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Revisiting Ricardo: The Rise and Fall of Ricardian Equivalence

This episode of Economics Explored explores the theory of Ricardian equivalence, a proposition that fiscal policy measures like tax cuts or stimulus payments may not effectively boost the economy if households anticipate higher future taxes to pay off government debt. Host Gene Tunny explains the concept originating from David Ricardo and popularized by Robert Barro, involving ultra-rational consumer optimization over infinite time horizons. While an elegant theoretical model, Ricardian equivalence relies on unrealistic assumptions and fails empirical tests. Evidence shows households do increase spending after rebates or transfers, although not always by as much as policy makers would like. Ultimately, while the merits of discretionary fiscal policy are debatable, Ricardian equivalence is too extreme a hypothesis. Households do not behave as ultra-rational dynamic optimizing models predict.

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Takeaways

Five takeaways from this episode are:

1. Ricardian equivalence is an elegant theoretical model but relies on unrealistic assumptions about rational consumer behavior.

2. Empirical evidence overwhelmingly finds that households do increase spending after tax rebates or fiscal stimulus, contrary to Ricardian equivalence predictions.

3. Related concepts like Friedman’s permanent income hypothesis are more nuanced but also face limitations in fully explaining consumer decisions.

4. While fiscal policy faces challenges, Ricardian equivalence is not a compelling argument against its effectiveness due to failures of the underlying theory.

5. Examining economic models against real-world evidence is important for evaluating their validity and implications for policy.

Timestamps

  • Introduction. (0:00)
  • David Ricardo’s economic theories and their relevance today. (5:30)
  • Ricardian equivalence in macroeconomics. (11:02)
  • Consumption function and fiscal policy. (17:48)
  • Rational economic models and their implications. (23:18)
  • Ricardian equivalence theory and its limitations. (26:41)
  • Ricardian equivalence theory and its empirical support. (33:59)
  • Consumer spending after receiving tax rebates. (39:10)
  • Ricardian equivalence in economics. (43:55)

Links

Previous episode in which Ricardian Equivalence was mentioned:

https://economicsexplored.com/2024/01/11/the-limits-of-fiscal-policy-insights-from-tony-makin-alex-robson-others-ep222

Robert Barro’s 1974 article “Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?”

https://eml.berkeley.edu/~saez/course131/Barro74JPE.pdf

James M. Buchanan on “Barro on the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem”

https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/260436

Geoffrey Brennan and James M. Buchanan on “The Logic of the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem”

https://www.jstor.org/stable/40911555

John J. Seater on “Ricardian Equivalence”

https://www.jstor.org/stable/2728152

T. D. Stanley on “New Wine in Old Bottles: A Meta-Analysis of Ricardian Equivalence”

https://www.jstor.org/stable/1060788

Economist 2008 column “Ricardian equivalence is dead”

https://www.economist.com/free-exchange/2008/05/19/ricardian-equivalence-is-dead

Anrdrew Leigh’s paper “How Much Did the 2009 Australian Fiscal Stimulus Boost Demand? Evidence from Household-Reported Spending Effects”

http://andrewleigh.org/pdf/FiscalStimulus.pdf

Matthew D. Shapiro & Joel B. Slemrod’s study “Did the 2008 Tax Rebates Stimulate Spending?”

https://www.nber.org/papers/w14753

Claudia R. Sahm, Matthew D. Shapiro and Joel Slemrod’s analysis “Check in the Mail or More in the Paycheck: Does the Effectiveness of Fiscal Stimulus Depend on How It Is Delivered?” 

https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/pol.4.3.216

Ikuo Saito’s paper “Fading Ricardian Equivalence in Ageing Japan”

https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2016/12/31/Fading-Ricardian-Equivalence-in-Ageing-Japan-44302

Transcript: Revisiting Ricardo: The Rise and Fall of Ricardian Equivalence

N.B. This is a lightly edited version of a transcript originally created using the AI application otter.ai. It may not be 100 percent accurate, but should be pretty close. If you’d like to quote from it, please check the quoted segment in the recording.

Gene Tunny  00:03

His argument was that all you’ve got to think about whether that be increase in income in the current period is a permanent increase or not. Because if it’s only a temporary increase, it doesn’t increase what they can spend sustainably over the long term buy much at all. Welcome to the economics explored podcast, a frank and fearless exploration of important economic issues. I’m your host gene Tunny. I’m a professional economist and former Australian Treasury official. The aim of this show is to help you better understand the big economic issues affecting all our lives. We do this by considering the theory evidence and by hearing a wide range of views. I’m delighted that you can join me for this episode, please check out the show notes for relevant information. Now on to the show. Thanks for tuning into the show. This week. I’d like to discuss what economists call Ricardian equivalence. You may recall that this concept was mentioned in the episode on the limits of fiscal policy earlier this year, and I’m going to be exploring it more this episode with my colleague, Arturo Arturo Espinosa, welcome to the programme. Thanks,

Arturo Espinoza Bocangel  01:21

Ian. I’m glad to be here. Excellent. So

Gene Tunny  01:24

yes, looking forward to chatting with you about Ricardian equivalence. Now this came up in a conversation I had with Tony maker. Well, I was replaying a previous conversation with Tony Mike and Tony is sadly, no longer with us. But in the conversation I had with Tony this, this idea of Ricardian equivalence came up. It’s one of those objections to fiscal policy as a way of influencing the business cycle as a macro economic stabilisation tool. And it’s a rather elaborate theoretical objection to fiscal policy. And result, it’s all very elegant. And I thought it’d be nice to go over it and explore it, because it does raise some important issues about how we think about the economy, how we model the economy. So if you’re happy to do that, I think that would be good. And if you’ve heard of this concept before, have you Arturo.

Arturo Espinoza Bocangel  02:30

Jaya during my time, so the students at uni, but I don’t remember very clear. So this is a good opportunity to refresh my memories.

Gene Tunny  02:43

Oh, good. Well, yeah. So hopefully, I can give a clear explanation. That yeah, so in we’ve been doing some, some reading. So to get across it, and to remind ourselves what it is because I must say it’s a proposition that was very popular when I was studying economics in the early 90s, early to mid 90s, when I started, because there was still some belief in this as an idea. This is a concept. But I think since then, we’ve probably figured out that maybe there’s really no, you know, not a lot of evidence to support it. So that’s something we’ll we’ll go over. The idea is that a fiscal stimulus, if it’s in the form of a tax cut, or a transfer to to households, if it’s a matter of cutting taxes, giving money to to households, the idea is that those households, or businesses, they will realise that in the future, the government has to, you know, pay, if they if the government’s borrowed money to finance this, then those households will have to pay higher taxes and otherwise, so that’s, that’s the idea. And that, and that, therefore, in the current period, they won’t spend that tax cut or that transfer that stimulus money, they will save it instead. So there’s that. That idea. And so it’s an argument as to why fiscal policy discretionary fiscal policy or fiscal stimulus may not be effective, because Okay, people will realise that the government is just borrowing this money, they’re taking on more debt, where the taxpayers we ultimately have to pay back that debt. And so we’re not any wealthier. That’s essentially the idea. And it’s, it’s based on households been forward looking about having this view into the future that we know we’re gonna have to eventually pay it back or our descendants will have to pay it back, our children, our grandchildren, and we have a we’re eltra not altruistic we what’s the word we we value the lives of our children out, we love our children, we, we, we want to, we want what’s best for them. So we’re not going to take on all this debt now and have, you know, live beyond our means so to speak and burden the future. So that’s, that’s the idea. Broadly speaking, I will try and define that more precisely, but that’s how I think of Ricardian equivalence is. Am I on the right track there,

Arturo Espinoza Bocangel  05:26

Arturo? Yes. That inclination was very clear again. Okay, good. Good. So

Gene Tunny  05:31

there are two things here. One is, is Ricardian so it’s named after David Ricardo, the famous economist. And then we’ll go into what’s equivalent. A bit later, we might talk about Ricardo to begin with. So David Ricardo, so his dates 18th 18th of April 1772 to 11th of September 18 23. So he lived. He lived through the age of wonder, whatever you however you want to describe it. So he was born just two years after Captain Cook discovered Australia for ice and, and he died in 1823. So he lived through the Napoleonic Wars. He was a British political economist, they call them in those days politician and Member of Parliament of Great Britain and Ireland’s This is from Wikipedia. recognised as one of the most influential economists, one of the most influential classical economists alongside figures such as Thomas Malthus, Adam Smith, and James Mills, so very esteemed company. Now, one of the one of my favourite descriptions of Ricardo comes from John Kenneth Galbraith, who was the American economist, professor at Harvard. He was an advisor to Jack Kennedy, he was Kennedy’s Ambassador to India. And Galbraith wrote this great book, The Age of uncertainty on, you know, history of economics, economic history, essentially. And this is quite a great description. Ricardo is Smith’s only serious contender for the title of founding father of economics. With him the great ethnic rivals of the Scotch arrive. Ricardo was Jewish. He was a stockbroker, a member of parliament, a man of superb clarity of mind and terrible obscurity of for this. That’s classic Galbraith. I mean, I don’t think anyone could write as well as Galbraith. He was it was a brilliant writer. So yeah, I mean, any, any economist relative to Galbraith? Probably, maybe we could be accused of obscurity of pros. Okay, so Ricardo, very famous, he wrote, was it Principles of Political Economy? I should know that off the top of my head, but he wrote a, he wrote several important works on in economics and his main claim to fame is the theory of international trade, isn’t it? It’s comparative advantage. And so this is this proposition that, like, we can talk about this in another episode, but essentially, David Ricardo demonstrated conclusively in a logical sense, why free trade is can benefit both parties. Why? Why countries can gain from trade from specialising in? Yes. Yep, and trading so of course, so specialising according to the comparative advantage of the country. And yeah, that’s something that you know, that’s a very, there’s a subtle definition of what comparative advantage is that we might go into in another in another episode, but it’s a very important theory in economics. Yeah,

Arturo Espinoza Bocangel  08:45

of course, I like to add some important information about this Ricardian model, tre, international trade causes in most of the International Trade courts around the world. The first model that is used in order to explain the patterns of trade is Ricardian model. It’s what that as you mentioned, basically is playing that country is specialised in in producing and exporting food that has a comparative advantage relative to other countries.

Gene Tunny  09:19

And is that based on the factor endowments what? What are the Allen’s please?

Arturo Espinoza Bocangel  09:25

The main reason is the level of productivity

Gene Tunny  09:30

level of productivity except Brian okay, we might go into that in another episode, but I guess the, like Australia, for example. I mean, a lot of people criticise Australia and say Australia is not a very complex economy. You’re just digging stuff out of the ground and exporting it or growing weed and exporting that. But I mean, we’re very good at that. Right? We’re very good at mining. We’re very productive in mining, and we’ve got great, great minerals, lots of valuable iron ore and and and coal coking coal in particular, which is very valuable. And so yeah, it makes sense for us to co produce and export that stuff. So yeah, we might well have to go into that Ricardian model of trade in, in the future. So the main point is that your Ricardo was a really big deal in economics. He essentially made the case for free trade. He argued against what was called mercantilism, which is the idea that countries become wealthy by exporting by having a trade surplus and bringing gold into the country accumulating gold in the reserves of gold. So that’s, he argued against that. He said, Well, that’s not necessarily the way to think about economic prosperity. So not exactly what we’re gonna talk about today. But it’s important to know Ricardo was very important in in that in international trade theory. Now, why is this relevant? What did Ricardo have to say about fiscal policy? Well, I mean, he wasn’t really a theorist of of, Oh, it wasn’t a macro. Well, I he’s a classical economist. So I suppose they did deal with that we’re thinking about the economy as a whole. But he’s not a macro economist, as we’d probably think of one today. But nonetheless, he did it, he did have this, he ran a thought experiment, you could call it or maybe you could say it was a bit of a thought bubble, but But he had this idea that of this equivalence between taxation and debt financing. So the Ricardian equivalence relates to the idea that if you think about this, in a particular type of framework, and you think about how these households eventually have to pay back the debt, so if you’ve got a choice between financing, spending, or financing, a particular like a surge in spending, because it’s a pandemic, for example, or a war, and it’s a choice between increasing taxes, or increasing, or borrowing the money in terms of how what happens to households, and you know, how they change their consumption, spending their behaviour, in this really theoretical framework, and under certain strong assumptions, which we’ll talk about soon, it could be the case that they just behave the same way that Yep, they might have to pay if they pay more taxes, and that lowers their disposable income, and then that may force them to, you know, that maybe they will cut back their consumption spending, they won’t spend as much. But then if the government goes and borrows money, then it may be that the households do the same thing, because they realise that, oh, hang on, we’ve got to pay for this in the future, eventually. So it’s as if let’s act now let’s spend less now let’s save more in anticipation of those higher taxes later on, because we have to pay the debt. So it’s this idea of this equivalence between taxation and debt finance, and I guess, this is where we start thinking, Well, hang on. That’s, that may not actually be what happens in reality. And indeed, Ricardo himself thought this was I think he thought he, he thought this was implausible, really, or he didn’t put a lot of he didn’t really, you know, make a huge thing about this is just a, you know, an idea he had just a speculation of his so I think that’s, it’s it’s certainly an interesting speculation to think about, like, how do households react to what the government does? And, you know, to what extent are they forward looking? To what extent are they Ultra rational, where this where this Ricardian equivalence thing, where it came from, or what where it was brought back into economics, or how it was brought back in economics was there was this school of thought that emerged in the late 60s and then in the 70s, called the New classical school of macro economics, which was trying to make macro economics more rigorous built, create micro economic foundations for it, because there was this view that what Keynes was talking about in the 30s. Okay, he, he didn’t really have really strong micro economic foundations or there was an optimising behaviour in it. There were a lot of us assumptions about how these macroeconomic aggregates such as consumption and income, were related to each other. But you weren’t really thinking about, well, how would rational households behave? So they, they had there was this idea that we want to have a more rigorous economics, that macro economics and it’s based on optimising models and, and one of the driving forces is the mathematization of economics in the post war period, from after Paul Samuelson foundations of economic analysis famous textbook in the in the 40s, where he brought mathematics to a lot of economics. And then the idea is let’s bring that to macro economics as well. Let’s have these really elegant optimization models and you know, Ricardian equivalence is is one of those types of models. Okay, how am I going to Euro? Very good. Okay. Okay. It’s a, it is a tricky sort of area to tricky concept to explain, I think. And having begun this conversation, I’m thinking okay, I’ll have to, maybe I’ll go and refresh my knowledge afterwards. But I hope that I am imparting enough of the substance of it. Okay, so who’s the big name associated with this proposition? Is Robert Barro, isn’t it? So? Okay, so Robert Barrow is one of the most famous economists of, say, the last 50 years or so. He’s probably the most famous economist out there at the moment who hasn’t won a Nobel Prize? I mean, who knows? It may be coming. But he hasn’t won one yet. At least as far as I’m aware, he hasn’t won the Nobel Prizes. He I probably would have put that down in the show in the notes. If he had. Okay, if he has I’ll, I’ll definitely double check that but I’m pretty sure he hasn’t Paul Lucas. Sorry, not Paul Lucas. Robert Lucas. won the Nobel Prize for new classical economics Thomas saj. And I’m pretty sure Robert Barro hasn’t won it. He’s currently the Paul M. Warburg professor of economics at Harvard. And he’s, you know, as a visiting scholar at American Enterprise Institute, research associate of National Bureau of Economic Research, PhD in, in economics from Harvard and a Bachelor of Science in physics from Caltech. I think it was a student of Richard Feynman, I think I read that. And he went into economics was he, he realised that, you know, physics was something he might not, you know, rise to the top in. He thought our economics is probably a better bit. Physics is too crowded. There are too many, you know, really, really smart people in physics. And they thought, Well, why not? Economics? That could be something different. But yeah, Barrow, right, this very famous article in the 1980s 1974, published in the the house journal of the University of Chicago economic School, which is the Journal of Political Economy, and his article is our government bonds, net wealth, and extremely clever paper, I’ll put a link in the show notes. But yeah, the basic idea there is that, if you think about it, in a particular type of model that was popular in the post war period, a particular way of thinking about macro economics, and less government bonds were was seen as something that made the community wealthier on their own, then they shouldn’t have a significant or they shouldn’t have an impact on consumption spending, because they shouldn’t make the community feel any wealthier, at least, that’s the that’s the idea. And his argument was that, well, if households realise that they actually are the ones who have to service that debt and pay back the debt, eventually as taxpayers, then they’re not any wealthier. So they’re not going to, you know, lift their level of consumption spending, if the government gives them a tax cut or transfers some money to them. So that’s the that’s the basic idea. Now, an a related concept, and I have been struggling to think about how to bring this into the conversation because it is related to it in a way that comes at this issue from in a different way. There’s the there’s Milton Friedman’s idea of the permanent income hypothesis. And, like one way of looking at fiscal policy if you’re thinking about a tax cut or a stimulus check, for example, Apple. And this is another way of thinking about this same question using a different model or a different, slightly different theoretical framework. And this was an objection to some of the the temporary, you know, bonuses or the temporary tax cuts or stimulus money that we’ve seen in different crises, like Milton Friedman argue that your consumption spending is related to your permanent income, which is essentially what you could, what you could spend out of your, out of your wealth sustainably over the long term. So if I’m getting that, right, so. So Keynes is consumption function related, corroding, current income to cut related your consumption spending to your current income. So if your B income is, say, say it’s, you know, $5,000 or something, and there’s an increase in your income of $1,000. And then Keynes would have this coefficient, the marginal propensity to consume and say, That’s point eight, then there’s this mechanical relationship of income goes up by 1000 times point eight, then your spending will go up. $800. So that’s the, that’s the Keynesian consumption function. And Friedman objected to that, because his argument was that, well, you’ve got to, you’ve got to think about whether that increase in income in the current period is a permanent increase or not. Because if it’s only a temporary increase, but doesn’t increase what they consider spend sustainably over the long term, by much at all, and his argument is that households would try to smooth out their consumption. Over time, there’s this idea that we’re better off if we have a more steady, sustainable standard of living, rather than having some periods where we’re spending more and living, living really well than other periods where we’re not living great at all. We’re on hard times, we’d be better off in his optimising model and his rational optimising model, we’d be better off saving those temporary windfalls and income, and you’re saving them up for times where we had less income, and so smoothing our consumption in that way. And so that’s an argument against fiscal stimulus, because you could, it could be the case that people get their tax cut, or their stimulus check. And they realise, well, hang on, it’s not really making us is not really lifting our permanent income, which is not going to make us you know, make us huge impact on our on our, you know, average income over the next five or 10 years. So why should we spend it baby, let’s say that, and we can use it to help smooth out income, it can cover those difficult periods. So that’s another example of an optimising model. And it’s a similar type of philosophy to Ricardian equivalence, but it’s not. It’s not quite the same thing because Barrows proposition is stronger than that. And because in Friedman’s model, it’s possible that if if the government’s transfer enough money to households, then they might think that Well, yeah, we are wealthier. It is, it will, this level of additional money will allow us to spend much more sustainably into the future. But Barrow goes further than Friedman, because in Barrows model, those households would realise that they would eventually have to pay back that money through the tax system. So that ultimately not any wealthier. So there’s, there’s probably a higher level of rationality in Barrows model, then, then Friedman’s model that Fred’s Friedman’s model gets you sort of the, you know, partly the way there because you’re starting to think about the future and households are starting to think rationally. What’s coming up in the future? Does that make sense? Or am I complicating things?

Arturo Espinoza Bocangel  24:31

I think I’m Porton assumption for the neoclassical economists here. Yeah. Individuals are acting as a rational. Yeah,

Gene Tunny  24:41

they’re rational and forward looking. Yeah. And so in Friedman’s model, then Friedman gets us a lot of the way there with this permanent income model. And then Barrow basically goes even further and says that households are so smart that they realise that any money that the government is is giving you temporary? Well, that it’s actually giving you through a tax cut or through a stimulus check. You’re gonna have to pay that back later. So you’re not any wealthier overall. And so there’s there’s there’s no increase in permanent income in in that situation. And yeah, there’d be no change. Whereas in the Friedman model, there’s a possibility maybe there is a small, a small impact on consumption if I think about that. Okay, we’ll take a short break here for a word from our sponsor.

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Gene Tunny  26:06

Now back to the show. Yeah, these ultra rational models, Friedman sort of started the this is an idea and then the new classical economists took it to the limit. Okay, so that was that was Barrow a very, very famous paper and generated a huge literature, people arguing about this theoretically. And then there was a lot of empirical work which we might go into. One point I should make at the moment is that when Barrow first wrote this paper, it wasn’t called Ricardian equivalence Barrow, himself didn’t realise that, that he was almost channelling Ricardo in a way. But this was pointed out by James Buchanan, who was a Nobel Prize winner for his work in public choice theory, what was called public what’s called Public Choice Theory. And he was at Virginia Polytechnic Institute at the time, I think that’s now George Mason University. Or I could have that wrong. But anyway, James Buchanan. He wrote a famous article in 1976, which pointed out that essentially what what Robert Barrow had done was rediscovered this proposition of David Ricardo and I might read this abstract because it’s very, it’s quite, quite succinct. So James Buchanan wrote his public debt issue equivalent to taxation. This is an age old question in public finance theory. David Ricardo presented the case for the affirmative. Professor Robert J. Barrow re examines this question in his recent paper, without however making reference to Ricardo or other earlier contributors, although his discussion has carefully qualified to allow for exceptions under specified conditions, the thrust of Barrows arguments supports the Ricardian theorem to the effect that taxation and public debt issue exert basically equivalent effects. So I think, yeah, my it’s interesting be cannon makes the point that David Ricardo presented the case for the affirmative, because my understanding was that even though Ricardo did make that, or he did make the case, he didn’t think that it was something that was realistic, in that it didn’t apply in reality, I think might have been Galbraith or someone like that, who made that point that even though no Ricardo wrote about this in the funding system, he himself thought it was a bit of a theoretical curiosity. Okay, and one thing you found so this is another article by Buchanan you dug this up before, Arturo? Because you didn’t I think this goes to this is related this point I was making about how this is a very elegant theoretical model is based on optimising behaviour forward looking rational. Now, let’s make the most elegant mathematically. What’s the word? Elegant, I suppose or logical model where you’ve got people maximising their their utility, what economists call utility, their satisfaction, and they recognise that they’re there ultimately, they ultimately have to pay the debt. So yeah, Buchanan and Jeffrey Brennan. So Jeffrey Brennan’s an Australian, he was at ASU and his son Michael Brennan actually runs the ball. He did run the Productivity Commission here. Now he’s running the e 61. Institute. Interesting. Yeah, yeah. And he was a senior person in the treasury after I was there, but he is all very good. Jeffrey Brennan, I remember did a staring rendition of Rule Britannia at tattersalls Club at a dinner, I went to law school dinner I went to, but 20 years ago, it was a, it was a good thing. It was a great singer and a very intelligent man. Very good economist. Okay. Now, that all of course is completely irrelevant to the point, the logic of the Ricardian equivalence theorem by Jeffrey Brennan and James Buchanan, which was published in was it finance archive? I think it was, yeah, the German public finance journal. And they, they list these very well, you’d say they’re restrictive conditions, aren’t they for, for this whole this theoretical approach this model applying, and I might put them in the show notes. But essentially, they make some very strong assumptions about how, you know, well, one is that capital markets are perfect individuals may borrow and lend at the same rate as the government. And I think what this is getting to is the fact that look, even if ourselves are rational and forward looking, they may not be able to act in such a way because they’re not able to easily borrow that you can’t borrow as much as you’d like to help smooth your consumption over time to. So it could be the case that if the government gives you a tax card, and or gives you a stimulus check, you may really need that money. In a in a theoretical, in an idealised world, you could have just been temporarily on hard times, and in that idealised world you could have borrowed against your future income, because you know, I’m gonna get out of this in the future. So rather than struggling now, and you know, me struggling to pay rent or buy the groceries, I’ll just borrow against my future income. But that doesn’t mean you can’t always do that in the real world. I mean, people do sort of, you know, some people try and do that through credit cards. But that’s a recipe for financial disaster in the long run. So it may be that, you know, fiscal, fiscal policy measures, such as a tax cut, or a stimulus check, has an impact because it helps alleviate a liquidity constraint. So there’s this concept of liquidity constraints. And that was one of the major objections to well, this whole new classical approach, and also to well to Friedman’s model, in a way, yes, definitely the Freedmen’s model, that, you know, one of the things that stops people from acting, as optimising over time rational households is the fact that you you may not be able to borrow the money that would be compatible with that optimization. So that’s that point. And then there’s some other points about how assumptions that that’d be Canada and Brandon, identify individuals are certain as to both current and future income and prospects. Which is, yeah, I mean, people, you know, so any theory about where people are optimising the future and making optimal decisions? Essentially, you have to assume that they know how the future is going to evolve. And it may be that they, they don’t. And so it could be that, you know, people’s, well, in the Ricardian model, it could be the case that, well, they see the government borrowing this money to give them a tax card or pay them a stimulus check. But in their own mind, they’re thinking, Well, I’m going to be wealthier in the future anyway, I’m going to be earning a higher income, so I don’t really care as much. Maybe I have to pay a little bit more tax, but but who cares? So they in that model? Yeah, there’s the Ricardian model essentially, assumes that they have this perfect foresight. Number five individuals, as current taxpayers and as potential future taxpayers behave in terms of infinite planning horizons, they act as a mortals Yep. So they either act as a mortals. Yeah. Okay. So what’s that, assuming that’s assuming that they care for their descendants? Basically, as if they’re just future versions of themselves at a later date in the future? It’s essentially you like your children, your grandchildren are essentially just you at a future date. And so that’s, that’s a very strong assumption. I mean, and it may be the case that, look, you know, one generation may be perfectly happy, running up a bill for future generations to buy. I mean, not that I’m saying that necessarily doing that, but, you know, it’s not necessarily the case that people are acting as a mortals I mean, just think about I mean, there are plenty without children, they may not have any connection. They may not feel any connection with sex with future generations. Right? So it’s a pretty, it’s a very strong assumption now that there were there were seven of those assumptions. I haven’t read them all out. But I’ll put them in the show notes. And you can check that out that the main point is that look, there’s there’s just very stringent conditions for this Ricardian equivalence to hold that, in reality, it’s probably not going to hold and therefore this objection to fiscal policy, this idea that households are going to just save any additional money the government gives them, it doesn’t seem to be, you know, supported when you think about it logically. Maybe in an elegant theoretical model, but not in reality with how people behave and what will go on to now as the evidence and my reading of the evidence is that it doesn’t support this hypothesis. Okay, any other points on the theory there, Arturo? No, I feel I’m gonna have to write this up. In an article just because I think that link, yeah, I want to explain how this model fits with these other models such as Friedman’s permanent income, because I think that’s a that’s an important question. Okay. What does the evidence say? Now, this is really interesting, because if you look at the earliest empirical studies after Barrows model came out, there were studies that were essentially finding support for it. But then later on, economists changed their mind as more evidence accumulated. Then when it first emerged, it was it was a popular proposition and there was a 1993 Journal of Economic Literature review paper Ricardian equivalence by John cedar, and he’s at North Carolina, North Carolina State University. So Journal of Economic Literature is the one of the leading journals published by the American Economic Association. The idea is to have authoritative literature reviews that summarise the current state of the economic literature on important questions. And his conclusion was that although tests of Ricardian equivalence do not quite give an unambiguous verdict on that propositions validity, I think it is reasonable to conclude that Ricardian equivalence is strongly supported by the data. Now, you know, I wasn’t a practising economist at that time, that was my first year at uni. And, but I do imagine that that would have been a controversial conclusion. And it’s definitely been reversed since then. So in 1998, there was a meta analysis. So this is a study of studies where you look at what Previous studies have found, ideally, if you can get hold of their data, you try and rerun all the, you know, try and pull all the data together, run a big regression that don’t always do that. But you’d at least look at each of the studies and try to work out well which is more authoritative, which has a better methodology, which is using better data, that sort of thing and come to a judgement as to where does the where does the weight of the evidence why and in the conclusion in that paper, is it by by a TD Stanley at Hendricks College in Arkansas, published in southern economic journal new wine in old bottles, the meta analysis of Ricardian equivalence and that concluded that a quantitative review or meta analysis of 28 empirical studies of the Ricardian equivalence theorem gives persuasive testament of its falsity, which is, you know, pretty much what I would I would have expected given that just how really outlandish the theoretical assumptions behind the model are when you think about it, and just think, just use common sense and and look at it if anything would have killed off the Ricardian equivalence theorem. It would have been evidence from the financial crisis and then the pandemic since then, the the free exchange column in The Economist may 19 2008. So this is prior to the the the financial crisis, but there was a looks like there was a tax rebate. There was a 2001 tax rebate in the US and then there was another one, maybe it was 2007. I’ll have to put that in the show notes. But they were looking at how consumers were spending their rebates. And this is the calmness in The Economist, so the authoritative magazine published in London, they wrote, I tend to be wary of the effectiveness of fiscal stimulus, though at least anecdotally, the current stimulus seems to be working theoretically, people should not increase consumption in response to a small temporary increase in income unless they face liquidity constraints. Or taxpayers might recognise that rebates increase the size of the budget deficit, if there is no corresponding decrease in government spending, that their future taxes will pay, okay? So they might recognise that rebates increase the deficit. And that means I’ll have to pay higher taxes in the future. But these factors suggest most of the rebate will be saved and not spent, perhaps consumers do consider these factors and plan on saving their rebates. But then what he does is he quotes evidence, or this colonists quotes evidence from Matthew Shapiro and Joel Slemrod. So well known us economists. Okay, so at the time of the rebate, when they got it in 2001, only 22% of respondents planned on spending it. Although they found little evidence, people factor government spending, ie future deficits into their decision. Okay, so that’s what they were thinking about at the time. But then, there’s a study by David Johnson, Jonathan Parker, and Nicholas Sulukule, that, that they actually spent a significant amount of it or a non trivial amount of it, they found that the average household spent 20 to 40% of their rebate within three months of receiving it. And two thirds of the rebate was spent within a quarter of receipt, lower income groups spend a large fraction of their rebate, I’ll put a link to that in the show notes as there’s a bit going on there. There’s quite a few different points there. The basic point is that people do spend more of a rebate, a tax rebate, they get that you might then these models, you know whether it’s permanent income hypothesis of Friedman or in the extreme the barrow, Ricardian equivalence, people do spend more than you might, then these models would predict. And this was also concluded by Andrew Lee, who’s a federal MP here in Australia, who is a professor of economics today, I knew how much did the 2009 Australian fiscal stimulus, boost demand evidence from household reported spending effects, he used some survey evidence. And he looked at the $21 billion in household payments delivered in Australia between December oh eight and may 2009. So he’s talking about the Rudd stimulus money. So the Rudd Government stimulus packages and 40% of households. So this is what Andrew found 40% of households who said they received a payment reported having spent it and you know, that’s a higher rate than in, in the US. And Andrew speculated that it could have been because of the form of the of the assistance, it was a it was a stimulus check, rather than a rebate of tax. And so Andrew was saying there could be something psychological going on there, you know, individuals are more likely to, to spend bonuses, so to speak, rather than, than rebates. But yeah, so Andrew does, essentially concluded that there’s this marginal propensity to consume out of these rebates, or this, you know, the stimulus money, I mean, of point four, one 2.42. So, that was spending around, you know, that two out of every $5 that they got so so they get this money, and they do actually spend a portion of it, it’s not as if they just leave it in the bank and, you know, maintain just just been what they normally would wait to wait to actually use some of it to go and maybe at the time, people were saying they were going to buy a flat screen TVs, that was the popular thing at the time to buy. But, yeah, definitely, there was more spending than then would have been expected. Right. I mean, the debate does go on. There have been some findings supportive of Ricardian equivalence, I should know there was a study by a former Treasury colleague of mine, Shane brittle, who, unfortunately is no longer with us. He was at University of Wollongong and I think he, this was a study published in the Australian Economic Review. He found some Ricardian impact but he couldn’t accept or he didn’t find in favour of full Ricardian equivalence. He did. He studied the macro data and his macro modelling suggested that over the long run changes in general government savings are offset by changes in private savings by almost a half minus point four, four. This implies that the behavioural response of households and corporations is not fully Ricardian. Well, I think that’s that’s right. So yeah, there’s definitely not full Ricardian equivalence. Could it be that maybe households there could be some Ricardian equivalence I don’t know, maybe, maybe, maybe households do realise that the eventually they might have to pay more in taxes. But maybe the reason that they’re saving part of it is this, this Friedman argument of permanent income, they realised that it hasn’t really allowed them to lift their consumption on a sustainable basis by much at all. And so therefore, let’s not spend too much of it. Now. Let’s save up the bulk of it. So look, whether what Shane’s found is regarding whether what whether he found some partial support for Ricardian equivalence, I think that’s that’s up for debate. My personal view is that it’s just such an extreme hypothesis. It’s yeah, it’d be it’d be hard to find any support for for it at all. This is not to say that discretionary fiscal policy is sensible. I think there are, there are plenty of arguments against fiscal stimulus discretionary fiscal policy that don’t require Ricardian equivalence what Tony makin was talking about with crowding out via interest rates via the exchange rate, all of the lags that that occur from when you recognise a shock in the economy to when the fiscal policy might actually impact. I think these are all valid reasons to question discretionary fiscal policy, but Ricardian equivalence probably isn’t one of those. Okay, Arturo, I think that’s that’s probably enough. I was going to talk about Japan, but I just don’t think Japan provides support for it either. There was initially a thought that maybe Japan’s The Ricardian case, because there was, you know, there was a lot of fiscal stimulus in the 90s. And it didn’t revive the economy. But, you know, Japan’s got Japan’s really, you know, it’s a bit of a special case. And I mean, we might go into it in another, another episode, but there are a lot of economic challenges there. And now they got the demographic challenge shrinking population. They had, you know, very, very high saving rate. Yeah, it’s a it’s a, it’s a different economy than ours in a way and, yeah, I mean, the conclusion is that it’s not really an example of Ricardian equivalence. And if it were, it’s becoming less Ricardian, there was a an IMF paper I’ll link to in the show notes that argues that it’s if it was recorded, and it’s becoming less so over time. But yeah, I think we might just leave that. Possibly I’ll do a bonus episode on Japan. But my feeling is that there’s just so much evidence against Ricardian equivalence, theoretically, it doesn’t. It’s just too strong. I mean, it’s very elegant model. It’s beautiful model. But the real world people just don’t behave as they do in elegant. optimising economic models. Maybe I have to follow this up with an article but hopefully I’ve got the main points across so anything you’d like to add?

Arturo Espinoza Bocangel  48:05

Well, in will basically, just to summarise so these recurrent colons, as you mentioned, was very formal model, I think is good for the students, academics, researchers, just to check that our current political evidence is can be cross check against the this model. So I think is supposed to want to explain these concepts, and also using data from different countries.

Gene Tunny  48:48

Yeah, yeah, exactly. Okay. So yeah, I think looking at different countries is important. Which is why and if you’re in the audience, you think it’d be good to look at Japan? Because, I mean, Japan was certainly one of the countries I was, when I first started studying economics. That was one of the countries I was interested in. Because it was just after the bubble burst. I mean, there was that. Well, what was it this square kilometre around the Imperial Palace was worth more than all the land in Manhattan or something, something along those lines, there was some crazy statistic about how much the Japanese property market was worth and Japan was just riding high in the late you know, in the 80s. And and they’re all these concerns are the Japan’s going to overtake the US and then they had the crash and the bubble burst and there’s all the talk about trying to revive it through fiscal policy through infrastructure spending, and it just didn’t just didn’t revive the economy and they had their last decade. But if you’re interested in hearing more about Japan, I can certainly cover that in a in a future episode and try to find someone who’s, you know, knowledgeable about Japan. If you know anyone, let me know. Okay, how to Thanks so much for your time. I really enjoyed chatting about Ricardian equivalence with you. Oh,

Arturo Espinoza Bocangel  50:04

thank you for having me again.

Gene Tunny  50:06

Very good rato thanks for listening to this episode of economics explored. If you have any questions, comments or suggestions, please get in touch. I’d love to hear from you. You can send me an email via contact at economics explore.com Or a voicemail via SpeakPipe. You can find the link in the show notes. If you’ve enjoyed the show, I’d be grateful if you could tell anyone you think would be interested about it. Word of mouth is one of the main ways that people learn about the show. Finally, if your podcasting app lets you then please write a review and later writing. Thanks for listening. I hope you can join me again next week.

50:55

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Credits

Thanks to Obsidian Productions for mixing the episode and to the show’s sponsor, Gene’s consultancy business www.adepteconomics.com.au. Full transcripts are available a few days after the episode is first published at www.economicsexplored.com. Economics Explored is available via Apple PodcastsGoogle Podcast, and other podcasting platforms.

Categories
Podcast episode

The Limits of Fiscal Policy: Insights from Tony Makin, Alex Robson & others – EP222

This episode on the limits of fiscal policy features highlights from host Gene Tunny’s past conversations with the late Australian economist Professor Tony Makin and former OECD Ambassador Alex Robson. In the discussions, Tony Makin provides a balanced and insightful analysis of Australia’s fiscal response to the COVID-19 pandemic, critiquing programs like JobKeeper while recognizing some justification. He and Alex Robson discuss the importance of considering the open economy impacts of fiscal stimulus and the long-term burdens of debt. The episode looks to validate Makin’s warnings about the limits of discretionary fiscal policy through subsequent evidence and events. Gene summarizes the JobKeeper evaluation results and what happened in the Australian housing market following the pandemic fiscal stimulus. 

Please contact us with any questions, comments and suggestions by emailing us at contact@economicsexplored.com or sending a voice message via https://www.speakpipe.com/economicsexplored.

You can listen to the episode via the embedded player below or via podcasting apps including Google PodcastsApple Podcast and Spotify.

What’s covered in EP222

  • Fiscal policy limits and its impacts: introduction (0:03)
  • Economic stimulus measures during the COVID-19 pandemic. (9:36)
  • JobKeeper program design and targeting. (15:44)
  • JobKeeper program’s effectiveness and infrastructure spending challenges. (21:31)
  • Keynesian economics and infrastructure spending. (27:50)
  • Fiscal policy and its impact on the economy. (33:13)
  • Fiscal policy and its unintended consequences. (40:12)
  • The economic impact of public debt with Tony Makin and Alex Robson. (48:31)
  • Fiscal policy and its impact on the economy: wrap up. (53:39)

Takeaways

  1. Fiscal stimulus packages must be carefully designed and limited in size to avoid unintended consequences.
  2. The nature of the workforce is important to consider when implementing fiscal policy, as not all workers can easily transfer to different industries.
  3. The burden of public debt, including interest payments, can have long-term impacts on national income and economic growth.
  4. The effectiveness of fiscal policy in an open economy is influenced by factors such as capital mobility and exchange rates.
  5. Tony Makin was a leading advocate for sensible fiscal policy in Australia, and his contributions to the field are greatly missed.

Episodes the highlights are clipped from

EP119: What Tony Makin taught us about macroeconomics – Economics Explored 
A Fiscal Vaccine for COVID-19 with Tony Makin – new podcast episode | Queensland Economy Watch

Links relevant to the conversation

Fiscal policy papers by Tony Makin:

The Effectiveness of Federal Fiscal Policy: A Review

(PDF) Australia’s Competitiveness: Reversing the Slide 

 A Fiscal Vaccine for COVID-19

Treasury analysis of JobKeeper:

Independent Evaluation of the JobKeeper Payment Final Report | Treasury.gov.au

The employment effects of JobKeeper receipt | Treasury.gov.au  

News regarding unintended consequences of fiscal stimulus:

Building company collapses into liquidation days before Christmas, impacting four Guzman Y Gomez sites

Transcript: The Limits of Fiscal Policy: Insights from Tony Makin, Alex Robson & others – EP222

N.B. This is a lightly edited version of a transcript originally created using the AI application otter.ai. It may not be 100 percent accurate, but should be pretty close. If you’d like to quote from it, please check the quoted segment in the recording.

Tony Makin  00:03

For instance, baristas who’ve lost their jobs are not necessarily going to be one want to be out there on the road as a construction worker, financial sector employees and not wanting to be perhaps putting paint bets and ceilings. So the the nature of the workforce is important. We can’t just treat the labour force as this homogenous entity where people can transfer across to any sort of industry at whim.

Gene Tunny  00:39

Welcome to the economics explored podcast, a frank and fearless exploration of important economic issues. I’m your host, Gene Tunny. I’m a professional economist and former Australian Treasury official. The aim of this show is to help you better understand the big economic issues affecting all our lives. We do this by considering the theory evidence and by hearing a wide range of views. I’m delighted that you can join me for this episode, please check out the show notes for relevant information. Now on to the show. Hello, in this episode, I’m going to talk about the limits of fiscal policy. So that’s the use of government spending and taxation to influence the economy. So to try to smooth out the business cycle or to respond to some big shock, like the pandemic or the financial crisis. During the pandemic, in particular, we saw heavy use of fiscal policy by governments around the world. While some stimulus may have been warranted, we’re starting to really see some of the adverse consequences of fiscal stimulus packages in different countries. So you could argue that are a good part of the inflation that we’ve seen in the last couple of years that was due to the, you know, these massive fiscal policy responses that occurred that, that injected all of this additional money into household and business bank accounts, and we ended up with too much money chasing too few goods, which is that that classic explanation of inflation. We’ve also seen high public debts. So big increase in debt worldwide. And then we’ve got the growing burden of interest payments on government budgets. We’ve also seen impacts like what you’d call crowding out, we’ve seen supply side impacts, or constraints really starting to, to bite, particularly in the building industry. So some of these, these unintended consequences, you could say, maybe they should have been foreseen, they’re really starting to have an impact, particularly here in Australia, we’ve seen an impact on the building industry on its costs, and that’s affecting firm viability. So there’s all this extra demand, and there’s only so much supply out there. And, you know, supply can only respond in, it can’t respond automatically or instantly, to to this additional demand. So we’ve seen a big increase in in costs in that sector, and then that’s having all sorts of adverse impacts and you know, builders are closing down and then the people who are getting their houses built, they’re badly impacted, too. So that’s, that’s one of the things we’re seeing here in Australia that I’m going to talk about. Early in the pandemic, Professor Tony Macon of Griffith University in Australia. So Tony was based on the Gold Coast, which is south of Brisbane, where I am so early in the pandemic tiny warned about the adverse consequences of fiscal stimulus in Episode 41 of the podcast. So in one of the earlier episodes of this show, in June 2020, I spoke with Tony about his analysis of Australia’s fiscal response to the pandemic. He prepared that for the Centre for independent studies, which is a think tank in Sydney. So the CIS it’s one that I’m an adjunct Fellow at and I’ve had a lot to do with over the years. I’m gonna play some clips from that conversation I had with Tony, in, you know what turned out to be one of the early Months of the pandemic. So, I mean, things started going, going crazy. And when was it March 2020. So that’s a, it’s just a few months after, after that. We had a big a major fiscal policy response by the end of March in Australia, if I remember. And so we’re starting to see some of the, you know, the less desirable features of that already in in June when I spoke with Tony. Okay, so I’m going to play some clips from that conversation to illustrate some really important points about the limits of fiscal policy. So I’m not saying that activist fiscal policy is everywhere and always bad. I think what I want to say is that you’ve really got to be careful with it, you’ve got to think about, well, what’s going to be the ongoing impact on your interest payments? Could could there be any crowding out? Could there be unintended consequences? Could you actually be destabilising the economy in the future? You may be trying to stabilise it now, but could you actually make things worse than they otherwise would be in in the future? So they’re the types of considerations I think are important with with fiscal policy? Okay, one thing I have to say is that tiny Macon is sadly, no longer with us. He died unexpectedly in November 2021. So, in addition to playing some highlights from my fiscal policy conversation with Tony, I’m also going to play some highlights from my conversation about Tony’s legacy that I had with Alex Robson in Episode 119, from December 2021. So I think they’re worth that’s worth sticking around. For. Alex is a you know, he’s a former collaborator with Tony, he wrote some papers with him. And he’s also Australia’s former ambassador to the OECD in Paris, which is really top job in economics. Yeah, so Alex, Alex is a great person to hear from and he has a lot of excellent observations about about Tony. Okay, let’s play the first clip, which it features Tony’s critique of the massive job keeper, payroll subsidy programme that we have in Australia. I think that much of Tony’s critique has been supported by the facts. So new evidence, or what we’ve learned about how Job keeper rolled out and, you know, the impacts that it had. And also, I think that the review of the programme that my old deputy secretary in the treasury, Nigel Ray, so Nigel did a review of it. Last year, I think that that review that brings out some of these, well, that’s supportive of some of the criticisms that that that Tony made, although, of course, it’s it’s going to be measured. And you know, Nigel, is not someone who’s going to come out and say, Look, this is, you know, this is terrible, you really stuff this up, he’s going to be very measured about it all. There’s also a treasury research paper that’s relevant here. And I’ll have more to say about them after I play the clip. Tony, I’d like to ask about the Australian response, I thought you made some really great observations about the different elements of the response. So there was the job keeper programme, the payroll subsidy programme. And then there were there were cash handouts. And there’s also some bringing forward of infrastructure spending. You made some really insightful remarks regarding the efficacy regarding the merits of the different elements of the Australian Government response. And I think there are lessons that can apply to responses across the world, would you be able to take us through what those those insights and lessons that you made workplace turning?

Tony Makin  09:36

Yeah, well, I made a distinction between fiscal responses that were targeting the aggregate supply side of the economy, and, in the paper, endorse those in principle and in particular, we’re talking about job Keeper which I think is a great innovation. We’ve not seen a scheme like like that, before, it’s not original to Australia, Australia copied what was happening in the UK and New Zealand and one or two other European economies. And the innovation was to see firms as a source of employment. Correct. And to alleviate the pressure on firms and their employees in particular, by providing a direct subsidy to the firm. So it was a supply side initiative, more than a demand side initiative, it was helping aggregate supply, it wasn’t an element that he was sought to increase CRI or it was increasing G, of course, but it was it was it was aimed at the firm’s production. So that was an innovation. And I think there’s a prototype there for future fiscal responses in heaven. Let’s hope we don’t have similar sorts of crises. But it’s it’s a preferred means as opposed to the aggregate demand side response. And a, we’re in the form of two cash transfers or cash handouts, as we saw in response to the GFC trying to in the Keynesian ways stimulate spending, and the purpose of stimulating the spending is to enhance employment. So it’s a roundabout way of trying to enhance employment. I think it has the features of a of a subsidy to retailers in effect, because they’re the ones that they’ve been at most. And in any case, if there is spending and evidence shows that such handouts tend to be largely saved, but if they are spent, they are spent on imports. And they’re funded by borrowing from overseas, which has to be paid in the future. So there were two responses there that were trying to sustain employment one was the direct one to Job keeper. Good marks for that one. And then there was another one on top of that, which was the cash handouts, which was a roundabout way of of sustaining employment when there was another policy in place for that purpose.

Gene Tunny  12:24

Yep. So this job keeper, it was originally costed at one 30 billion, it turns out all it it may only cost 70 billion, there was a forecasting error. But that’s that’s, that’s tangential to our discussion. You did know that while job keeper is more justifiable than other stimulus or emergency measures, there are still concerns with the design of job keeper. Could you take us through some of those please, Tony,

Tony Makin  12:57

our look, the key one is the industry is involved. The questions about casuals being paid more on job teper than they were otherwise earning. So they’re being paid more not to work than to work. I think that’s the key floor with the with the programme. And hopefully that will be fixed when the Treasury completes its review very soon. I guess it’s also questions about eligibility and the the the rule that was there for downturn in, in sales, some of those aspects of it could be possibly fine tuned, but I think it is a useful prototype that can be improved.

Gene Tunny  13:49

Yep. If they if they did it again, I’m sure they would better targeted, and they might target it to the industries that are most affected, such as hospitality, tourism, retail, possibly not professional services, which, you know, appear to be, well not as badly affected as some other sectors. So the the key lesson is that this needs to be better targeted. The problem was from what I can tell this was developed within a week, possibly under a week when at toward the end of March, when they realised that they needed something like this because all of the employer groups were coming to the the government ministers and telling them we need this or we’re going to have to sack millions of people. So I think that’s what drove it. It was done very quickly.

Tony Makin  14:43

Yes. And also the alternative was to put enormous pressure on the on the Employment Benefits Scheme. people queuing up for benefits that would have been a major headache as well. Absolutely.

Gene Tunny  14:56

I think one of the great points you made in the paper was Sir. Regarding the cash handouts, we want to get people out spending, but the public health advice is saying actually stay home, we don’t want you to go out. So I thought that was a really interesting point. And actually, yes, that’s right. So the goal of these emergency measures should be to sustain businesses to keep people in employment during this challenging time. It’s not necessarily, though, and the way to do that is not necessarily to give people money to go out and, and spend on new flat screen TVs, which are imported. So that’s, I think that’s a good point that you’ve made. Okay, so that was Tony on job keeper, which was the payroll subsidy programme we had in Australia. And yep, Tony was, Tony was right about the some of the problems with that programme. Um, overall, I mean, I think that was a very balanced assessment of Tony’s he did recognise that to an extent, it could have been justifiable if it was better targeted. So he wasn’t ruling it out completely. He just had the had some concerns about the design. So I think that was a very, you know, measured, balanced assessment of job keeper from tiny, and another measured and balanced assessment of job caper came from Nigel Ray, who, as I mentioned, was my boss in the treasury. So really, really great public servant, Nigel. And, yep, I think he’s written a great report on job keeper. In the independent evaluation of the job keeper payment final report, he prepared that for the Treasury, I’ll put a link in the show notes. It was broadly supportive of the programme. But Nigel, you know, he had to acknowledge there are some serious issues with it with the design of it. And so what did he conclude? Let’s, let’s go through it. So one of the major conclusions was that a more flexible policy designed during the first phase of job keeper. So I think that was the first six months. A lot of the detail is, it’s hard for me to remember at this stage, but I think that he’s talking about the first six months of the programme. They rolled it out for six months, and then they had another six months of it. A more flexible policy designed during the first phase of job keeper would have enabled an earlier move from prospective to retrospective eligibility thresholds. For example, After three months, this would have allowed better targeting of payments beyond the initial three months and lower the costs of the programme. Okay, so what he’s, what he’s talking about there is that when it was rolled out, basically, you know, accountants would apply for their clients that apply to the ATO, and the accountants would be asking their clients, okay, well, what do you think’s gonna happen to your turnover over the next six months, so when whatever the whatever it was, maybe was quarterly basis, and, you know, you’d think, Oh, well, we’re gonna have this major pandemic. So yeah, we think we’re gonna get smashed. And so there are a lot of, you know, firms that applied for job keeper and got this job keep it like this very generous, turned out wage subsidy, that, you know, they really didn’t end up needing and they didn’t have that turnover reduction that they were forecasting and that they, you know, they’re they advise the ATO that they would, they would have, but there was no way for the ATO to claw that, to claw that back. So, yeah, what Nigel’s getting out there is that you could have designed it in a way that limited the fiscal cost by actually seeing, you know, what happened to the businesses like after a few months and then adjusting the payments after that. So I think that’s what he’s getting out there. It relied a lot on what businesses and their accountants were forecasting would be the impact of the pandemic on their, their turnover. And for many businesses that didn’t actually they didn’t experience the big revenue reductions or the turnover reductions that that they were forecasting, you needed to forecast a particular percentage reduction in in your turnover. I can’t remember off the top my head if I can find it. I’ll put it in the show notes. Righto. So and the second major finding from Nigel regarding job keeper he noted that a tiered payment structure One that is proportionate to previous earnings is better targeted than a flat payment. And this is getting at that concern that Tony had that there were quite a few part time. People, part time employees who may have maybe they were working a couple of days a week in, in a business and they, you know, they were earning an award wage that wasn’t much more than the national minimum wage. Suddenly, because of this payment for a job keeper was that it was more gee, it must have been at sort of trying to approximate a might have been a full time wage for a person roughly on minimum wage or something like that. I can’t remember exactly. But it was much higher, then, you know, some it’ll be more money than someone be would be earning if they’re only working a couple of days a week, part time. And so the idea was, let’s make this simple. Let’s get this out to the people who need it. Let’s not worry too much about trying to make it more targeted, because we don’t have time to do that. And what it meant is that you had and this is the point time he’s making you had many part time people actually earning more with job keeper, then they would have learned otherwise. So yeah, that was a really poorly designed part of job keeper. Also relevant regarding job keeper is a recent Treasury research paper and this came out. So this came out late on Friday, the 22nd of December, okay, so the Friday before Christmas 2023. And Peter Tula, who’s my colleague at the CIS, so Peter is the chief economist at CIS. He tweeted on the Friday that the fact that Treasury releases it late on Friday 22nd December suggests that it embarrasses somebody. So Peter was suggesting that this paper from the Treasury by Natasha Bradshaw, Nathan Deutsche and Lachlan vos, or vas, it’s titled The employment effects of job paper receipt, Peter suggesting it must be embarrassing someone. So what does it what’s embarrassing about it? So the main findings from it. So I’ll put a link in the show notes, you can check out what they’ve done. They’ve done some clever things with a, you know, a data set on businesses that where they can try to infer what’s actually going on, it’s rather clever paper. So check that out. Our findings suggest that at its height in early 2020, job keep it directly preserved between 300,000 to 700,000. Jobs. Right. Okay. So that’s, that’s reasonable. I mean, that’s, you know, if that if it was 700,000. And, you know, that could have pushed the unemployment rate up to near 10% or something, they’ve got an estimate of what then what that would have been, and put that in the show notes. So, you know, that’s a, that’s a big deal. But then if it’s only 300,000, well, okay, is that, you know, how effective was that? So I guess, maybe that’s something you could, you could say, justifies the cost of the programme, which was in the order of $100 billion or so that’s, you know, that’s something you could argue about. So, you know, I’d say somewhere between 300,000 to 700,000 jobs, that compares with around three and a half million employees covered by the scheme at its peak. So I think when the government was rolling it out, initially, it it was suggesting it could save something around, you know, 700,000 jobs or so. If it actually is about 300,000, then well, that makes you wonder, you know, was that good value for money? So maybe that’s something that they’re embarrassed about? I’m not sure. I mean, you could say Oh, well, hundreds of 1000s of jobs, maybe it was worth it. That would be their their argument. What could be the potentially embarrassing bit about the paper is a finding that is in the footnote. It’s a one of the footnotes. And this finding is it’s on page two suggestive evidence. That job keeper receipt made casual workers less likely to be employed over a year later. So they found suggestive evidence that job keeper receipt made casual workers less likely to be employed over a year later. So the effects are far smaller and less statistically significant than the positive effects found during early 2020. But are not implausible they could reflect income effects on labour force participation given job keep a lead to some workers having substantially higher incomes than they otherwise would have. Okay. So this is that point about these, you know, these part time workers getting all of this additional, additional cash so many, many casual workers would only be working part time, they would be, you know, they could be working in a bar or at a cafe, and they’re getting much more money than they would have expected. So they’ve got all this extra money in their bank accounts. And so what they do a year later, is, you know, for many of them, they go, okay, but there’s extra cash, maybe I don’t need to work as many hours at the bar or the cafe, I’m going to spend more time on my studies or, or on a hobby, or I’m going to go overseas. So that’s what they’re, they’re driving out there. So this is really illustrative of how you can have these unintended consequences with fiscal policy. So maybe that’s what’s what’s embarrassing about the paper. So check it out. I think it’s a good paper, it illustrates a neat little econometric technique that I might talk about in a future episode. Okay, so that’s, that’s plenty on job keeper, the payroll subsidy programme and the the challenges or the problems you have when you don’t design a programme properly, of course, they had to do it very quickly. Next time, let’s hope they have a much better design, if there is a next time hope there isn’t a next time. If there is it needs to be better designed. The second clip that I want to play from my chat with Tony is about infrastructure spending. So with job keeping, we were talking about this payroll subsidy and you know, often, often the fiscal stimulus comes in the form of cash payments to households or businesses with the payroll subsidy programme, which then had to be paid to the employees. Some fiscal stimulus comes in the form of infrastructure spending, public works, that sort of thing. And I think Tony’s right there, that can also be problematic, you’ve really got to think about that. And that is the topic of this second clip from tiny, so I will play that now.

Tony Makin  27:50

infrastructure spending can be beneficial. And it has lasting benefits. And what it does not do is deteriorate the government balance sheet, as does the spending on cash handouts and other forms of consumption related government stimulus. What infrastructure does is it creates an asset there on the government’s balance sheet that matches the borrowing, it still has to be funded by borrowing, we started with a budget deficit. So all of his extra spending has to be funded by borrowing. And so there’s an asset there, so the balance sheet won’t deteriorate, to the extent otherwise. But again, it needs to be quality spending, it needs to pass certain tests, the crude Keynesian idea would be again, just to spend on anything. And being holes in the ground, as you mentioned earlier, is a form of crude Keynesianism, which, which could well be sort of portrayed as a form of infrastructure spending if it’s working on the road somewhere. But the point about infrastructure spending is it does have to pass the test where the benefits the present value of the benefits of the project, exceed the costs. And one other point to make about infrastructure spending. And this is one feature of government spending, the Keynes instanced in his work originally right back in the 1930s, but he talked about Public Works, which is effectively what we call infrastructure today. But the difference between then and now when they talk about boosting infrastructure spending is that the nature of the workforce has changed dramatically. I mean, people these days, have certain skills. It’s a highly variegated work workforce, people doing different things. And the assumption in Keynes’s theory was you increase spending on public works, then you have workers easily transferred from jobs that they’ve lost places of employment where they used to be in factories and other areas of unskilled work and they can easily be transferred to, you know, working on the road, so to speak. But these days, that seems far fetched, because for instance, baristas who’ve lost their jobs are not necessarily going to be one want to be out there on the road as a construction worker, financial sector employees, and not wanting to be perhaps putting pink bats in ceilings. So the the nature of the workforce is important. We can’t just treat the labour force as this homogenous entity where people can transfer across to any sort of industry at work. And there’s also I mean, there’s, there’s information costs there. There’s transactions costs, which which make the whole process a little bit trickier than than it sounds in terms of increasing employment.

Gene Tunny  31:08

Yeah, it’s not like it was in the 30s when you could get a whole bunch of unskilled or semi skilled workers, unemployed workers and have them carve out a walking track in the national park or something like that. Exactly. Right. Yeah, yeah. Okay, we’ll take a short break here for a word from our sponsor.

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Gene Tunny  32:06

Now back to the show. Okay, so another really balanced and insightful clip from tiny. And one of the things Tony was talking about in this clip is Keynesianism, so the ideas associated with John Maynard Keynes, the great British economist, and there’s a particular I guess, a school of thought or there’s a crude Keynesianism often in the way that you know, some, some economists or well, not not many economists, I think most economists recognise the the limits of fiscal policies, the problem with too much discretionary policy with Hey, you got to be careful with it. But there are there still are some we could say crude Keynesians and in in politics, too, there are some people with these these crude Keynesian ideas and they become quite popular during times of crises. And you know, Tony was someone in Australia who was always, always pushing back against that crude Keynesian view and trying to explain what are the what are the potential offsetting impacts, you know, how can interest rates respond, exchange rate, what’s the response to fiscal stimulus and particularly in an open economy like Australia’s Okay, so I’ll play the next highlight in which Tony covers that. So,

Tony Makin  33:42

in the open economy, where you introduce capital flows, exports imports, exchange rates, and emphasising in particular the exchange rate, then you can have a counter model to crude Keynesianism and the best known approach is the so called Mundell Fleming model, which is which features in intermediate macro economics textbooks. And it really just builds upon the IS LM model that Hicks invented by introducing capital flows and exchange rates and net exports. So, listeners may well be familiar with with that model, but simply says that if you increase government spending, you’re going to increase the budget deficit there’s going to be more spending in the economy, but that for a given money supply is going to tend to push up domestic interest rates relative to foreign interest rates and that will induce capital inflow foreigners will be flooding into buy these bonds that are paying a slightly higher interest rate than in their own countries, and that capital inflow will appreciate the currencies. And we’re talking about a floating exchange rate here. And that appreciation will worsen competitiveness because in the short run, price levels are fixed. So a nominal appreciation will translate to a real appreciation. And that loss of competitiveness will crowd out net exports. And this is exactly what we saw. Post GFC. And I’ve written written on this. It’s part of the Treasury external paper. But the exchange rate appreciated massively. As the fiscal stimulus was being rolled out and just look at the national accounts, and you’ll see that the swing variable, there was net exports that went down due due to the loss of competitiveness. That’s, that’s one open economy perspective. And I think that model has been borne out empirically, with reference to Australia’s previous experience, post GFC.

Gene Tunny  36:10

Yeah, so I’ll put a link to that paper of yours, which I think was in agenda. And you also wrote a paper for the minerals Council. One thing which was what one thing that’s really interesting, tiny is that your original minerals Council paper was criticised by the Treasury Secretary, Dr. Martin Parkinson, my old boss at the time. But then a couple of years later, you wrote a paper for the Treasury under the new secretary, John Fraser, essentially, almost refuting what Dr. Pockets and wrote in that rather extraordinary refutation of your minerals Council paper.

Tony Makin  36:58

Yes, yes. It’s quite curious and evidence that economists disagree, even heads of treasury disagree and their economic thinking. So yes, Martin Parkinson issued a press release criticising my minerals Council paper, which was mostly about Australia’s competitiveness. It was not focused, essentially on fiscal policy. That was a part of it. But that’s what caught the criticism from Treasury. And then subsequent to that, when John Fraser Parkinson, successor became Treasury head, he commissioned me to write a paper for Treasury, and that is available from their website, Treasury, external paper where I elaborated on the aspects in the minerals Council paper about fiscal policy and and raise some of these issues about accounting models to to crude Keynesianism. Yeah.

Gene Tunny  37:58

It’s interesting, because I mean, we both worked for Treasury it at different times, though. And I remember the traditional Treasury view is that we have to be careful about fiscal policy because it could end up being destabilising is the open economy impacts that you’ve mentioned, there’s also the problem that you don’t know whether you’re intervening at the right time. The problem that, you know, the stimulus might come on when the economy is recovering anyway. And then it’s, you know, it’s not really necessary. So there are these lags involved. What happened, I think, during the GFC, or the global financial crisis, was that the Treasury people thought, and you know, the, the politicians Kevin Rudd, the Prime Minister, Wayne Swan, the Treasurer, they thought, well, we’ve got this huge shock coming from overseas, we’ve got to do something. So we’re just going to throw as much money at the problem as we can to save the economy. That seems to be the logic and know all of those old concerns about discretionary fiscal policy, what we call discretionary fiscal policy, as distinct from automatic stabilisers such as unemployment benefits, which increase during recessions or the fact that your tax revenues fall during recessions. That all view that discretionary fiscal policy is insensible. That was just thrown out the window. And we’re seeing it again now. So what do you do you have any views on why treasury? The Treasury line on fiscal policy has changed, Tony?

Tony Makin  39:35

Well, I think it’s become crude, Keynesian. And there’s another example that you hadn’t mentioned, and it was the response to the Asian financial crisis, which was also a major, a cataclysmic event at the time in terms of what happened to asset prices and, and we by then had been heavily dependent on the Asia Pacific For our for our trade, not so with the GFC. Because our trade with North North America, the North Atlantic region was minimal compared to Asia. And yet the responses were completely different. In the first instance, there was virtually no fiscal response, there was a strong monetary response, which allowed the exchange rate to stay at a highly depreciated level, which, which soars through that crisis, we didn’t experience a recession that time. And that was what was happening with the global financial crisis, the exchange rate collapse, not as much as it did during the Asian financial crisis. But the government of the day then panicked, reflecting the panic in the US, and by that time, interestingly, the International Monetary Fund had a change course. And it’s thinking it has traditionally been influenced by Chicago economists and had always highlighted in my time working there highlighted problems with activist fiscal policy, including the lags problem that you’ve you’ve mentioned, but there had been this major reversal of thinking at those levels. And the Australian government here, panicked as a consequence of the crisis where we did not where it should not have given that the banking system here didn’t collapse in the same way as it did. In the United States. I fully endorse the the underwriting of the system or the banking system at the time, but the fiscal stimulus was, was completely over the top in my view.

Gene Tunny  41:46

Okay, I really loved that clip of my chat with Tony about fiscal stimulus, I think the comparison he makes or the contrast he makes between how Australia responded to the Asian financial crisis, which as he knows, was a huge deal. Particularly in in Southeast Asia. I mean, it had huge impacts on a major Well, an important economy to the north of us, Indonesia, which, you know, country I’ve had a little bit to do with, particularly with their finance ministry. And it led to effectively to the overthrow of the Suharto regime that they had there. So huge, huge impacts in that region. And yet, Australia responded differently, as Tony was explaining, but by the time of the financial crisis, the thinking in in Treasury, and and also it was a government of a different political persuasion, too. So that may have had something to do with the response. Right. Okay. So we’ve talked about crude Keynesianism. The other thing? Oh, yes, one. One thing I want to mention here is that I’ve been talking about how there are these unintended consequences of fiscal policy that that we can see. And I think that was particularly the case with, with one of the packages that was part of the pandemic response here, which was home builder, which was this home builder grant to two people who were, you know, building or renovating a home. So they had a home builder grant there was about, I think it was two and a half billion dollars. I’ve got that in my notes. And it’s ended up having these, you know, a really adverse impact on the building sector now. So there was a really crisp report from this was on news.com.au. This was on Christmas Eve, Kassar building group collapses into liquidation receivership owing $3.7 million, Guzman and Gomez. So jiwaji sites impacted. And so it’s a nice little as well, you know, it’s not nice, but it’s a good illustration of these unintended consequences. So I’ll just read some, I’ll put it in the show notes. And I’ll just read. I’ll just read some of the main points because I think it does illustrate, you know, what can go wrong if you’re not thinking through what the consequences of your policies can be. So ASIC is the Australian Securities and Investments Commission. So that regulates companies here in Australia. So ASIC insolvencies, statistics show 2213 building companies collapsed during the 20 to 23. financial year, there was a 72% increase on the previous 12 months. The alarming trend has been blamed on a perfect storm of factors including fixed price contracts, escalating costs, supply chain disruptions and tradie shortages. So tradie that’s the what we call tradespersons here in Australia. I’m not sure if you use that term in other countries, if you’re in the state So the UK, for example, the previous Morison government’s home builder grant, which was introduced in June 2020, handed out $2.52 billion to owner occupiers who wanted to build a substantially renovated home it turbocharged the sector, more than 130,000 Customers signed on to the programme with many trainees agreeing to the work under fixed price contracts, it soon became unsustainable as prices began to soar. Okay, so there was this crowding out. And you know, the, the builders or the tradies, they were relying on supply, you know, whether, you know, they may, they may have had to subcontract to other trainees, or they may have been, you know, they may need to purchase the supplies, so plumbing supplies or timber, and they may have been thinking, Oh, well, we’ll just quote based on the prices at the moment. And then suddenly, there’s this additional demand a huge amount of additional demand, and their prices increase for all those input costs. And they’ve signed these contracts to do the work at a particular rate. And these jobs are no longer viable for them. And so now what we’re seeing is we’re seeing these these building companies and collapsing, they’re just going into, into receivership liquidation administration. Yep. So bad results from that. So I’ll put a link in the show notes to that really important piece of information there. This is my final clip from Tony, from my conversation with Tony that had in June 2020. It relates to the ongoing burden of the debt. So those interest payments that, you know, that takes money out of your budget, that’s money that you can’t spend on health and education, for example, and this is something that I think it’s not sufficiently appreciated by decision makers during times of crisis. Okay, so I think, you know, there’s, there’s this need to respond, there’s this, there’s this panic, we think this is, this is the big issue we’re going to deal with. Okay. Sure. Except I accept that. But I think decision makers really have to think more about the long term implications. Okay, because, you know, this, this crisis will pass, presumably, I mean, you don’t want to be, too, you know, obviously, we need to be realistic. But generally, these things will pass, we’ll get to the the other side of it. And I suppose we, we probably should have expected that we would get over this pandemic. I mean, it has been, it has been dreadful, and you know, lots of people have died from it. So I’m not willing to downplay it. But we should have thought that yep, there will be life after the pandemic, and there will be this ongoing burden. Okay. So let’s play the next clip, the final clip from Tony on debt. What do you see as the the problem with this is this buildup of debt isn’t there, and there’s the problem, we have to pay for it, or we have to service that debt and a lot of that money is going to go overseas. You’ve also mentioned the impact on economic growth. What evidence is there regarding the impact on economic performance and growth of a buildup of public debt, which is in Australia is easily going to exceed $1 trillion within a few years?

Tony Makin  48:31

Yes, well, there’s certainly going to be the impact on national income because there’ll be a pure drain from national income of the public interest paid abroad, and we’re talking about 10s of billions there that will just be subtracted from national income to service to service the debt that we will have and that that drain will likely exceed. If it’s a trillion dollar debt, it’s likely to be about eight times the foreign aid budget and a multiple of, of what’s spent on the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme and, and a host of other other government programmes. So there’s going to be a direct impact there. But there’s been a number of elaborate econometric studies done. And you’ll find them in the literature. I won’t instance all the authors, but the IMF has done work on this. I’ve actually done had a paper published with a PhD student of mine, looking at Asian economies, and there seems to be a consensus empirically, that a 10% increase in public debt. Other things are saying well, contract, GDP growth, that’s conventionally defined GDP by point two of a percent. So that might not sound much but new compound that through it can be quite significant. After a few years.

Gene Tunny  49:55

What would be the mechanism there tiny would it be the fact that too due to service this debt, you might have to have taxes higher than otherwise. And these taxes, haven’t they lead to an efficiency loss. There’s an efficiency loss with taxation, because you’re discouraging people from working or investing. Could that be one of the mechanisms?

Tony Makin  50:15

Yeah, absolutely. The interest rate is going to play a play a role as well. But the there’s going to be a deadweight losses of the future taxes are going to harm future income. There’s no question about that. But also, there’s other studies have shown that the the the interest rate will will increase by seven basis points, or 1% increase in the public debt to GDP ratio tends to in these studies show that the interest rate tends to go up by about five basis points or up to five basis points. But the mechanism through tax is important, but also, through expectations, if you’ve got this big debt overhang, public debt overhang that’s going to affect expectations. And we can invoke Ricardo there in terms of what what he said for for households having to attend to to save more, but also firms and it’s not something that Ricardo instance, I think it’s important that investment investment is likely to be weak due to the uncertainty that business has about future tax liabilities in the face of an enormous public debt. And then lastly, there’s the impact on future generations that Thomas Jefferson, a founding father of the United States instance, and that the the future generations are going to have to pay for the repayment of the massive debt that’s that’s arisen due to the fiscal response. Yep.

Gene Tunny  52:02

Okay, so that was really interesting from tiny there. Now, some of that was the point he was making about expectations and what you call Ricardian equivalence, I think we’ll have to cover that in a future episode, because there’s a big controversy about that, and to what extent that actually, that actually happens. So, yeah, we’ll we’ll cover that in a future episode. The other stuff, you know, the, I think it’s the other points are really undeniable, really about the the interest burden of the debt and what that does the budget. So I think that’s, that’s well said, from tiny Okay, so that’s, that’s it from my conversation with Tony. What I’d like to do now is I like to play some clips from Alex Robson, who I mentioned before, Alex is out of the amazing Korea. He was an economic adviser to former Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull has been Australia’s ambassador to the OECD in Paris. And like me, he hails from Townsville in North Queensland. So yeah, I was really glad to catch up with Alex. Well, I wasn’t glad because it was a terrible event. But it was good that I could catch up with Alex after Tony’s passing to discuss Tony’s legacy. So here’s Alex on tinies legacy.

Alex Robson  53:38

I mean, in a closed economy, the assumption is you’ve got no capital inflows or outflows. And so the exchange rate then doesn’t really matter. So what Mondale and Fleming showed in the 60s Was that actually, if you just change that assumption, and then allow for the exchange rate to change, and capital inflows and outflows to occur, and that has been impacted by by imports and exports. And so with policy, say, for fiscal policy, you get this leakage into and out of exports and imports. And so if your sales are up, for example, boosting government spending or reducing taxes that will then have effects on interest rates, exchange rates and exports, so and then an open economy like Australia, that obviously matters quite a bit. And so the critical thing lever there that that changes, or you know, a lot of those predictions of the standard sort of pump priming model, we think about your government goes out and spends more money and has these multiplier effects and so on is this assumption of capital mobility and how it affects the exchange rate. And once you have that, you get a completely different predictions about the effectiveness of these different policy instruments. So and and Tony was always really good at just constantly reminding people of this and and I think it’s the tend to be something which was taught. It’s been taught, obviously, in universities for a long time, but it didn’t seem to quite make it into the, into the policymakers sort of calculus in in in Canberra. And so that was just one of Tony’s big things was just to remind people and of that. And I think, you know, I mean, we saw that during the GFC. With respect to exports, we saw it with respect to the exchange rate, there were big changes going on. And the point is that, you know, Australia is affected by everything else that’s going on in the world. And that’s why places like the OECD and IMF are always talking about coordinating fiscal policy, because, you know, otherwise, you get these leakages across across countries, and you may not get the impacts that you’re trying to achieve.

Gene Tunny  55:50

Okay, and here’s the second clip from Alex. So my conversation with Alex, I

Alex Robson  55:56

mean, thinking about, he had a good mix of very good technical economic skills. I mean, he wasn’t a heavily mathematical person, but he did use those tools when he needed them. And, but also very much an applied focus to policy questions of the day that that mattered. And it wasn’t something where he, you know, there’d be a policy issue. And so I’m now going to think about that. It was, you know, he’d been thinking about these things for a long time. And then when they tended to come up again, and again, he was ready with the arguments that he divided, quite a lot of thought to. So it was wasn’t like he was sort of chasing these different policies. She was, I think he just spent a career thinking about the big macro topics. And they just come back again and again, in Australia. And and it was we were fortunate, I think, to have him as a voice during these tumultuous times in the big macro debates of the 90s. And then during the GFC. And then more recently, as well, yeah, I think, yeah, thinking about his career, it was a good mix of contributions to the academic literature, technical skills, but then also translating that into policy commentary and advice that really stood him apart from a lot of economists today.

Gene Tunny  57:10

Okay, so we’ve come to the end of the episode. I think that the experience of many economies over the last couple of years has provided validation for the criticisms of fiscal policy of activist fiscal policy that came from economists such as the late Tony makin. The takeaway from this episode is that fiscal stimulus packages need to be very carefully designed and limited in their size, if you are going to implement them. There’s a legitimate argument that they’re best avoided altogether, but I would reserve the right to use them in some cases. And even Tony did suggest that there may have been justification was something like Job keeper, but a more targeted in better designed version of it. Okay, so, to wrap up, it’s really pleased me to be able to go back into the archives and to to find these great highlights from my conversation with tiny, tiny making. He was the leading advocate for sensible fiscal policy and Australia for for many years, and he is sorely missed. Thanks for listening. rato thanks for listening to this episode of economics explored. If you have any questions, comments or suggestions, please get in touch. I’d love to hear from you. You can send me an email via contact at economics explore.com Or a voicemail via SpeakPipe. You can find the link in the show notes. If you’ve enjoyed the show, I’d be grateful if you could tell anyone you think would be interested about it. Word of mouth is one of the main ways that people learn about the show. Finally, if your podcasting app lets you then please write a review and leave a rating. Thanks for listening. I hope you can join me again next week.

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