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Podcast episode

Dollar Dominance: Can the US Keep Its Edge? w/ Stephen Kirchner – EP246

This episode features a conversation between Gene Tunny and Stephen Kirchner about the dominance of the US dollar in global finance. They examine the reasons behind the dollar’s strong position, the effects of US fiscal policy and public debt, and the debate over the future role of the US dollar. Kirchner provides insights into how the US’s status as a net oil exporter influences currency dynamics and global trade.

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About Stephen Kirchner

Stephen Kirchner is the Senior Economist at the Business Council of Australia, the former Program Director for Trade and Investment at the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney, and a Senior Fellow of the Fraser Institute. An expert in monetary and fiscal policy, financial markets, and trade economics, Mr. Kirchner was formerly a research fellow at Australia’s Centre for Independent Studies, an economist with Action Economics, LLC and a former director of economic research with Standard & Poor’s Institutional Market Services, based in Sydney and Singapore. He has also worked as an advisor to members of the Australian House of Representatives and Senate.

Mr. Kirchner holds a BA (Hons) from the Australian National University, a Master of Economics (Hons) from Macquarie University, and a PhD in Economics from the University of New South Wales. He blogs at http://www.institutional-economics.com and is active on Twitter (@insteconomics).

What’s covered in EP246

  • US dollar’s global role as reserve currency, benefits, and potential challenges. (0:00)
  • US fiscal policy and its impact on the US dollar’s global role. (8:40)
  • Monetary vs fiscal policy dominance in determining interest rates and exchange rates. (14:39)
  • US dollar’s role in global finance and its potential replacement by other currencies. (20:39)
  • China’s economy, currency, and trade agreements. (29:59)

Takeaways

  1. The US dollar’s dominant role in global finance is largely due to the unparalleled size, depth, and liquidity of US capital markets.
  2. Despite concerns about the US fiscal position, the demand for US assets remains strong, which supports the dollar’s value.
  3. Other economies, like the Eurozone and China, face challenges in rivaling the US dollar due to less developed capital markets.
  4. The US becoming a net oil exporter has altered the traditional relationship between the US dollar and commodity prices.
  5. Fiscal policy in the US, while concerning, does not currently pose an immediate threat to the dollar’s global dominance due to strong international demand for US assets.

Links relevant to the conversation

Stephen’s post on dollar dominance:

https://stephenkirchner.substack.com/p/dollar-dominance-if-you-can-keep

Stephen’s US Studies Centre article “The ‘reserve currency’ myth: The US dollar’s current and future role in the world economy”:

https://www.ussc.edu.au/the-reserve-currency-myth-the-us-dollars-current-and-future-role-in-the-world-economy

Stephen’s post on how the US dollar is now a commodity currency

https://stephenkirchner.substack.com/p/why-is-the-australian-dollar-so-weak

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Transcript: Dollar Dominance: Can the US Keep Its Edge? w/ Stephen Kirchner – EP246

N.B. This is a lightly edited version of a transcript originally created using the AI application otter.ai. It may not be 100 percent accurate, but should be pretty close. If you’d like to quote from it, please check the quoted segment in the recording.

Gene Tunny  00:00

Gene, welcome to the economics explored podcast, a frank and fearless exploration of important economic issues. I’m your host. Gene Tunny, I’m a professional economist and former Australian Treasury official. The aim of this show is to help you better understand the big economic issues affecting all our lives. We do this by considering the theory evidence and by hearing a wide range of views. I’m delighted that you can join me for this episode. Please check out the show notes for relevant information. Now on to the show. Stephen Kirschner, welcome to the programme.

Stephen Kirchner  00:36

Thanks for having me back. Gene,

Gene Tunny  00:38

oh, good to have you on, Stephen, you’re doing really interesting things in your newsletter. It’s, well, it’s a sub stack, the institutional economics sub stack. And I wanted to chat with you about some of the things I’ve been reading in your sub stack recently, and also some of these, you know, big international macro economic issues to start with. Might ask you about this recent post. You had dollar dominance. If you can keep it, could we start off? Could you explain what’s what do people mean by this concept of dollar dominance, please.

Stephen Kirchner  01:23

Mostly it’s referring to the fact that the US dollar plays an overwhelming role in as the currency of denomination for international finance. So it makes up the vast majority of global ethics turnover. It’s the currency of denomination for most of the world’s debt issuance and a lot of international lending as well. It’s about 60% of global FX reserves, and it’s the predominant currency of denomination for most of the global trade in goods and services. And so the US dollar plays this very prominent role, which I think is ultimately attributable to the fact that the US has capital markets that are really unrivalled in terms of their size, their depth and liquidity. And so that puts the US in a very good position to be a provider of financial services to the rest of the world. And I think that, more than anything else, is what underpins the role of the US dollar, where I think there’s been a lot of interest over many years, is how much longer this role can continue, and there’s constant speculation about the future role of the US dollar. And this speculation goes back a long way. So in my paper for the US study centre a few years ago on the reserve currency myth, I went back and pointed to lots of embarrassing quotes from the Economist magazine and various other sources predicting the dollar’s demise. All those predictions have proven to be incorrect, but it’s remarkable that half a week goes by, I would say, without an op ed in the FT speculating about the US dollar’s future, which I think about Oasis, sort of getting the cart before the horse. I think before you speculate about the US Dollars global role, you kind of need to think about what would actually change in terms of underlying fundamentals to really shift that position.

Gene Tunny  03:39

Got You Can I ask about that the role as the global reserve currency? Economists such as Joseph Stiglitz have argued that this, this gives the US an un an unfair advantage or an exorbitant privilege. Is that right? Is that? Is that a concern is, does it? Does it actually get is it? How, to what extent does it benefit from being that global reserve currency?

Stephen Kirchner  04:06

Yeah, I have a lot of problem with the idea or the term reserve currency, because I think it’s a little bit confusing. And if you look around trying to find definitions of what it means to be a reserve currency, most of them are somewhat tautological. And so when you invoke the term reserves, people will automatically think of central bank holdings, the foreign exchange reserves. And all central banks hold foreign exchange reserves. On average, about 60% of those reserves are denominated in US dollars, but I don’t think that’s what gives the US a dominant role in the US dollar, a dominant role in international finance. And in fact, if, if foreign central banks held no US dollars, I think that would actually have a fairly marginal impact on both the US dollar exchange rate and. And interest rates similar, because the turnover in foreign exchange markets on a daily basis is in the order of trillions of dollars. It’s probably eight or $9 trillion on a daily basis, and central bank holdings the US dollars in the billions. And so the effect that those reserves might have, and changes in reserve balances, I think you’re going to be very marginal. So the way I think, prefer to think about it is that the US provides a very deep set of capital markets which can accommodate the world’s saving and there is a demand for US dollar assets, and so that’s what I think of, in terms of the US dollar having a dominant role, or a reserve currency role, but it’s really a case of us being a supplier of safe assets to the rest of the world, and this is what’s responsible for the US Dollars roles. I think central bank reserves in this context are fairly marginal.

Gene Tunny  06:10

Yeah. Okay, so the couple of things to explore there in terms of, well, safe assets to the rest of the world. Are you talking about US Treasury bonds?

Stephen Kirchner  06:21

Principally, yes. So the US provides not only what is effectively a risk free benchmark asset for the rest of the world in the form of US Treasuries and treasury bills, but even in terms of a medium of exchange, about 40% of the US banknotes in circulation actually circulate outside the United States, so there’s a demand to hold the US Dollar as a medium of exchange as well.

Gene Tunny  06:53

Yeah. So does this all mean that that the US dollar its value in its exchange rate, so it’s more favourable than it otherwise would be. And so that means that Americans can get, you know, they can buy stuff from the rest of the world a lot cheaper than otherwise. Is that? Is that reasonable to say

Stephen Kirchner  07:17

that’s part of it? I mean, there are people like Michael Pettis, for example, who argue that the US dollar suffers from a structural overvaluation problem that’s because of its dominant role, as you say, would tend to contribute to a higher exchange rate than otherwise. But the way I think about it is in terms of the equilibrium US dollar exchange rate. You would want that exchange rate to reflect all underlying fundamentals, and this is just a one of the fundamentals that feeds into the US Dollars valuation. So I don’t see that as being a problem per se, and it’s certainly not a problem with the United States that there’s very strong demand to invest in the US, whether it’s in the form of debt securities, equity securities, or foreign direct investment. We had this debate in Australia for many years about whether the current account deficit was a problem or not, and I think most of those arguments carry over to the US setting, where it’s certainly not a problem that in the US there’s very strong investment demand, not all of that demand could be met through domestic saving, and it’s actually a vote of confidence on the part of foreign investors that they want to invest in your economy. Yeah,

Gene Tunny  08:39

it’s remarkable. Stephen, you just reminded me, if you go back to say, the mid to late 80s and then the early 90s, there was such an obsession with the balance of payments and the current account deficit. So, I mean, Australia’s now got a current account surplus, haven’t we, thanks to mining, which is a, yeah, very, very positive thing, but yeah, we were, we were obsessed about it, and there was a big debate about whether that made sense or not, or whether this was just a reflection of the great investment opportunities in Australia. So it was good to to remind me of that debate. Can I ask about the safe assets? So you’re talking about us, treasury bonds. And I’ve had guests on this show. I’ve had Romina from, I think she was a Cato. And I’ve had Dan Mitchell from, he’s, he’s got his own Centre for freedom and prosperity. He’s ex Cato, ex heritage. And Dan’s a prominent commentator. And I mean, they’re very worried about US fiscal policy as I am. I mean, it looks like they’re on a very, you know, very bad, well, you know, unsustainable trajectory. They’re gonna have to correct it in some way. But from what you’re saying, I mean, there’s still this healthy demand for US government bonds, isn’t there? So is how. Do. How do you actually reconcile these, these two facts?

Stephen Kirchner  10:04

Well, in fact, a lot of the commentary around the future of the US dollar over the decades has really turned on this question of is the US on an UNSUSTAINABLE fiscal trajectory, to the extent that this might actually compromise the US Dollars global role, and is certainly the case that the US, in terms of the debt held by the by the public, has reached levels that are just a little bit below the levels we saw at the end of World War Two, and the US government was obviously very heavily borrowing. The difference being, of course, that we’ve got this level of debt in the absence of wartime conditions, and with the US economy is still pretty much fully employed. So the question would be, what would happen in the event of an adverse macroeconomic shock when you’ve got such a bad starting point. So I mean on the one hand, the US debt position, the public sector debt position, is one which actually is useful from the point of view of providing a supply of risk free assets to the rest of the world. So there’s no shortage of demand to invest in US Treasury securities. And if there was going to be an issue around the sustainability of the US fiscal position, you’d kind of expect it to show up in the exchange rate and interest rates at some point. But if you if you’re not seeing that in the price, then I think there are fewer concerns about the sustainability of the US deposition. So one way of thinking about this is us, dollar exchange rate actually serves to sort of price this demand to hold us assets. I’d say there’s an excess demand globally to hold us dollar assets, and the US dollar exchange rate reflects that.

Gene Tunny  12:15

So is the market just thinking that, Oh, well, all of these fiscal problems, there still a fair way down the road, and it’s not going to affect our demand for five year or 10 year treasuries. Or are they thinking, Oh, well, the Americans that they’ll eventually sort it out in in Congress, I mean, that they’ll recognise the that they need corrective actions as they have. You know, the Americans managed to do that in the 90s with under Clinton and Gingrich. So is that what they’re thinking? I think

Stephen Kirchner  12:48

from the point of view of the exchange rate, you have to remember that the exchange rate is a relative price, and so it’s the relative price of US, output and assets compared to the rest of the world. And if you look at fiscal policy trajectories in other economies, they don’t look too great either. So Japan, Japan will be an obvious example of an economy which has an even worse net and gross debt position than the US. Fiscal policy settings in places like Italy, which is the world’s third largest market for sovereign debt, don’t look too flashy, either. So with exchange rates, you always have to ask yourself, how does a country look on a relative basis? And so I think the US still looks good in those terms. Yeah, of course, in an absolute sense, you know, I’d certainly agree that the fiscal position in the United States is of a concern. At some stage they’re going to have to address it. But they’re hardly alone in that regard. So thinking about the US Dollars role internationally, I don’t see the US fiscal position, per se as being a problem, okay, but ultimately, I think the issue for the US is that there’s a rising interest Bill associated with its public sector Debt. Just recently, that bill has eclipsed the US defence budget in terms of absolute science, right? And this in itself, is a constraint on US fiscal policy, because that rising interest bill ultimately constrains what the US government can do. Yeah,

Gene Tunny  14:39

yeah, that’s extraordinary. I’ll have to check that out. I mean, to think, I mean, given how large the US military machine is that, how large the Pentagon is, to think that that’s incredible, right? Why I asked that before Stephen was because you’ve got this fascinating chart from macro bond in. Your newsletter on dollar dominance. If you can keep it, I’ll add a link in the show notes that essentially shows practically no correlation between general government gross debt to GDP percentage and the 10 year government bond yield. And I mean, we all know that there’s challenges with doing cross country correlations. But what do you you know and inferring things from from cross country data? But what do you read into that, that that chart? What do you read into those, those data points?

Stephen Kirchner  15:34

Yeah, like the point I was making with that chart, and this probably applies more so to developed markets than emerging economies, but still holds broadly, I would say, is that the fiscal position of an economy is actually not a very good predictor of its borrowing rates, its government borrowing rates. I mean, most obvious example that would be in Japan, which probably has the worst fiscal position on a gross and net basis of any of the advanced economies, and yet has the lowest in interest rates. So I think what that’s telling you is that interest rates are ultimately determined by other things. So underlying productivity growth and monetary policy, and monetary policy, I think, is a much more powerful predictor of cross country variation in interest rates. So if you’re looking to try and predict movements in interest rates between economy and stuff looking at changing fiscal positions, I don’t think you’re going to get very far. And that then flows through to exchange rates, because, yeah, if it’s if it’s the case that interest rates are actually not that sensitive to fiscal policy, then it’s going to imply that exchange rates are probably, by extension, not going to be that sensitive either. So this comes back to the issue of monetary versus fiscal dominance, and that monetary policy ultimately is far more important in terms of determining interest rates than fiscal policy.

Gene Tunny  17:21

Yeah, I think that’s, I think that’s right, certainly in the I mean, I mean you, I can ask you this. I mean, you can, you may have answered this, but I mean, I can understand that in the short term, like I think about how market economists forecast the value of the Australian dollar, and they’ll look at the differential between you know, bond yields or or, you know, they’ll have different maturities, like they might be looking at, I don’t know whether it’s three three month bills or six months or a year, but they, I know they’ll have an interest rate differential or spread, and then they’ll have the terms of trade, for example, in there, but yep, they’re not going to have something like the, you know, what’s happening with the the debt or the budget, I suppose. Or maybe I’m wrong about that, but I take your point. I think it’s a it’s a good one. What does it mean for say, John Cochran theory of the fiscal fiscal theory the price level. I spoke with John Cochran at Centre for independent studies. There was an event we had last, last September in Sydney, and I asked him about the fiscal theory of the price level. What do you think this means for that theory? Have you looked at that at all? Stephen,

Stephen Kirchner  18:41

yeah. I mean this, I’ve addressed that in a number of posts on the newsletter, and I think this goes to your question about the long run. And the long run situation is a little bit different in that it’s possible to imagine fiscal policy and public sector debt getting to a point where it is so unsustainable that you enter a regime of fiscal dominance. In other words, fiscal policy ends up determining the price level, and that is certainly a possibility. So in that situation, the central bank is forced to effectively accommodate expansion fiscal policy. So it’s certainly the case that fiscal policy can play that role. But the way Australia, the United States and other advanced economies have set up their sort of macro policy frameworks is one in which, for the short term, at least monetary policy is dominant. So whatever the fiscal authority is doing with fiscal policy tends to get discounted by monetary policy actions. So as long as you have an independent inflation targeting central bank. Think, then I think you’re in a regime of monetary dominance, but it’s certainly possible that those institutional arrangements might fall apart in the context of a fiscal position that’s unsustainable in the long run, and then you are in that sort of fiscal theory of the price level type world,

Gene Tunny  20:21

yeah, yeah, for sure. Okay, yeah, I think that’s a good point. So if you’ve got an independent central bank, and it’s, it’s not just, you know, it’s, it’s setting monetary policy to target inflation, and it’s, you know, monetary policy doesn’t end up being determined by the government. I mean, if the gov, because you get into that problem in, say, some Latin American countries historically, or Weimar Republic, where the government just prints money to pay its bills, to cover its deficits, rather than borrowing from the bond market. And yeah, that’s where you end up in all sorts of strife, potentially even hyperinflation. So, yeah, I think that’s a fair point. Yeah. Just thought I’d ask you about that, because I think, yeah, John’s, he’s got a really fascinating theory there, and he’s a very, very compelling presenter, and a, you know, really top economist, obviously. So that that’s really good, one of

Stephen Kirchner  21:18

the Argentina, Argentina, good example of the sort of situation you’re referring to. So they’ve had a number of experiments with managed exchange rate regimes that have blown up, and the reason for the blow up in each case was basically that fiscal policy was incompatible with that regime, and it was fiscal policy the one out in the end. So the issue around Argentina, addressing both its inflation problem and the issues around its exchange rate ultimately depend upon it putting in place institutions that will constrain fiscal policy. Yeah,

Gene Tunny  21:58

one of the other posts that I’ll put a link to in the show notes, Stephen, I think it was a post of yours where you’re talking about how the US dollar, how it’s been or the exchange rate, how that’s been affected by the fact that the US has become such a Strong producer of was it shale oil and shale gas? I mean, it’s become a has it become a net energy exporter? Or have I got that wrong? Or how do you

Stephen Kirchner  22:29

Yeah, the United States is now a net oil exporter. Has been since about 2018, 2019, yep. And in fact, produces more oil than Saudi Arabia, which I think is a a fact that would surprise most people. Yeah, so. So the significance of this is that US dollar now trades, you know, as a positive correlation with its terms of trade. It’s it’s trading in much the same way as we’re familiar with here, where the Australian dollar has a very close relationship with our terms of trade. And so the US dollar is trading like a commodity currency. This has big implications for the Australian dollar exchange rate, because what it means is the US dollar is now positively correlated with commodity prices, and in terms of the Australian dollar, traditionally, the Australian dollar has exchange rate has been correlated with commodity prices, but we typically quote The Australian dollar in terms of the US dollar, if its correlation with commodity prices is increasing, then our exchange rates correlation with those prices is going to weaken. And you can see that in the data that the relationship between Australian dollar and commodity prices is essentially broken down since 2018 2019 coinciding with the US becoming a net oil exporter? Yeah,

Gene Tunny  24:06

yeah. But do we do? Is there still a correlation with trade weighted index? Do you know? I mean, I can check that myself, but just wondering, because I think that’s what, where you’re going at there. I mean, because we, we tend to, yeah, quoted in terms of US dollars, but there’s this broader exchange rate concept that you could use instead,

Stephen Kirchner  24:27

no, it affects the Australian dollar trade weighted index as well. So that was actually the charts that I used in that post were the Australian dollar twy. And the reason is, US dollar still has a big weight in the tui China has a big weight as well. But of course, China is running a managed exchange rate regime, largely targeting the exchange rate with the US dollar. Yeah, so China’s weight effectively becomes a US dollar weight in that measure. Gotcha. Yeah. Yeah. So this has huge implications for us, because it means that the with these australian dollar being less sensitive to commodity prices, we’re going to lose some of the shock absorbing role of the Australian dollar. The Australian dollar is not going to moderate those fluctuations now in terms of trade and quality of prices as it has historically. And I think one implication of this is that the reserve bank is going to have to become more activist in its conduct of monetary policy, because it won’t be able to rely on the exchange rate to do a lot of the heavy lifting in terms of setting monetary conditions. So if the exchange rate is not adjusting as aggressively as it has historically, then I think by implication, the cash rate is going to have to do more of the work. I

Gene Tunny  25:50

think that’s a really excellent point, because I remember when I was in Treasury, yeah, we always used to talk about that shock absorbing role of the Australian dollar. And there was a view that that’s why Australia got through the Asian financial crisis so well. So I think that’s a really excellent point. Just trying to remember where I was, where, what I was going to ask about the Yeah, so we’ve got the point about the the twy. I’ll the trade weighted index. I’ll link to that article. Is it China? Is that the in terms of who, which country could replace, the which currency could replace, the US dollar? Is it the the Chinese currency, or is it the euro? What are what are people speculating on? I

Stephen Kirchner  26:40

think the problem that people have there have trouble wrapping their head around is the idea that the US dollar and its role is somewhat disconnected from the relative size of the US economy and its importance in global trade. So the Chinese and the eurozone economies rival the US in terms of size, and they certainly rival the US in terms of their prominence in international trade. And people kind of expect that the respective roles of their currencies should reflect those GDP shares and trade shares where both Eurozone and China fall down is in terms of not having the capital markets that rival the US in terms of size, depth and liquidity. And so the US dollar’s role is essentially a function of the dominant role that the US has in global finance. Yeah, and I think that’s always going to be more important in determining the role that the US dollar plays. Certainly, when the Euro was launched in 1999 there were expectations that it would rival the US dollar and the ECB produces a an index which essentially tries to measure the role of the euro in global finance. So in terms of FX turnover, currency of denomination for debt securities, currency of denomination for global trade. And it does pick up a little bit immediately following the Euro’s launch. But of course, with all the problems in the eurozone and the Eurozone debt crisis, that role has essentially flatlined more recently. So I’d say the Euro has basically disappointed the expectations that were held for it in terms of taking on a global role, and the same with China. So China launched a campaign to internationalise the renminbi and toyed around with a more flexible exchange rate setting around about 2015 2016 but very quickly walked away from it when the exchange rate started to exhibit more volatility than they would like, and so they’ve clamped down in terms of exchange rate setting. They’re still running a managed exchange rate regime and a closed capital account, yeah, and if you’ve got a closed capital account, I think that’s always going to limit the prospects for internationalisation of your currency. And we saw exactly the same thing with the yen as well. In the late 1990s early 2000s the Japanese Ministry of Finance had this idea that they would internationalise the yen, make it the main currency of denomination for trade in the Asia region. They wanted to set up an Asian Monetary Fund without participation with the United States. And all of those efforts really went nowhere. Yeah.

Gene Tunny  29:59

Yeah. I think it’s Yeah, very good point, Steve. And I just remembered what I was going to note before, because why I thought that was interesting, that post of yours talking about how the US has become an oil exporter, and you were explaining why, more recently, the Australian dollar relative to the US, hasn’t got up to the highs that it got up to in the first in mining boom, mark one in the 2000s so where it got to parity, I think at one time. So I think that was a really good explanation of that.

Stephen Kirchner  30:36

I think the contrast is quite dramatic, because we had a big terms of trade boom around about 2011 when, as you say, the Australian dollar got about parity with the US. Well, the terms of trade actually got even higher in 2022 In fact, they were the highest terms of trades going back to about 1860 and yet you certainly don’t see that in the Australian dollar exchange rate. And so the difference is, by 2022 we had this situation where the US had become a very substantial oil exporter, and that just really changed the relationship between commodity prices and the Australian dollar. Yeah, yeah,

Gene Tunny  31:15

good stuff. Just for clarity. And I think this is a simple, I think this is a quick question, the capital control. So you’re talking about how they’ve got a closed capital account. So they’re, they’re limiting the the exchange of of their currency for others, they’re all, they’re limiting people’s ability to pull money out of China is that, is that what people will be concerned about and why they’re limiting the ability of investors to repatriate funds home? Is that why it it may be limited in its potential to be a reserve currency?

Stephen Kirchner  31:59

Yeah. I mean, part of it is just a function of having a managed exchange rate regime that you need to control your capital flows in order to do that, I think it’s worth pointing out that a lot of the outbound capital controls are really not targeting foreign investors. They’re targeting Chinese savers, who they worry might send, there might be capital flight from the Chinese themselves to offshore, and so they place strict limits on the amount of money you can take out of the country.

Gene Tunny  32:35

Yeah, good point. And we’re, we’re a significant recipient of that, aren’t we? I mean, if there was a lot more cap, if there was that capital flight, or a lot more of it, then, yeah, a lot of it would go into Australian real estate, I expect. So yeah, that’s more of a comment, right? Final question, Stephen, there’s a lot of talk about the breakdown of this agreement. That was apparent, I think, is it Jim Rickards, who I’m trying to remember, who goes on about this, but apparently there was some agreement in 1974 between Richard Nixon and the Saudis that all oil sales would be denominated in US dollars. And that agreement has expired. And so there, there are people arguing that this will have profound implications for the US dollar and the US economy. Are you across that issue? And what are your thoughts on it?

Stephen Kirchner  33:34

Yeah, I think people make too much of this issue of in which currency is global trade in goods and services denominated and there’s certainly been moves in the past to re denominate more of the global oil trade and other currencies, including euros. But I mean, in this sense, I think, you know money, the exchange rate is really just a veil. Ultimately, the demand for the US dollar is a function of people either wanting to purchase US goods and services or wanting to purchase US assets. And so that’s where the demand comes from. You can, and that’s a real that’s a real demand. You can denominate global trade in whatever currency you like. There’s no reason why the Saudis and the Chinese could not denominate their trade in oil in renby, for example. But ultimately, the US, US dollar exchange rate is going to reflect the demand for US goods and services and US assets. So, you know, I don’t think it really matters. Is that much what the currency of denomination is. So to give an example, a lot of our iron ore exports would be denominated effectively in US dollars, because it’s a US dollar market. But I don’t think that affects the issue of the demand for the Australian dollar, because ultimately, that money, to the extent that it comes back to Australia, has to be converted into Australian dollars. So yeah, the demand for Australian dollars still reflects the demand for international demand for our iron ore. Yeah,

Gene Tunny  35:38

I think that’s a good answer. I was just thinking about it then. I mean, so if you think about it, Say yes, say the Saudis are accepting US dollars. So they, they sell their oil, they get the US dollars, and then they’ll, they will want to convert it to either their own currency, or they’ll want to convert it to pounds because they want to buy properties in Knightsbridge or or Mayfair or wherever, or wherever they want to invest in around the world. So I think, I think that’s a fair point to make. That’s a, yeah, I think that’s a really good perspective, righto Steven, it’s been illuminating. I’ve really enjoyed this conversation, and I’ll put a link to your great newsletter, institutional economics. I think you’ll Yeah, you’re actually doing some really deep analysis. You’re thinking carefully about these issues, the theoretical considerations, the empiric so I’ve been really impressed by it, and I would recommend it. Are there any any final comments or any reactions to anything I’ve said in this conversation before we wrap up, please.

Stephen Kirchner  36:49

I think that’s been great. Gene. Thanks very much for having me back on.

Gene Tunny  36:52

Oh, it’s been terrific, Stephen. And yeah, keep up the great work, and hopefully we’ll catch up with you again soon.

Stephen Kirchner  36:59

Thanks very much. You.

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Podcast episode

Revisiting Ricardo: The Rise and Fall of Ricardian Equivalence

This episode of Economics Explored explores the theory of Ricardian equivalence, a proposition that fiscal policy measures like tax cuts or stimulus payments may not effectively boost the economy if households anticipate higher future taxes to pay off government debt. Host Gene Tunny explains the concept originating from David Ricardo and popularized by Robert Barro, involving ultra-rational consumer optimization over infinite time horizons. While an elegant theoretical model, Ricardian equivalence relies on unrealistic assumptions and fails empirical tests. Evidence shows households do increase spending after rebates or transfers, although not always by as much as policy makers would like. Ultimately, while the merits of discretionary fiscal policy are debatable, Ricardian equivalence is too extreme a hypothesis. Households do not behave as ultra-rational dynamic optimizing models predict.

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Takeaways

Five takeaways from this episode are:

1. Ricardian equivalence is an elegant theoretical model but relies on unrealistic assumptions about rational consumer behavior.

2. Empirical evidence overwhelmingly finds that households do increase spending after tax rebates or fiscal stimulus, contrary to Ricardian equivalence predictions.

3. Related concepts like Friedman’s permanent income hypothesis are more nuanced but also face limitations in fully explaining consumer decisions.

4. While fiscal policy faces challenges, Ricardian equivalence is not a compelling argument against its effectiveness due to failures of the underlying theory.

5. Examining economic models against real-world evidence is important for evaluating their validity and implications for policy.

Timestamps

  • Introduction. (0:00)
  • David Ricardo’s economic theories and their relevance today. (5:30)
  • Ricardian equivalence in macroeconomics. (11:02)
  • Consumption function and fiscal policy. (17:48)
  • Rational economic models and their implications. (23:18)
  • Ricardian equivalence theory and its limitations. (26:41)
  • Ricardian equivalence theory and its empirical support. (33:59)
  • Consumer spending after receiving tax rebates. (39:10)
  • Ricardian equivalence in economics. (43:55)

Links

Previous episode in which Ricardian Equivalence was mentioned:

https://economicsexplored.com/2024/01/11/the-limits-of-fiscal-policy-insights-from-tony-makin-alex-robson-others-ep222

Robert Barro’s 1974 article “Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?”

https://eml.berkeley.edu/~saez/course131/Barro74JPE.pdf

James M. Buchanan on “Barro on the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem”

https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/260436

Geoffrey Brennan and James M. Buchanan on “The Logic of the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem”

https://www.jstor.org/stable/40911555

John J. Seater on “Ricardian Equivalence”

https://www.jstor.org/stable/2728152

T. D. Stanley on “New Wine in Old Bottles: A Meta-Analysis of Ricardian Equivalence”

https://www.jstor.org/stable/1060788

Economist 2008 column “Ricardian equivalence is dead”

https://www.economist.com/free-exchange/2008/05/19/ricardian-equivalence-is-dead

Anrdrew Leigh’s paper “How Much Did the 2009 Australian Fiscal Stimulus Boost Demand? Evidence from Household-Reported Spending Effects”

http://andrewleigh.org/pdf/FiscalStimulus.pdf

Matthew D. Shapiro & Joel B. Slemrod’s study “Did the 2008 Tax Rebates Stimulate Spending?”

https://www.nber.org/papers/w14753

Claudia R. Sahm, Matthew D. Shapiro and Joel Slemrod’s analysis “Check in the Mail or More in the Paycheck: Does the Effectiveness of Fiscal Stimulus Depend on How It Is Delivered?” 

https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/pol.4.3.216

Ikuo Saito’s paper “Fading Ricardian Equivalence in Ageing Japan”

https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2016/12/31/Fading-Ricardian-Equivalence-in-Ageing-Japan-44302

Transcript: Revisiting Ricardo: The Rise and Fall of Ricardian Equivalence

N.B. This is a lightly edited version of a transcript originally created using the AI application otter.ai. It may not be 100 percent accurate, but should be pretty close. If you’d like to quote from it, please check the quoted segment in the recording.

Gene Tunny  00:03

His argument was that all you’ve got to think about whether that be increase in income in the current period is a permanent increase or not. Because if it’s only a temporary increase, it doesn’t increase what they can spend sustainably over the long term buy much at all. Welcome to the economics explored podcast, a frank and fearless exploration of important economic issues. I’m your host gene Tunny. I’m a professional economist and former Australian Treasury official. The aim of this show is to help you better understand the big economic issues affecting all our lives. We do this by considering the theory evidence and by hearing a wide range of views. I’m delighted that you can join me for this episode, please check out the show notes for relevant information. Now on to the show. Thanks for tuning into the show. This week. I’d like to discuss what economists call Ricardian equivalence. You may recall that this concept was mentioned in the episode on the limits of fiscal policy earlier this year, and I’m going to be exploring it more this episode with my colleague, Arturo Arturo Espinosa, welcome to the programme. Thanks,

Arturo Espinoza Bocangel  01:21

Ian. I’m glad to be here. Excellent. So

Gene Tunny  01:24

yes, looking forward to chatting with you about Ricardian equivalence. Now this came up in a conversation I had with Tony maker. Well, I was replaying a previous conversation with Tony Mike and Tony is sadly, no longer with us. But in the conversation I had with Tony this, this idea of Ricardian equivalence came up. It’s one of those objections to fiscal policy as a way of influencing the business cycle as a macro economic stabilisation tool. And it’s a rather elaborate theoretical objection to fiscal policy. And result, it’s all very elegant. And I thought it’d be nice to go over it and explore it, because it does raise some important issues about how we think about the economy, how we model the economy. So if you’re happy to do that, I think that would be good. And if you’ve heard of this concept before, have you Arturo.

Arturo Espinoza Bocangel  02:30

Jaya during my time, so the students at uni, but I don’t remember very clear. So this is a good opportunity to refresh my memories.

Gene Tunny  02:43

Oh, good. Well, yeah. So hopefully, I can give a clear explanation. That yeah, so in we’ve been doing some, some reading. So to get across it, and to remind ourselves what it is because I must say it’s a proposition that was very popular when I was studying economics in the early 90s, early to mid 90s, when I started, because there was still some belief in this as an idea. This is a concept. But I think since then, we’ve probably figured out that maybe there’s really no, you know, not a lot of evidence to support it. So that’s something we’ll we’ll go over. The idea is that a fiscal stimulus, if it’s in the form of a tax cut, or a transfer to to households, if it’s a matter of cutting taxes, giving money to to households, the idea is that those households, or businesses, they will realise that in the future, the government has to, you know, pay, if they if the government’s borrowed money to finance this, then those households will have to pay higher taxes and otherwise, so that’s, that’s the idea. And that, and that, therefore, in the current period, they won’t spend that tax cut or that transfer that stimulus money, they will save it instead. So there’s that. That idea. And so it’s an argument as to why fiscal policy discretionary fiscal policy or fiscal stimulus may not be effective, because Okay, people will realise that the government is just borrowing this money, they’re taking on more debt, where the taxpayers we ultimately have to pay back that debt. And so we’re not any wealthier. That’s essentially the idea. And it’s, it’s based on households been forward looking about having this view into the future that we know we’re gonna have to eventually pay it back or our descendants will have to pay it back, our children, our grandchildren, and we have a we’re eltra not altruistic we what’s the word we we value the lives of our children out, we love our children, we, we, we want to, we want what’s best for them. So we’re not going to take on all this debt now and have, you know, live beyond our means so to speak and burden the future. So that’s, that’s the idea. Broadly speaking, I will try and define that more precisely, but that’s how I think of Ricardian equivalence is. Am I on the right track there,

Arturo Espinoza Bocangel  05:26

Arturo? Yes. That inclination was very clear again. Okay, good. Good. So

Gene Tunny  05:31

there are two things here. One is, is Ricardian so it’s named after David Ricardo, the famous economist. And then we’ll go into what’s equivalent. A bit later, we might talk about Ricardo to begin with. So David Ricardo, so his dates 18th 18th of April 1772 to 11th of September 18 23. So he lived. He lived through the age of wonder, whatever you however you want to describe it. So he was born just two years after Captain Cook discovered Australia for ice and, and he died in 1823. So he lived through the Napoleonic Wars. He was a British political economist, they call them in those days politician and Member of Parliament of Great Britain and Ireland’s This is from Wikipedia. recognised as one of the most influential economists, one of the most influential classical economists alongside figures such as Thomas Malthus, Adam Smith, and James Mills, so very esteemed company. Now, one of the one of my favourite descriptions of Ricardo comes from John Kenneth Galbraith, who was the American economist, professor at Harvard. He was an advisor to Jack Kennedy, he was Kennedy’s Ambassador to India. And Galbraith wrote this great book, The Age of uncertainty on, you know, history of economics, economic history, essentially. And this is quite a great description. Ricardo is Smith’s only serious contender for the title of founding father of economics. With him the great ethnic rivals of the Scotch arrive. Ricardo was Jewish. He was a stockbroker, a member of parliament, a man of superb clarity of mind and terrible obscurity of for this. That’s classic Galbraith. I mean, I don’t think anyone could write as well as Galbraith. He was it was a brilliant writer. So yeah, I mean, any, any economist relative to Galbraith? Probably, maybe we could be accused of obscurity of pros. Okay, so Ricardo, very famous, he wrote, was it Principles of Political Economy? I should know that off the top of my head, but he wrote a, he wrote several important works on in economics and his main claim to fame is the theory of international trade, isn’t it? It’s comparative advantage. And so this is this proposition that, like, we can talk about this in another episode, but essentially, David Ricardo demonstrated conclusively in a logical sense, why free trade is can benefit both parties. Why? Why countries can gain from trade from specialising in? Yes. Yep, and trading so of course, so specialising according to the comparative advantage of the country. And yeah, that’s something that you know, that’s a very, there’s a subtle definition of what comparative advantage is that we might go into in another in another episode, but it’s a very important theory in economics. Yeah,

Arturo Espinoza Bocangel  08:45

of course, I like to add some important information about this Ricardian model, tre, international trade causes in most of the International Trade courts around the world. The first model that is used in order to explain the patterns of trade is Ricardian model. It’s what that as you mentioned, basically is playing that country is specialised in in producing and exporting food that has a comparative advantage relative to other countries.

Gene Tunny  09:19

And is that based on the factor endowments what? What are the Allen’s please?

Arturo Espinoza Bocangel  09:25

The main reason is the level of productivity

Gene Tunny  09:30

level of productivity except Brian okay, we might go into that in another episode, but I guess the, like Australia, for example. I mean, a lot of people criticise Australia and say Australia is not a very complex economy. You’re just digging stuff out of the ground and exporting it or growing weed and exporting that. But I mean, we’re very good at that. Right? We’re very good at mining. We’re very productive in mining, and we’ve got great, great minerals, lots of valuable iron ore and and and coal coking coal in particular, which is very valuable. And so yeah, it makes sense for us to co produce and export that stuff. So yeah, we might well have to go into that Ricardian model of trade in, in the future. So the main point is that your Ricardo was a really big deal in economics. He essentially made the case for free trade. He argued against what was called mercantilism, which is the idea that countries become wealthy by exporting by having a trade surplus and bringing gold into the country accumulating gold in the reserves of gold. So that’s, he argued against that. He said, Well, that’s not necessarily the way to think about economic prosperity. So not exactly what we’re gonna talk about today. But it’s important to know Ricardo was very important in in that in international trade theory. Now, why is this relevant? What did Ricardo have to say about fiscal policy? Well, I mean, he wasn’t really a theorist of of, Oh, it wasn’t a macro. Well, I he’s a classical economist. So I suppose they did deal with that we’re thinking about the economy as a whole. But he’s not a macro economist, as we’d probably think of one today. But nonetheless, he did it, he did have this, he ran a thought experiment, you could call it or maybe you could say it was a bit of a thought bubble, but But he had this idea that of this equivalence between taxation and debt financing. So the Ricardian equivalence relates to the idea that if you think about this, in a particular type of framework, and you think about how these households eventually have to pay back the debt, so if you’ve got a choice between financing, spending, or financing, a particular like a surge in spending, because it’s a pandemic, for example, or a war, and it’s a choice between increasing taxes, or increasing, or borrowing the money in terms of how what happens to households, and you know, how they change their consumption, spending their behaviour, in this really theoretical framework, and under certain strong assumptions, which we’ll talk about soon, it could be the case that they just behave the same way that Yep, they might have to pay if they pay more taxes, and that lowers their disposable income, and then that may force them to, you know, that maybe they will cut back their consumption spending, they won’t spend as much. But then if the government goes and borrows money, then it may be that the households do the same thing, because they realise that, oh, hang on, we’ve got to pay for this in the future, eventually. So it’s as if let’s act now let’s spend less now let’s save more in anticipation of those higher taxes later on, because we have to pay the debt. So it’s this idea of this equivalence between taxation and debt finance, and I guess, this is where we start thinking, Well, hang on. That’s, that may not actually be what happens in reality. And indeed, Ricardo himself thought this was I think he thought he, he thought this was implausible, really, or he didn’t put a lot of he didn’t really, you know, make a huge thing about this is just a, you know, an idea he had just a speculation of his so I think that’s, it’s it’s certainly an interesting speculation to think about, like, how do households react to what the government does? And, you know, to what extent are they forward looking? To what extent are they Ultra rational, where this where this Ricardian equivalence thing, where it came from, or what where it was brought back into economics, or how it was brought back in economics was there was this school of thought that emerged in the late 60s and then in the 70s, called the New classical school of macro economics, which was trying to make macro economics more rigorous built, create micro economic foundations for it, because there was this view that what Keynes was talking about in the 30s. Okay, he, he didn’t really have really strong micro economic foundations or there was an optimising behaviour in it. There were a lot of us assumptions about how these macroeconomic aggregates such as consumption and income, were related to each other. But you weren’t really thinking about, well, how would rational households behave? So they, they had there was this idea that we want to have a more rigorous economics, that macro economics and it’s based on optimising models and, and one of the driving forces is the mathematization of economics in the post war period, from after Paul Samuelson foundations of economic analysis famous textbook in the in the 40s, where he brought mathematics to a lot of economics. And then the idea is let’s bring that to macro economics as well. Let’s have these really elegant optimization models and you know, Ricardian equivalence is is one of those types of models. Okay, how am I going to Euro? Very good. Okay. Okay. It’s a, it is a tricky sort of area to tricky concept to explain, I think. And having begun this conversation, I’m thinking okay, I’ll have to, maybe I’ll go and refresh my knowledge afterwards. But I hope that I am imparting enough of the substance of it. Okay, so who’s the big name associated with this proposition? Is Robert Barro, isn’t it? So? Okay, so Robert Barrow is one of the most famous economists of, say, the last 50 years or so. He’s probably the most famous economist out there at the moment who hasn’t won a Nobel Prize? I mean, who knows? It may be coming. But he hasn’t won one yet. At least as far as I’m aware, he hasn’t won the Nobel Prizes. He I probably would have put that down in the show in the notes. If he had. Okay, if he has I’ll, I’ll definitely double check that but I’m pretty sure he hasn’t Paul Lucas. Sorry, not Paul Lucas. Robert Lucas. won the Nobel Prize for new classical economics Thomas saj. And I’m pretty sure Robert Barro hasn’t won it. He’s currently the Paul M. Warburg professor of economics at Harvard. And he’s, you know, as a visiting scholar at American Enterprise Institute, research associate of National Bureau of Economic Research, PhD in, in economics from Harvard and a Bachelor of Science in physics from Caltech. I think it was a student of Richard Feynman, I think I read that. And he went into economics was he, he realised that, you know, physics was something he might not, you know, rise to the top in. He thought our economics is probably a better bit. Physics is too crowded. There are too many, you know, really, really smart people in physics. And they thought, Well, why not? Economics? That could be something different. But yeah, Barrow, right, this very famous article in the 1980s 1974, published in the the house journal of the University of Chicago economic School, which is the Journal of Political Economy, and his article is our government bonds, net wealth, and extremely clever paper, I’ll put a link in the show notes. But yeah, the basic idea there is that, if you think about it, in a particular type of model that was popular in the post war period, a particular way of thinking about macro economics, and less government bonds were was seen as something that made the community wealthier on their own, then they shouldn’t have a significant or they shouldn’t have an impact on consumption spending, because they shouldn’t make the community feel any wealthier, at least, that’s the that’s the idea. And his argument was that, well, if households realise that they actually are the ones who have to service that debt and pay back the debt, eventually as taxpayers, then they’re not any wealthier. So they’re not going to, you know, lift their level of consumption spending, if the government gives them a tax cut or transfers some money to them. So that’s the that’s the basic idea. Now, an a related concept, and I have been struggling to think about how to bring this into the conversation because it is related to it in a way that comes at this issue from in a different way. There’s the there’s Milton Friedman’s idea of the permanent income hypothesis. And, like one way of looking at fiscal policy if you’re thinking about a tax cut or a stimulus check, for example, Apple. And this is another way of thinking about this same question using a different model or a different, slightly different theoretical framework. And this was an objection to some of the the temporary, you know, bonuses or the temporary tax cuts or stimulus money that we’ve seen in different crises, like Milton Friedman argue that your consumption spending is related to your permanent income, which is essentially what you could, what you could spend out of your, out of your wealth sustainably over the long term. So if I’m getting that, right, so. So Keynes is consumption function related, corroding, current income to cut related your consumption spending to your current income. So if your B income is, say, say it’s, you know, $5,000 or something, and there’s an increase in your income of $1,000. And then Keynes would have this coefficient, the marginal propensity to consume and say, That’s point eight, then there’s this mechanical relationship of income goes up by 1000 times point eight, then your spending will go up. $800. So that’s the, that’s the Keynesian consumption function. And Friedman objected to that, because his argument was that, well, you’ve got to, you’ve got to think about whether that increase in income in the current period is a permanent increase or not. Because if it’s only a temporary increase, but doesn’t increase what they consider spend sustainably over the long term, by much at all, and his argument is that households would try to smooth out their consumption. Over time, there’s this idea that we’re better off if we have a more steady, sustainable standard of living, rather than having some periods where we’re spending more and living, living really well than other periods where we’re not living great at all. We’re on hard times, we’d be better off in his optimising model and his rational optimising model, we’d be better off saving those temporary windfalls and income, and you’re saving them up for times where we had less income, and so smoothing our consumption in that way. And so that’s an argument against fiscal stimulus, because you could, it could be the case that people get their tax cut, or their stimulus check. And they realise, well, hang on, it’s not really making us is not really lifting our permanent income, which is not going to make us you know, make us huge impact on our on our, you know, average income over the next five or 10 years. So why should we spend it baby, let’s say that, and we can use it to help smooth out income, it can cover those difficult periods. So that’s another example of an optimising model. And it’s a similar type of philosophy to Ricardian equivalence, but it’s not. It’s not quite the same thing because Barrows proposition is stronger than that. And because in Friedman’s model, it’s possible that if if the government’s transfer enough money to households, then they might think that Well, yeah, we are wealthier. It is, it will, this level of additional money will allow us to spend much more sustainably into the future. But Barrow goes further than Friedman, because in Barrows model, those households would realise that they would eventually have to pay back that money through the tax system. So that ultimately not any wealthier. So there’s, there’s probably a higher level of rationality in Barrows model, then, then Friedman’s model that Fred’s Friedman’s model gets you sort of the, you know, partly the way there because you’re starting to think about the future and households are starting to think rationally. What’s coming up in the future? Does that make sense? Or am I complicating things?

Arturo Espinoza Bocangel  24:31

I think I’m Porton assumption for the neoclassical economists here. Yeah. Individuals are acting as a rational. Yeah,

Gene Tunny  24:41

they’re rational and forward looking. Yeah. And so in Friedman’s model, then Friedman gets us a lot of the way there with this permanent income model. And then Barrow basically goes even further and says that households are so smart that they realise that any money that the government is is giving you temporary? Well, that it’s actually giving you through a tax cut or through a stimulus check. You’re gonna have to pay that back later. So you’re not any wealthier overall. And so there’s there’s there’s no increase in permanent income in in that situation. And yeah, there’d be no change. Whereas in the Friedman model, there’s a possibility maybe there is a small, a small impact on consumption if I think about that. Okay, we’ll take a short break here for a word from our sponsor.

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Gene Tunny  26:06

Now back to the show. Yeah, these ultra rational models, Friedman sort of started the this is an idea and then the new classical economists took it to the limit. Okay, so that was that was Barrow a very, very famous paper and generated a huge literature, people arguing about this theoretically. And then there was a lot of empirical work which we might go into. One point I should make at the moment is that when Barrow first wrote this paper, it wasn’t called Ricardian equivalence Barrow, himself didn’t realise that, that he was almost channelling Ricardo in a way. But this was pointed out by James Buchanan, who was a Nobel Prize winner for his work in public choice theory, what was called public what’s called Public Choice Theory. And he was at Virginia Polytechnic Institute at the time, I think that’s now George Mason University. Or I could have that wrong. But anyway, James Buchanan. He wrote a famous article in 1976, which pointed out that essentially what what Robert Barrow had done was rediscovered this proposition of David Ricardo and I might read this abstract because it’s very, it’s quite, quite succinct. So James Buchanan wrote his public debt issue equivalent to taxation. This is an age old question in public finance theory. David Ricardo presented the case for the affirmative. Professor Robert J. Barrow re examines this question in his recent paper, without however making reference to Ricardo or other earlier contributors, although his discussion has carefully qualified to allow for exceptions under specified conditions, the thrust of Barrows arguments supports the Ricardian theorem to the effect that taxation and public debt issue exert basically equivalent effects. So I think, yeah, my it’s interesting be cannon makes the point that David Ricardo presented the case for the affirmative, because my understanding was that even though Ricardo did make that, or he did make the case, he didn’t think that it was something that was realistic, in that it didn’t apply in reality, I think might have been Galbraith or someone like that, who made that point that even though no Ricardo wrote about this in the funding system, he himself thought it was a bit of a theoretical curiosity. Okay, and one thing you found so this is another article by Buchanan you dug this up before, Arturo? Because you didn’t I think this goes to this is related this point I was making about how this is a very elegant theoretical model is based on optimising behaviour forward looking rational. Now, let’s make the most elegant mathematically. What’s the word? Elegant, I suppose or logical model where you’ve got people maximising their their utility, what economists call utility, their satisfaction, and they recognise that they’re there ultimately, they ultimately have to pay the debt. So yeah, Buchanan and Jeffrey Brennan. So Jeffrey Brennan’s an Australian, he was at ASU and his son Michael Brennan actually runs the ball. He did run the Productivity Commission here. Now he’s running the e 61. Institute. Interesting. Yeah, yeah. And he was a senior person in the treasury after I was there, but he is all very good. Jeffrey Brennan, I remember did a staring rendition of Rule Britannia at tattersalls Club at a dinner, I went to law school dinner I went to, but 20 years ago, it was a, it was a good thing. It was a great singer and a very intelligent man. Very good economist. Okay. Now, that all of course is completely irrelevant to the point, the logic of the Ricardian equivalence theorem by Jeffrey Brennan and James Buchanan, which was published in was it finance archive? I think it was, yeah, the German public finance journal. And they, they list these very well, you’d say they’re restrictive conditions, aren’t they for, for this whole this theoretical approach this model applying, and I might put them in the show notes. But essentially, they make some very strong assumptions about how, you know, well, one is that capital markets are perfect individuals may borrow and lend at the same rate as the government. And I think what this is getting to is the fact that look, even if ourselves are rational and forward looking, they may not be able to act in such a way because they’re not able to easily borrow that you can’t borrow as much as you’d like to help smooth your consumption over time to. So it could be the case that if the government gives you a tax card, and or gives you a stimulus check, you may really need that money. In a in a theoretical, in an idealised world, you could have just been temporarily on hard times, and in that idealised world you could have borrowed against your future income, because you know, I’m gonna get out of this in the future. So rather than struggling now, and you know, me struggling to pay rent or buy the groceries, I’ll just borrow against my future income. But that doesn’t mean you can’t always do that in the real world. I mean, people do sort of, you know, some people try and do that through credit cards. But that’s a recipe for financial disaster in the long run. So it may be that, you know, fiscal, fiscal policy measures, such as a tax cut, or a stimulus check, has an impact because it helps alleviate a liquidity constraint. So there’s this concept of liquidity constraints. And that was one of the major objections to well, this whole new classical approach, and also to well to Friedman’s model, in a way, yes, definitely the Freedmen’s model, that, you know, one of the things that stops people from acting, as optimising over time rational households is the fact that you you may not be able to borrow the money that would be compatible with that optimization. So that’s that point. And then there’s some other points about how assumptions that that’d be Canada and Brandon, identify individuals are certain as to both current and future income and prospects. Which is, yeah, I mean, people, you know, so any theory about where people are optimising the future and making optimal decisions? Essentially, you have to assume that they know how the future is going to evolve. And it may be that they, they don’t. And so it could be that, you know, people’s, well, in the Ricardian model, it could be the case that, well, they see the government borrowing this money to give them a tax card or pay them a stimulus check. But in their own mind, they’re thinking, Well, I’m going to be wealthier in the future anyway, I’m going to be earning a higher income, so I don’t really care as much. Maybe I have to pay a little bit more tax, but but who cares? So they in that model? Yeah, there’s the Ricardian model essentially, assumes that they have this perfect foresight. Number five individuals, as current taxpayers and as potential future taxpayers behave in terms of infinite planning horizons, they act as a mortals Yep. So they either act as a mortals. Yeah. Okay. So what’s that, assuming that’s assuming that they care for their descendants? Basically, as if they’re just future versions of themselves at a later date in the future? It’s essentially you like your children, your grandchildren are essentially just you at a future date. And so that’s, that’s a very strong assumption. I mean, and it may be the case that, look, you know, one generation may be perfectly happy, running up a bill for future generations to buy. I mean, not that I’m saying that necessarily doing that, but, you know, it’s not necessarily the case that people are acting as a mortals I mean, just think about I mean, there are plenty without children, they may not have any connection. They may not feel any connection with sex with future generations. Right? So it’s a pretty, it’s a very strong assumption now that there were there were seven of those assumptions. I haven’t read them all out. But I’ll put them in the show notes. And you can check that out that the main point is that look, there’s there’s just very stringent conditions for this Ricardian equivalence to hold that, in reality, it’s probably not going to hold and therefore this objection to fiscal policy, this idea that households are going to just save any additional money the government gives them, it doesn’t seem to be, you know, supported when you think about it logically. Maybe in an elegant theoretical model, but not in reality with how people behave and what will go on to now as the evidence and my reading of the evidence is that it doesn’t support this hypothesis. Okay, any other points on the theory there, Arturo? No, I feel I’m gonna have to write this up. In an article just because I think that link, yeah, I want to explain how this model fits with these other models such as Friedman’s permanent income, because I think that’s a that’s an important question. Okay. What does the evidence say? Now, this is really interesting, because if you look at the earliest empirical studies after Barrows model came out, there were studies that were essentially finding support for it. But then later on, economists changed their mind as more evidence accumulated. Then when it first emerged, it was it was a popular proposition and there was a 1993 Journal of Economic Literature review paper Ricardian equivalence by John cedar, and he’s at North Carolina, North Carolina State University. So Journal of Economic Literature is the one of the leading journals published by the American Economic Association. The idea is to have authoritative literature reviews that summarise the current state of the economic literature on important questions. And his conclusion was that although tests of Ricardian equivalence do not quite give an unambiguous verdict on that propositions validity, I think it is reasonable to conclude that Ricardian equivalence is strongly supported by the data. Now, you know, I wasn’t a practising economist at that time, that was my first year at uni. And, but I do imagine that that would have been a controversial conclusion. And it’s definitely been reversed since then. So in 1998, there was a meta analysis. So this is a study of studies where you look at what Previous studies have found, ideally, if you can get hold of their data, you try and rerun all the, you know, try and pull all the data together, run a big regression that don’t always do that. But you’d at least look at each of the studies and try to work out well which is more authoritative, which has a better methodology, which is using better data, that sort of thing and come to a judgement as to where does the where does the weight of the evidence why and in the conclusion in that paper, is it by by a TD Stanley at Hendricks College in Arkansas, published in southern economic journal new wine in old bottles, the meta analysis of Ricardian equivalence and that concluded that a quantitative review or meta analysis of 28 empirical studies of the Ricardian equivalence theorem gives persuasive testament of its falsity, which is, you know, pretty much what I would I would have expected given that just how really outlandish the theoretical assumptions behind the model are when you think about it, and just think, just use common sense and and look at it if anything would have killed off the Ricardian equivalence theorem. It would have been evidence from the financial crisis and then the pandemic since then, the the free exchange column in The Economist may 19 2008. So this is prior to the the the financial crisis, but there was a looks like there was a tax rebate. There was a 2001 tax rebate in the US and then there was another one, maybe it was 2007. I’ll have to put that in the show notes. But they were looking at how consumers were spending their rebates. And this is the calmness in The Economist, so the authoritative magazine published in London, they wrote, I tend to be wary of the effectiveness of fiscal stimulus, though at least anecdotally, the current stimulus seems to be working theoretically, people should not increase consumption in response to a small temporary increase in income unless they face liquidity constraints. Or taxpayers might recognise that rebates increase the size of the budget deficit, if there is no corresponding decrease in government spending, that their future taxes will pay, okay? So they might recognise that rebates increase the deficit. And that means I’ll have to pay higher taxes in the future. But these factors suggest most of the rebate will be saved and not spent, perhaps consumers do consider these factors and plan on saving their rebates. But then what he does is he quotes evidence, or this colonists quotes evidence from Matthew Shapiro and Joel Slemrod. So well known us economists. Okay, so at the time of the rebate, when they got it in 2001, only 22% of respondents planned on spending it. Although they found little evidence, people factor government spending, ie future deficits into their decision. Okay, so that’s what they were thinking about at the time. But then, there’s a study by David Johnson, Jonathan Parker, and Nicholas Sulukule, that, that they actually spent a significant amount of it or a non trivial amount of it, they found that the average household spent 20 to 40% of their rebate within three months of receiving it. And two thirds of the rebate was spent within a quarter of receipt, lower income groups spend a large fraction of their rebate, I’ll put a link to that in the show notes as there’s a bit going on there. There’s quite a few different points there. The basic point is that people do spend more of a rebate, a tax rebate, they get that you might then these models, you know whether it’s permanent income hypothesis of Friedman or in the extreme the barrow, Ricardian equivalence, people do spend more than you might, then these models would predict. And this was also concluded by Andrew Lee, who’s a federal MP here in Australia, who is a professor of economics today, I knew how much did the 2009 Australian fiscal stimulus, boost demand evidence from household reported spending effects, he used some survey evidence. And he looked at the $21 billion in household payments delivered in Australia between December oh eight and may 2009. So he’s talking about the Rudd stimulus money. So the Rudd Government stimulus packages and 40% of households. So this is what Andrew found 40% of households who said they received a payment reported having spent it and you know, that’s a higher rate than in, in the US. And Andrew speculated that it could have been because of the form of the of the assistance, it was a it was a stimulus check, rather than a rebate of tax. And so Andrew was saying there could be something psychological going on there, you know, individuals are more likely to, to spend bonuses, so to speak, rather than, than rebates. But yeah, so Andrew does, essentially concluded that there’s this marginal propensity to consume out of these rebates, or this, you know, the stimulus money, I mean, of point four, one 2.42. So, that was spending around, you know, that two out of every $5 that they got so so they get this money, and they do actually spend a portion of it, it’s not as if they just leave it in the bank and, you know, maintain just just been what they normally would wait to wait to actually use some of it to go and maybe at the time, people were saying they were going to buy a flat screen TVs, that was the popular thing at the time to buy. But, yeah, definitely, there was more spending than then would have been expected. Right. I mean, the debate does go on. There have been some findings supportive of Ricardian equivalence, I should know there was a study by a former Treasury colleague of mine, Shane brittle, who, unfortunately is no longer with us. He was at University of Wollongong and I think he, this was a study published in the Australian Economic Review. He found some Ricardian impact but he couldn’t accept or he didn’t find in favour of full Ricardian equivalence. He did. He studied the macro data and his macro modelling suggested that over the long run changes in general government savings are offset by changes in private savings by almost a half minus point four, four. This implies that the behavioural response of households and corporations is not fully Ricardian. Well, I think that’s that’s right. So yeah, there’s definitely not full Ricardian equivalence. Could it be that maybe households there could be some Ricardian equivalence I don’t know, maybe, maybe, maybe households do realise that the eventually they might have to pay more in taxes. But maybe the reason that they’re saving part of it is this, this Friedman argument of permanent income, they realised that it hasn’t really allowed them to lift their consumption on a sustainable basis by much at all. And so therefore, let’s not spend too much of it. Now. Let’s save up the bulk of it. So look, whether what Shane’s found is regarding whether what whether he found some partial support for Ricardian equivalence, I think that’s that’s up for debate. My personal view is that it’s just such an extreme hypothesis. It’s yeah, it’d be it’d be hard to find any support for for it at all. This is not to say that discretionary fiscal policy is sensible. I think there are, there are plenty of arguments against fiscal stimulus discretionary fiscal policy that don’t require Ricardian equivalence what Tony makin was talking about with crowding out via interest rates via the exchange rate, all of the lags that that occur from when you recognise a shock in the economy to when the fiscal policy might actually impact. I think these are all valid reasons to question discretionary fiscal policy, but Ricardian equivalence probably isn’t one of those. Okay, Arturo, I think that’s that’s probably enough. I was going to talk about Japan, but I just don’t think Japan provides support for it either. There was initially a thought that maybe Japan’s The Ricardian case, because there was, you know, there was a lot of fiscal stimulus in the 90s. And it didn’t revive the economy. But, you know, Japan’s got Japan’s really, you know, it’s a bit of a special case. And I mean, we might go into it in another, another episode, but there are a lot of economic challenges there. And now they got the demographic challenge shrinking population. They had, you know, very, very high saving rate. Yeah, it’s a it’s a, it’s a different economy than ours in a way and, yeah, I mean, the conclusion is that it’s not really an example of Ricardian equivalence. And if it were, it’s becoming less Ricardian, there was a an IMF paper I’ll link to in the show notes that argues that it’s if it was recorded, and it’s becoming less so over time. But yeah, I think we might just leave that. Possibly I’ll do a bonus episode on Japan. But my feeling is that there’s just so much evidence against Ricardian equivalence, theoretically, it doesn’t. It’s just too strong. I mean, it’s very elegant model. It’s beautiful model. But the real world people just don’t behave as they do in elegant. optimising economic models. Maybe I have to follow this up with an article but hopefully I’ve got the main points across so anything you’d like to add?

Arturo Espinoza Bocangel  48:05

Well, in will basically, just to summarise so these recurrent colons, as you mentioned, was very formal model, I think is good for the students, academics, researchers, just to check that our current political evidence is can be cross check against the this model. So I think is supposed to want to explain these concepts, and also using data from different countries.

Gene Tunny  48:48

Yeah, yeah, exactly. Okay. So yeah, I think looking at different countries is important. Which is why and if you’re in the audience, you think it’d be good to look at Japan? Because, I mean, Japan was certainly one of the countries I was, when I first started studying economics. That was one of the countries I was interested in. Because it was just after the bubble burst. I mean, there was that. Well, what was it this square kilometre around the Imperial Palace was worth more than all the land in Manhattan or something, something along those lines, there was some crazy statistic about how much the Japanese property market was worth and Japan was just riding high in the late you know, in the 80s. And and they’re all these concerns are the Japan’s going to overtake the US and then they had the crash and the bubble burst and there’s all the talk about trying to revive it through fiscal policy through infrastructure spending, and it just didn’t just didn’t revive the economy and they had their last decade. But if you’re interested in hearing more about Japan, I can certainly cover that in a in a future episode and try to find someone who’s, you know, knowledgeable about Japan. If you know anyone, let me know. Okay, how to Thanks so much for your time. I really enjoyed chatting about Ricardian equivalence with you. Oh,

Arturo Espinoza Bocangel  50:04

thank you for having me again.

Gene Tunny  50:06

Very good rato thanks for listening to this episode of economics explored. If you have any questions, comments or suggestions, please get in touch. I’d love to hear from you. You can send me an email via contact at economics explore.com Or a voicemail via SpeakPipe. You can find the link in the show notes. If you’ve enjoyed the show, I’d be grateful if you could tell anyone you think would be interested about it. Word of mouth is one of the main ways that people learn about the show. Finally, if your podcasting app lets you then please write a review and later writing. Thanks for listening. I hope you can join me again next week.

50:55

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