m not I’m not being critical of anyone because that’s the best we can do. Given that we’ve have ditched carbon pricing, although that will come back. Then at the bottom of all this you’ve got people who are voters, and they won’t accept that it’s their responsibility who they vote for. They love the idea that they’re getting ripped off by these politicians who lie to them. But they don’t ask themselves. Why did the politicians lie to them? Because if they don’t lie to them, they won’t vote for them. If the politicians come out and say, well, actually, we all know that carbon pricing is the way to reduce emissions, then they won’t vote for those people. They’ll vote for the people who say, Oh, no, I’ll do it all without carbon pricing. So it’s a big house of cards. It’s not, it’s the wrong metaphor, because it won’t totally collapse. But there is something about it that lacks integrity, and will end in tears to a substantial extent.


Gene Tunny  15:53

Yeah, look, okay, I think I understand what your argument is with ESG. And you want to get more input from the members to really understand their you know, where they’re coming from what they’d like to see their understanding of the trade offs. Just on carbon pricing. I think we might have to have that discussion another time or because there’s, there’s a whole debate about carbon pricing. I agree if we are going to do something about climate change, then definitely carbon pricing is the best way to do it.

Nicholas Gruen  16:25

Yeah it’s a major part of the solution, its not the whole solution. But if that’s what we’re trying to do, it’s a major part of the solution.


Gene Tunny  16:33

The one reservation I’d have in, for Australia, like if you think about Australia, is it optimal for us to adopt it, if other countries don’t adopt it?


Nicholas Gruen  16:45

Yeah, sure, sure that’s right. But we can then adopt a domestic carbon price. So that’s a design, I look at that as a design feature. So Australian consumers should pay a carbon price, whether the exporters of Australian energy should plan to pay a carbon price is something we can we can defer to the design stage. If you like, I agree that that’s an issue. Yeah. But you would agree, wouldn’t you that Australian consumers should pay a carbon price?

Gene Tunny 17:02

If we cut taxes elsewhere?

Nicholas Gruen 17:05

But that’s you’re imposing a, an ideological or, yeah, an ideological preference. I mean, I’m just trying to impress carbon prices, yes I suppose I am. So I, you know, I’ve got my preferences. I’d like to use the money to do X, Y, and Zed, but I’m not going to say, Oh, well, I don’t want to do it. If you can’t, I can’t use the money in the way that I want.


Gene Tunny  17:40

Yeah, but conceptually, I agree that the the best way to tackle climate change is via a carbon price, I wouldn’t want to impose it and and make our industries worse off, and you’re arguing that? Yeah, the the way to stop that or that leakage, whatever they call it, when the industries go to other countries is by having an exemption of some kind. So there’s some design issues, they


Nicholas Gruen  18:06

just don’t want to that is a genuine issue that needs to be sorted out by the international community, if you can make a pretty reasonable attempt to do so at the at the unilateral level, if you have to, it’s not as good as a multilateral solution. But that’s a separate issue.


Gene Tunny  18:23

Okay. I didn’t mean to distract us from the discussion of ESG. Because I’m interested in what this mechanism is, you’re talking about? What is it a group or a sample or a


Nicholas Gruen  18:37

think of it, think of a jury, and you sample from your membership in such a way that it is representative of the membership. So you look at the age profiles, some demographics, and then you try and produce some replication of that in this otherwise random sample. Now, I think that the what that group can do is it can become aware on behalf of the members of these dilemmas, and they’re very deep dilemmas because you really get a governance problem. Any mug can say, Oh, we’re investing in all these high emissions companies in which every time we turn up to the AGM, and we say they should lower their emissions. But that’s not serious. So, if you want to go in this more bonafide direction, you, it raises important governance questions, it raises questions about communicating to your members that you really are doing your best. So that’s one way to involve the members. I also think that at the moment, what we have is we have a thing called the sole purpose test, which it makes a lot of sense, which is to say, you get various concessions to invest in Super and even if you don’t we force you to invest in these pension funds or superannuation funds so we don’t want you to invest in a holiday home, where you will get some benefit from this in your investment fund, it has to be for the sole purpose of your retirement. But a lot of people don’t mind the idea of, they like, in fact, I’ll go further, they like the idea that they will be investing in their community, they’ll be investing in things that will be good for their kids, and so on. So one thing that a fund might do in this model, according to me, and it would actually require some change in the legislation. But one thing that a fund might do is you might the ESG folks might take to this council, they might the ESG. Governance, the people running the ESG might say, Look, this is really very hard. And we’re not sure if this is achieving much. But we do think that there are a whole lot of ways we can spend money. And it may not be it may not get us commercial returns. But we’re prepared to put 1% of your portfolio into some funds that will improve the community for your children and your grandchildren. Our calculations are this won’t reduce your returns by more than this amount. But it needs to be something that you want to do. I think that’d be very healthy. And it would introduce a different kind of collective institution and collective decision making into our world and, and our use of capital.


Gene Tunny  21:38

Yeah, I think that’s, that sounds like a reasonable idea. And what was the reception like at that conference?


Nicholas Gruen  21:44

I’ve been invited to I mean, I didn’t go to that last point. But I’ve been been invited back to talk to CEOs about it, these were just so there was a lot of enthusiasm, because a lot of these in fact, I don’t think there were any, there’s virtually no managers of ESG who aren’t sitting around, really quite perturbed by the fact that they’re sort of putting on a show for the public. And when they, when they read the literature, and they think about what they’re doing. They’re not at all sure that this is a great idea. And it’s growing bureaucracy in all directions. There are standard international standards of what you report. It’s hard graft to connect up profit-seeking with community development. It’s a worthwhile objective, and we don’t understand it very well conceptually, but what’s happening is it’s being driven politically. And that’s kind of just turning into a for at least from my observation into into a pretty unhelpful set of bureaucratic instincts set up by standards, bodies, accounting bodies, everyone’s producing these reports. And I think the agenda is I’m not pooh poohing it, it’d be easy to take the fairly standard sort of public choice, critique of this and say, it’s all rubbish. I think it’s clear that there are good things about it. But then we have to take it seriously. And it should at least take the public choice, criticism of it seriously enough to do the best job of this, that it can.


Gene Tunny  23:25

Okay, and it’s about introducing some economic logic into the ESG discussion?


Nicholas Gruen  23:29

No, not necessarily. No. Well, I would say it’s about a different mode of governance instead of a mode of governance which has a bunch of consumers, and then a bunch of people who are managing a system and marketing to the consumers. You actually say to the consumers, these are difficult questions. We want to invest in a random sample of you guys to help us run this agenda. Because that’s A, going to be useful. B, it’s going to give what we do real legitimacy. We won’t be putting on a show for you. We will be trying to do what it is that you want us to do. And all of our systems default back to what I call the puppet show, and I showed them I don’t know whether you’ve seen many people have seen the film, The Sound of Music in which Julie Andrews and the kids put on a puppet show for Captain von Trapp and his girlfriend at the time. And I say the public out here Captain von Trapp and the and your members are out here. ESG is the puppet show and you’re up here, Julie Andrews and the kids putting on a show and you actually know that there’s a fair bit of unreality to this show. Get the get the audience behind, show them what you’re doing and ask them what they want.


Gene Tunny  24:56

Yeah, yeah, I love it. Very good. The Baroness was his girlfriend at the time if I remember or was it…


Nicholas Gruen  25:05

the Baroness gets gets shafted. It wouldn’t be a nice role to have as the Baroness because the Baroness has to be kind of creepy, gold-digging, vacuous, easily dispatched by the the sweet, innocent Julie Andrews. Maria von Trapp, who the real Maria von Trapp looks extraordinarily like my aunt, I can tell you who was Viennese as well. So that is a remarkable fact for you.


Gene Tunny  25:36

Okay, we’ll take a short break here for a word from our sponsor.


Female speaker  25:42

If you need to crunch the numbers, then get in touch with Adept Economics. We offer you frank and fearless economic analysis and advice. We can help you with funding submissions, cost benefit analysis studies, and economic modelling of all sorts. Our head office is in Brisbane, Australia, but we work all over the world. You can get in touch via our website, http://www.adepteconomics.com.au. We’d love to hear from you.


Gene Tunny  26:11

Now back to the show.

Nicholas, you wrote a post during the pandemic, didn’t you on your thoughts on liberty? And there was a whole debate about lockdowns and masks and you had a rather interesting perspective on it. So would you be able to just take us through that, please? Then we might talk about what it all means for policy.


Nicholas Gruen  26:35

Yeah, so during the COVID period, everybody got themselves very worked up about compulsions of impositions by government, and they were lockdowns, vaccine mandates, mask mandates. And it’s entirely appropriate that people talk about those things and debate those things and have different views about those things, and also have passionately different views about those things. That’s, that’s just fine and dandy. But imagine that we were in London during the Blitz, and we had those debates about whether the government should impose a blackout so that the Luftwaffe couldn’t bomb us, we would all understand that it was consistent with our liberty to impose those constraints. And likewise, if there is absolute chaos, that it is consistent with restoring liberty and actually to getting some liberty to impose martial law, for instance. So everything is a matter of context. Now, is that me not caring about people’s liberties under these particular measures? Well, as I wrote in the blog post, I’m the only person I know who’s got a record going back 40 years of actually taking this subject seriously. But I took it seriously in a rather different way. I didn’t say oh I’m on the side of I’m always going to be sort of leaning towards Liberty rather than coercion. What I said was, what are the things about our constitution that are most would be most would be the first things that an authoritarian trying to take control of government, or deny basic democratic values? What are the first things? Where were they hid? What are the weaknesses in our Constitution, that would help them out. And so when John Button who I worked for Senator John Button in 1981, he was in opposition. And I wrote out with the help of the Clerk of the Senate, Harry Evans, I wrote out a bill, a private member’s bill on the subject of parliamentary privilege, because at the time then, and it is still the case now, the members of either house, either our house of representatives or our Senate, can meet as a Privileges Committee, and they can decide according to whatever procedures they wish to adopt, to put someone in jail for contempt of Parliament, including one of their own members, as two journalists were put in jail in Australia in the 1950s. And so this private member’s bill actually picked up some old work of, from memory, Owen Dixon who was, who became the chief justice, but I think this was when he was attorney general. If he was attorney general, I think he was and it started with a private member’s bill he wrote, and we went over it and and made it to our own satisfaction. And so all that Parliament could do was to hold initial hearings and then to present the case to a magistrate to an independent magistrate saying, This person is guilty of contempt of Parliament. And over to you. Now, that is a much safer way to deal with this matter and a way that is consistent with our liberties taken seriously. And it’s quite a topical thing because as you may recall, the House of Commons Privileges Committee has just met and considered the routinely egregious behaviour of its former prime minister, Boris Johnson and decided that he would be suspended for 90 days. Now, I think suspending Boris Johnson from the House of Commons for 90 days, I happen to think that’s a great idea, I might make it longer. But it’s not it’s a disastrous idea that it should be their decision, because they’re politicians. And it’s very easy to imagine a situation where that, in fact, it’s hard to imagine an institution more ripe, to be abused, when people without any respect for the traditions, and the conventions within which those systems operate whenever they come along. So So that’s an introduction to this idea of liberty as being fundamentally about the legitimacy of government. And then secondarily about these particular decisions that get made.


Gene Tunny  31:36

Right, just before we go on Nicholas, which jurisdiction were those? Did you say two journalists were jailed by…


Nicholas Gruen  31:44

Commonwealth, Commonwealth, Commonwealth 1956, thereabouts, maybe 1954, the House of Representatives took umbrage at these journalists, you can look it up, I can’t remember the exact details. But the journalist reported a private discussion or something, it was just the sort of thing that’s pretty pretty standard practice now, off they went cooled their heels in Goulburn jail for a week or so. And they could be detained indefinitely. There’s nothing in our constitution or in the rules of the House of Representatives that prevents the House of Representatives from locking up anyone for any length of time in jail, now, we now have a more activist High Court that would probably get itself involved and say, This is not consistent with the spirit of the Australian Constitution, but that’s what happened. And nobody, yeah, and then, and then what happened is, Button released this thing to the public hadn’t, was a bit of a disaster, because he hadn’t read it very carefully. And I’ve tried to take him through it, but he was kind of busy or tired or something. And Michelle Grattan started asking him quite detailed questions about the bill. And he didn’t know what was in it, which was a little embarrassing. Then his party turned on him and people walked past him in the corridors saying, what has got into you? Why would you want to do this? And he wasn’t too sure himself. It was really all my idea. And it, you know, another idea of mine, and no-one knows who had it, you know?


Gene Tunny  33:20

Yeah. So I just want to understand what you’re, you’re arguing, you’re arguing that well, okay, so liberty, yeah you’re taking this seriously, you’re interested in the constitutional framework, or the all the all the rules we have in place that can affect Liberty before we get into one of these situations, like the pandemic, and I’m just trying to understand what you what you’re arguing, you want to make sure that we’ve got the right mechanisms or the right infrastructure in place so that we make the right decisions, or what are you? What are you arguing exactly?


Nicholas Gruen  33:54

Well, I’m arguing that if you’re serious about liberty, that you accept a few things, you accept that governments need in the final analysis to have quite Draconian powers if we’re at war, and so on. So that puts the focus on safeguards. And it also puts the focus on the importance of legitimacy in the in the post that I did during COVID. I said, I would have thought that it would be a good idea during COVID, if you want to introduce these emergency measures have us, and we talk about this a lot. Now, it’s one of my, one of the things I go on about which is you could have a jury body of randomly selected citizens who are there who are paid to turn up every week and to look at what’s going on and the government can’t do things that it objects to. I think that would have protected a lot of governments and would have protected us from a lot of the culture war that we saw, because these kinds of things need to reflect a sense of legitimacy. And they need to reflect the confidence of people that they’re doing what they think is the right things, and for the right reasons. And there was a great, you know, the the activism against mask mandates, for instance, was, because I regard mask mandates as the least intrusive kind of intervention you could have. And I would be perfectly I think it would be good if we had mask mandates on public transport, properly enforced even now. And again, that’s a, you know, a virus is a public is a public good is an externality, these are, these are difficult questions. And so you want to find a way to navigate them with proper community involvement. If we simply have governments and the usual sort of activism against those governments, it becomes very easy to turn it into a kind of standard issue culture war, which is what we saw more in the United States than here, but certainly it’s become that way here to a substantial extent.


Gene Tunny  36:11

Yeah, okay. So there are a few things I want to comment on there. So you’re right about government. I mean, it needs the the ability to, to at times do things that do constrain liberties, there’s no doubt about that government has a monopoly on violence, as they say, I agree with you there. Now, this point about getting the citizens involved, the citizens jury, it would have been good to have done it before we got into the pandemic, because the problem is because of all of the fear, then the citizens jury might end up just supporting a lot of these the policies? Well, I mean, I mean, the concern I would have is that a lot of these policies were driven by fear. And, you know, and which, to us, to an extent, I mean, to some extent, was rational. And some people for sure, I mean, it was certainly a serious virus. But the governments they would argue that they were polling people like they were like Dan Andrews and Anastacia Palaszczuk, they were relying on opinion polling, and that was driving a lot of their policymaking. So they would argue they had that legit legitimacy. I…


Nicholas Gruen  37:21

Well, I make a distinction, as I think you might know, between the opinion of the people for which I don’t have a high regard and the considered opinion, which for which I do have a high regard. So and certainly the considered opinion of the people, I think the considered opinion of the people would have looked very like the opinion of the people early on. But if it was really fairly clear that a lot of this was the product of project fear, then there would be people in a citizen jury, that would, you know, the citizen jury would have powers to ask questions, to call witnesses, all that kind of stuff. And that’s, we spoke about this in the previous podcast we did on a different subject. The structure we have is a government that is constantly performing for the satisfaction of its consumers, ie the voters, this is what corporations do. And what we need to do is to find mechanisms for bringing ordinary people, these people who we accept are the legitimate source of democratic government, to bring them into the process and to inform them as best we can, and then ask them to deliberate and then give the considered opinion of the people an important role in this. And it isn’t just that I think it would lead to better decisions, it would lead to a grea…, it does lead when you see it being done, to a tremendously less hostile, fearful environment. The situation we’re in, we had to make decisions. I don’t even want to defend lockdowns. I don’t want to attack them either. They were difficult decisions, you could see that the pie could see and one might, you know, you might have seen something different and we’ll never know who’s right. But I think I could see politicians doing their best. That’s an, a very important thing to cultivate during a crisis and this sort of mechanism does that.


Gene Tunny  39:24

Yeah look I’m not going to criticise them for a minute. I think they did. They took it seriously. I think they were trying to do their best. I agree there. I just think there’s a good case to be made that there was an overreaction, and it was because of the the amount of fear and they were making policy based on the fear at the time. Now, pre pandemic hadn’t didn’t we have all of these plans for what we would do during a pandemic and it didn’t involve half of the things that that we ended up doing? So when we were looking at it rationally and we had a different idea of what we were could do, but then because of the, maybe there aren’t enough checks and balances or constraints, there’s not enough, there wasn’t enough time to to actually properly consider these, these policies like what we had in Queensland here, we had the government, it had a Public Health Act, and it introduced in 2005. And you know, it was, it was thinking oh we may need something like this in case there is an emergency, a pandemic. But then when we get to the actual pandemic, they they’re starting to worry about it all. And they’re thinking, Oh, my God, we actually may not have all the powers we need to deal with this. And, and so they rushed through this bill to give Jeannette Young, the Chief Health Officer at the time, all of these extra powers so she can direct individual citizens to isolate and impose lockdowns, etc. And I mean, one of the problems we’ve got here in Queensland and this is in, this is why I’m attracted to your idea of looking at the the institutions, the whatever you want to call it, the policy architecture. I like that as a concept, because one of the problems we’ve got here in Queensland is we don’t have an an Upper House, which would provide some friction. Maybe it’s not enough, because other states have Upper Houses and that didn’t stop…

Nicholas Gruen 40:11

It wouldn’t do a lot.

Gene Tunny 40:13

Policies. Yeah. But yeah, and one thing I found is that their mechanisms weren’t working, there wasn’t enough scrutiny. I mean, I spoke at a parliamentary committee here in Queensland in early 2021. And I was trying to make the case that I thought that some of the restrictions are excessive, and we should look at this as in a cost benefit framework. But the only politician who actually was sympathetic was the One Nation MP, that both Labour and the Coalition or the LNP up here. Well, they were sort of, you know, not not wanting to question anything, there was sort of a consensus view. And I mean, I don’t mind if they come to that, legitimately, but I just thought there should have been more questioning in the in the parliament, but everyone just sort of said, Oh, we’re just going to, yeah, the normal mechanisms, or what we would hope would occur in a democracy, just didn’t work. There wasn’t enough contestability, or there wasn’t enough considered development of policy.


Nicholas Gruen  42:14

Well, I completely agree with you. But I think, I don’t think it’s particularly easy to bring that about now. Because if you look at the life of a politician, certainly a politician in a major party, the major parties are kind of like battleships, manoeuvring around getting a position on a thing, circulating their talking points, and then enforcing rigid party discipline. And when an important issue comes along, that people are very emotional about, the press is doing the same thing. The press is trying to maximise clicks, report excitement, if you get up in the House and you make you make a speech, which isn’t entirely in support of your own party and call for, you know, when you discuss the issues, well, you’re not going to get any benefits in your own party for that. The press will go through it and pick out bits of your what you’ve just said, to amp them up, and then they’ll stick a microphone in front of the party leaders face and say, Well, do you agree with what your backbencher said about what’s going on in Logan? This is just a disastrous environment in which to get high level discussion. And that’s again why, I’m arguing that actually people still like discussion, not on our airwaves, but in the right forums. You bring them together, and they speak to each other civilly. And they try to see each other’s point of view. And they tried to compromise and, and explore their way to a common view. Now, that’s almost totally absent from our politics. I think it’s terrific that the TEALS have done as well as they have in federal parliament because it has set the clock back a bit. I know we’re supposed to think of setting the clock back as a bad thing. But the way the TEALS do electoral politics is a bit more like the way, but I was saying this to a team the other day, one of the members of parliament that’s a bit more like backbenchers were 35 years ago, you know, they can talk about their own situation, their own concerns, they’re not completely preoccupied with the talking points of their party and so on. But if we want really proper deliberation, we, we better try and think about how we, I was gonna say route around parliament. Well, Parliament has the power but it’s not going to, the way we, the way our society runs at the moment, there’s nothing much you can do to make that discussion a search for the truth. It’s a search for advantage. And so we have to try to think, how do we build institutions that cover for that, that allow discussion to take place, allows these processes to take place without imagining that that’s going to happen in Parliament?


Gene Tunny  45:20

I was just going to ask, I mean, like you mentioned the TEALS and, yeah, I mean, they’ve really shaken things up, that’s for sure. Do we need more, you know, more representation from different groups? Could proportional representation help with that? Something like…


Nicholas Gruen  45:35

Yeah it might be able to help with that, I think it may have helped in something a bit like proportional representation in New Zealand. I think the, I mean the worst, the most toxic politics I know of, is in our two historical great and powerful friends, Great Britain and the United States. Both have first past the post voting, I was gonna say both have two major parties. Well, that is true in the United Kingdom, but they also have an outrider, the Liberal Democrats, but those have provided very toxic political environments. And the extent to which we’ve injected other elements, I think, has been good. And in fact, you may recall, you will recall what I call the randos in the Senate, people like Ricky Muir, who got into the Senate. And you could imagine it almost like a randomising process, you just throw in four or five random people who happen to get the benefit of tiny little preference margins. Well, I thought that was actually a very good illustration of it. Like it didn’t make much sense on paper. But the people who ended up in the Senate, listened to the debate and tried to come up with the right answer. Now, that would never do inside a political party, you’re not in Parliament to try and work out who’s winning the debate and where the answers are, you’re there to add one, one vote to your party. And that’s all decided by the party structures, completely disastrous.


Gene Tunny  47:08

Yeah I think the Senate does it’s structure in the way that yeah, because it’s got it’s not just, you know, it’s dominated by one party, that leads to arguably better outcomes and I think that Housing Australia Future Fund, I think that getting held up, I think that was a good idea, because that didn’t doesn’t seem to make much sense as a policy, I know the Greens are getting bashed over the head over that but I think their stance was perfectly acceptable.


Nicholas Gruen  47:34

I don’t think you’d be as keen on their proposal for rent control


Gene Tunny  47:37

No not keen on their proposal, but I think them actually teaming up in the so called Axis of Evil with the Coalition was very good. So the reasons they opposed it was sensible, I don’t agree with what they’re proposing instead. But I was just saying, that’s a good illustration of the Senate federally working.

Nicholas Gruen 47:54

Yes I agree

Gene Tunny 47:56

I like your, how the way you’re thinking about this, we’ve got to get the right frameworks in place, so when we get into the, the crisis, we’re not just, yeah, we’ve got a proper way to deal with it. What I was wondering is whether we decide before a crisis. So outside of a pandemic, these are the thresholds if we exceed this threshold of this virus looks like it’s of this seriousness, we’re willing to accept these restrictions, like we decide all of that prior to the pandemic, so when we get into it, we’re not panicking. And we’re not imposing restrictions that arguably aren’t justifiable. So I’m wondering if we should work all of that out, and then sort of have the debate there and you could have your citizens jury, you could have a more considered process rather than it just being decided all in a panic.


Nicholas Gruen  48:48

You know, there’s, there’s a case for trying to show what foresight you can but remember, all of our plans were predicated, I mean, this was an extraordinary thing, that all of our plans were predicated on the idea that this pandemic would be a flu, and it wasn’t a flu. And yet, all of our our entire official medical establishment, that is the people like Brendan Murphy, Paul Kelly, these are the official, Commonwealth medical officers and state medical officers. They didn’t bat an eyelid. They didn’t say, right, we need to rethink this. That happened actually, the first, because I believe the first medical establishment, and by medical establishment, I don’t mean doctors, I mean general, in general, I mean the offices of the government that are there to provide the government with medical advice. The first country that did this was the New Zealand medical establishment and they did a pretty good job, for after a couple of months they said hang on, this is not a flu, we need to rethink this and that’s what they did. That we, we were incredibly inflexible, not adaptive, not, and a lot of these guys were thinking of their role as making rules for the community rather than helping the community think through the problems. So I would put more effort into that. But we’re still drifting into this question of how do you manage a crisis. And what I’m saying is that crises will be well or badly managed, and that it’s an important thing to think about. But every time I suppose you are doing something, which I’m kind of arguing we should do, which is that every time this sort of thing happens, we should be asking ourselves questions on two levels. What do we do now? And what sorts of institutions should we have to do this thing well? And there we probably should wrap up because we’ve gone on for a fair while but one of the things that just gobsmacks me is in the United States, 51 people, all the governors and the President have a pardon power. Now, maybe some of the States have done to the pardon power, what I wanted to do to parliamentary privilege and to contempt of Parliament. But by and large, the President simply decides, as Boris Johnson decided regarding various knighthoods and so on, that it’s simply an exercise of executive power to give someone a pardon. And so much so that there is serious discussion about whether Donald Trump can pardon himself in jail, because there’s certainly a precedent for him campaigning in jail that was done in World War One when Mr. Dobbs was in jail and picked up something like 3% of the vote from jail, he was in jail for breach of the Espionage Act, the same act that Julian Assange is arraigned under or being pursued under. Now. I don’t know. I am unaware of a single Democratic politician who says By the way, we’ve got to get rid of the presidential pardon power, or if you don’t want to get rid of it, we have to subject it to proper due process. We are no longer in the 18th century. But nobody does this. And I find that completely extraordinary. So there you are. I won’t say another word about it in protest.


Gene Tunny  52:33

Okay, okay. Well, Nicholas, thanks again, for a fantastic Policy Provocation. That one was particularly provoking. So, yes, gave me a lot to think about and yeah reflecting on that period we’ve, we’ve been through and yes, lots to think about for policy. So thanks again. Really enjoyed that one.

Nicholas Gruen  52:52

Thanks Gene.

Gene Tunny  52:55

Righto, thanks for listening to this episode of Economics Explored. If you have any questions, comments or suggestions, please get in touch. I’d love to hear from you. You can send me an email via contact@economicsexplored.com, or a voicemail via SpeakPipe. You can find the link in the show notes. If you’ve enjoyed the show, I’d be grateful if you could tell anyone you think would be interested about it. Word of mouth is one of the main ways that people learn about the show. Finally, if your podcasting app lets you then please write a review and leave a rating. Thanks for listening. I hope you can join me again next week.


53:44

Thank you for listening. We hope you enjoyed the episode. For more content like this or to begin your own podcasting journey, head on over to obsidian-productions.com

Credits

Thanks to Obsidian Productions for mixing the episode and to the show’s sponsor, Gene’s consultancy business www.adepteconomics.com.au. Full transcripts are available a few days after the episode is first published at www.economicsexplored.com. Economics Explored is available via Apple PodcastsGoogle Podcast, and other podcasting platforms.

Categories
Podcast episode

A new Monetary Policy tool to end Inflation and avoid Recession w/ Prof. Larry Marsh, Notre Dame – EP184

In this episode of the Economics Explored podcast, host Gene Tunny interviews Professor Larry Marsh about his proposal for a new monetary policy tool that uses a central bank digital currency (CBDC) to end inflation without causing a recession. They also discuss the disconnect between the financial sector and the real economy. Larry Marsh is Professor Emeritus in the Department of Economics at the University of Notre Dame and author of the book “Optimal Money Flow.” 

Please get in touch with any questions, comments and suggestions by emailing us at contact@economicsexplored.com or sending a voice message via https://www.speakpipe.com/economicsexplored

You can listen to the episode via the embedded player below or via podcasting apps including Google PodcastsApple PodcastsSpotify, and Stitcher.

What’s covered in EP184

  • What is optimal money flow according to Prof. Marsh? [1:28]
  • What is the role of government in controlling the economy? [6:24]
  • A helicopter drop of money [13:58]
  • What is the idea of a Federal Reserve/central bank digital currency (CBDC)? [18:56]
  • Fractional Reserve Banking [23:08
  • Narrow banking as a solution to the banking sector problems [24:55]
  • A good example of an all-employee owned company: Burns & McDonnell, Kansas City, MO [31:31]
  • What Larry describes as a winner-takes-all economy [34:37
  • The invisible hand of the market [37:43]
  • Gene’s wrap up: How the current monetary policy tightening is causing hardship in many economies, it may well be worth experimenting with a new monetary policy tool [43:47]

Links relevant to the conversation

Larry Marsh’s Optimal Money Flow website:

https://optimal-money-flow.website/

Where you can purchase Larry’s Optimal Money Flow book:

https://www.avila.edu/optimal-money-flow/

AEA conference session in which Larry presented his idea for the new monetary policy tool using a CBDC (presentation available for download):

https://www.aeaweb.org/conference/2023/program/1335

Australian ABC News article referring to Nicholas Gruen’s savings policy proposal mentioned by Gene in the episode:

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-02-12/raising-interest-rates-reserve-and-bank-and-inflation-management/101952926

Nicholas’s 1999 paper outlining the policy proposal:

https://lateraleconomics.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/AvoidingBoomandBust.pdf

Links to videos on China a listener sent me in response to EP182 with Dr Jonathan D T Ward: 

Prepare for Armageddon: China’s warning to the world | 60 Minutes Australia

Two Davids & Goliath | David Matas & David Kilgour | TEDxMünchen

America Just KILLED China’s Tech Industry 

Transcript:
A new Monetary Policy tool to end Inflation and avoid Recession w/ Prof. Larry Marsh, Notre Dame – EP184

N.B. This is a lightly edited version of a transcript originally created using the AI application otter.ai. It may not be 100 percent accurate, but should be pretty close. If you’d like to quote from it, please check the quoted segment in the recording.

Gene Tunny  00:06

Welcome to the Economics Explored podcast, a frank and fearless exploration of important economic issues. I’m your host Gene Tunny. I’m a professional economist and former Australian Treasury official. The aim of this show is to help you better understand the big economic issues affecting all our lives. We do this by considering the theory evidence and by hearing a wide range of views. I’m delighted that you can join me for this episode, please check out the show notes for relevant information. Now on to the show. Hello, thanks for tuning in to the show. In this episode, I chat with Professor Larry Nash about his idea for a new monetary policy tool which uses a central bank digital currency, a cbdc. Larry argues that this new tool could end inflation without causing a recession. Larry is professor emeritus in the Department of Economics at the University of Notre Dame. In the episode, Larry and I also discussed the disconnect he sees between what’s been happening in the financial sector and in what’s often labelled as the real economy or Main Street. Okay, let’s get into the episode. I hope you enjoy my conversation with Professor Larry Marsh. Professor Larry Marsh, welcome to the programme.

Larry Marsh  01:27

Well, thank you, Gene, this is a great honour to be on your programme.

Gene Tunny  01:31

Excellent. Larry, I’m keen to chat with you about your book optimal money flow. And also a proposal that you presented at the American Economic Association meeting earlier this year. Now this is all very topical, given what’s been happening in the US and in Europe, with banks, we’ve got this age old problem of the stability of the banking system that we really haven’t resolved after many centuries. So I think, I think your book and your work looking at the role of money, the role of credit in the economy, I think that’s, I think that’s highly relevant. So to begin with, Larry, could I ask you about your book, optimal money flow? What do you mean by optimal money flow? And what’s your argument in that book, please?

Larry Marsh  02:28

Well, it’s primarily about the role of government in our economy, and that there’s, in order to have a efficiently running free market economy, government plays a critical role in certain realms where they need to be able to match the marginal cost with marginal benefits. And so you got some that are fairly obvious negative externalities, water pollution, air pollution, positive externalities, where you can talk about a vaccine for a highly contagious disease. So if it was not contagious, and it would be up to the individual to pay for the whole thing. But if it’s a contagious disease, then there’s a common property resource aspect to it. And so you have also you have public goods, and then you have things like highways and so forth. But there’s there’s a lot of areas that people have neglected and not fully recognised. Then I do get into the book into the role of the Federal Reserve, and propose a new policy tool to the bigger the fundamental problem is the the financial markets have become more and more separated from the real economy. No, my father was a Wall Street investment banker. So I learned as a little boy, how the markets worked, and how to invest the money and all of that. But the thing is that the real economy, the GDP has been growing on average, over the decades, about 3% In recent decades, whereas the stock market has been growing by 10%. There’s over three times as much. Well, how can it be that these financial markets are growing so much faster than the real economy? And part of it is the back in 1996? I believe it was that our Federal Reserve Chairman, Alan Greenspan, was talking about irrational exuberance. He said, All these people are pouring money into these financial markets and but then instead of doing something about it, he contributed to this and then other fed chairs and fed boards have contributed to pumping money into the financial markets, whatever they thought the economy was a little bit on the weak side. So part of the problem is that so much money has been diverted, from the real economy, from employees and so forth, that they can no longer afford to buy back the value of the goods and service that they’re producing. And so they go up to their eyeballs in debt they get the private debt is just mushrooms tremendously. So there was this large buildup of private debt as more and more money went into the stockpile. And then I kind of discovered this personally, when I invested in a company and kind of forgot about it, and later discovered that I got a 7,000% return on my investment. I thought, wow, I thought why deserve a decent return, but not 7,000%. You know, I thought free free markets and free enterprise is all about incentives and giving people incentives. So hard work pays off, but not for the person doing the hard work hard work, hard work pays off for the shareholder. And so you really want to see people like Steve Jobs at Apple Computer, you know, when he created Apple Computer to get rewarded strongly, all the hard working employees, the company that I had invested in was Adobe. And they were very creative, and imaginative people, but, but I was getting all this money. And what did I do all 84% of the stock market is owned by the 10% richest people. And when you get a certain amount of money, it gets to the point where you’re not quite sure what to do with it, you can only wear one pair of shoes at a time or buy one car at a time, you may have a couple of summer cottages and you know, maybe you have three or four cars. But after a while it gets to be a burden to deal with all these things. And so you basically just find that you have to invest the money somewhere. I mean, you couldn’t just take it home and stuff in your mattress. So it makes sense to reward entrepreneurs and creative people. But because the stock market has been ballooned by so much money going into it, and then Chris Leonard wrote the book, The Lords of easy money about how the Federal Reserve was pumping money. And then Karen Petroff, has written the book the engine of inequality, about how the Fed is pumped so much money into the give the money to the wealthy people through the financial markets, and then trickle down with the idea that it would trickle down to the real economy. And unfortunately, doesn’t trickle down all that well. And it just builds up and the markets just growing up, up and up without the money. And it’s gotten so bad that non financial firms have discovered that they can actually make more money investing in the stock markets and investing in their own business. So instead of creating new products, or enhancing the products already have or improving their productivity, they say, Hey, we can take this money and put it into the stock market and get a better return than just investing in your own business. And this is really hurt productivity in America and in other developed countries as well. And money flows from around the world into New York financial markets. And sometimes it’s detracts from real investment in the real economy. And so, in retrospect, I think maybe I should have bought my book distorted money flow, or money flow. You know, I was trying to say where we should be going. But I probably should have spent more time laying out where we are, and what what needs to be done than just laying out an optimal world as to what the role of government should be in that in that situation.

Gene Tunny  08:06

Okay. So Larry, in your view, what does need to be done? Well,

Larry Marsh  08:11

as far as the Federal Reserve is concerned, I think it’s very important to recognise that there’s two tools that one could use in controlling the economy. The tool that the Federal Reserve uses exclusively is the cost of borrowing tool. But there’s also a return on savings tool, which the Federal Reserve has ignored. Well, of course, part of the reason it’s ignored it because it hasn’t been authorised by Congress to make use. So I can’t really blame Jay Powell and the others in the Federal Reserve Board for not using a tool that they have been authorised to use. But I talked about this in the book, and why they need to have accounts for everyone with a social security number in the United States would get an account with the federal government. And these could be interpreted as part of a central bank, digital currency, to be a true central bank digital currency, you would have to allow anybody in the world, say somebody in India or Australia, who had US dollars, to set up an account with the US Federal Reserve Bank. And so if anybody anywhere in the world could could set up an account, and then transfer money in and out of their account that account when in fact be a digital currency. That’s the kind of the idea behind digital currencies. Now you the alternatives is have a coin based or per token type base, like Bitcoin, but then you would be supporting money laundering and a lot of legal activities. So one of the ideas I had to protect people’s privacy was to have two separate files. So transactions file, where you keep track of all the transactions that take place, and then a personal identification file. There may be a few transactions that need to go on the personal identification file because it’s becomes too obvious who the person is. But basically, you want to have a situation where government agency, government authorities can look through the transaction file all they want. If they find something that looks suspicious, that looks like criminal behaviour, then they go to a judge and get the authorization to access the Personal Identification file. So this would hopefully satisfy some conservatives that were concerned about the government having too much oversight or control over their accounts and what they were doing and so called spying on them. I personally knew that I’m happy to have the government spy on me as long as I can spy on the government, but you know, happy to have the police spy on me as I can, I can spy on the police. So I don’t have a problem with with the privacy issue, but some people do. And so I did propose that as part of this idea. The other idea is to use these accounts, so that you could intervene directly into the real economy, and not have to go through the financial economy. And so if you were able to offer say, if they have a six or 7% inflation, if you’re able to offer 10%, return the 10% savings interest rate, then this, this would target the marginal saver where you don’t know it’s only on the first say $10,000. Or you can even limit it to 5000, you want to target the marginal saver not the wealthy who are just moving their money around, not the poorest of the poor that can afford to save anything. But the marginal saver who’s probably making about 50,000 US dollars a year and could be saving more. Because the whole problem with inflation is you’ve got too much money chasing too few goods, the demand is too strong and the supply is too weak. The problem with the way the Federal Reserve does it now is when they raise the cost of borrowing. Yeah, they do raise the cost of items that require getting a loan, for example, automobiles or housing. But it doesn’t affect the items that don’t require getting a loan. So you’re really just shifting the inflation from the items that require loan to items that don’t require a loan. But where the Fed is able to be effective is through the supply side. Because there’s a lot of businesses that have to borrow. Some are retail businesses that operate in the red most of the year until they get to the holiday season, where they cover their costs and make a profit is farms that may operate some marginal fields where they have to put a lot of money in in the spring, and they don’t get any money until harvest time. So there’s all sorts of businesses that have to pay for their inputs before they ultimately work to the point where they have outputs to sell and get the money. So if you raise the cost of borrowing, this, this puts the brakes on to some degree, it means that the these businesses cut back hours layoff workers and close outlets. And this ultimately suppresses demand because the workers aren’t getting the money, and you can’t spend money you don’t have. Yeah, so ultimately, that’s what slams on the brakes, and causes us to suppress the inflation, but it does so at a great risk of having a recession. Whereas if you offered the 10% on savings, and targeted the marginal saver, and of course, prices are set on the margin, not on the average. So it’s actually the marginal saver that sets the prices and determines the inflation or not. And in times of recession, you can inject money directly into these accounts, the central bank digital currency accounts for everyone with a social security number within the United States. Now, you can offer the 10% savings on the first say $10,000, but only for those that had a social security number. So if you’re in Australia, you wouldn’t get the 10% return on the money in the accounts because you didn’t have the social security number, your social media, because the US would be targeting its own country, you know, the US in terms of inflation or recession? And then presumably, Australia would have its own central bank digital currency could do something similar. In that respect. Yeah,

Gene Tunny  13:58

that it makes the so called helicopter drop of money a bit easier what it is, that’s essentially what it is you’re injecting an additional 10% into all of these accounts in the States.

Larry Marsh  14:10

Yeah, there’ll be different ways of doing this. So if you’re trying to fight inflation, you offer 10%. But if you’re trying to stimulate the economy, you can inject money directly, and just put it in the people’s accounts say, okay, and which, which they’ve done to George W. Bush, they did, they did inject money, you know, gave people the money. So there’s certainly a more direct way of doing it, then doing it through the financial markets during trying to trying to control the real economy through the financial markets, which has not been working very well.

Gene Tunny  14:38

Well, and it certainly, I mean, people are asking a lot of questions about I’ve noticed that so that, I don’t know if you saw the interview that Jon Stewart had with Larry Summers, and I mean, he absolutely ripped apart Larry Summers it was it was quite extraordinary. And it just shows the popular. Just how the Federal Reserve’s going about it. monetary policy, it’s difficult for it to explain and it’s difficult for the, for it to convey to the public why it needs to do this. And you may have seen the other exchange that was at some of the senators with Jay Powell, and he was trying, they were trying to get him to say that he was, you know, he basically wanted unemployment to go up to slow inflation. So it’s a very, it’s very difficult for the central banks to explain what they’re doing. And perhaps Yeah, this could be another tool for them. But Larry could ask about the feasibility of this, what do we know about the responsiveness of savings to interest rate changes to the returns on saving? Well, that’s

Larry Marsh  15:39

a good question. And this, I would agree that I am not very precise on this. And so we would have to do some experimenting to find out what level of interest rate may work. Now we know that when things get too extreme, people will respond. So we know for example, when inflation starts getting faster and faster, people will start spending money faster and faster. And then sometimes they’ll get their paycheck, and they need to spend it within hours in Zimbabwe or, or Venezuela, where you get this horrendous inflation. So we know that people do ultimately respond to financial incentives. It’s just a question of how extreme you have to go. And so we would experiment I’ve said 10%, right off the top of my head without any empirical evidence to support it. So I would be the first one to admit or to agree that there needs to be a great deal of econometric research to determine what the appropriate levels would be, and how effective they would be.

Gene Tunny  16:37

Yeah, yeah, I had to look at what the literature says, doesn’t mean people. consumption spending will be influenced by in savings will be influenced by the way, those interest rates to an extent, but then they’re influenced heavily by your, your level of income. So I might have a look, I might do some digging myself. It’s an interesting proposal, for sure. Can I ask you about the Postal Service? Yes. Can you tell us that story, please.

Larry Marsh  17:09

So I talked about using a central bank digital currency to influence the problem and inflation or the problem where the recession, but one could also do it through the postal bank accounts, which we used to have in the United States under the postal banking act of 1910. So for over 50 years, when I was young, over 50 years, people could go to their local any post office and cast a check or set up a savings account. And Canada also did this. And we continued until 1966, when they terminated this postal savings accounts. And Canada went for a couple more years, and they terminated theirs in 1968. But Canada now in 2022, has reinstituted the postal banking, they they’re focused somewhat on concern for the disadvantaged to get into an automobile accident or a medical emergency or the rent goes up and they go to pawn shops or payday loans, and they get exploited where they they get deep into debt and then can’t get out of debt. So there’s been some political concern for these people in the in the United States with the end in Canada, as to how you could make loans available at a reasonable interest rate small loans, and Canada has now started their their postal banking back and are making these loans available to people who are in a tight situation and don’t have much income and need need some help with the over the short term without having an exorbitant interest rates.

Gene Tunny  18:56

Rod. Okay. So with your your proposal, you’re proposing that people could have accounts, essentially with the Federal Reserve, so you have this CB DC, does that do away with the need to have a bank account or to deposit money into? I don’t know what’s what the I mean, what are the banks had put money in in the states would have been Chase Manhattan? It was at an investment bank. I’m just thinking in Australia,

Larry Marsh  19:27

Bank of America, Bank of America an example. Okay, yeah. So this is a very interesting gene, because there’s been a lot of people have been raising questions about this, and saying, well, maybe there’s a better way to do it. And I would agree that it’d be interesting to have intermediaries to access your fat account so that the referring to it as the Fed account in the central bank, digital currency, United States is the Fed account. And so you could go through your regular bank and they would be paid a fee for allowing you access to your central bank digital currency. So it might be that instead of by going directly to the Fed, you would be operating through PayPal Venmo, you know, digital wallets. And part of the idea behind that is the feeling that the private sector has a tendency more creative than to come up with other financial tools and things that are valuable to consumers. And so rather than trying to exclude the private sector, from the central bank, digital currency, we might even pay them to help carry out some of the work and, and the the access by individuals and, and how to access their account and how to use their financial situation more efficiently in this context.

Gene Tunny  20:45

Yeah, yeah, there may be some benefits in that rather than having the central bank having to manage all of that. So yeah, I can see the logic in that. Larry can ask you about the banking system. So one of the things I’ve talked about in a previous episode, is this idea of narrow banking, which has been one of the proposals to address this fundamental problem that we’ve got with banks that rely on deposits. There’s this mismatch in the the maturities of their assets and liabilities. Have you done any thinking on this? What was called the Chicago Plan, this narrow banking concept? And is that a way that some of these problems could be solved? Could it fit into your framework? Could you tell us about that, please?

Larry Marsh  21:36

Yeah, people don’t realise that. Over 90% of the money in the United States is actually not created by by the Federal Reserve is created by banking system, that that people sometimes have the mistaken belief, and it’ll be called the loanable funds theory that you put money in the bank and the bank loans that money out? Well, that’s not what’s happening. Then other people think, okay, I put $1,000 in the bank, and the bank leaves $100 And they loan out $900? Well, no, that’s not the way it works. either. You put $1,000 in the bank, let’s say you put a 10 $100 bills, okay, so that’s, that’s real money, or whatever you want to call it. And then the bank would that $1,000 can then create $9,000 out of thin air. That because then that, that 1000 is 10%, which is the wonder the quote, so called fractional reserve banking, but it really the the term fractional reserve banking is a little bit misleading. It should be called Creative creation, banking, or something like that. But so part of the problem is that you are, as you point out, if you’re allowing people or banks to create all this money out of thin air, just on the basis of deposits, especially checking deposits or deposits, that can be withdrawn almost immediately, then that makes for a very shaky situation. And not only does it make it for a shaky situation for individual bank that might get into trouble as we’ve seen. But it also creates a situation where when, when the economy is doing well, the economy starts expanding and really looking great, then these banks have a tendency to make lots and lots of loans, because they have all these excess reserves, so they can they exacerbate the situation so that the irrational exuberance carries over into the loan market. And it’s become even worse now that they can securitize these loans. So it used to be that the local banker was very careful in making loans that be pretty certain things would be, and they would know about local conditions, much better than any one out any other banks or outside the local area. And so but nowadays, they can securitize the loans, they can make a loan. And it’s a little bit shaky. Yeah, what the heck, I’ll just sell it off to the markets. And so this securitization has made it even more shaky. And then when the economy starts to slow, or when they think, for example, that the Federal Reserve is trying to slow the economy and might push us into a recession, then they say, Oh, we better cut back on our loans. So they cut back. And that makes things even worse, and especially during an inflation, the banks don’t want your money, when they think the economy is going to be slowing. Because they don’t, they’re not going to use it. And they just have to pay you some interest rate. They’d like to set the savings rate at zero at that point that would freak everyone out. So they’re not going to do that. But they really don’t have use for your money. And but you’re putting money in the bank that just causes them a liability of having to pay you on your account for money they don’t need and don’t want. So that’s why it’s necessary for the government to step in and offer say 10% on savings in order to slow inflation those times because the banks aren’t going to do it.

Gene Tunny  24:55

Okay, and I mean with this. So with narrow banking do Do you think there’s merit in that concept?

Larry Marsh  25:02

Yeah, I think there’s some merit in that, because you could limit it to a savings account. So in other words, don’t allow checking to serve as the basis, but you could use any discounts or you could use certificates of deposit, they’re even more solid. Because you can’t withdraw that is readily. So yeah, you could do narrow banking, where you focused on savings accounts and certificates of deposit and not on checking accounts. So that would certainly reduce the irrational exuberance, if you say, you know, the, the generating getting too far out on the limb for the individual banks and, and exacerbating the problems of the economy, for the the banking system as a whole contributing to problems and for the economy. And so, you know, there are definitely both individual bank problems, and the economy wide problems that come about through this fractious so called fractional reserve banking, which I which, as I said, really should be called very credit creation banking. Yeah. And then narrow banking would help reduce these problems, both for the individual banks and also economy wide. So now banking would certainly be better than what we’re doing now.

Gene Tunny  26:17

Okay, we’ll take a short break here for a word from our sponsor.

Female speaker  26:23

If you need to crunch the numbers, then get in touch with Adept Economics. We offer you Frank and fearless economic analysis and advice, we can help you with funding submissions, cost benefit analysis, studies, and economic modelling of all sorts. Our head office is in Brisbane, Australia, but we work all over the world, you can get in touch via our website, http://www.adepteconomics.com.au. We’d love to hear from you.

Gene Tunny  26:52

Now back to the show. I wanted to ask you, how was your your presentation at the AAA meeting receive Laurie was it was a positive reception?

Larry Marsh  27:08

Well, I think so now, my discussing. You know, there’s an old joke, I don’t know if you know this, the difference between a British discussion and an American discussing the British discuss it, we will say a few nice things about your work and then proceed to tear it to shreds. The American discussion will summarise your work, and then proceed to spend the rest of the time talking about their own research. But but so my discussion did point out, which I think is perfectly legitimate to do so that if you want something to serve as as purely a medium of exchange, you shouldn’t introduce the interest rate, either positive or negative interest rate, you should just make $1 be $1. And you don’t gain anything, you don’t lose anything. It’s just like the dollar bill in your pocket. A US dollar bill in your pocket. So he felt that to be a medium of exchange, you wouldn’t. And I can say well, okay, but then we could do that through the post office as I’ve, as an alternative, instead of saying, well, your central bank, digital currency will earn you 10% interest, I can say, okay, an account with the post office loan you 10% interest, so we can do it in a separate way. So I did run into the idea that maybe there’s different objectives. And you may want to have a central bank digital currency that doesn’t get you involved in the offering the return on savings and do that through the post office instead. Now that’s a possibility.

Gene Tunny  28:41

Rod. Okay. I’ll have to check whether the discussing prepared any remarks or or a PowerPoint, just to see what they are. They’re driving it there. Right. Okay. Larry, you mentioned about the just this disconnect, or this apparent disconnect between what’s been happening in the real economy. So what’s been happening with GDP, and then what’s been happening in the stock market, and then you talked about the disproportionate returns. Do you have any thoughts on what needs to be done there? Do you have any proposals there? I mean, yes. You mentioned the Federal Reserve’s probably

Larry Marsh  29:20

there’s interesting problem in that. Right now. The way our corporate boards work, is the CEOs tend to get other CEOs on their board. So it’s basically the CEO and his golf buddies or their corporate board. And so I’m on your board and you’re on my board and I maximise your compensation, you maximise my compensation, and we’re all concerned with the short term share price. But the problem is, you want an innovative economy, you want a board that’s really knows what’s going on in the company, and the CEO basically gives the board all these reports about what a great job the CEO is doing, you know. And really, you want representation from product development, you want representation. From sales, you want representation from marketing, you want representation from distribution you want to get. So Germany has come up with an approach where they require a certain proportion of the corporate board be elected directly from the rank and file employees. And this gives representation of what’s actually going on in the company. And not some hypothetical theoretical stuff that the CEO comes up with to show the corporate boy, what a great job they’re doing. And so this problem is that the maximising of shareholder value has diverted the attention to the short term share price. And an example of this would be Apple Computer, Apple Inc, as it’s now known for Steve Jobs is a very creative, innovative guy who came up with all these great ideas and then this, and then John Sculley came along and said, You know what, Steve, you need a professional manager, you need someone that knows how to maximise the margin and get the profits up, and let’s get our share price up. And so John Sculley came along and kind of pushed Steve Jobs aside, and took over. And then after a while, they became to realise that Apple was losing his competitive advantage against his Microsoft and other companies. And they said, no, no, no, we need to get Steve Jobs back in here. Because you’ve gotten off on the wrong track, you’re no longer focused on the customer, you’re no longer focused on innovation, creativity. And so we need a system. And I found out here in Kansas City, there’s a company called Burns and McDonnell, and a former CEO of burns. McDonald just wrote a book called create amazing. And what it is burns in McDonald’s started as a small construction company in Kansas City, then it grew to a nationwide us wide construction or an engineering company. And now it’s a worldwide engineering company. Well, it turns out that Burns and McDonnell is all employee owns, when you retire, you have to sell your shares and get the money, but only the employees own the company. So you This is recognising the agency of employees, employees are not just another factor and put like steel or glass or plastic, these these people have agency. And when they work together, and they say, Okay, we benefit when the company benefits. So it’s not just that individuals are motivated, because they’re gonna benefit as an individual, but because their teammates need to do their job. So it’s like being on a football team or you know, on any sort of athletic team, that it’s not just you’re doing your job, you got to be on the case of your compatriots, your colleagues to do their job. And so this is really we’re talking about free enterprise, you talked about incentives, the proper incentive structure, and getting employees involved in the corporate operation, and getting them rewarded for their involvement in the proper operation. Instead of giving that 7,000% return to you know, that Adobe, I invested in Adobe and got that 7,000% return while I was a deadbeat, I’d forgotten that invest in the company. I was like getting this money, please creative entrepreneurs, these these employees, these hard working people that create this new software, they should get the money, not me, I should get some return on my investment, but not 7,000%. That was just too much.

Gene Tunny  33:22

Well, yes, I mean, well, Dan Mitchell, I don’t know if you know, Dan, at all, but Dan is former Cato Institute, on his on his website, he often links to, I think you can make voluntary donations to the US Treasury. But now he puts that as a bit of a joke. I don’t think anyone would like to do that. But what I would like to ask you about Larry is if there are these outsized returns, or returns that people really, you know, they may not have needed those returns to have actually inspired them or induce them to invest or to save or invest? Do you see any role for tax policy? Do you see any tax policy changes? Would they be desirable in the US?

Larry Marsh  34:05

Well, that’s a good question. I was actually inspired and reading my book by a book by George Cooper was recently called Money, bloody revolution. And later, he really issued it as sort of a second round revised edition called fixing economics. And he points out and I remember the chair of the economics department, Sherwin Rosen back in 1981, I believe was wrote an article in American Economic Review called superstars. And he’s basically pointed out and George Cooper picked up on this idea that this there tends to be a winner take all approach in our economy and you know, athletics, it’s pretty obvious entertainment is pretty obvious, but it’s also obvious. I’m trying to think about an Amazon I think the average pay was something like 33 $1,000 That year, and the new CEO, I’m trying to remember his name is now getting $214 million a year. I mean, you know, the question is, you know, is this is this the free enterprise system? But no, and the the interesting book by Steven Clifford called the CEO pay machine. Steven Clifford was on these boards. And he came to realise that this was not free market that competing to get the most capable CEO. This was a rigged system, where the CEOs maximise each other’s compensation. And so, you know, when we talk about free enterprise and incentives, we need to be realistic about what we’re talking about. And not imagine a hypothetical world, a theoretical world where there’s full information and one of the things I talked about in my book is that economics is based on rational independent decision makers. When we’re talking about rational expectations and all this rational list and rational down that on average, people should be rational. And then Dan Ariely wrote the book, predictably irrational, but not only are people irrational, but they’re predictably irrational, why is taken out now, of course, the field of behavioural economics and economics has come about to explore some of these possibilities that people are irrational and predictably irrational. But why it took economists so long to figure this out. But the people in marketing have understood this and exploited this for hundreds of years. To kind of uncivil very slow and facing the reality that we don’t have this perfect information, perfect efficiency in the markets don’t solve all of our problems, we need to be realistic about what the markets can do and what they can’t do. And they work very well, for goods and services up to a point, although in reality, Adam Smith, really there was really two invisible hands, people, people talk about the first invisible hands were businesses compete with one another, to produce better quality products at lower prices. But Adam Smith implicitly had a second invisible hand, and in his second invisible hand, is that businesses conspire with one another against the public to raise prices. So you have the second invisible hand of market power, you have the first play of a competition, but then the second invisible hand of market power, and these invisible hands are in constant struggle with each other. And it’s government it has to be has to play a role in making sure that the invisible hand of competition wins out, and that the head of market power doesn’t corrupt and undermine the system.

Gene Tunny  37:43

Raw and okay, I’ll have to look back. I know that there are I know that famous passage in Adam Smith about how seldom do men have the same trade gather together? And the the conversation does not eventually get on to some conspiracy to fix prices or something like that. Exactly. That’s exactly, yeah. But did he was he? Was he suggesting that was another invisible hand? Was he did he do that explicitly? I’ll ask well, I

Larry Marsh  38:09

don’t think he did that explicitly. No, no. So I’m basically proposing that, you know, but I think others may have proposed that as well. So say there’s really two invisible hands.

Gene Tunny  38:17

Gotcha, gotcha. Because he did actually talk about the invisible hand of the market or the price mechanism. And then your suggested or and others have suggested that there could be this other invisible hand. That’s that’s an interesting concept. But yet he certainly he was, he was concerned about market power. I like that example of what was it Burns and McDonnell. City. So to look at that, it is challenging to find, I mean, I know there are examples of these of a worker cooperatives or cooperatives more generally, in the world, and either asset, some successful examples, but they’re, they’re often special circumstances, or it can be something that’s hard to get, right. But that’s it sounds like they’re doing something right. Or they’ve got a very good culture, they’re in their business that enables them to be successful, and then how to look on their website looks like they’re doing all sorts of incredible things in aerospace and in, in clean energy, etc. So I’ll put a link in the show notes to that operation. Okay. Couple more things. Larry, there was a proposal in Australia here from an economist, Dr. Nicholas grew and which, when you were talking about your, your idea of these accounts with the Fed, and then you could use, you could use this borrowing rate to encourage saving and that can pull you know, that means that there’s less money chasing those few goods and that can pull back on inflation. There was an idea from an economist to Dr. Nicholas grew and he was suggesting that in Australia, we could use the there’s a compulsory superannuation system so what you could do is If there is a inflationary time, you could require more contributions into that. So that’s another. That’s another concept. I don’t know whether you’ve seen that idea at all whether you have any reactions to that. I know I

Larry Marsh  40:14

need to understand that a little better. Okay, I’ll might I

Gene Tunny  40:17

might send on a link to the to that that idea, because probably should have given you a heads up on that.

Larry Marsh  40:25

Very interesting. I’d like to look at that. Yes, absolutely.

Gene Tunny  40:28

Yeah. So because there’s a bit of discussion about this in Australia at the moment, too, because these interest rate increases are starting to affect households. And I think unlike in the US, the large majority of you know, people who borrowed for Home Loans here in Australia, mortgage holders, they’re, they’re on variable rates. So they’re really affected when those interest rates change when they increase and so there are people who are now paying $1,000 or more a month, on their, on their home loans. And that’s really starting to affect budgets. Okay, Larry, before we wrap up any final thoughts on optimal money flow, or how we can make things better?

Larry Marsh  41:16

Well, let me first just say that if one purchases Apple mindset, or directly to Apple University Press, then all $24.95 goes to student scholarships, I pay for the production of the book and the mailing of the book. On the other hand, if you’d prefer to listen to Apple money flow for free, Bupa digital.com, is used by many public libraries. And it’s actually better in my average humble opinion than Libby or some of the other ones where they where the public library just gets a couple of copies of an e book or, or an audio book, where and then then you have to go through a hold period to wait until one becomes available. But in hoopla digital, it’s a rental system. And if 20 People suddenly want this book, big, all 20 Again, so there’s no hold period. So it’s free to listen to through your public library, or your Public Library’s paying for it, and you’re paying for it in your taxes, which is important. And that’s something I also wanted to point out was the public libraries. And public education in general is so important, because our most valuable resources are people. And too often, conservatives overlook the important role that government plays in making sure that we get or as close to equal opportunity as we can. Because they say the most important decision you make in your life is your choice of parents, you want to choose rich, well executed parents, well, you haven’t been able to do that, then the public library and our public education system is designed to give you a fighting chance. So I think that we need to recognise how important it is to make sure that all children and I like to say I think the solution to crime in the inner cities is college, get these kids out of that crime laden area and get them into college, we have a number of colleges now, because of the low birth rates and the fewer people coming to college, who are really trying to help get scholarships, funding for disadvantaged students, and get them out of those prime laden inner cities and get them into nursing, accounting, chemical engineering, anything other than shooting it out in the inner city. So, you know, I like to say the solution to crime is college.

Gene Tunny  43:41

Yeah, yeah. Yeah, absolutely. I think education is incredibly important. Okay. Yeah. First, Larry Marsh, thanks so much for your time, I really enjoyed talking about optimal money flow and learning about your proposals. So I thought that was great. And yeah, really found some of those examples. Valuable, though, particularly burns. And McDonnell, I’ll look into that a bit, a bit more. And you gave some good references there, this idea of the co pay machine, that’s something that I find I’m interested in looking at a bit more, because there’s definitely the potential for co pay to get out of proportion to what is optimal, given there is that principal agent problem in companies? So the fact that the people who run the company are acting as agents of the principals who are the shareholders and so yeah, that’s that’s certainly a problem. Yeah, very good.

Larry Marsh  44:52

If I could mention another book by Lynn stout called the shareholder value myth. And so she’s actually a I’m lawyer who has really investigated this whole concept of shareholder value, and found that there’s a lot of flaws in the way this shareholder value concept has been presented. And she really explains that well, and it’s worth looking at the shareholder value event. So I know your guests probably don’t spend all that time promoting other people’s books. But I found so many books that are so valuable. And I mentioned the Greg graves book create amazing another, which is also on hoopla digital. So it’s easy to access to your public library.

Gene Tunny  45:35

Very good. I’ll definitely put a link to to your book, Larry, and to optimal money flow and also to your AAA presentation, which I thought was was was great. Yeah, lots of lots of good illustrations in it. So well done on that. Very good. Well, Larry, I’m pleased that things are getting warmer there. For you in in Kansas City. And thanks so much for your time. Really appreciate it.

Larry Marsh  46:06

Ron Frank Eugene, you have a wonderful podcast. I was very excited when I’ve learned about it. And you’ve covered some wonderful topics. I’ve been going through your podcasts and learning a lot from your guests. So I encourage people to check out your podcasts and take advantage of all their wonderful information that you’re making available.

Gene Tunny  46:26

Excellent. Thanks. Thanks, Larry. And yeah, have a great day. And I’ll see who knows, maybe I’ll chat with you again soon. Really appreciate it.

Larry Marsh  46:35

We’re okay, great, thanks to.

Gene Tunny  46:41

Okay, have you found that informative and enjoyable? Given all the hardship that the current monetary policy tightening is causing in many economies, it may well be worth experimenting with a new monetary policy tool along the lines suggested by Larry. As I noted in my conversation with him, I’m unsure just how responsive household savings will be to the interest rates on cbdc accounts. But I’d be interested in seeing the results of a pilot study of the concept. That said, I know concerns have been expressed about CBDCs by many people, including libertarians and crypto advocates. For instance, there’s a concern that a cbdc could allow central banks and governments greater control over our lives. I probably need a full episode to explore the pros and cons of cbdc. So I’ll aim to do that in the future. I should note here that a previous guest of the podcast, Nicholas grown an Australian economist that I’ve worked with from time to time, he’s previously proposed that the RBA provides digital bank accounts for Australian so a proposal similar to what Larry is proposing for the US. He’s also offered his own interesting alternative to conventional monetary policy. And this is something that the ABC journalist Gareth Hutchins is written up in a recent story of his and I mentioned that to, to Larry, in my conversation, so I’ll put a link in the show notes to that ABC article. In a 1999 paper for the Business Council of Australia. Nicholas proposed very in the superannuation contribution rate. So that acts as a counter cyclical macro economic policy instrument. I’ll link to that paper in the show notes, and I might try to get Nicholas back onto the show to discuss the idea with me. Overall, I’m not sure about the feasibility, economic and political of various alternatives to the existing monetary policy approach to fight inflation. But given the downsides of the existing approach, I’m open to exploring and testing alternatives. Okay, I’d be interested in your thoughts on this episode. For instance, Are you positive or negative about CBDCs? What do you think? And what do you think about employee owned companies such as burns, and McDonnell and Kansas City? Can they work? Have you seen any good examples of them? Please send me an email with your thoughts, you can reach me via contact at economics explore.com. Recently, I’ve had a listener send me links to several videos on China after he listened to my recent conversation with Dr. Jonathan DT ward. Those videos included some rather troubling evidence which would support Dr. Ward’s arguments. So I’m very grateful to that listener for having sent links to those videos because they’re forcing me to think more deeply about the West’s relationship with China. I’ll include the links in the show notes. Finally, if you enjoyed what Larry had to say this episode, please consider getting a copy of his 2021 book optimal money flow, also linked to in the show notes. Thanks for listening. Right Oh, thanks for listening to this episode of economics explored. If you have any questions, comments or suggestions, please get in touch. I’d love to hear from you. You can send me an email via contact at economics explore.com or Smile via SpeakPipe. You can find the link in the show notes. If you’ve enjoyed the show, I’d be grateful if you could tell anyone you think would be interested about it. Word of mouth is one of the main ways that people learn about the show. Finally, if your podcasting outlets you then please write a review and leave a rating. Thanks for listening. I hope you can join me again next week.

50:34

Thank you for listening. We hope you enjoyed the episode. For more content like this where to begin your own podcasting journey, head on over to obsidian-productions.com

Credits

Thanks to Obsidian Productions for mixing the episode and to the show’s sponsor, Gene’s consultancy business www.adepteconomics.com.au

Full transcripts are available a few days after the episode is first published at www.economicsexplored.com. Economics Explored is available via Apple Podcasts, Google Podcast, and other podcasting platforms.

Categories
Podcast episode

Aussie Conference of Economists wrap-up w/ Leonora Risse & Cameron Murray – EP148

While in Hobart, Tasmania for the 2022 Australian Conference of Economists, show host Gene Tunny caught up with Dr Leonora Risse and Dr Cameron Murray to reflect on the big economic issues covered at the conference. The Conference was framed in the context of adjusting to the so-called new normal. It dealt with issues such as government wellbeing budgets, the housing affordability crisis, the pandemic, and nowcasting, among others. Hear from Gene, Leonora, and Cameron regarding conference highlights and takeaways, including the risk of unintended consequences of government policy interventions.

You can listen to the episode via the embedded player below or via podcasting apps including Google Podcasts, Apple Podcasts, Spotify, and Stitcher.

About this episode’s guests – Leonora Risse & Cameron Murray

Dr Leonora Risse is an economist who specialises in gender equality. She is a Research Fellow with the Women’s Leadership Institute Australia, and recently spent time in residence at Harvard University as a Research Fellow with the Women and Public Policy Program. Leonora is a co-founder of the Women in Economics Network (WEN) in Australia and currently serves as the WEN National Chair. Leonora earned her PhD in Economics from the University of Queensland, and previously served as a Senior Research Economist for the Australian Government Productivity Commission. She is currently appointed as a Senior Lecturer in Economics at RMIT University in Melbourne, Australia. Her Twitter handle is @leonora_risse. 

Dr Cameron Murray is Post-Doctoral Research Fellow in the Henry Halloran Trust at The University of Sydney. Cameron has taught a number of courses including UQ’s MBA economics course, macroeconomics, globalisation and economic development, and managerial economics. He writes for MacroBusiness, IDEA economics and Evonomics. Cameron has a PhD from the University of Queensland on the economics of corruption. He hosts the podcast Fresh Economic Thinking and his Twitter handle is ‎@DrCameronMurray.  

Links relevant to the conversation

Greta’s articles at the Lowy Institute Interpreter:

https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/contributors/articles/greta-nabbs-keller

Greta’s articles at ASPI’s the Strategist:

https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/author/greta-nabbs-keller/

Greta’s conversation article on Australia’s relationship with South East Asia:

https://theconversation.com/how-well-has-the-morrison-government-handled-relations-with-southeast-asia-181958

Background reading on China and Taiwan:

https://www.cfr.org/blog/what-xi-jinpings-major-speech-means-taiwan

https://www.brookings.edu/on-the-record/understanding-beijings-motives-regarding-taiwan-and-americas-role/

Transcript: Aussie Conference of Economists wrap-up w/ Leonora Risse & Cameron Murray – EP148

N.B. This is a lightly edited version of a transcript originally created using the AI application otter.ai. It may not be 100 percent accurate, but should be pretty close. If you’d like to quote from it, please check the quoted segment in the recording.

Gene Tunny  00:01

Coming up on Economics Explored.

Leonora Risse  00:04

I think we also need to clarify that a well-being budget doesn’t mean just spending more, like spending more on feel-good items. I think there is some misinterpretation out there. I think it’s more about proper reallocation.

Gene Tunny  00:17

Welcome to the Economics Explored podcast, a frank and fearless exploration of important economic issues. 

I’m your host, Gene Tunny. I’m a professional economist based in Brisbane, Australia, and I’m a former Australian Treasury official. This is episode 148 on the 2022 Australian Conference of Economists, or ACE as we call it. The conference was held on 11th to 13th July in Hobart, Tasmania. 

In this episode, I reflect on the highlights of ACE with my colleagues, Dr. Leonora Reese, and Dr. Cameron Murray, who I was lucky enough to catch up with at the conference. 

Leonora is the chair of the women in Economics Network, and she’s a senior lecturer at RMIT, the Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology. This is Leonora’s third appearance on the program. 

Cameron Murray, however, is appearing on the program for the first time, and I’m delighted that he agreed to share his thoughts on the conference with me. Cameron is postdoctoral research fellow in the Henry Halloran Trust at the University of Sydney. 

One of the big takeaways for me from the conference was the risk of unintended consequences from government policy interventions. And I give some examples of those in this episode. 

The show notes, you can find relevant links and details of how you can get in touch with any questions, comments, or suggestions. Please get in touch and let me know your thoughts. I’d love to hear from you. 

Right oh, now for my conversations with Leonora, who’s on first, and Cameron who’s on second on ACE 2022. 

Thanks to my audio engineer, Josh Crotts for his assistance in producing this episode. I hope you enjoy it. 

Leonora, good to be chatting with you again.

Leonora Risse  02:00

Thanks, Gene for having me. 

Gene Tunny  02:02

Oh, it’s good to catch up here at the conference in Hobart. So, how have you found the conference so far?

Leonora Risse  02:10

It’s great to be back in person. This is the first Annual Conference of Economists in Australia since the pandemic. So, it’s wonderful to be surrounded by people again, seeing people face to face, hearing the latest research. In some ways, it feels like time hasn’t really passed. You know, we’re seeing everyone again. And there’s some great research that’s really timely reflecting on COVID. But also thinking about climate change, politics, immigration, the labor force, So, many highly topical issues are being covered.

Gene Tunny  02:49

Absolutely. And we just had this amazing presentation via Zoom last because he couldn’t make it by Martin Wolf, one of the editors at the Financial Times. And he was talking about a number those issues and the crisis of democratic capitalism, which I found really a fascinating presentation and gave us a lot to think about and their issues I’ve tried to cover on the program in the past. I was grateful for that presentation. Were you involved in the organization of this conference?

Leonora Risse  03:19

This year, I wasn’t. So, the way that the conference works is each state or territory branch usually takes carriage of organizing it. So, this year, a big shout out to the Tasmanian branch of the Economic Society who organized it. I’m part of the Economic Society Central Council, a representative of the Women in Economics Network. So, we were involved in organizing the wind sessions of the conference. So, I was involved in that part.

Gene Tunny  03:48

Okay, good one. So, what were those sessions, Leonora?,

Leonora Risse  03:52

Each year, since WEN was created, that’s the Women in Economics Network, that was created in 2017. So, WEN has been a part of the program, we’ve held a special session where we’ve discussed some of the issues that are confronting women in the economics profession. 

This year, we talked about what WEN had achieved in its first five years. We looked back at what action we had taken to deal with this problem of women’s under representation in economics. So, we were sharing some statistics as well as some examples of the initiatives that WEN had embarked on in that session, and it was more it was broader than just talking about gender inequality. It was talking about diversity and inclusion in the economics profession. So, we held that special session. 

We made sure that there were females amongst the keynote speakers, we had Angela Jackson, talking about the well-being budget. And Angela is a member of our WEN committee, but a very distinguished speaker in her own right and that was wonderful to make sure we had females amongst the keynotes. And tomorrow, we have a lunch for WEN members to come along and network and meet and talk about some topical issues.

Gene Tunny  05:12

Oh, good one. And So, Angela is a co-author of Yours. On a paper, I’d like to talk with you about; so, you had a look at how COVID affected the economy here in Australia and how it had differential impacts by agenda. So, would you be able to tell us about that, please, Leonora?

Leonora Risse  05:32

Thanks so much for the opportunity to share this with you, Gene. We looked at the workforce impacts of the first year of the COVID pandemic in Australia, where we had very strict lockdowns as well as the direct effects of the pandemic. And at the time, there was obviously a lot of interest from the news, from the media, from the government, what exactly were the impacts, and we knew that women were generally being more severely affected on average than men, because of the gender patterns that exist in industries of employment. So, we know that the types of industries that women are employed in, they tended to be the ones that were most affected by the direct lockdowns, particularly in the state of Victoria. But then, also women were potentially dropping out of the workforce, because they were responsible for homeschooling; schools were closed. Childcare wasn’t necessarily available through out that duration. 

So, we wanted to produce a systematic and statistical based analysis of what exactly happened in terms of labor force indicators. So, employment, unemployment, labor force participation; and break it down by gender, because I think there was a lot of talk, and there’s potentially some misinterpretation about what exactly those effects were, and generally, we saw a dive, a plunge in women’s employment, that was steeper than men’s. Then towards the end of the first year of the pandemic, women’s jobs did start to pick up again, which was a positive thing. And we were concerned that that was giving the impression that things were okay again, and even though there were huge numbers of women who dropped out of the workforce, just looking at those numbers climb again, it potentially led to people assuming that that time out of the workforce hadn’t caused any damage for women being detached those interruptions losing your job, and perhaps coming back again, but not being the same job that you had before; losing potentially, your eligibility for leave entitlements. It’s what we call scarring effects of economics.

Gene Tunny  08:05

Is this hysteresis? Is that the old term for it? Or am I thinking of something else? Was that related to it? There was that idea that if you had a period out of the workforce that reduced your; well, you lost the attachment, it can affect your marketability in the future, So, it can have these long run consequences. 

Leonora Risse  08:27

Yeah, that is a concern about people sort of, getting stuck in that state of unemployment or labor force detachment. That’s exactly right. So, we were looking at net numbers, aggregate numbers. We weren’t necessarily following the same individuals to see potentially, people who dropped out of the workforce who lost employment and didn’t reenter. But that would have been a concern behind the scenes. When I presented the paper here at the conference, there was an excellent question about long term unemployment, people would become entrenched in unemployment or drop out of the workforce and don’t reenter. So, that’s part of that concern about hysteresis as well, people getting stuck. And that skill erosion and perhaps that lack of confidence to reenter again, some of the dynamics that can explain what you’re describing there.

Gene Tunny  09:14

Right. So, I’ve got a couple of questions. You looked at the Australian data, do you know if this happened in the US and the UK as well? Was this the xi session that they talked about?

Leonora Risse  09:26

Yes. This was very much a global picture. You’re right. We were hearing this from the US, from Europe and the UK, from many other countries throughout Asia, Canada; that there were terms like it was a she-session, a play on the recession, but emphasizing the gender element of it. And the thing is that this is very different from past economic downturns. So, in our analysis, we look at what happened with job losses during the 1990s recession in Australia and during the global financial crisis around 2008. And what you see with the economic downturn, the recession that occurred as a result of COVID, women share those total job losses was a much higher proportion than what had occurred in previous economic downturns. And why that matters is because, it meant the policy responses needed to be different.

Gene Tunny  10:24

That was stunning. So, I was struck by just the proportion of the jobs lost in the early 90s recession here in Australia that were lost by men; what was it? 90% or something. I guess that makes sense because at the time, the industries that suffered were manufacturing industries or construction, because we had the colossal property boom in the 80s, and then the crash. So, they were industries dominated by men, but this time, and this is what you found, I think, isn’t it? that it was those sectors where women were disproportionately employed such as hospitality.

Leonora Risse  10:58

Yes, that’s right. So, it was the preexisting patterns of employment. For instance, at retail trade, what are the types of jobs within retail trade that women tended to be employed in things like clothing stores, Ford fronting customer service roles, waitress or waiter jobs in hospitality, whereas males tended to be employed in things like in retail, but in electronic stores, or building supply and hardware stores, which actually were all booming during the pandemic, because of all the incentives for people to stay at home or invest in these other things and things like shell fillers, or deliveries and transport behind the scenes rather than face to face customer service. 

So, these preexisting gender patterns of employment, as well as who’s doing the bulk of caring duties at home and who takes on the majority of the homeschooling responsibilities, meant that there were demand side factors as well as supply side factors, putting a lot of pressure on women’s capacity to retain their attachment to the workforce as well.

Gene Tunny  12:12

Okay. I might ask you about your highlights of the conference. I can tell you mine so far. I mean, one highlight was definitely Martin Wolf’s presentation, which made me think a lot about, how do we get that balance between having a market system which provides the goods and services we want that’s dynamic, that allows for you know, that is compatible with individual liberty, but at the same time, avoid a system where we have monopolization, where we have money getting into politics and corrupting it and inequality widening for various reasons, including monopoly, because of the big tech platforms, the big tech giants, people being able to earn money globally because of these platforms. And then if you’ve got an advantage that can be magnified by the technology, also skill biased technological change all those reasons. How do we deal with that in a way that keeps the incentive to innovate, but means we don’t have inequality that could be politically devastating? And I mean, I don’t know the answer to that. But I’m just saying that I thought that was a great presentation and Hal Varian, I mean, that was amazing. Talking about how they’re using all of the Google Trends data to Nowcast the economy, so, unemployment claims just based on people searching, where’s the local unemployment office in Michigan or wherever. So, I thought that was great. But how about you, Leonora? What were your highlights?

Leonora Risse  13:41

Oh, I haven’t been able to see everything on the program, which is frustrating when there’s so many options, you can’t see them all. The keynote speakers have been fantastic this year, because they’ve been so timely. The topics, the issues that they’ve been delving into, I thought hell variants, illustration of how we can use Google data for economic analysis, really enlightening. There’s so much capacity there. I’m looking forward to hearing Joseph Stiglitz speak tomorrow. So, we haven’t come to the end of the program. And he’s, he’s obviously an eminent voice in terms of inequality issues. I really enjoyed Angela Jackson’s keynote address at the start of the conference. And Angela talked about a well-being budget and put a lot of thought into what would be the dimensions of well-being. 

And also, she brought up some really potentially confrontational issue. She did talk about how do we handle domestic violence and family violence? And I think that was an indication that these are some hard topics that economists and policymakers and researchers need to deal with. And I mentioned that as a highlight, because I really don’t think in past conferences, we’ve been empowered or bold enough to bring up some of these confrontational topics.

Gene Tunny  15:02

I think that’s true. I want to see how this wellbeing budget is implemented in practice. I mean, as a former Treasury bureaucrat and someone who worked in Budget Policy Division, I’m just not sure what it’s going to mean. Is it just another chapter in the budget, enhance more work for Treasury analysts? Or is it a fundamental rethinking of how the budget process works and how the all of these policy measures are assessed? Will there be an explicit wellbeing score? I don’t know; we have to see exactly how the government is going to implement it. And whether it is something that really will mean that the budget is reformulated or rethought of as something that’s explicitly dedicated to improving well-being and therefore you would look at the whole range of government expenditures and activities. 

Is it that or is it just something that is just going to be another glossy budget document or something that the government of the day can sort of, wax lyrically about, but doesn’t have any real practical implications? That’s just my natural skepticism. So, I’m not knocking it. I just want to see how it’s implemented.

Leonora Risse  16:10

Yeah, I think that’s a really healthy degree of skepticism to have with any government. I sense that this government is really sincere and actually quite well informed by the research because as your listeners have known, there are very deep and comprehensive streams of research looking at measures of multi-dimensional poverty or disadvantage, which is really part of that literature on what constitutes a well-being and life satisfaction. And I think the takeaway here is when we think about a well-being budget, it’s about broadening the suite of indicators that we monitor, and we care about. So, it’s not just GDP, or inflation or wage price index. But we include a wider and fuller list of economic indicators, including measurements of inequality. So, I imagine that if you’re constructing a well-being budget, you’d want to compute a Gini coefficient, for instance. So, at least inequality is going to be on the minds of your policymakers, it becomes more salient, so that when they’re developing their policies, they’re not just thinking about how do we increase GDP, but what is the distribution of those prosperity benefits?

Gene Tunny  17:19

So, they could ask how do these particular budget measures affect inequality, affect the Gini Coefficient? Is that what you thinking?

Leonora Risse  17:26

Potentially along those lines, that’s right. So, it’s thinking about measuring success along a broader spectrum or dimensions of real world impact.

Gene Tunny  17:37

Yeah. Okay. So, every budget, as well as providing the economic outlook in terms of GDP and talking about what the budget aggregates are, you could have a reflection, the government could reflect upon what’s happening with some of these other indicators, such as inequality. Angela mentioned a whole range of things they could be interested in targeting in the interests of well-being, mental health, reducing domestic violence. 

Leonora Risse  18:04

The budget contains a lot of that already. And it’s about pointing out; actually, a lot of that contributes to GDP, which we know like, if you invest in your mental health and physical health and community inclusion in your population that are all in federal ingredients was making people or supporting people to become more productive as well. But I think it will probably find that there are a lot of government initiatives that are in place that are supportive of well-being and this is, I guess, perhaps justifying that expenditure in a broader set. 

I think we also need to clarify that a well-being budget doesn’t mean just spending more, like spending more on feel good items. I think there is some misinterpretation out there. I think it’s more about proper reallocation. So, you could say, well, let’s not go ahead with this hypothetical, say tax cuts for a higher income bracket, because that’ll have a negative effect on the Gini Coefficient. It will detract from income equality. 

So, we then have another benchmark of impact you consider some of these redistribution or reallocation decisions, it doesn’t mean spending more, it just means spinning things in different ways.

Gene Tunny  19:23

Yeah, fair point. Okay, Leonora thanks so much. Great to catch up with you here in Hobart.

Leonora Risse  19:27

Thanks, Gene. And thanks for running such a great podcast.

Gene Tunny  19:30

Thank you. 

Okay, we’ll take a short break here for a word from our sponsor.

Female speaker  19:38

If you need to crunch the numbers, then get in touch with Adept Economics. We offer you frank and fearless economic analysis and advice. We can help you with funding submissions, cost benefit analysis studies and economic modelling of all sorts. Our head office is in Brisbane, Australia, but we work all over the world. You can get in touch via our website, www.adepteconomics.com.au. We’d love to hear from you.

Gene Tunny  20:07

Now back to the show. 

Cameron Murray, good to be chatting with you.

Cameron Murray  20:13

Thanks for having me,Gene.

Gene Tunny  20:14

It’s a pleasure. We’re both finished the Conference of Economists for 2022, here in Hobart. We just had the lecture by Joseph Stiglitz. And, yes, it’s been a busy, few days. How have you found the conference, Cameron?

Cameron Murray  20:30

Yeah, pretty good. Pretty broad range. I’ve been to this conference many times, I like it because you, you will find a few people that study related topics, and you can catch up with your mates who researched your area, and then you can sit in on the random ones. Your session was called what, Miscellaneous? Which is actually pretty good. I think most people enjoyed, you know, a variety of discussions that you just don’t really get a lot of smart people in one room to chat about that often. Yeah, it was a good time.

Gene Tunny  21:01

Thanks. Yes, that was an interesting session. And we can touch on that a bit later. I thought it’d be good to chat about highlights of the conference and also what the themes of the conference have been. So, I guess on the themes, there was a big theme, it seemed to me of Economics in the New Normal; I think that was actually the designated theme of the conference, something about the new normal. And there was that speech by Martin Wolf, where he’s talking about the crisis of democratic capitalism. And then Joseph Stiglitz, today was talking about the Post-Neoliberal Order. So, there seems to be this general recognition that things need to change. I still don’t know exactly what they’re proposing. 

Cameron Murray  21:54

Yeah, I got the same impression. There’s a lot of; we’re at the end of some era, and something’s happening. And I wasn’t clear what specifically is not working? I’m not a big believer in labelling of things; oh this is proper capitalism. I’m like, well, you can have capitalism and a good welfare state and good public services and, you know, all of those functions well, together. It’s not clear that we need a new label. I think we do have a lot of things right. I found that a little bit unusual, I thought Stiglitz was right, in terms of Economics as a discipline evolving. And I can observe that I’ve been involved after the financial crisis in that rethinking economics and those groups trying to add some color and flavor to your economics education, because it can be a bit dry, like it’s straight with the neoclassical view on things. But in terms of actual policy, yeah, it’s wasn’t super clear to me where it’s going, but it was kind of unusual to get that feeling that everyone thinks there’s some change happening..

Gene Tunny  23:03

So, you’ve got a blog, haven’t you? Fresh Economic Thinking, and I found that interesting, what you were saying about the teaching of Economics and you said that you’ve tried to give it a different flavor. What sort of things have you done? What have you tried to emphasized in your teaching and your writing?

Cameron Murray  23:20

Yeah, well, maybe let me give you an example. Because Joe Stiglitz, one of the last things he talked about was, well, we use Robinson Crusoe as this example of production. And when Friday comes, we talk about specialization. And I use that to say, well, that’s one element of the coordination problem when you’ve got two people. Someone pick the coconuts and someone go fishing. That example allows us to think more broadly? Why is someone better at picking coconuts? Who taught them? Who has the fishing net? And why do they have it and not the other person? Can they be more productive if the two of them go fishing on one day using a net holding one end each, and then the two of them pick coconuts the next day by helping them climb the tree? Like these, the coordination problems are much broader than I guess the way we’re trying to think about it. And I think in Economics training, we can think more broadly as issues come up, we can maybe see where there’s these net improvements on the status quo. And that’s kind of, what my blog is; is there a different angle to this problem? Is this really a coordination problem? Is it really specialization? Is it this? Is it that?

When I look at housing, for example, I was writing about the Shared Equity proposal, I’m like, well, is this the best option? Why isn’t a 100% equity better? This is the proposal where the government will buy 30% of a house for you as an equity partner for first home buyers. 

Gene Tunny  24:46

Are they going to go ahead with that, aren’t they? Because they want government here in Australia, right. 

Cameron Murray  24:51

And someone at the conference was telling me that the details are being worked out, can’t say anymore. I think we got to think well, that’s one policy, and we can look at it. But we should be tweaking at the edges as well and going well, if 30% is good, why isn’t 40% better? And if 40% is better, why not 100%. And if we’re at 100% equity, where sort of the government owns your house, that’s public housing. Like we should be a bit more expansive in thinking about how things fit together. And that’s what I tried to do.

Gene Tunny  25:22

So, we’re reportedly having a housing crisis here in Australia. And you’ve previously commented, or you’ve recommended a Singapore model, haven’t you? Is that what you’re driving at with a 100%?

Cameron Murray  25:37

Oh, well, my example, for example, in that blog post was the Land and Housing Corporation in South Wales that owns all the public housing stock. And the value of that housing stock went from $32 billion in 2012, to $54 billion in 2019. And like, that’s a really good return on equity for government, if we consider that as an independent entity, making $20 billion in seven years in terms of the value. So, that was my example of well, you know, we’re going to start another fund over here, and it’s going to buy equity in people’s houses; we have a fund here, that’s buying equity, we’re just not conceptualizing it this way, we’re only looking at the costs, and we’re ignoring the fact that what public housing is is an equity investment. So, that’s the expansive way to think about it.

Gene Tunny  26:24

Right. Okay. I’ll put some links to your blog in the show notes, and also some of the reporting on your recommendation regarding that Singapore model.

Okay. What I found were the highlights, and I can ask you about yours. Papers that really struck me as something I wasn’t expecting, or that made me think differently, it was an analysis by this recent master’s graduate from Harvard, Nicole Kagan, not so super. And what she showed was that, that policy during the COVID period here where they let you withdraw $10,000 from your superannuation balance, and it was a lot easier than the normal requirement where you had to demonstrate hardship. And she was making the point that it could actually backfire on the government in the long term due to the fact that it’s reducing their super balance, and therefore the government would have to pay them more pension in the future. She had some calculations that illustrated how that could occur. I thought that was a good analysis, a good paper, and it just shows those unintended consequences and just how there, whenever you’re designing a policy, there’s probably or there’s possibly a lot better way to do it. And So, you should be thinking laterally about the types of policies.

Cameron Murray  27:58

I thought hers was very good as well, because she didn’t just say, this is the result of this policy. She said, oh, here’s another policy of an interest free loan. And what was the other; that she had a third one as well and said, here’s something else. And now I’m going to compare all three of them. And I feel like that’s a really fundamental economic approach of saying, well, this is a good policy I showed you, it’s like, no, what are all the alternatives? And we should be picking the best one, because if we can beat this, we should. Right. So, I thought that was very good. And that was my comment to her as well, there was another. And it might be related to your presentation as well, that the government could have let you take your super or it could have bought your assets from your super and given you the cash and held those assets in its own fund and got their compound growth or whatever. And, therefore, the government would have had those future assets to pay you back when you got the pension, if you know what I mean. So, you could sort of draw a little circle around the super early release program, and take that forward through time by the government owning those assets in its own federal treasury super account, and then paying the extra pensions to you in the future out of that account if it wanted to. So, you know, that’s just another alternative. And she evaluated three and I really liked that approach and was enthusiastic to look at more.

Gene Tunny  29:25

Yeah, I thought it was good. The other papers I liked; Stephanie Schurer who won Young Economist of the Year Award, she looked at a paper, while her paper looked at these anti interventions of various measures in the Northern Territory to a world to reduce alcoholism or to reduce domestic violence and sexual abuse in the indigenous population there. She had this, I think it was some differences model share this methodology to identify what happened in Alice Springs when they introduced a minimum price of alcohol to try to reduce the drinking and the cost of wine. It didn’t have the effect that they necessarily expected. When they looked at what did it mean for babies with the birth way of babies? And what seems to have happened is, well, there was some substitute; they did stop drinking cask wine. There was a big drop in the consumption of that. But then, there was an increase in consumption of beer and other alcohol, to an extent. So, there’s sort of substitution there. But also smoking, smoking increased.

Cameron Murray  30:43

Yeah, it did. That was pretty clear and one of the main results, wasn’t it? 

I think that’s actually a result I’ve seen elsewhere of trying to change behavior with the sort of syntax approach where you tax the behaviour you don’t want to get. And I think we get that in cigarettes and marijuana and things like that, if there are substitute ways to get the broader consumption good. Then you’ll find them.

Gene Tunny  31:12

Yeah. I thought that was a good illustration of the possibility of unintended consequences that you can get with policy and as was Nicole’s paper, too. Okay. The other one I thought was great was Warwick McKibbin’s paper on COVID. So, he went over some modelling results of his early in the pandemic. And I mean, Warwick was claiming, I think he’s probably right about this, that he got reasonably; I mean, his estimates were probably better than any ones in terms of the ultimate economic impact. And a lot of it came from voluntary, people voluntarily withdrawing from the labor market.

Cameron Murray  31:58

I wasn’t in that one. Can you? What did he predict? And why?

Gene Tunny  32:03

This was a paper he released in February of 2020. He saw that COVID was spreading in China. And it was going to come to the end; I think it was in Italy at the time. And he used his, what is it, the McKibbin Sachs Global model – MSG model he’s got some global economic model originally built with Jeffrey Sachs at Harvard. And he’s sold it; to all of these finance ministries, I think Treasury had a copy when I was there. How would you describe it? Well, it’s a general equilibrium macro-economic model of the global economy. And he was projecting; he calls them simulations, he’s not calling them forecasts. He made a joke today about how he doesn’t like doing forecasts, because you’re only ever going to be wrong, you never forecast know precisely.

Cameron Murray  33:10

I think that’s very wise. 

Gene Tunny  33:12

So, I think that’s very clever of Warwick to do that. And he was showing what GDP deviations he was getting from his assumptions around how COVID would spread. Then he had endogenous policy responses, or actually, they may not have been endogenous, he must have assumed what policy responses would be in terms of fiscal policy, and then monetary policy. He knew that governments would respond and that would help the economy recover. And he was showing that he had the big GDP losses to begin with, but then the V-shaped recovery or the rapid recovery. So, Warwick was claiming that; and it’s probably right.

Cameron Murray  33:56

Did you get the inflation element as well as it’s sort of second half of last year and this year? Because the V-shape recovery; remember, there was a big debate, V-shaped recovery, W-shaped recovery. There was a lot of chatter, and I think obviously he was right on that. But what about the inflation part?

Gene Tunny  34:19

I think he was. He may not have got it to the; he may not have predicted as much as it has occurred, but I’ll have to check that. I think he did say something about that. I just can’t remember off the top of my head. I’ll put links in the show notes to that paper. I found that fascinating. 

One thing he didn’t predict and he was surprised by; he was really surprised by just how badly the United States did. But he was modelling the COVID infections and mortality, the COVID deaths, and his prediction for the US was too low. And because in his model he was basing the health response. So, he had the epidemiological development of the disease, the infections and the deaths. He had that related in part to the public health system or the public health response. And because the US, because of the CDC, it came out high in terms of public health effectiveness. So, in his model, US had high public health effectiveness. So, that was reducing his estimate of what would happen in the States. We all know that it just didn’t work. I mean, they may have had the CDC, but for some reason or another, something didn’t work.

Cameron Murray  35:49

Well, you know, the assumptions matter don’t they? One of the standout presentations for me was Hal Varian, the Chief Economist at Google. And I think, simply because he’s got the inside run on all the data, he had a great method of augmenting your traditional time series forecasts that have seasonality and trends with an additional regression that selects for the most useful search terms out of Google Trends, and then uses them as predictors in the regression part of the overall model. And was pretty good at predicting a lot of economic outcomes from Google trends search data, which I thought was pretty impressive, but I guess we kind of, accept that that happens. But what impressed me more is they have a Google survey tool that you can put as like an ad on the news item. And people get credit on Google Play or something if they fill in surveys. So, you can do these really rapid surveys, and it will distribute them to readers of news that meet certain criteria. And it replicates really well, these well-done official surveys that sample representatively across society based on census records of types of people and where they live, it replicates a lot of findings by being completely non representative, and just flooding the internet, essentially, with the survey. 

So, the message here is sort of saying is we don’t know if representativeness is that important, but you can find out cheaply and quickly by just doing a Google survey to augment your official survey where you’ve got representative samples from different parts of the country, in different age groups and so forth. 

We’re obsessed about sampling and he’s now saying, well, as long as we throw it out to the internet, sometimes it doesn’t really matter. 

Gene Tunny  37:54

It’s good enough, the results are good enough. It may not be as precise as a random survey, or a survey done by Roy Morgan or Gallup but it’s got to be good enough for what most people need it for.

Cameron Murray  38:07

Especially picking the trends, right? Is this declining in interest or rising interests, you’ll get that sort of stuff very quickly and cheaply. So, I immediately went back to my computer after that session and looked at housing markets and predictions and tried to catch up with the state of the literature on that, and it’s booming right now. So, I think that’s going to be something we’ll hear more about. And I expect, for example, in the next five years, we’ll probably have a new house price index that is informed by daily Google search trends. Like a live modelled index from this type of stuff, that would be my expectation, given that people are already trying to do that.

Gene Tunny  38:46

Yeah, because CoreLogic put out a daily House Price Index, I think, don’t they? 

Cameron Murray  38:52

They do put out a daily index but there’s a lot of assumptions because you don’t know sales data until the settlement and the price was 30 or 60 days beforehand. Over a longer term, it works well. And it seems to pick turning points well. But I think if you’re in the market for producing high frequency index like that, and you can augment that with Google Trends, I think you would dominate that market because people would put more stock in yours, you’d get more press coverage, you’d become very; So, I’d be very interested in if CoreLogic has got people looking at this. They obviously have a lot of data nerds. You might see live daily trackers of many things; could be an interesting new world at the next conference.

Gene Tunny  39:40

Yeah, absolutely. That was great, that nowcasting session and I chatted about that with Leonora. I’ll put a link in the show notes regarding that, too. 

So, on housing, Cameron, you presented a paper on housing, didn’t you? Would you be able to tell us about that, please?

Cameron Murray  39:56

Yeah. So, it’s pretty straightforward. There was a lot of very detailed statistical modelling at this conference and mine was the exact opposite. Mine was just, here’s the data on the rate of production of housing from new major subdivisions in Australia. Because the argument that we have at the moment, are planning regulations, stopping supply and keeping the price of housing up. And my question was, how are planning regulations stopping supply? Because we can observe in practice, all these major approvals with three to 20,000, approved housing lots, and we can observe how quickly they supply after the approval. And what you find is that during an economic boom, these property developers will sell at a rate that’s 30 to 50 times faster than when it’s not a boom. 

So, they’ll sell five a month, and then they’ll sell eight a month for a few months when there’s a boom. So, if you look at land sales in major subdivisions around Melbourne, when there was that 2015 to 17, boom, you can see, not only did the price rocket, but the sales rocket, and then when the price is up, typically, supply and demand say, well, at higher prices, you sell more, but then it stops once price gets up. So, as prices start rolling over, they stopped selling again. 

The main point of that is, there seems to be a built-in speed limit. And then in addition to that, I looked at aggregate company data for listed companies across states where they had eight to 12 different projects. And the question there as well, is that variation I’m observing; does it average out across different areas, if we diversify? And it does, but only to a small degree. And then I looked at council level data for the different councils in Queensland and showed that actually, the variation, even at a whole council level is much the same. So, the point of all that is that there’s some kind of built in speed limit that the market will supply, regardless of planning restrictions. So, if you want to talk about the effective planning regulations, it has to go via this market absorption rate, this optimal rate per period that you would produce new housing. 

Gene Tunny  42:20

Yeah, I see what you’re arguing there. So, at any point in time, there is going to be a speed limit. I think that’s fair enough. It’s like with the sale of government bonds, for example. So, they don’t just go and auction off the whole years in one day.

Cameron Murray  42:42

Yeah. The market has a finite depth, right? Especially in property, your local market has a very; it’s very competitive. But in your local area, if there’s only a few buyers rocking up each week, you can’t really sell faster than that. And if you did want to, you’d have to reduce the price dramatically. And that itself might not even work, because who wants to buy something that’s falling in price? Right? You’ve just showed me this is a terrible property asset to buy, because you keep decreasing the price on me. Right? I think property markets function like other asset markets, property developers aren’t in the business of panicking, and to reduce price and selling very quickly. So, if we want to talk about cheap and affordable housing options or systems, we’ve got to acknowledge that limit. 

We can’t go around saying oh up zone, and it’ll all be fine, because we’ve got a property boom in the whole world, regardless of local planning conditions. There’s almost no city you can name right now, Regardless of whether they’ve got very generous planning, whether they’ve got height limits, where they’ve got no height limits. Auckland, famous in 2016 up zone the whole city, and then had the biggest boom, I think just about in the world between 2016 and 2021.

So, that was mine. Yours was one of the last sessions of the day, that was just before Joe Stiglitz. I actually really liked your topic because, I have a strong interest in privatizing public assets and accounting trickery.

Gene Tunny  44:26

Yeah. Well, what I thought was bizarre about what Queensland Government did. This is the state government, where Cameron and I both reside; it’s the state government where Brisbane is the capital. What I found odd about what they did was they actually didn’t privatize it, they pretended they privatize it. They said if we did privatize it, we could sell it for $8 billion, and therefore, even though it’s still doing the same thing it did yesterday, we’re now going to treat it as a well; we’re creating this private company, we’re converting a government.

Cameron Murray  45:08

This was the property title’s office, right where you change, when you sell a house, you register the change in ownership. It’s the Torrens title.

Gene Tunny  45:16

Yeah, that’s right. Sorry, I should have mentioned that. Well, this is actually a private company, and we own shares in it. So therefore, we’re going to take it out of the general government sector. And we’re going to recognize this $8 billion asset on our balance sheet and use it to offset our $40 billion worth of debt or whatever it was, and that reduces our net debt.

Cameron Murray  45:47

That’s an accounting trick. I did think it was very interesting that we’re going to privatize, we’re not going to change the ownership. We’re just going to say that it’s; and I guess my point to you was; The other point you were saying is that Queensland has a future fund that does investments in private companies. And they were saying that we’re not putting it in that fund is that?

Gene Tunny  46:14

I know they did. So, it is in that future fund? Yeah. It is in there – the debt retirement fund they’ve got. 

Cameron Murray  46:22

Well, and I think one of the questions in your comments was that New South Wales got a lot of flak last year for doing the same thing. And they created this thing called the transport asset holding entity. Did you follow that news? 

Gene Tunny  46:38

Yeah, I’ve got to look more into it.

Cameron Murray  46:4

The basic gist was the same thing. They said, well, this is the Department of Rail or whatever it’s called. But actually, we’re going to corporatize it and say it’s a private company. So, when we subsidize it, that’s an equity injection. So, that’s actually an investment, not a cost. So, there was this great big accounting trick to get around there other standard measures of government spending and standard ways that they produce the budget. They’re like, well, no, that’s not a cost, that’s an equity injection, which of course, you could do for anything.

Gene Tunny  47:19

I have to have a closer look at that. I guess the point I was trying to make is that I thought this was a good example of just the financial or the public accounting trickery that can go on. And I think as economists, we need to be mindful of that.

Cameron Murray  47:40

I think your point; you said at the beginning that we’re meant to be sort of, reporting in a standardized way. And you’re comparing governments between countries and budgets and debts. How much does this accounting trick matter? And we’re comparing Queensland and Western Australia or Australia to New Zealand to Canada.

Gene Tunny  48:01

Yeah. It’s difficult to know. And while any one of them, you might think in the greater scheme of things, okay, maybe that’s not the biggest deal but they just all add up and you just don’t know. 

I remember what I was saying about what was going into the future fund. What I was trying to say is that originally, they were going to put in liquid assets. So, the original idea was, we would have, I think it was 4 billion or whatever it was, from the defined benefit. The funds set aside to meet the defined benefit superannuation liability, and they were going to take that out, because they were saying, well,  we’ve got excess there, we don’t need that much to pay the pensions. We’ll put that into this future fund, but they would have been liquid financial assets. So, cash or shares or whatever. But then, they didn’t have as much as they expected. So, they couldn’t actually put in liquid assets. What they then did was said, well, oh, we’ve got these $8 billion titles registry, let’s stick that in the future fund. And is not the same thing, because it’s not actual ready money. It’s not a liquid asset.

Cameron Murray  49:13

No, it’s definitely not. Although, we did later discuss before we recorded that, a cynic might say that the government is wedged right now in not privatizing any public assets. And they’re literally setting this up. So, when they’re out of power, they get the result they want because the next government, it makes it easier for them to then privatize and sell this off, because the structure is already changed.

Gene Tunny  49:42

It certainly does do that.

Cameron Murray  49:45

It depends how much you think these political games are being played behind the scenes.

Gene Tunny  49:50

Yeah, I’ll put a I’ll put a link to both of our papers in the show notes. I’ve got to think more about your housing article because I think that’s a fair point about the speed limit at a point in time. And I’ve had Peter Tulip on the show before. Peter is someone that you’ve debated or you have a lot of interactions on Twitter and

Cameron Murray  50:15

and in person every time. Yeah.

Gene Tunny  50:19

So, Peter was here at the conference too. And I think Peter’s point is that; I think he acknowledges that, like, you’re not going to solve the housing supply shortfall overnight by relaxing restrictions, because there’s just so much construction or so much building that would have to occur. I mean, have to occur over many years. And I think his point is that, well, the problem is we’ve had these restrictions in place for decades. So, there’s been a whole lot of under building. 

Cameron Murray  50:51

We had a good conversation last night with Peter. I think there’s a hidden mental model that we both have that I can’t quite articulate with both tried. One of the components of that is this competitive element in the property market, like how fast would we supply? What’s the real counterfactual? Because his argument, and it’s a common argument, is that we’ve had supply constraints for a long time, therefore, we don’t have enough houses. If we didn’t have a supply constraint, we would have more dwellings per person and more space than ever before. And yet, that’s actually what we have. 

Although prices are high. Part of that’s the interest rate, right? Rents compared to income in the private market are 20%. They were 20% in 1996. So, we’re talking, what’s that 26 years ago, quarter of a century. So, not only are rents the same proportion of income, and we’d probably expect people to spend roughly the same proportion of income on housing as they do, you know, there’s a fixed budget share results in the Cobb Douglas function as your income grows. But we have bigger houses, we have more bedrooms and more area and fewer people. And we actually saw that in the recent Census. Census was interesting, because last year, the week that we filled it out in August 2021, I predicted that the homeownership rate in the census would go up. Because it was 65.4%, in the 2016 census. And when the data came out a month ago, it was 66.0. So, a 0.6% increase. So, we got more homeownership. And we saw that the number of people per dwelling fell quite a lot as well, partly because of COVID. People sort of spread out a little bit more. Yeah. And we had a bit of a building boom as well, in that period. And So, we’ve got bigger houses, fewer people in them. So, the question is, why isn’t this the market outcome? Like, surely, you’ve got to tell me why the market outcome is something of even bigger houses and fewer people than what we have. And why would that be the case? That’s where we still disagree. Myself and Peter Tulip as the most active housing supply debaters on Australian social media.

Gene Tunny  53:27

Absolutely. Love to have you both thoughts for a chat in the future. But anyway, we’ll have to leave it there. Because we’ll wrap up soon, because we’ve got the State of Origin game between Queensland and New South Wales coming up. 

Yeah, I thought that’s been a great discussion. I just thought of something with Nicole Kagan’s paper.. So, you’ve got that idea that the government could have bought the shares off or it could have basically bought the super assets…

Cameron Murray  54:05

From people if they want to cash out their super, then the Superfund says, okay, we’ll give you cash but the government’s got to give us the cash to take a claim on their same assets.

Gene Tunny  54:15

Yeah. So, the government would have to borrow to buy or to let them cash out. But your argument would be they would be earning more, the government would be earning more from those assets than the cost of the borrowing, giving borrowed and was so cheap.

Cameron Murray  54:31

Yeah. And also, that whatever they earn on those assets is exactly what the people who took the money out of super would have earned. So, if you’re thinking about a cost to the age pension in the future, well, the government now got those assets, exactly the same amount of assets that it can use to spend on your age pension. Do you know what I’m saying? Because you don’t have the super, the government has it. And if you need the age pension, they’ve got exactly the same amount of money that they can give back to you if you qualify for the age pension.

Gene Tunny  55:00

I’ll just have to think that through because I’ll also have the debt one day to a border. Although you could think about the Reserve Bank doing it, perhaps. I mean, that’s one thing that could have;

Cameron Murray  55:14

I mean, it’s a balance sheet expansion for the government. And it’s a contraction for the person who took the cash and doesn’t have that other asset. I might write a blog on this; 

Gene Tunny  55:25

I think would be good. I’d love to see.

Cameron Murray  55:27

Nicole was the author of the paper? I’ll reach out because I thought she had the right idea of testing all these scenarios. There you go. That’s what conferences are for; meeting people and sharing ideas.

Gene Tunny  55:41

Absolutely, very good. Cameron Murray, from University of Sydney. Thanks so much for your time. It’s been really great chatting. And it’s been amazing catching up with you at this conference. It’s been great.

Cameron Murray  55:52

Yeah, I know, it has been great to hang out, Gene. 

Gene Tunny  55:57

Thanks, Cameron.

Okay, that’s the end of this episode of Economics Explored. I hope you enjoyed it. If so, please tell your family and friends and leave a comment or give us a rating on your podcast app. If you have any comments, questions, suggestions, you can feel free to send them to contact@economicsexplored.com and we’ll aim to address them in a future episode. Thanks for listening. Till next week, goodbye.

Credits

Thanks to this episode’s guests Leonora and Cameron for the great conversations, and to the show’s audio engineer Josh Crotts for his assistance in producing the episode and to the show’s sponsor, Gene’s consultancy business www.adepteconomics.com.au

Please consider signing up to receive our email updates and to access our e-book Top Ten Insights from Economics at www.economicsexplored.com. Also, please get in touch with any questions, comments and suggestions by emailing us at contact@economicsexplored.com or sending a voice message via https://www.speakpipe.com/economicsexplored. Economics Explored is available via Apple Podcasts, Google Podcast, and other podcasting platforms.

Categories
Podcast episode

Risk, CBA, & the Enlightenment w/ Prof. Deb Brown – EP128

In Episode 128 of Economics Explored, Philosophy Professor Deb Brown helps us explore some big questions around risk, cost-benefit analysis (CBA), and public policy, particularly relating to the pandemic. Deb also explains what was so important about the Enlightenment. 

You can listen to the episode using the podcast player below or on Apple Podcasts, Google Podcasts, Spotify, and Stitcher, among other podcasting apps. A transcript of the conversation is included below.

About this episode’s guest – Prof. Deb Brown

Deborah Brown is Professor, School of Historical and Philosophical Inquiry at the University of Queensland, Australia. During her time in the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Deb has coordinated a wide range of projects focusing on critical thinking. She has been instrumental in establishing connections and partnerships within the school sector, including with the Queensland Department of Education, as well as building partnerships across UQ and with international education providers. 

As part of her role, Deb works to link the UQ Critical Thinking Project into relevant projects within the university to provide educators with an understanding of how to embed critical thinking in classroom practice and assessment and to maximise outcomes for students, particularly those from disadvantaged backgrounds. Deb has established a professional development program for educators, booster courses for school and university students and research collaborations with a diverse range of researchers from the broader UQ community. 

Deb has a Bachelor of Arts from the University of Queensland and a Master of Arts and PHD from the University of Toronto.

Truth (or the lack of it) in politics and how to think critically with help from Descartes – EP123

Abbreviations

QALY Quality-Adjusted Life Year

Transcript of EP128 – Risk, Cost-benefit analysis, and the Enlightenment w/ Prof. Deb Brown

N.B. This is a lightly edited version of a transcript originally created using the AI application otter.ai. It may not be 100 percent accurate, but should be pretty close. If you’d like to quote from it, please check the quoted segment in the recording.

Gene Tunny 00:01

Coming up on Economics Explored.

Deb Brown 00:04

What is the Enlightenment is that the movement is about promoting intellectual autonomy, not just relying on what others or testimony or what authority tells you.

Gene Tunny 00:17

Welcome to the Economics Explored podcast, a frank and fearless exploration of important economic issues. I’m your host, Gene Tunny. I’m a professional economist based in Brisbane, Australia and I’m a former Australian Treasury official. This is Episode 128, on philosophy, risk, cost-benefit analysis and the Enlightenment. This is part two of a conversation that my occasional cohost Tim Hughes and I had in January 2022, with University of Queensland philosophy professor Deb Brown. Part one of their conversation was broadcast in Episode 123, in which we chatted with Deb about truth and critical thinking. In part two, which is in this episode, we consider some big questions around risk and public policy, particularly relating to the pandemic.

Assessing government policy measures during the pandemic has been very challenging. In my view, there aren’t easy answers. Basic Facts are disputed and people are making different subjective assessments of what restrictions on our liberty are justifiable, for public health reasons. I found this conversation with Deb really helpful in clarifying some of the important issues for me. And I’ll aim to come back to the pandemic in a future episode soon with some further thoughts.

Deb also helped me understand just what is meant by that critically important period in our history known as the Enlightenment. Part of the way forward out of the mess that we’re in globally at the moment, in my view, surely has to be a greater appreciation and a recommitment to the values of the Enlightenment. Okay, please check out the show notes for links to materials mentioned in this episode, and for any clarifications and abbreviations, such as QALY, Q-A-L-Y, which stands for quality adjusted life year, that’s one of the abbreviations that Deb uses in our conversation. You can find the show notes via your podcasting app, or at our website, economicsexplored.com. If you sign up as an email subscriber, you can download my new e-book, Top 10 Insights From Economics. So please consider getting on the mailing list. If you have any questions, comments, or suggestions, then please either record them in a message via SpeakPipe, see the link in the show notes, or email me via contact@economicsexplored.com.

Righto, now for our conversation with Professor Dave Brown on philosophy, risk, cost-benefit analysis and the Enlightenment. Thanks to my audio engineer, Josh Crotts, for his assistance in producing the episode, I hope you enjoy it.

One thing that I’m always conscious of is that as economists, we do cost-benefit analysis studies. And we try to put everything in dollar terms. And we do this over the lifecycle of a project or over X number of years, 30 years. And we come to conclusions such as, well, the present value of benefits exceed the present value of costs, and therefore this is a good thing to do. But we’ve always got to bear in mind that there are some big philosophical assumptions we’re making when we’re doing a cost-benefit analysis. And in some cases, those assumptions are fine. Or if we’re doing a cost-benefit analysis of a bridge or a new raw railway tunnel or a road, okay, well, then, maybe that’s okay to put everything in dollar terms. But it’s difficult in the context of the pandemic, because we’re dealing with people’s lives and you’ve got –  there are all the issues of like, can you quantify that in dollar terms? And then even if you did a cost-benefit analysis, there’s a utilitarian assumption underlying cost-benefit analysis in economics is Benthamism, this Benthamied approach. And I think if you understand that, as an economist, that helps you in understanding how much you should take out of any particular bit of analysis you do. You need to be honest about what it is and you need to have an understanding of this – I think it’s  David Hume, his problem.

I find I’ve been thinking a lot about that during the pandemic and I’ve been tried to be less dogmatic or less – maybe it’s making me less confident in saying that if you’ve got a particular cost-benefit analysis result and that’s the right thing. That’s a bit of a ramble. Sorry, Deb, but do you have any thoughts on that or in response?

Deb Brown 05:01

Yeah. First of all  cost-benefit analyses have their place. Sometimes I wish there were more of them driving decision making because sometimes I look at decisions and think that that isn’t even valid from a cost-benefit analysis. The fact the matter is, is that there are other considerations as well. There are considerations of ethics and equity and morality and so on. And I actually sort of do hold the view that morality has its  advantages, and that we only get those advantages if we aim at morality, not if we aim at something else. And I think the problem with utilitarianism is that because it focuses on the consequences and maximising what’s perceived as utility, that other factors can be obscured in the process. So the pandemic is a good example.

I was part of a webinar series with the Chinese University of Hong Kong, which included virologists from UQ, and people in the medical faculty, and as well as people who worked in biomedical ethics, which is not a specialisation of mine, so bit out of my league there. But, I was looking at these quality based arguments against lockdowns and, I actually think that… There, the argument was that you should only lock down if the quality0adjusted life years of doing so from a cost-benefit perspective outweigh not locking down. This was back in 2020, and at the time, it was relatively older people who were dying. So the quality0adjusted life years saved by locking down compared to the $11 billion a week it was costing during lockdown looked like it wasn’t justifying locking down in terms of pure monetary value. But the problem with this is that quality0based analyses and decision making, they make sense in certain contexts. So, here’s where I think that cost-benefit analyses do have a point.

So if you’re a hospital, and you’re trying to decide whether to invest in in one medical technology over another, and you’ve got information about how much QALYs each one will save, then you should go for the one that has the highest return on investment, in terms of QALYs. But the thing is, there’s an implied ceteris paribus clause there. All else being equal, if you’re choosing between A and B, and A gives you the biggest return on investment, in terms of QALY, then B should go for A.

But what was happening in the pandemic is that it wasn’t the case that all things were equal. So there were certain communities who were more durable than others. So not just the elderly, but also migrant communities in the United States. It was African American communities and indigenous communities who are being adversely affected by COVID. Often, because they’re frontline workers they’re often living in more crowded housing, and all of these different reasons contributing to them being a more vulnerable group, than say whites, or in the US, Asians. Here in Australia we were seeing that we’re certainly affecting low SES communities more, and in the UK, same deal. And also in the UK we’ve seen recently that disabled people are more adversely affected by COVID than other communities as well. And so things are not equal. So in those kinds of circumstances, you can’t just rely on the cost-benefit analysis, you have to take into account these fundamental issues of equity.

Gene Tunny 09:31

Yeah, there are all sorts of issues to take into account. Equity is important. So I’m trying to think how Gigi Foster, who is someone who came out and she was against the lockdowns because of she thought it wasn’t justified. You couldn’t justify it with a cost-benefit analysis for the reasons you were just describing before. And I think that Gigi is associated with that view. She would probably counter that, well, we could take that into account in our cost-benefit analysis with weights. We could, we could weight the loss of life for particular groups, we would provide more of a weight to that or that there’d be some way you could adjust it, I’m sure she’d say.

The problem is, what I think is incredibly difficult in analysing policy during the pandemic is we just don’t know. Early on, we just didn’t know how bad this would be. And now, the pandemic keeps surprising us with Omicron. And it’s just incredibly difficult to know what the right policy is. And we’re going to have to assess this in future decades. Well, what made sense, what didn’t?

I think we also need to take into account issues of civil liberties. And I think one of the problems with lockdown as a policy, even if you did think that in a cost-benefit sense it maybe it did make sense, o if you took into account the effects on different groups in the community, maybe you could argue it made sense. But even if it did, there are people who value those individual rights, the civil liberties, and you could argue that well, this was a breach of that this is something that really – I don’t think anyone contemplated government would do what they did during the pandemic. I think it’s quite extraordinary measures. I never thought governments would impose those lockdowns and stay at home orders that they did implement. And they saw what happened in China. That’s one view, argument, that we imported this policy of lockdown from China, which is an authoritarian regime. So depending on what your values are, you could argue against lockdown, because you think this is such a breach of our individual liberty. Am I on the right track there, Deb? Is that an important value to consider too?

Deb Brown 11:52

Well, certainly liberty is an important value, but the concept of liberty and the , associated concept of a right is not unqualified or unconditional. So from the earliest discussions of rights, take for example, John Stuart Mill back in the 19th century, so, you only have a right, if the exercise of that right does not interfere with the liberty or rights of others. Okay, so this is often referred to as Mill’s harm principle. So I don’t have a right, I don’t have a right to drive on whatever side of the road I like, because that will deprive you of your freedom of movement and your right to life. So that’s always been a constraint on the notion of freedom and the notion of freedoms and rights is that you just do not have a right to something, if that right is going to deprive somebody else of their rights and their liberties.

The interesting thing to me about this whole discussion around lockdowns is that we accept all sorts of curtailments of our freedom big so as to avoid harming others, right. I don’t remember this kind of stink about not allowing people to smoke in public places. Right? So we ban smoking in bars and clubs and public places and buildings and so on. And we’ve all just sat that out, because, and the argument was, is that people are exercising their right to smoke whenever they like actually causes harm through secondhand smoking to others. And so it can interfere with the exercise of their rights, their right to health and life and so on. And the kind of mask mandates lockdowns whatever might be our infringement on what you might think of as our freedoms, but we don’t have the liberty to harm others. And that’s the justification for those kind of mandates.

Now, it doesn’t mean when you when you curtail somebody’s freedom or their rights, it doesn’t mean that you are you are not respecting the concept of a right or a freedom. Right. But as I say, right, it has to be measured against what are the foreseeable harms here. I think that’s very different from embracing authoritarianism and I think we need to keep a distinction there. Not every curtailment of our freedom means that we’re subject to authoritarian control, right.

But it was interesting. I don’t know whether either of you saw this this wonderful publication pre 2020 by the Rockefeller Institute. They do this scenario kind of planning. And, and one of the scenarios that that they discussed is called Lockstep and they anticipate a global pandemic, and, and what sort of behaviours it will drive. And one of the things that that they envisage there is that in some countries, it will drive authority an acceptance of authoritarian control, and it predicts that those countries will do better in terms of managing the managing the pandemic, but at considerable costs to the liberty of citizens or subjects in those countries. Right. And that that may have long term consequences that are not justified by the authoritarian control. It also predicted that there would be anti-authoritarian movements. So, you can read this document and think, oh, my gosh, they were reading the tea leaves on the pandemic, because all of those sort of anti-authoritarian anti Vax movements are also predicted as well where people , do feel that they are suddenly being thrust under authoritarian control. And that’s why it’s very important to distinguish between authoritarianism to not sort of operate with extremes, to not just think because we have to wear masks in public spaces we’re heading in the direction of an authoritarian regime. No, it’s more subtle and complicated than that.

Gene Tunny 16:38

Okay, we’ll take a short break here for a word from our sponsor.

Female speaker 16:44

If you need to crunch the numbers, then get in touch with Adept Economics. We offer you frank and fearless economic analysis and advice. We can help you with funding submissions, cost-benefit analysis studies, and economic modelling of all sorts. Our head office is in Brisbane, Australia, but we work all over the world. You can get in touch via our website, http://www.adepteconomics.com.au. We’d love to hear from you.

Gene Tunny 17:13

Now back to the show. Did you have any thoughts, Tim?

Tim Hughes 17:18

Actually there’s so much involved in this whole in this whole talk. Could go on for hours. I’m cool with that. For instance, with the authoritarian lockdowns, etc. it is a very effective way of treating with contagious diseases and everything. So it’s been around for centuries that that whole thing. It’s an authoritarian measure, but it’s still very effective in locking down or containing contagious diseases.

Gene Tunny 17:52

I think quarantine or cordoning off particular areas.

Tim Hughes 17:56

Yeah, isolation.

Gene Tunny 17:57

Where there is infection. Yeah.

Tim Hughes 17:58

As far as measures go, it was a predictable measure that was going to come in. But I understand and agree. There’s this lively debate around how long and if it was the right thing to do, etc. I just hope that we get good modelling from this for whatever comes next, because who knows what may come in the future, but hopefully, we’ll be better prepared for it for what we’ve gone through with this.

Gene Tunny 18:26

Oh, absolutely. Let’s hope. We certainly will be. We’ll be talking about this and analysing this for decades. Deb, I was just thinking, this point about how we, you’re right, we don’t have a right to harm others, that’s right. The issue is what level of harm or risk or probability of harm, what’s the threshold, because every time we go out into the community, there’s a risk that we could be involved in a traffic accident, say, and we could harm someone else so there’s a level of risk that’s assumed, but this may be too big a question to deal with. This is where I think this whole issue of the lockdowns, that’s what annoys people. Some libertarians are thinking well, okay, well, what’s really the risk? I guess that the argument is that each person, anyone breaking the rules could actually start off a cluster and then that could grow in numbers. This is not relevant now in Australia, because it’s gotten out of control and it’s out there so that we’re not going to have any more lockdowns so there’s probably no point. But in the early days, the argument was that anyone doing the wrong thing could actually start off a cluster and so therefore, yeah, that could affect everyone else. Maybe I can see the logic there but that’s what I’ve been struggling with, what’s that level of risk to others in the community that would justify a restriction on liberties. And I don’t think we’ve got an answer to that. Has anyone been doing any thinking on that?

Deb Brown 20:07

I don’t know, although I think you’re exactly right, that we really need to, we really need to think about risks here, because you’re right, that there’s all sorts of things that we do. We assume normal risks, because the benefits of taking those risks warrant the risk. As you say, every time we get in the car there’s a risk that we could lose our lives, or suffer serious bodily harm. But overall, people agree to those risks, because driving has benefits, let’s say. Maybe less so as climate as climate change takes off. But for a long time, that’s what really justified people in assuming a level in that level of risks. And so then the question there’s been a lot of discussion.

I think, actually, Robert Nozick had something to say about this, and there were economists that he was drawing on as well, about the difference between a normal risk and an abnormal risk. Right. So we allow certain levels of normal risk in a society but we don’t allow, for example, people to play Russian roulette, right not for any amount of money, not for any benefit, right. And we regard that as, as an abnormal risk, it’s not justified and so on. And so the question is, like, where at various stages of the panic of the pandemic,  … Panic pandemic, that’s interesting. Where at various stages of the pandemic, what kinds of risks are we actually facing here? And I think I think that underlying a lot of the policy changes that we’re seeing recently is just the assumption that we are moving more into that normal risk space. And because I’ve sort of gotten tired of hearing about sheer numbers of people with COVID. The relevant data is numbers of hospitalizations, numbers of deaths. Deaths and hospitalizations, per capita, those are the relevant figures. If it’s true, I think it’s probably too early to say, but if, if we are moving more with the kind of vaccination regime into to having fewer hospitalizations, per capita from the pandemic, then that will sort of shift the balance. And lockdowns won’t be as justified as they were when the risks were much higher, when it was a bit like playing Russian roulette in terms of number of people dying from the from the pandemic. So I’m not myself a risk analyst. And you in your field you’re kind of masters of risk analysis. So I would have to learn from you here. But conceptually, it seems to me that’s the sort of space we need to be in.

Gene Tunny 23:10

Absolutely. I haven’t seen an authoritative analysis along those lines yet, for the pandemic. Hopefully. I’m sure economists will be turning their minds to that. There have been some. Judy Foster’s done a cost-benefit analysis of a sort for Victoria. She presented that to the Victorian Parliamentary inquiry. Gigi and some of her colleagues have written a book on the great panic. You could consider it polemical, in a way, but we do need to have some sort of authoritative analysis along those lines, because these are big questions about just how do we manage these things and what regulations are acceptable, what level of risk are we willing to bear. I’m going to have to look up that, that work by Nozick. It seems to ring a bell, but I’ll look it up, the normal risk versus abnormal risk. That looks like it could be highly relevant.

Deb Brown 24:14

Yeah. It’s a chapter in Anarchy, State and Utopia. as I as I recall, though it’s been a while since I looked at it.

Gene Tunny 24:24

Okay, I’ll I’ll look that up.

Deb Brown 24:28

I’m trying to remember the name of the economist, whether it was French or something beginning with F. I’m not sure. Yeah, there was an economist on whom he was, I think drawing in terms of that risk. He was sort of particularly interested in compensation, so when is compensation warranted for risky behaviour? And of course, being very interested in… He’s a libertarian right. So he’s sort of interested in in when is it ever justified to restrict people’s freedom to take certain kinds of risks, and when is compensation warranted and so on. That’s what I recall from that.

Gene Tunny 25:07

Okay. Oh, yeah, I’ll look it up. But that may be of interest. I may try and cover that on the podcast in the future. We’ll probably have to wrap up soon, given how much of your time we’ve taken, Deb. Sorry.

Deb Brown 25:18

No, I’m having a ball.

Gene Tunny 25:19

Oh, very good. Okay. Oh, well,

Deb Brown 25:21

I was just going to talk about the media literacy issue because I think in terms of the critical thinking project, that’s, that’s a massive area. And I’ve been shocked learning from colleagues at Queensland University of Technology, and University of Western Sydney, and particularly Tanya Notley there is a specialist on youth media literacy. I’m kind of shocked at the data coming out about not just the general public, but also sort of academics capabilities, in terms of fact checking and checking the sources of media articles and being able to do lateral searches, and so on to see what different sites say about the same the same article. Then I’m also shocked that the youth, right, get most of their news entirely from social media, there’s very little engagement with mainstream media, very little engagement with credible news and media. So I think this this is another kind of – the lack of media literacy is another kind of pandemic, and it really does contribute substantially to that culture of, of confusion and mistrust.

Tim Hughes 26:45

I love you’ve said that because that was what I was going to come back to because way back and, we’ve touched on it with intention and trust. And I think it’s such a big area, and you’ve gone straight to it, which is great. And how do we trust the new sources? And this isn’t a present day problem. This has always been a thing for everyone throughout the ages. How do you how do you trust your source of any kind of news, whether it be from a person or from an agency, or whatever it may be. And so with that also comes a limited amount of time that we may have as individuals to make our minds up on these different things that come up to us where we form an opinion, and any opinion is only as good as the information it’s based on. So if we’ve got good information, we’re going to have a reasonably good opinion, the more varied information, again, better opinion. So all of these things, and like you’re touching on, for instance, people getting their information, information from just one source is going to be biased, or maybe not a full picture. There are all these different ethical sort of problems with … We form our opinions. And we find our trusted news sources. And of course, there are more and more coming out all the time. Where does this sit in with critical thinking and to try and do this in a in a reasonably quick period of time, knowing that most people only have  a certain amount of time in their day to give towards forming an opinion on something in the new cycle? How can we do this better?

Deb Brown 28:31

I mentioned earlier we have this collaboration with the Impact Centre, which works with office forces and critical thinking to school students. And last year, one of my colleagues, who was the UNESCO Professor of Journalism at the University of Queensland, Peter, Greste – do you know Peter Greste, the foreign correspondent with that awful experience in in Egypt? So he approached me and he said, “I really want to work with schools to try and get a kind of journalism media literacy course going with schools. And I know you have all these collaborations with the Department of Education.” And, and he and I together, and other colleagues as well, and colleagues and the collaborators in the Impact Centre, put together this course on media literacy in journalism, and it’s offered to senior secondary students. And effectively what they’re doing is they’re learning about media literacy, but they’re also learning it in conjunction with critical thinking.

So often, when you look at the media literacy courses, they often concern tips and tricks for checking sources, right, finding out who the sponsor is of a page, doing lateral searches, but adding a layer of critical thinking over that. What you get is you get students thinking about how their thinking is framed, within, within an article. So what gets to be in the headline? The headline shapes how you’ll think about the rest of the article. How’s the information presented? What’s up front? Right? Is there an argument developed? Is there an analysis? Right? What justification is there for the things that are said in the article, so getting students to interrogate an argument, look within those practices of justification.

Then in conjunction with that media literacy course – and then there are teachers at the Impact Centre, particularly Dr. Luke Zaphir and, and Dave Thornton, who put together a fantastic course for school students, developing all those critical thinking and media literacy skills. It’s just amazing. In conjunction with that, the students also develop their own article. Sorry, they work with journalists from In Queensland, which is an independent news service in Queensland, and has a commitment to public service journalism. Journalists from In Queensland work with students in the, in the Media Academy to basically construct articles for publication in In Queensland. So if you look at the In Queensland website, they’ve got a Media Academy tab, and those are all the articles that were written by students in school. Fantastic opportunity for students to learn how journalism works, how it’s actually produced, and to think critically about the way in which information is presented in an article.

And I think , another big problem within media is that if you haven’t got a kind of blatantly biased media outlet, right, on the right, or on the left, whatever it might be, you’ve got this kind of bizarre assumption that all you need to do is to provide a balance of opinions. Right, and you’ve done your duty in critical analysis. First of all, there’s very little analysis. Often it’s just kind of putting together these polarised opinions and this assumption that as a journalist, you have to stay neutral. Neutrality will come through, if you actually do a critical analysis, right. I think that sort of presenting balanced opinions just contributes to the confusion out there, right. People think well, there’s this opinion and that opinion, and everybody has got a different opinion. So I can believe whatever I like. No.

Tim Hughes 32:52

Actually, one of the things with this, because we seem to, which isn’t a bad thing, but we look for certainty where we can. We’re always looking for definitives and absolutes. We like to know this is this is correct, and that’s wrong, etc, whereas, of course, the reality is, there’s a spectrum of likelihood or possibilities with so many things that we look at. And I love that in the article, the ABC article, you mentioned that one of the keys was being comfortable with doubt and uncertainty, and feeling free to change position if evidence or new information required it, which we touched on earlier. But it’s just such a great statement, I think, in allowing people to be okay being not so sure, this is the best yet, at the moment, this is the best information that’s out there is going to change and being open to that change and to changing opinions when things evolve now, so I think that’s a really … When we talk about polarisation, quite often, that’s because people have found a certainty maybe too soon or without researching it very much, whatever the issue may be, and, and then being sort of loyal to that certainty, regardless of what other information comes through, which of course, is a problem.

Deb Brown 34:17

I think being able to divest one’s ego from the argument of work is very, very important, but it’s very difficult for people to do because their identity is so much bound up with what they think and what they believe.

Tim Hughes 34:30

That’s right. And so to change their mind would be affecting… It’s a decision then to change their identity, or tribe, even. It can be part of the group that you’re in or the environment that you’re in, which you identify with. And so the incentive to change opinion or to change mind or to hear different views, of course, is not a welcome one.

Deb Brown 34:53

Yeah. It’s interesting that in collaborative reasoning environments, if they’re run effectively, you do see that behaviour shift, because the focus of the group is on the on the pointed issue, on the topic. And if you sort of don’t allow people to just make assertions, but to actually back that up with reasons very soon you start to see them giving and taking reasons where – not just giving out reasons, but taking them standing corrected. In children, you see that behaviour shift remarkably quickly. And then something happens to us, and we end up terrified to change our minds. Where did it all go wrong?

Tim Hughes 35:39

With this, with the critical thinking project, teachers and students, is it also open to anybody who might want to get in touch and learn from this? You might have mentioned this before, so apologies if you’ve mentioned it. But this is open to everybody? Is there something there for everyone? Because everyone I think could benefit from it.

Deb Brown 35:58

Oh do I get to do some product placement here?

Tim Hughes 36:02

 You do. Well, you are God after all today.

Deb Brown 36:05

[unclear 36:05]. Of course, working with the Department of Education, that’s restricted to government schools. But we also, we also have contracts with other schools. Peter and I have both done corporate training, for example, in critical thinking. I had a wonderful time in India with fin tech capital of the Tata Group, Tata’s biggest company in India. Had a wonderful session doing critical thinking with them. It was it was really fun. Like I said, we’ve got contracts and done work with Singapore, and UCLA, University of California, Los Angeles. They actually included the media literacy and journalism course in their critical thinking summer programme last year. And it was a huge hit. And I think so I think that that course could easily be made available to anyone. And I think it should. This is not just for kids. We all need this.

Tim Hughes 36:18

Yeah, for sure.

Deb Brown 36:19

The other issue that the other issue that’s driving along misinformation is just the unavailability of peer-reviewed publication sites. So the more open source publishing, open access publishing we can do – I would love it if university libraries we’re open to the public again, not just coming onto campus, but actually the online edition, but there’s all sorts of issues there around publishing as an industry as well, right? So that’s what sort of impedes that. But the more information we can make accessible, and quality information, we can make this accessible, the better off we’d all be.

Gene Tunny 38:03

Yeah, you’ve got those big journal companies, such as Elsevier and – is it Springer, I’m trying to remember – but they make millions or hundreds of millions or whatever out of university libraries paying for subscriptions to journals. It’s, it’s a bit of a racket, arguably.

Deb Brown 38:25

It’s very strange. We do all the work, the writing, reviewing. We do all the hard yards, and then [unclear 38:33] business model that one.

Gene Tunny 38:35

Yeah, that’s true. Okay, I think we’re gonna have to wrap up at a minute. This has been great. I did have one question. We’re hearing a lot about the need for these Enlightenment values. More people are talking about the Enlightenment and the Age of Reason, because there’s this recognition that we’ve, maybe we’ve lost touch with that. And then I know you’re an expert on Descartes. And he’s associated with rationalism. Is rationalism, like, how does that fit in with the Enlightenment and the Age of Reasons. Is the Age of Reason the same as the Enlightenment? Is rationalism – is that a very specific part of the Age of Reason? Is that just a hyper or a total reliance on reason, or is the Enlightenment something broader? Is there a way for us to understand this, Deborah, or is it just such a big question that it’s not really answerable in this context in this podcast?

Deb Brown 39:29

No, it’s a great question. And I’m all for a renaissance in the Age of Reason. So I think those terms are often used interchangeably, Age of Reason and Enlightenment. And a lot of people trace the Enlightenment as beginning really with Descartes, the publication in 1637 of his Discourse on Method, which really was sort of that introduction to the new method of relying on reason and needing yourself to be intellectually autonomous, as opposed to intellectually heteronomous, where you’re relying on authority.

The Enlightenment was connected up with this metaphor of light that permeates discussions in the, the 17th and 18th century. So Descartes appeals to the natural light, and distinguishes that from the teachings of nature, right? Nature might teach you that things are hot and cold. But if you examine them from a scientific point of view, it’s more likely that that heat is certain motion of molecules, and cold is nothing at all.

So the light of reason will revise what nature teaches you, if you like, and one should be guided by the light of reason, not by what seems to want to be true on the basis of sensory apprehension. The light metaphor was common. So you get lumiere in French, and you get aufklaren, which means sort of clarity or light in German, as being in opposition to Aristotelian scholastic philosophy, which dominated philosophy, particularly in the schools and universities, up to the end of the 16th century. And it was perceived as being doctrinaire and authoritarian so, even though a lot of original work went on in the Middle Ages, there was always this deference to authorities as Aristotle said, as Augustine said, and so on. And with the advent of the scientific revolution, that begins in the late 16th century, with people like Copernicus, and Kepler, and Galileo sort of developing a heliocentric view of the universe and really starting to develop this new mechanical, scientific theory and doing a lot more sort of experimental work and observational work using telescopes and so on. That all sort of doctrinaire, the categories of Aristotelian scholastic philosophy were thought to be mysterious, occult and didn’t fit with the new science.

Also coming into the 17th century, you’ve got] the European humanist tradition, right, this reclamation of ancient texts, particularly the Stoics, but also the sceptics as well. And both Latin and Greek texts, and that revival of kind of classical as opposed to Scholastic philosophy. All that sort of feeds into the 17th century.

And then you get Descartes who thinks that we can’t just keep going with philosophy has to kind of catch up with these revolutions in science and also in engineering as well. And it needs a nice new face, and it needs a new message, right? And it needs to be grounded in reason, because only that will sort of, in a way fit the kind of mechanical mathematical science that that is really taking over the whole scientific space. And Descartes, of course, is also motivated to ground that new science in a system of philosophy that’s not antithetical to religion, but is really basing his connection to religion on reason, right? And I think when people talk about the Age of Reason, this is what they mean is they mean a sort of rational foundation for religion as opposed to faith, right.

And that goes all the way through to Thomas Paine’s book, The Age of Reason, which is really like a rationalist kind of attempt to sort of ground religion on reason, as well. But yeah, so the Enlightenment is sort of set in opposition to the so-called Dark Ages, which is a term that seems to be coined by Petrarch, who’s one of these European humanists in the 14th century, even though he’s embedded in that mediaeval context, but he’s sort of arguing against this kind of authoritarian aspect of philosophy in that period.

And so when you get to the 17th and 18th century, you’ve got a new method, you’ve got this method of doubt, you’ve got scepticism being taken seriously again, and that scepticism becomes part of the message. Again, that’s just subjecting what you believe to doubt and upholding the highest standards of reasoning and evidence. It wasn’t as if it was all rationalist. I don’t actually like the division between rationalism and empiricism myself because the so-called rationalists like Descartes and Spinoza and the Leibniz, Newton, these are often [unclear 45:06] people are doing experimental philosophy, and often the empiricists so the people like Barclay and Locke and Hume and so on, are often relying on philosophical reasoning as well, not just sort of observation and induction. And, of course, Hume famously problematizes the very inductive method of science anyway, so those kind of binary categories are not really helpful.

But I think in a way, Kant kind of encapsulates in his essay what is the Enlightenment, is that the movement is about promoting intellectual autonomy, right? Not just relying on what others or testimony or what authority tells you, but applying the the methods of reasoning and analysis, so that your own beliefs on the securest foundation they can possibly be.

Gene Tunny 45:57

Yeah, yeah, that’s, that’s a great explanation of that, Deb, I was just thinking, not trusting, don’t necessarily trust authority. And this is where we’re getting into problems nowadays, because we’ve got people who are thinking, oh, well, I’m doing my own research. Fauci says this, but I’m doing my own research, but often it’s on the internet. It’s on the net, and the source might not be that accurate. And you could argue that maybe they haven’t thought enough about the reliability of what they’re looking at, to justify their dismissal of what the certain authorities such as the CDC, or in our country, what different state chief health officers are saying.

I guess this is where it’s challenging, because there is value in being sceptical. And this is an important part of, of scientific method is being sceptical. Then the challenge is, sometimes there is something valid being said by some of these authorities, and you can take that scepticism too far. Particularly if you’re not relying on , good information, if you’re not, if you’re not fully embracing that critical thinking and you’re thinking critically about the information you’re getting and the points of view you’re putting across. So that that just occurred to me, then when you talked about the importance of being sceptical and not necessarily deferring to authority.  I thought that was a really good point.

Deb Brown 47:36

Yes, it’s interesting. My husband and I spend each morning looking at World Metre. That’s what passes for fun nowadays. Let’s have a cup of tea and see how the virus is doing, darling. In general, I’m a little frustrated, just that you often can’t get the data. I think there’s an issue that maybe a lot of people are not going to be able to even interpret the data. And that’s certainly a problem. And that’s why everybody needs some training and statistics and critical thinking. But there’s a lot of data that you just can’t get like this data, I want to know, hospitalizations, I want to know deaths. Then there’s also this issue about how much of this is being reported. Make more data, make more information available. That’s sort of one thing.

And then there is also this question of trust. So who can you trust in this in this context? And one of the I guess the most important questions to ask is who has a vested interest in a certain kind of outcome being reported? I’m happy to trust Fauci because I don’t think that he has any vested interest in this. I’m less inclined to trust somebody who I think is spinning a yarn, because they’re only interested in being reelected or making their political party look good. Right. That’s an important question to always ask about any source. Then you do have to do those lateral searches, right, how is this being reported by these different organisations, what are their interests, who’s sponsoring this page and so on. You’re right, it’s a minefield, and the more information that there is out there that is just sort of polarised and politicised and all that, it just noise that interferes with being able to give an accurate assessment of the situation.

Gene Tunny 49:52

Absolutely. Okay. Deb, that’s been great. I think we’ve got to wrap up there. We’ve taken so much of your time. I’ve got so much tape here. I’ll have to think about whether release it as a whole episode or Imight have to split it up in two.

Tim Hughes 50:08

Six parts. Six-part series.

Deb Brown 50:12

I’m sorry.

Gene Tunny 50:14

Not at all.

Deb Brown 50:15

I’m just not getting out enough. This constitutes as getting out. I’m just so excited, I got a bit carried away.

Tim Hughes 50:21

Not at all.

Gene Tunny 50:22

That’s great.

Tim Hughes 50:23

We could completely carry on because it is fascinating. And they are very big topics. So really appreciate the care you’ve put into the responses there, Deb.

Gene Tunny 50:34

Yeah, thanks so much. Deb, really enjoyed chatting with you. And I’ll put links to as much of the material that you mentioned in the show notes so people can find that. Really valued your perspectives and your great knowledge of philosophy, which it’s given us a lot, given me a lot to think about, and a lot for Tim and me. I’m sure we’ll be chatting about this a lot in the future, these issues that came up today.

Tim Hughes 51:06

That’s the thing. They’re big issues that remain big no matter where you are in history, and important questions.

Deb Brown 51:18

Thank you. I really enjoyed your questions, and it was such a great conversation. Thanks for having me.

Gene Tunny 51:24

It’s a pleasure. Professor Deb Brown from University of Queensland. Thanks so much.

Tim Hughes 51:29

Thanks, Deb.

Deb Brown 51:28

Thank you. Bye-bye.

Tim Hughes 51:29

Bye-bye.

Gene Tunny 51:31

Okay, that’s the end of this episode of Economics Explored. I hope you enjoyed it. If so, please tell your family and friends and leave a comment or give us a rating on your podcast app. If you have any comments, questions, suggestions, you can feel free to send them to contact@economicsexplored.com and we’ll aim to address them in a future episode. Thanks for listening. Until next week, goodbye.

Credits

Thanks to Deb Brown and Tim Hughes for their great conversation and insights, and to the show’s audio engineer Josh Crotts for his assistance in producing the episode. 

Please get in touch with any questions, comments and suggestions by emailing us at contact@economicsexplored.com or sending a voice message via https://www.speakpipe.com/economicsexplored. Economics Explored is available via Apple Podcasts, Google Podcast, and other podcasting platforms.

Exit mobile version